EDUCATION AND PRODUCTION

A GENERATIVE MODEL

Robert Moore

Thesis submitted for the Ph.D. Degree to the University of London
Institute of Education
ABSTRACT

This work critically examines the place of the education/production relationship in 'the new sociology of education' and associated Marxist theories. The assumptions of these approaches are explicated and placed within a particular paradigm. It is argued that a number of important problems associated with this paradigm result from its being grounded in a distinctive 'philosophical problem field' which, whilst ostensibly rejecting 'positivist sociology', retains the basic categories of positivist doctrine.

Bhaskar's realist theory of science is presented as an alternative framework, and Boudon's account of structuralism and Bernstein's classification and framing theory are discussed in realist terms. This alternative perspective is developed in relation to the sociology of education on the basis of the works of Bernstein, Bourdieu and Boudon and a review of contemporary, comparative and historical material on the relationship between education and production (including works on labour markets, income distribution, work-life patterns, elasticities of substitution of labour, and social mobility) and on the effects of changes and variations in educational practices and characteristics of pupil groups. The role of 'the world of work' in the curriculum is discussed with reference to social education, work experience, vocational preparation and social and life skills training. The period covered is from the Newsom Report to the present day and the advent of the Youth Training Scheme. It is argued that these developments and the phenomena of class and gender differentials in educational attainment should be discussed in terms of a culturalist perspective.
which relates pupils' educational and occupational decision-making to occupational communities and labour-markets. This is developed through a discussion of consumption and related to Marx's labour theory of value.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Ian Hextall for his support and encouragement over many years, for his patient listening, illuminating questioning and numerous suggestions. Basil Bernstein has been generous in his care, time and attention, and his interest has both inspired and enlightened. I have benefitted greatly from discussing many aspects of this work with my friends at the Polytechnic of the South Bank: in particular with Mike Hickox and Eva Stina Lyon. I would also like to express my gratitude to our students on the M.Sc. Sociology of Education course (many of whom are London teachers) who have brought the benefits of their experiences to bear upon the ideas I have inflicted upon them. Inge Bates, John Clarke, Dan Finn and Paul Willis have also added to my understanding of the issues discussed herein through our meetings over the past four years - my thanks to them also.

My deepest gratitude is to my wife, Susan Marritt, for tolerating the deprivations she has suffered while I indulged this obsession.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Chapter One:</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section One</td>
<td>THE PROBLEM FIELD</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter One: Paradigms and Problems in the Sociology of Education</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter Two: Explanations and Explorations</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Two</td>
<td>CRITIQUE</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter Three: Realism, Structuralism and the Educational Field</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter Four: Education and Production</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter Five: Pupils, Pedagogy and the School</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Three</td>
<td>THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter Six: Schooling and the World of Work</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter Seven: The Logic of Change</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Four</td>
<td>REPRODUCTION</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter Eight: Production and Reproduction</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB Notes are located at the end of each chapter together with selected bibliographies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLES</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4:1</td>
<td>use of qualifications by numbers of employers adopting each recruitment strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:2</td>
<td>use of qualifications and strategies by size of establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:3</td>
<td>% staying-on until 16 or later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:4</td>
<td>schooling by status, second generation (Boudon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:5</td>
<td>status by schooling, second generation (Boudon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:6</td>
<td>educational mobility career paths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:7</td>
<td>SEG by highest qualification level, by sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:8</td>
<td>social origins of men in elite occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:9</td>
<td>channels of mobility into elite occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:10</td>
<td>highest qualification levels of professionals by age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:11</td>
<td>SEG by sex, by age, by highest qualification level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:12</td>
<td>source of qualifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:1</td>
<td>assessment of factors relevant to personal advancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:2</td>
<td>perceived influences on upward mobility by social class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:3</td>
<td>models of mobility by social class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:4</td>
<td>university students by class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:5</td>
<td>parental occupation of accepted home candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:6</td>
<td>fathers' SEG for ILEA sixth-formers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:7</td>
<td>ILEA school-leavers: current situation by fathers' occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:8</td>
<td>reasons for continuing education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:9</td>
<td>current and preferred situations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
alternatives considered at 16 285
career aspirations 289
5th year examination results 291
populations, SxP. 300
fair distribution at T1, SxP 300
fair distribution at T2, SxP 300
fair vs actual distribution at T1 301
fair vs actual distribution at T2 301
distribution of places at T1, SxP 304
distribution of places at T2, SxP 304
indices of association, T1 304
indices of association, T2 304
numbers taking public examinations 1973-78 308
school-leavers with two or more A-level passes 309
employers' evaluations of young workers 331
factors influencing recruitment of apprentices 334

ontological and methodological relationships to positivism 48
from 'strict' positivism to the 'D-N Social World' 54
positions in the problem field 54
possibilities of the educational field 166
positions in the educational field 187
trend curves (Oxford Mobility Study) 234
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4:2</td>
<td>trend curves (Oxford Mobility Study)</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:3</td>
<td>trend curves (Oxford Mobility Study)</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:1</td>
<td>distribution of social education approaches (Lee)</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:2</td>
<td>models of social education (Lee)</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:3</td>
<td>The Doxa of the Educational Field</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:4</td>
<td>transformations of transmitters and acquirers</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:5</td>
<td>transformations of types, Transmitters</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:6</td>
<td>transformations of types, Acquirers</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:1</td>
<td>age-earnings profiles</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:2</td>
<td>Standard Distribution of Income</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:3</td>
<td>Hybrid Curve</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:4</td>
<td>Dimensions of the social space</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL**

- The Philosophical Problem Field
- Schema of Althusser's argument
- Schema of development from the Culture of Positivism to Resistance
- Routes through the educational system
- Work-Life patterns
- Provisions for young people
- Liberal-humanist and technicist-training paradigms
- Voc-prep common core objectives
- Method of evaluation of common core objectives
- Skills used in occupational groups
INTRODUCTION

This work is concerned with the manner in which the relationship between education and production has been approached within recent, influential currents in the sociology of education. In particular it will examine the treatment and role of this key relationship in 'the new sociology of education' and the neo-Marxist (or 'political economy') approaches with which it became associated in the mid-seventies. Essentially this work is a critique of the broad-based paradigm which was created by the progressive fusion of the new directions and the political economy approaches. The history of that fusion and the central place of the education/production relationship within it will be a major topic of the first section.

The critical components of this work are, first, epistemological - I will locate the debate around the new sociology of education within a particular philosophical problem field, the key term of which is "positivism" - and secondly, substantive - the relationship between education and production will be examined on the basis of a detailed review of material on the occupational structure, social mobility and income distribution, and labour markets. The theoretical orientation of this critique is derived from the realist philosophy of science (1), and the methodological framework from structuralism (2). The major contextualising theory is Bernstein's classification and framing theory of the educational field (3). This approach will be termed "generative theory".

The major argument to be developed throughout will be that the paradigm under examination, and the varying approaches within it fundamentally fails to
recognise the true character of the relationship between education and production. I will show how this failure relates to a problem grounded within the fundamental features of the philosophical field within which the new sociology of education is located. The theoretical and substantive problems associated with this can only be solved if the discussion is shifted onto a new set of epistemological foundations. Hence this work is also concerned with outlining the basis of an alternative approach.

I will argue and attempt to demonstrate how such an alternative is already available in the works of three major theorists in the sociology of education: Basil Bernstein, Pierre Bourdieu and Raymond Boudon. I will argue that once the problems associated with the new sociology of education are understood on the level of their epistemological presuppositions, and that once an epistemological alternative (i.e. generative theory - realism/structuralism) is established, then the works of these writers can be 'read' in a fashion which provides a deeper and more coherent understanding of their major contributions to the field. Bernstein's classification and framing theory will form the generative core of the analyses undertaken in the latter part of this work (chapters six and seven in particular) where I will hope to display through demonstration the plausibility of the alternative approach being offered.

The importance of the education/production relationship within the theories being critically discussed lies in the manner in which it provides them with their major interpretive and explanatory principle. In the most general terms, they hold that educational practices are processes of identity
formation which develop in individuals sets of characteristics required in production. This general principle achieves two things: first, it provides a rule for organising the analyses, interpretations and explanations of the educational system and its internal practices (classroom interaction, school knowledge etc.). Secondly, it defines the crucial site towards which processes of reproduction are taken to be directed, i.e. relationships in production. This point is of fundamental importance because it entails what I see as a crucial error: it confuses social relationships in production with the social relations of production. On this basis, reproduction comes to be understood in terms of sustaining (largely through the action of the State) an articulation between sets of practices within different systems (e.g. the family, the school, production) which are taken as serving the interests of the ruling class (or, more abstractly, 'capital') and which have, therefore, intrinsic political value. Hence it becomes possible to define conservative or radical educational practices. It is this approach which I will argue against. The alternative is to treat systems as fields characterised by endogenous transformational properties and relational features. Outlining this alternative in detail will form a major part of this work.

The principle of the relationship between education and production in the paradigm to be criticised will be termed "indexical" (4). This term is used to indicate the fact that the approaches being considered assume a fundamental, underlying continuity between education and production. Features of the former are held to be intelligible in terms of requirements of the latter.
The precise way in which this relationship is conceptualised varies considerably and has developed through time. Indeed, the development of the conceptualisation of the education/production relationship has been a major project for writers in this area (5). This development is examined in some detail in section one. Essentially there has been a move from a simple "correspondence" view (6) to a more complex model incorporating notions of "relative autonomy" and "resistance" (7) within which the relationship is more heavily mediated and the connection between educational practices and production less immediately obvious. However, this complexity is still based on a determinant relationship between the two spheres. This fundamental limitation is registered by Dale in this way: "It is a relative autonomy in respect only of the execution of the work of education systems." (Dale R. 1982 p145).

The term indexical covers the range of interpretations from simple correspondence to relative autonomy of execution. A second major assumption associated with indexicality within this paradigm is that of the effectivity of educational practices, i.e. the assumption that the requirements of production can be translated into effective educational forms. The epistemological criticisms are contained in chapter three, and the principles of indexicality and effectivity are examined in chapters four and five respectively.
OUTLINE

Section One is concerned with outlining the basic problems which will be developed in the rest of the work. It takes as its starting point problems in the new sociology of education – in particular the problem of reconciling the political commitment of the new sociology writers with the relativism of phenomenological sociology. It is argued that there is an underlying conflict between political radicalism and sociological radicalism. This conflict is expressed in the distinction between "analytic" and "possibilitarian" phenomenology (8). In order to adopt a possibilitarian position in which sociological analysis is integrated with radical political analysis it is necessary to incorporate into the approach a systems level of analysis which describes the characteristics of classroom practices in terms of class interests and class relations. This has the effect of privileging a particular class of analyses and interpretations, i.e. politically radical ones. It creates a conflict with phenomenological sociology in two respects: firstly, by promoting and privileging a particular point of view, and secondly by re-introducing social structure as an effective ontological category. It is argued in chapter one that positivism and phenomenology have a common basis in two fundamental categories: the subject and experience. These categories are the basis of a problem field of which positivism and phenomenology are opposite poles rather than fundamentally different positions. The new sociology of education poses problems fundamental for this field.

The approach to the issues in this section is derived from Bhasker's
ideas about the "hegemonic effects" of the philosophical problem field which underpins positivism. Bhasker argues that,

.....upon analysis, anti-naturalistic theories of social science may often be seen to consist entirely in, or at least depend essentially on, the inversion or displacement, transformation and/or condensation of characteristically positivistic themes. In this sense the effects of positivism, or rather of the philosophical problem field that underpins it, on the philosophy of social science have been hegemonic. The problem field is defined by an ontology of experience, empirical realism, and a sociology of man, sociological individualism, and its incorporates transcendental idealist and collectivist variants. It is this couple (empiricism/individualism) that I think must be held largely responsible, or rather that acts as the meta-theoretical trustee for the practices responsible, for the social scientific malaise. (Bhaskar R. 1979 p25)

In relation to phenomenology, we can take up Bhaskar's point that,

.....writers in the hermeneutical tradition have adopted the positivist view that the objects of knowledge are events (or their counterport in the domain of the human sciences, actions). Transposed to the hermeneutical perspective, this misconception has encouraged a definition of the social by reference to the category of behaviour, albeit of a particular, for example intentional or rule governed, sort. (ibid p26)

Phenomenology operations with an individualist ontology (associated with the rejection of the concept of a sui generis, emergant social level - 'positivism'), and a methodology which restricts explanation to the level of the (intending/interpreting/acting) knowing subject. Together these things are associated with voluntarism. Social agents are seen not so much as the producers of the social (active within a social mode of production) but as the ingenious creators of their 'life-worlds'. Significantly it is precisely this opposition which was the central dilemma for the new sociology of education.
Conventionally positivist sociology and phenomenological sociology are seen as radically opposed, and the new sociology of education is associated with phenomenology. The argument in this section, however, posits an underlying continuity between positivism and phenomenology, and a conflict between phenomenology and the new sociology of education. The continuity lies in the common commitment to the fundamental categories of the subject and experience, and the conflict lies in the new sociology of education's requirement for a non-positivistic systems level analysis. But because the new sociology of education retains from phenomenology the association of science with positivism, the situation (and the possibility of the solution to the problem) is not conceived of in this way. Rather than seeing the necessity to construct a non-positivistic model of science (i.e., to transcend the problem field of empirical realism and sociological individualism), new sociology of education writers have concentrated instead on the issue of the relationship between social structure and classroom practices, on the assumption that the problem is simply that of appropriating this issue in a sufficiently complex and sophisticated form. The history of this dilemma in the writings of the new sociology of education and its relationship to Marxism is the main topic of chapter two. It is argued in that chapter that until the problem is seen as the need to move beyond the problem field there will be no more than an endless oscillation between the structural-determinist and the subjectivist-voluntarist positions within the field.
Section two is concerned with the critical issues which arise from the discussion in section one. On the theoretical level the issue addressed is the character of an explanatory paradigm which falls outside of the problem field defined by the categories of the subject and experience. Chapter three presents the realist philosophy of science as this alternative. Realism takes "generative mechanisms" as its object of study. The characteristics of such mechanisms in the realm of the social sciences forms a major topic of the third chapter. Structuralism, and in particular Boudon's account of it, is presented as a type of social scientific realism and Bernstein's classification and framing theory of the educational field is taken as a specific instance of such an approach in the area of education. Hence, the argument in chapter three moves from a general discussion of realism, to a more specific account of structuralism in realist terms, and ends with an exploration of a particular major approach in the sociology of education within the theoretical framework so established. The major concept introduced is that of "field" - specifically the educational field, and chapter four develops this concept at a substantive level by looking in detail at the relationship between education and the economy.

Chapter four addresses the principle of indexicality in detail by examining a number of aspects of the relationship between education and production. It is argued, on the basis of this, that there is no direct determinant relationship between the two spheres, but, rather, that both education and production must be treated as independent systems (or fields) articulated within the social totality with their own internal principles and properties, and that
changes can occur independently within each subject to conjunctural conditions. Changes within systems generate changes between systems, and it is these which provide the basis for understanding what is happening in education in terms of the overdetermined effects of the interaction between endogenous and systematic changes.

Chapter five considers "effectivity" and translates the changes which take place in the relationship between the educational system and the occupational system into effects within educational sites (e.g. the school fifth and sixth forms). Specifically it is argued that critical changes occur in the social composition of educational sites and that schools respond to these changes by a process of differentiation of pedagogic practices. Hence educational processes at least in part, can be seen as pragmatic responses to control problems in the classroom and are only indirectly related to production. These problems arise as a result of the positioning properties of the system of relationships and the manner in which groups of pupils are repositioned relative to the school by the trends generated by the changes in the relationship between education and the occupational system.

This section argues for a "positioning theory" approach to the situation of the pupil in the school. By this is meant a view of the pupil as a competent member of the social community, but one who, as a culturally specific subject, is likely to adopt a particular position towards the school - its values, demands and expectations. This approach, derived from Bernstein's sociolinguistic theory of elaborated and restricted codes, treats the school as
a context regulating realisations of competencies possessed by culturally differentiated categories of subjects. Position refers both to a position adopted by pupils, and to a position given by the regulative principle of the context. This approach is distinctive in that it acknowledges both the integrity of pupils' culture and their competence as subjects. In this it differs strongly from the other major paradigms in the sociology of education which have tended either to see the culture of working class pupils as deficient or the pupils themselves as the (relatively) passive victims of ideological manipulation by educational practices (9). Strangely, this singular aspect of Bernstein's socio-linguistic theory has remained virtually unrecognised, particular by his critics who have tended to treat the concepts of elaborated and restricted codes as marking difference in competence which have their origins in different types of socialisation (10). The "socio" aspect of the theory in fact refers to social context as a regulator of performance.

Section three looks at the educational field directly. The main theme explored is "the world of work" in the curriculum. The historical period covered is roughly from the Newsom Report (1963) to the rise of the Manpower Services Commission and the advent of YOP (1979) and, more recently still, the Youth Training Scheme (1983). Necessarily the contemporary character of the later events will require that they be approached with some degree of caution and tentativeness. Chapter Six will look at the "world of work" in the school curriculum, specifically in a detailed analysis of the Schools Council Social Education Project. Social Education will be treated as an example of the type of wider educational programme which from Newsom to the late seventies was seen as a
necessary contextualising framework for work experience schemes and "the world of work". It will be argued that in the 'Newsom period' "the world of work" was located within a liberal-humanist educationalist paradigm which is now being supplanted (or complemented) by a technicist-training paradigm. An examination of the latter and a discussion of why this shift might have occurred and how it can be represented will be the main topic of chapter seven.

Specifically, the argument to be developed in this section is as follows:

(1) Changes in educational practices incorporating "the world of work" (under the auspices of "relevance") are in the first place pragmatic responses to control problems in the classroom created by critical changes in the social composition of the pupil population.

(2) These changes involve the extension of educational careers which crucially interrupts the evolution of the social career.

(3) Pupils who, by virtue of their experience as members of working communities (material class cultures), are prepared for work and who, further, wish to start work, are presented within educational ideologies as 'immature', unable to 'cope' etc., and, therefore in need of a special educational programme.

(4) The changes in pedagogy which occur in these new programmes incorporate changes in the principle regulating access to elaborated knowledge, e.g. to social scientific knowledge in the case of social education which takes community relationships as its object of study.
(5) In conditions of full employment, young people can successfully make a transition from school to working life which is consistent with the aspirations and expectations embedded within their class specific social career paths. This real possibility negates the critical possibilities opened up by the change in the regulative principle.

(6) High youth unemployment, however, opens a space within the process of cultural reproduction which is normally realised by the social career. Access to critical knowledge within this space might lead to a challenging of the principles of the social division of labour as such (rather than simply to the necessity of schooling). The internal logic of social education can lead, through a transformation of the principles regulating the relationships between categories of subjects (transmitters and acquirers, and those formally excluded from the educational transmission process), to a repositioning of categories of culturally specific subjects relative to elaborating knowledge.

(7) The development of the new technicist-training paradigm within the MSC institutions effectively closes down this critical space. It is essentially a shift away from an elaborating knowledge orientation towards a restricting orientation. This is achieved by a fundamental change in the relationship of "agents of symbolic control" to production. It is a switch away from control by educationalists who have an indirect relationship to production, to various agencies which have a direct relationship to production.

The transformational model constructed in chapter seven can be taken as representing the move towards the oppositional elaborating position in figure 3:2 in chapter three.
The concluding section attempts to draw together the main themes developed throughout the work and to summarise the argument. Chapter eight develops Boudon's concept of "the educational decision field" and, more generally, relates culturally specific processes of educational decision making to social structural formations. This approach is located within a culturalist perspective (11) and is essentially concerned to extend the concept of "positioning theory" discussed in earlier chapters. Essentially the argument is that pupil behaviour within the regulative context of the school reflects pupil identity (as a culturally specific subject) and that identities are constructed and located within social careers, the trajectories of which are embedded within (and at the same time constitutive of) the material cultural practices of broad-based "socio‐occupational communities". These communities (the material locations within social structure of educational decision fields) are identified with "labour market segments" characterised by distinctive socio-economic features.

The final phase of the argument relates the concepts developed above to a more general theory of social reproduction through processes (material cultures and their associated practices) located within and realised through consumption. It is argued that radical reproduction theories in the sociology of education have tended to confuse social relations of production with social relationships in production. This distinction is examined in relation to Marx's labour theory of value (12) and it is suggested that the focus of social reproduction theories should shift away from an emphasis upon relationships in production and the (assumed) action of the State in imposing hegemony and unity.
upon the social formation, towards the material cultural processes and practices whereby identities are constructed through ideologies of class, gender, ethnicity and labour realised through consumption. On the basis of Marx's theory, consumption is understood as a complex process incorporating, at one level, the realisation of value within the circuit of capital, and, at another level, the formation of identities through the creation of systems of need. Hence this approach is based in a particular appropriation of Marx's basic concepts and of the labour theory of value.

Implicit in the approach outlined in this work is a critique of the Statist perspective which predominates in the new sociology of education/political economy approach. State theory as such (13) is not explicitly taken up in this work, nor is there a developed discussion of the concept of ideology. These 'omissions' reflect the perspective along which this work has been developed: i.e. starting from epistemology and treating in depth key substantive areas. This reflects in part the fact that the new sociology of education itself took "positivism" as its point of departure. It also follows from a desire to deliberately distance this work from certain established positions in this area. For instance, "realism" could alternatively be presented as "materialism" (14) and the epistemological dimension of the argument elaborated in terms of a debate and rhetoric associated with the work of Althusser. For a number of reasons I did not wish to do this, mainly in order to avoid an association with a set of (in my view spurious) ideological presumptions (e.g. only those who occupy the "class theoretical position of the proletariat" are really 'materialists' (15)) which I reject. I also feel that it is important to discuss in detail a substantial
body of empirical data relating to the education/production relationship.

There has been, in my view, a degree of naivety in the treatment by sociologists of education of such a complex structure as the occupational system and its associated labour markets. Lastly, I wish to be able to demonstrate the principles of the alternative which this work is advocating in addition to simply arguing for it on theoretical grounds - hence chapters six and seven deal in some detail with substantive issues in education.

Although the State is clearly involved in the regulation of the relationship between the educational system and production in the initiative considered in this work (see chapters six and seven), it is not seen as concerned with imposing sets of practices which correspond to the needs of production. This follows directly from the critique of "indexicality" with which this work is principally concerned. To take up a distinction made by Finn and Frith (see chapter four), ideologies about the relationship between education and production are seen, here, as recontextualising discourses which position categories of agents (e.g. pupils, 'trainees', teachers, supervisors, educationalists, employers) within the complex sets of relationships which exist between home, community, education and work. They are not seen as, either directly or indirectly, re-presenting, masking or disguising the work that education does for production. Education is not seen as doing work for production in that sense.

Indexicality entails a model of what can be termed "serial articulation" in which a unity is imposed upon sets of mutually reinforcing social relationships in different areas of social life, e.g. between the family, education, and production (it is argued, for instance that patriarchal gender relationships reinforce
authority relationships in the work place). The argument in this work treats such systems as fields within which social relationships can undergo a number of permutations governed by the regulative transformational principle of the field (the doxa). Hence social relationships can assume apparently contradictory forms between fields (e.g. between the social relationships in education and those in production). It is the maintenance of the field within the social relations of production which is important not the articulation between social relationships in various areas with the social relationships in production. An important implication of this is that resistance comes to be seen as a position within a field – a position given by the field's regulative principle or code.

I have also omitted a detailed examination of the position of women and girls and race in relation to education and production. These are topics which, apart from their intrinsic importance provide significant test cases for the ideas advocated in this work – in particular in relation to schooling and identity formation. There is also a growing fund of material which indicates the complexity of this area (16). To do these topics justice would have required at least a chapter on each in its own right. Space does not permit this. Neither, in the context of this work, would it have been appropriate to have dealt in detail with the issues associated with specifically feminist problematics (e.g. the concept of 'patriarchy'). Further, the 'omission' of females from this work is in a sense illusory in that males are similarly omitted (except, trivially, where they figure exclusively in tables or examples). To the extent that boys
and girls, men and women are socially constructed categories this work is not primarily about people at all. It is in the first place about the transformational properties of relational systems. How these systems of relationships then translate, through the mediation of ideologies of class, gender, ethnicity and labour, into cultural practices through which people come to understand, realise and transform their material existence in the world is another issue – it is the most important issue, but, as Marx said:

It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the earthly kernel of the misty creations of religion than to do the opposite, i.e. to develop from the actual, given relations of life the forms in which these have been apotheosized. The latter method is the only materialist, and therefore the only scientific one.

(Marx K. 1976 p494 (fn))
FOOTNOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION


(2) the approach to "structuralism" being adopted in this work draws most directly upon Boudon R. 1971. See also, Bourdieu P. 1968.

(3) see especially Bernstein B. 1977 and 1982.

(4) the term "indexical" is being used in a sense loosely derived from Leach E. 1976. An **indexical** relationship is contrasted with a **symbolic** relationship. In the latter there is no material or intrinsic continuity between the symbol and its object, e.g. between a picture of a flame and an actual fire. But there is such a continuity in an **indexical** relationship, e.g. smoke can be a material index of a real fire. See Moore R. 1979.

(5) see, for instance, the recent collections Apple M. ed. 1982 and Dale R. et al eds 1981a/1981b - especially the articles by Gintis and Bowles, and Hall in the latter, and by Carnoy and Dale in the former.

(6) see Bowles S. and Gintis H. 1976 for the classic example of this approach.

(7) this movement has been reviewed by Arnot M. & Whitty G. 1982.

(8) on this distinction see Whitty G. 1977 and Sarup M. 1978.

(9) for a review of approaches in the sociology of education see Flude M. 1974.

(10) see, for example, Labov W. 1972 and Rosen H. 1974.
(11) for "cultuarian" in this sense see Davies D. 1981.

(12) on the recent debate on the labour theory of value see Elson D, 1979, Steedman I. 1981.

(13) a review of perspectives on the State is given in Jessop B. 1977 and with specific reference to education see Carnoy M. op. cit.

(14) see, for instance, Benton's discussion of Althusser in Benton T. op. cit.

(15) very crudely this is what Lecourt is in effect saying vis-à-vis Kuhn and the concept of paradigm relative to the Althusserian concept of 'problematic' in Lecourt 1975. Essentially this posture can be interpreted as a form of vanguardism.

(16) the Inner London Education Authority, for instance, has recently produced a set of interesting reports on sex differences in achievement in London schools: see ILEA R&S 1981/82/83. These reports reveal a complex pattern of differentiation, especially in key areas such as maths and sciences.
REFERENCES IN THE INTRODUCTION

Anot M. & Whitty G. (1982) "From Reproduction to Transformation" in *British Sociology of Education* vol. 3


Bourdieu P. (1968) "Structuralism and a theory of sociological knowledge" in *Social Research* 35


Inner London Education Authority (1981)  Achievement in Schools II: Sex Differences RS806/81 ILEA R&S London

Inner London Education Authority (1982c)  Sex Differences and Achievement RS 823/82, ILEA R&S London


Jessop B. (1977)  "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State" in Cambridge Journal of Economics vol.1


Moore R. (1979)  "The Value of Reproduction" in Screen Education 29


The Value Controversy  
Verso, London  

Whitty G. (1977)  
"Sociology and the Problem of Educational Change" in  
Young M. F. D. & Whitty G. eds 1977
SECTION ONE

THE PROBLEM FIELD

Section One will introduce the problems to be explored in this work. It will concentrate on the new sociology of education and the various Marxist approaches in the sociology of education with which it became associated. Chapter One will address the relationship between the new sociology of education 'positivism', and phenomenology. It will explore the dilemma posed for new sociology writers by the relativism of phenomenology. It will be argued that the political commitments of these writers necessitated a means whereby they could give moral and theoretical priority to a particular radical class of interpretations/explanations of classroom practices. This involved showing the link between the classroom and social structure. Hence the new sociology required a systems level of analysis which entailed the reintroduction of 'positivist' concepts. It will be argued that a great deal of confusion has arisen from a particular usage of the term 'positivism' in sociology. The solution to the dilemma described has the form of an alternative, non-positivist theory of science. Chapter two will concentrate on the developing relationship between the new sociology of education and Marxism. The underlying assumptions of the paradigm which that convergence created will be outlined and it will be argued that attempts to resolve the dilemma of the new sociology within the framework of that paradigm are doomed to failure.
CHAPTER ONE

PARADIGMS AND PROBLEMS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION

This chapter will focus upon the issues raised by the 'new sociology of education' following the publication of *Knowledge and Control*, edited by Michael F. D. Young in 1971. Specifically I will look at the view that this approach represented a radical break or 'paradigm change' in the sociology of education by virtue of its fundamental rejection of 'positivist sociology'. I will argue that the idea of a radical opposition between phenomenological sociology and so-called 'positivism' is mistaken. I will locate the debate on these issues within a positivistic philosophical problem field, which, following Bhaskar's argument (1), can be seen as grounded in the fundamental categories of experience and the subject. I will contend that positivism and phenomenology in reality represent opposed poles of that field. I will explore the issues associated with the usage of the term 'positivism' in this debate in some detail because I believe that confusions have been created in the sociology of education by a wide-spread failure to locate the positivism/relativism debate within a philosophical context and that insufficient attention has been given to epistemological background. I will argue that the relationship of the new sociology of education to phenomenology is in fact more complex than is often allowed. Specifically, the political commitments of the new sociology writers necessitated that they reject phenomenological relativism. They needed to be able to give epistemological and social privilege to a particular radical class of sociological accounts of educational practices. They attempted to achieve this by developing
the principle of the relationship between education and production as a theoretical guide to interpretation and explanation. This effectively reintroduces the major features of sociological study which phenomenology rejected: i.e. an epistemologically privileged class of explanations and a concept of social structure as an ontological and effective category. Hence, I will be arguing that the education/production relationship can be seen as providing a putative solution to a basic problem in the new sociology of education's relationship with other approaches in the area. However, it is the problem field as such which is the real problem and ultimately it is only by shifting into a fundamentally different epistemological field that the problems can be solved.

PARADIGM CRISIS

The recent condition of the sociology of education has often been discussed in terms of a "paradigm change" or "paradigmatic crisis" (2). This suggests that there are a number of competing approaches in this area, at least some of which are competing at the most fundamental level of the meta-theoretical presuppositions. There is also the implication that one of these approaches should be emerging as the new "normal science". The main contender for this role has been the "new sociology of education".

The new sociology of education raised a number of fundamental issues, not just in relation to education but to sociology in general. In this respect it resembled the phenomenological approach within the main discipline upon which it drew. The situation in the sociology of education cannot, of course,
be divorced from that within the discipline as a whole following the phenomenological critique of 'positivism'. But although the new sociology of education drew heavily upon phenomenology and was inspired by its radical humanism, it should not be treated simply as a carbon copy of it. The most fundamental problems to afflict the movement arose precisely from the efforts of its major proponents to distance themselves from a central aspect of phenomenology – specifically from its relativism. By and large the critics of the new sociology of education have ignored this fact and have tended to simply project the problems of phenomenology onto the new sociology of education. In the main this is because such critics tend to take for granted that a sociology of knowledge approach must invariably be relativistic (3).

In Kuhn's account of science, a "normal science" involves not just a shared "meta-paradigm" (4) but also an accumulation of recognised achievements and techniques. Although the new sociology of education gives a detailed exposition of its metatheory, serious questions can be raised concerning its corpus of substantive achievements. Indeed, Arnot and Whitty (echoing an earlier judgement of Karabel and Halsey (5)) have recently written that,

The standard judgement on the various 'new directions' in the sociology of education of the 1970s seems to be that they signalled many new departures but precious few arrivals. Nowhere has this judgement been more true than in the substantive area where they were widely expected to bear most fruit, the sociology of the curriculum. (Arnot M. & Whitty G. 1982 p. 93)

They suggest that one of the main reasons for this failure was a
series of rapid changes in approach at the theoretical level. These occurred too quickly for a substantial body of analyses to be established. That this should happen can be seen as reflecting another aspect of 'paradigm crisis'. Bernstein describes it thus:

...the 'news' of much contemporary sociology appears to be news about the conditions necessary for creating acceptable news. Theories are less to be examined and explored at conceptual and empirical levels, but are to be assessed in terms of their underlying models of man and society. It follows that students are to be made aware of the values underlying theories, and to learn how to place them in the perspective of an approach; students are socialised into approaches rather than encouraged to create news. (Bernstein B. 1977 p.157)

The preoccupation with metatheoretical issues leads to a proliferation of approaches rather than generating substantive research. This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that some of these approaches have proclaimed that this is what sociology is all about anyway.

I will argue that the situation of rapid changes in approaches, although perhaps the immediate cause of the failure to produce substantive work, is not the fundamental reason. In order to discover that, we have to investigate the philosophical problem field which underpins the debate about the new sociology of education. To do this involves not (in the first place) underlying values or models of man (sic), but theories of knowledge and knowledge production. Such an investigation reveals that the conventionally assumed set of relationships between 'positivism', phenomenology and the new sociology of education (i.e. positive relationships between the last two and a negative one between them both and positivism) is mistaken - there is in fact an underlying
continuity between positivism and phenomenology and an underlying tension between the new sociology of education and phenomenology.

**POSITIVISM**

Associated with the proliferation of approaches is the production of 'maps' which outline the contours of the field. One of the most authoritative of these is that produced by Karabel and Halsey (6). They list five basic approaches in the sociology of education:

1. functionalist theories,
2. human capital theory,
3. methodological empiricism,
4. conflict theories,
5. the interpretive tradition.

In terms of the 'paradigm' view of the field, a radical break is seen as having occurred within the fifth approach. Part of the interpretive tradition itself and all the rest are seen as varieties of 'positivism'.

It should be noted that these five approaches more accurately represent approaches to education within sociology rather than distinctive forms of the sociology of education. The sociology of education itself has its own particular history of institutional growth and establishment within distinctive enclaves in universities and colleges of education and the developments which will be covered in the following pages are to a large degree intelligible in terms of that history (7). However, the 'sociology of the sociology of education' will not form a part of this account, the focus of which will be epistemological. A distinctive feature of the
institutionalisation of the sociology of education as such was that it involved (or coincided with) a switch from approaching educational systems as organisational contexts to approaching them as communicative contexts. Bernstein's socio-linguistic theory played an important part in this movement, but at a fairly early stage the communicative perspective became incorporated within a phenomenological paradigm with very different implications. This may be intelligible in terms of the new practitioners of the mushrooming 'sociology of education' requiring a distinctive and apparently radical persona through which to present both themselves and their field (particularly as the institutionalisation of the field coincided with the student radicalism of the late sixties and the requirement for new graduate teachers to follow a year's teacher training).

The phenomenological perspective grounded its radicalism in the manner in which it distinguished itself from its immediate predecessors in interpretive sociology - symbolic interactionism, labelling theory, etc.

Writing on ethnomethodology, for instance, Dreizel says that:

...the method of 'documentary interpretation' should not be misunderstood as a method to reveal patterns that underlie appearances, actions, events and the like and have an existence independent of the interpretive procedures. This is where ethnomethodologists radically depart from the established approaches in sociology, including symbolic interactionism which still concentrates on the shared symbols and meanings of everyday activities, even if these symbols are seen as the result of negotiations and interpretations, and therefore, have a precarious, constantly shifting existence. Ethnomethodologists, on the other hand, maintain that the social order, including all its symbols and meanings, exists not only precariously but has no existence at all independent of the members' accounting and describing practices.

(Dreizel H. P. 1972 pxv)
In a similar fashion, Walsh says that:

(labelling theory) continues to be firmly anchored in the depiction of the real world that underlies appearances even though it shifts its concerns away from positivistic categories of behaviour to meaningful categories of action. Thus, the examination of everyday deviant activity in terms of shared symbols and meanings remained wedded to an account of what the social world is really like...it still treats of that world as 'real' and 'out there',...it is at this point that such theory parts company with sociological phenomenology, which would deny the existence of the social world independently of the social meanings that its members use to account it and, hence, constitute it.

Walsh D. 1972 p49)

The sociological radicalism of phenomenology becomes problematical for the new sociology of education through its view of the social, and in particular of social structure, and their implications for the political radicalism of new sociology of education writers.

Walsh associates 'positivism' with the tendency to treat the world as "'real' and 'out there'". This view of positivism will be explicated in more detail later. Terms such as "positivism" and "paradigm" have their origins in the philosophy of science, but have been taken up in particular ways (not necessarily consistent with their original usages) by sociologists. Any examination of these usages and an explication of their implications becomes a necessary preliminary to the critical discussion of the sociological issues with which they have become associated. The view in this work is that an insufficient attention to major debates in the philosophy of science has led to confusions of a fundamental nature in sociological debates. The terms have obscured rather than clarified issues. The argument, here, will be referred back in some detail to the philosophy of science and to the three major traditions of positivism, conventionalism and realism.

- 30 -
It is important to understand the role that the concept of "positivism" has played in the events under consideration. Strictly speaking, positivism is a philosophical position. Kolakowski gives the following broad description:

Positivism stands for a certain philosophical attitude to human knowledge... it tells us what kinds of contents in our statements about the world deserve the name of knowledge and supplies us with norms that make it possible to distinguish between that which may and that which may not reasonably be asked. Thus positivism is a normative attitude, regulating how we are to use such terms as 'knowledge', 'science', 'cognition', and 'information'.

(Kolakowski L. 1972 pp10-11)

Giedymin has listed six doctrines which he sees as constituting "strict positivism":

(a) identification of knowledge with science (natural and social) and mathematics, to the exclusion of other areas, e.g. ethics;

(b) empiricism in the extreme form of either phenomenalism or physicalism, i.e. the reduction of science to statements about directly observable facts and the elimination as meaningless of any sentence that is neither analytic nor empirical, e.g. of metaphysics;

(c) the reduction of philosophy to the 'logic of science' (philosophy of science) and of mathematics;

(d) methodological naturalism (naturalistic methodological monism) i.e. the view that the social sciences and even humanities have basically the same aims and methods as the natural sciences;

(e) sociological relativism with respect to norms, in particular ethical ones;
the emphasis on the social value of science and on its practical applications.

(Giedymin J. 1975 p276)

Giedymin argues that each of these doctrines may be affirmed or denied independently, and just how many need to be present in order to define someone as a 'positivist' is "an arbitrary terminological decision".

But unless such a decision is made the concept of positivism is vague.

The term has been much used in sociology - particularly by anti-positivists. Giddens has pointed out that philosophers and sociologists tend to have "rather different points of reference in mind when they use the term" (Giddens A. 1974 p2). He goes on to say that,

Positivism in sociology may be broadly represented as depending upon the assertion that the concepts and methods employed in natural sciences can be applied to form a 'science of man', or a 'natural science of society'.

(ibid p.3)

We can illustrate this contention with the following statement by Walsh:

....positivism is that position in sociology which argues that sociology should attempt to constitute itself as a discipline in the manner of the natural sciences. Although there are varieties of positivism within sociology, all of them subscribe to the three basic premises on which the argument is grounded:

(1) That social phenomena are, for all analytical purposes, qualitatively the same as natural phenomena;

(2) That the techniques of analysis developed in the natural sciences are applicable to sociological investigation, and;

(3) The aim of sociology is to produce a system of high-level, empirically grounded theoretical propositions which would provide the basis for predictive statements about social phenomena.

(Filmer P. et al 1972 p16)
Giddens says that this type of assertion "relies upon some sort of stated or unstated view of the character of natural science". This view (as Walsh's third point implies and as is further developed in his work) is invariably a positivist view of natural science - positivist, that is, in the "strict sense". It is a model of natural science incorporating not only Giedymin's fourth item (the principle of the unitary nature of the scientific method) but others, and, most crucially, the second. Within the anti-positivist frame of reference in sociology, "positivism" and "natural science" have been treated as synonymous.

The first point in the argument is, then, that within the anti-positivist sociological frame of reference "natural science" = "positivism" (in the strict sense). The second point follows from Walsh's reference to "varieties of positivism within sociology". This variety, which Walsh goes on to examine in detail, includes the sociology of Durkheim, behaviourism, variable analysis, functionalism and Marxism. However, if the strict positivist programme for constructing knowledge is extended into sociology, it leads specifically to a behaviouristic methodological individualism. For instance, Homans, following the positivism of Carl Hempel, concludes an essay attacking functionalism with these words:

If sociology is a science, it must take seriously one of the jobs of any science, which is that of providing explanations for the empirical relations it discovers. An explanation is a theory, and it takes the form of a deductive system. With all its talk about theory, the functionalist school did not take the job of theory seriously enough. It did not ask itself what a theory was, and it never produced a functional theory that was in fact an explanation. I am not sure that it could have done so, starting
as it did with propositions about the conditions of social
equilibrium, propositions from which no definite conclusions
could be drawn in a deductive system. If a serious effort
is to be made to construct theories that will even begin to
explain social phenomena, it turns out that their general
propositions are not about the equilibrium of societies but
about the behaviour of men.
(Homans G.C. 1973 p64)

I will argue that Homans' methodological individualism - the strict appli-
cation of positivism to sociology - actually has more in common with
phenomenology than with the types of systems theory that the latter most
characteristically defines as 'positivist'.

In a fundamental respect, systems theories are incompatible with
strict positivism. As Keat and Urry point out:

----positivists in social science have rarely adhered to such
a fully-fledged behaviourist programme. First, their work
is normally based upon the sui generis character of the social,
or of society, although on a strict positivist programme,
references to the social level of reality ought to be ruled out
on grounds of non-observability. Second, few positivists in
sociology have been able to avoid referring in some way or
other to the subjective states of individuals, that is, again
to essentially unobservable structures and processes.
(Keat R. & Urry J. 1975 p69)

Walsh says that:

All varieties of positivism in sociology have been influenced
by Durkheim's polemical attempt to establish a scientifically
grounded sociology in "The Rules of Sociological Method"
(1938), summed up in his famous dictum to treat social facts
as things. Basically, he argues that whenever men come to
interact together, they produce an emergent level of reality
which is distinct from that of the individuals and which is ex-
ternal to such individuals and exercises control over them.
(op cit p37)

For Walsh, and other phenomenologists, it is precisely this "reality sui
generis" (loc cit) which makes Durkheim a positivist, yet at the same time it
is this central aspect of his work which for Homan shows that he is not.

It is interesting to read Walsh saying later on the same page as the quote above that,

....what is missing in Durkheim's account is some actual analysis of the process by which the structure of social interaction produces an emergent social reality. That is, questions such as how an emergent social world is accomplished through shared gestures, signs and language, and the processes by which the shared character of such comes to be recognised by the members of society, are ignored in the Durkheimian account of social reality. (ibid pp37-38)

Compare this with Homans:

Again, functionalists are interested in the consequences of institutions, especially their consequences for a social system as a whole. For instance, they are endlessly concerned with the functions and dysfunctions of status systems. Seldom did they ask why there should be status systems in the first place. Some theorists have taken the emergence of phenomena like status systems as evidence for Durkheim's contention that sociology was not reducible to psychology. What is important is not the fact of emergence but the question how the emergence is to be explained. One of the accomplishments of small-group research is to explain how a status system, of course on a small scale, emerges in the course of interaction between the members of a group. (op cit pp 58-59)

What Walsh and Homans have in common is the belief that sociological explanation must involve a reduction to statements about the activities of individuals. They differ radically in how they conceive of that reduction. But what they have in common is more significant than their difference.

The important point here is that each from within his own tradition - empiricism and phenomenology - is using the same type of reductionist principle in order to make the exactly opposite point. For Homans, Durkheim's
sui generis emergent reality shows that he is **not** a positivist. For Walsh it shows that he **is**. Understanding how this can be is the key to understanding the problem field in which the debate about the new sociology of education is located.

**DEDUCTIVISM**

Consider these statements:

**Homans**: An explanation is a theory, and it takes the form of a deductive system.

**Walsh**: (Durkheim) argues that whenever men come to interact together, they produce an emergent level of reality which is distinct from that of the individuals, and which is external to such individuals and exercises control over them.

Working out the implications of these statements can provide the answer to the problem described above.

The statement by Homans can be taken as a succinct expression of positivist doctrine. We now have to tighten the focus and concentrate upon positivist explanation. Rom Harre provides what we can treat as a detailed explanation of Homans' position.

According to the deductivist, to explain is to produce some sentence or sentences from which a sentence, which could be used to make a statement of what was to be explained, could be deduced. The explaining sentence or sentences must be at least as general as the explained sentence, and usually the explainer will be more general than the explained sentence. The most typical case, according to this view, will be that of a natural law and a particular phenomenon. The phenomenon would be explained if a sentence which could be used to describe it, were able to be deduced from a law and some other sentence. Typically, again, the law would be a conditional sentence and the other sentence or sentences would be particular sentences which would be used to assert the
obtaining of the conditions described in the antecedent of the conditional. If the phenomenon to be explained is say the red colour of a flame in which strontium salts have been introduced, then the colour of the flame is explained by the joint assertion that strontium salts have been introduced and that if strontium salts are introduced into a suitable flame it will become red in colour. (Harre R. 1970 p16)

The model of explanation being described here is known as the Deductive-Nomological, or D-N, model of explanation. Schematically it can be represented in this way:

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
\text{L}_1, \text{L}_2, \ldots, \text{L}_r & \text{Laws} \\
\text{C}_1, \text{C}_2, \ldots, \text{C}_k & \text{Antecedent Conditions} \\
\text{Premises} & \\
\text{Explanans} & \text{Explanandum} \\
\text{Premises} & \text{Conclusion} \\
\text{E} & \\
\end{array}
\]

(from Keat & Urry op cit p10)

In this form, Harre's example of strontium salts colouring a suitable flame red would look like this:

- If strontium salts are introduced into a suitable flame it will become red.

- Strontium salts were introduced into a suitable flame 

- The flame became red.

Keat and Urry give an example utilising Durkheim's theory of the causes of suicide:

- \( \text{L}_1 \) Suicide rates vary inversely with the degree of integration of domestic society.

- \( \text{C}_1 \) There are two groups, one of married, one of unmarried people.

- \( \text{C}_2 \) Married people are more integrated

- \( \text{E} \) There is a lower suicide rate among the married group compared with the unmarried group

(Keat & Urry op cit p87)
It is important to note that these explanations are intrinsically predictive.

This is the model of explanation implicit in Walsh's second and third premises quoted above. What are the consequences of extending this model to the explanation of social phenomena? For any model of explanation we can ask the question, what would the world be like in which this model was valid? (8) We can then ask, is this world recognisably our world in those respects most significant for the model? So, to what kind of social world would the D-N model of explanation be appropriate, and is this our social world? Essentially the phenomenologists provide us with an account of the social world of the D-N model and they (like many other types of sociologists) tell us that it is not our social world. Whereas Homans takes deductivism as his point of reference, for Walsh it is the D-N social world.

THE D-N SOCIAL WORLD

The first point to be made about the D-N social world is that "social phenomena are, for all analytical purposes, qualitatively the same as natural phenomena" (Walsh - see p32 above). According to Walsh,

.... the natural world can be characterised as an object world of material (sometimes tangible) sense data (facts) which are external to the observer and whose existence is independent of him. It follows that such phenomena may be examined externally in terms of the paradigmatically identified overt properties which are relevant to the scientist's task at hand. This is the crux of operations in the natural sciences, such as concept formation, theory testing and causal explanation, all of which directly refer to such identifiable overt properties.

(Walsh op cit p.8)
Another major advocate of the phenomenological position has characterised this 'positivistic' scientific posture as "absolutism".

Douglas describes how the 'scientific' approach is expressed in sociology:

Thus the early social scientists adopted a conscious policy of studying man in the same way one would study any physical object. Having presupposed these methods, they adopted the stance most in accord with them. They adopted the absolutist perspective on man and society. That is, they viewed man as an object, causally determined (totally) by forces outside of his self. In accord with this perspective, they adopted an absolutist (or objectivist) stance toward everyday life. They assumed that these categories should be both independent of and in opposition to the common-sense categories of men in everyday life. They assumed that all decisions about how one would decide that his results were true or false could and should be made in advance of studies of the everyday phenomena. And they assumed that the goal should be one of controlling the everyday phenomena in the way scientists seek to control the natural world.

(Douglas J. 1974 pp13-14)

These "classical" scientistic ideas are, Douglas argues, to be found in "the methods of present-day positivistic sociologists".

The causally determining force that is outside of the individual is, of course, the emergent sui generis social reality of systems theory. This concept, which Douglas relates back to Durkheim and calls "the hypothesis of social realism" is seen by him as involving "the fallacy of treating society as if it is somehow a separate level of existence, outside of the hearts and minds of living-and-breathing human beings" (ibid pp8-9). Within the phenomenological perspective the externality of this emergent reality is seen in terms of "an object world of material (sometimes tangible) sense data (facts) which are external to the observer and whose existence is independent of him" - i.e. as for all intents and purposes like the natural world vis-a-vis the natural scientist. Its salient
features are available in terms of "identifiable overt properties". It is necessary that this should be so if sociologists are to be able to adopt a scientific attitude towards it and to produce scientific explanations on the D-N model.

Absolutism can be related to what T. P. Wilson, in his account of "the normative paradigm", describes as "the assumption of cognitive consensus" (Wilson T. P. 1974 pp60-61). He begins by stating that,

The normative paradigm consists of two major orienting ideas: interaction is essentially rule governed, and sociological explanation should properly take the deductive form characteristic of natural science.

(ibid p59)

The second of these ideas refers to the D-N model of explanation. The first relates to his introductory comment that the normative paradigm is concerned with action, i.e. with meaningful behaviour. The rules that govern action are, therefore, located within systems of meaning and find expression in things such as shared cognitive frameworks, reciprocal expectations, common values, etc. symbolic meaning systems into which individuals are socialised.

Wilson states that this view does not commit the sociologist to "a version of psychological reductionism" (ibid).

Given this last statement, it is peculiar to find Wilson giving in addition to functionalism, "operant conditioning theory" as a major instance of this paradigm. He does say that "The concept of action, in the sense employed in this chapter is perhaps not properly used within the context of operant conditioning theory. Consequently we will use the term behaviour pattern instead of action..." (ibid p63). However, this fundamentally understates the situation.
"operant conditioning" are completely incompatible. The difference between "action" and "behaviour pattern" is absolute. Behaviourism, as the strict application of positivist doctrine to human behaviour, disallows not only the concept of action, but the other central concept in structural functionalism – that of social totality or holism. What the two approaches do share is a common commitment to deductivism.

Wilson's discussion of "cognitive consensus" enables us to see how approaches which are fundamentally opposed in their basic doctrines can share a common methodological approach. Wilson shows how the absolutist view of the social world makes possible the application of the D-N model of explanation despite the fundamental incompatibility between functionalism and positivist doctrine. And this enables us to see how for Homans Durkheim is not a positivist, whereas for Walsh he is.

Wilson argues that the normative paradigm assumes "a stable linkage between the situation of an actor and his action in that situation."

(ibid p60). He explains this as follows:

It is clear, then, that the way in which an actor discriminates situations and actions is critical. For if a particular rule (S, A), whether a disposition or an expectation, is in fact operative on a given occasion, then that occasion must be discriminated by the actor as an instance of the situation S, since if the occasion is responded to as an instance of some other situation, say S', then a different rule, say (S', A') would be operative. Similarly, on any given occasion the concrete behaviour of one actor must be recognised by another as either an instance of the action A or an instance of some other action, for otherwise such processes as reinforcement and sanctioning could not operate as mechanisms for the acquisition and stabilisation of dispositions and expectations. It follows
that if social interaction is to be stable, the different participants must discriminate situations and actions in virtually the same way. Otherwise rules could not account for stable, coherent interaction over time and across situations, and the explanatory function of rules would disappear. Thus, theories within the normative paradigm require an empirical assumption of substantial cognitive agreement among interacting actors. (ibid p61)

It is clear how the S, A rule model links, on the one hand, with the absolutist or objectivist view of the social world and, on the other, with the D-N model of explanation. Given that the basic doctrines of the functionalist approach (action, social whole) are incompatible with positivist doctrine (on the grounds of non-observability, rejection of holistic concepts, etc.) the absolutist approach makes possible the application of D-N explanation which functionalists identified as scientific explanation. The social world is treated as an empirically available fact world, the phenomena of which are unproblematically available (cognitive consensus) and amenable to explanation and prediction within the logic of deductivist explanation. The absolutist or objectivist posture enables D-N explanation to be reconciled with action and holism. Absolutism constructs a social world based in the concepts of action and holism, but in which deductivism is a possible and valid mode of explanation.

We can say that strict positivism in the human sciences takes the form of behaviouristic methodological individualism. Its doctrines disallow traditional sociological concepts such as action and social totality. On this basis, for strict positivists such as Homans, Durkheim is not a positivist and his(functionalist type) arguments are not scientific explanations. But functionalists and others holding to these 'heretical' doctrines nevertheless believe that deductivism is the correct model of scientific explanation. We
see a conflict between the **ontological** and the **methodological** dimensions of the approaches. In order to enable D-N explanation in these non-behaviouristic approaches the social world has to be seen in a particular way - a way which removes the problematical implications of the ontological principles. Absolutism and objectivism achieve this end. They create a social world appropriate to D-N explanation. It is to the character of the D-N social world that we must now turn.

THE CULTURE OF POSITIVISM

An influential essay which approaches the dichotomies of Wilson's argument from a somewhat different direction is Dawe's "The Two Sociologies"). The two sociologies are grounded in diametrically opposed concerns and values:

The first asserts the paramount necessity, for societal and individual well-being, of external constraint; hence the notion of a social system ontologically and methodologically prior to its participants. The key notion of the second is that of autonomous man, able to realise his full potential and to create a truly human social order only when freed from external constraint. Society is thus the creation of its members; the product of their construction of meaning and of the action and relationships through which they attempt to impose that meaning on their historical situations.

In summary, one views action as the derivative of system, whilst, the other views system as the derivative of action. (Dawe A. 1971 pp550-551)

The idea of the **methodological** priority of the social system refers to the manner in which systems theory accommodates itself to the D-N model of explanation, but it is important to stress that the idea of its **ontological** priority is fundamentally at odds with positivist doctrine. As the quote
above indicates, it is not only interpretive theories which treat the
system as the "derivation of action" - so does strict positivism.

Whereas positivists take the D-N model of explanation as their
central point of reference when using the term "positivism", anti-
positivist sociologists refer to the **D-N social world**. Bernstein says
that,

> ...it is argued that such a method for studying people is
derived from a method for the study of objects, and there-
fore it is an outrage to the subjectivity of man for him to be
transformed into an object. These arguments go on to
link positivist methods with the political control of man
through the use of the technology of social science.
(Bernstein op cit p147)

It is to the D-N social world in which deductivism is made possible by
granting an **absolutist** version of ontological priority to the social system
that Walsh's view of positivism as an emergent reality external to and
controlling the individual refers. These absolutist, reifying and de-
humanising characteristics become most contentious, and most likely to
provoke "outrage", at the point of **control**. It is here that key arguments
develop which "link positivist methods with the political control of man
through the use of the technology of social science". Fay, for example,
attempts to demonstrate the existence of an internal, conceptual link
between positivist science and **control**, based in the relationship between
explanation and prediction in deductivism, which is manifested in "policy
science".

Fay's argument about policy science attacks a fundamental tenet
of positivist doctrine and one which functions as an important source of
legitimation for positivist ideas; namely the view that positivist
type knowledge is objective and value neutral and, consequently,
disinterested. He says that,

....the policy scientist doesn't merely clarify the possible
outcome of certain courses of action, he actually chooses
the most efficient course of action in terms of the available
scientific information. In this regard, the policy scientist
really is a type of social engineer who makes instrumental
decisions on the basis of various laws of science - in this
instance, social science - which are relevant to the problem
at hand. The policy engineer, if I may use this phrase, is
one who seeks the most technically correct answer to polit-
tical problems in terms of available scientific knowledge.
(ibid p14)

In a similar argument, Gouldner says that this approach "has great
social importance because it congenially resonates the sentiments of
any modern elite in bureaucratised societies who view social problems
in terms of technological paradigms, as a kind of engineering task."
(Gouldner A. 1972 pp51-52). Within such a perspective politics becomes
a type of applied science and, according to Fay, "its conjectural, arbitrary,
emotional and personal elements would drop out, and its arguments and
decisions would assume the same neutral characteristics as those of
engineering." (op cit p22).

It is in the area of social deviance that 'policy engineering' is
most starkly revealed. Eysenck, for instance, has said,

I think the major objection to the proposals I have outlined
is that they smack of treating human beings as if they were
nothing but biological organisms subject to strictly deter-
ministic rules; this Pavlovian revolution, coming on top of
the Copernican and Darwinian ones, is too much for the self-
esteem of many people. Undesirable the fact may be, but

- 45 -
that is not sufficient reason for rejecting it as a fact, one would need better reasons to change one's scientific judgement. And where there is (1) a recognised and social need and (2) a recognised body of scientific knowledge which looks likely to be able to create a technology to cope with that need, it needs very little in the way of precognitive ability to forecast that in the course society will use this knowledge and create this technology. (quoted in Taylor I. et al 1973 p32)

The content, tone and logic of this statement are quintessentially positivistic in the sense being discussed.

Fay contends that "the scientific enterprise understood positivistically contains within itself an implicitly instrumentalist notion of how theory and practice are related, and that, with regard to the social sciences, there is consequently an implied political theory as an element in its account of what it means to understand social life." (Fay op cit pp14-15). He is arguing something more than the familiar propositions that 'objective' scientific knowledge inevitably has social and therefore value implications or that 'objective' knowledge is inevitably contaminated by presupposition or implicit theory. The argument is that the intrinsically predictive character of D-N type explanation entails control by its own internal logic. The D-N model of explanation builds its own world (the D-N social world) and a place for itself within that world:

Science must view the world in this way in order for it to provide the kind of explanations it prizes, which is to say, in order for it to provide the control over the phenomena which is a sign of its having understood a phenomenon. Because science marks out the 'world' as a world of observable phenomena subject to general laws it thereby is constituting this 'world' from the viewpoint of how one can gain control over it. It is for this reason that possible technical control provides the framework within which the definition of reality and truth in science occurs. (ibid pp40-41)
The symmetry of explanation and prediction in the D-N model entails an instrumentalist relationship of theory to practice that is realised, politically, in a technology of social control.

The link analysed by Fay can be identified with the more amorphous and ubiquitous phenomenon which Whitty calls "the culture of positivism". (Whitty G. 1977 pp37-39). Relating this concept to the school, he says:

I am suggesting, then, that there is a wider 'culture of positivism' whose embeddedness in the culture of that school creates considerable difficulties for those people who want to 'see' the world differently and transcend prevailing conceptions of knowledge. This culture is 'positivist' in that it displays no interest in the grounds of knowledge and assumes that Nature, or an external reality, is the author of 'truth'. Such a culture operates with a notion of valid knowledge detached from particular knowing subjects, and views school knowledge as (at least potentially) verifiable 'knowledge' about a 'real world' rather than arbitrarily legitimated ways of seeing. In making such distinctions, it recognises a hierarchy between those who possess such knowledge or the means to it (and thus may teach), and those who lack it (and must learn). (ibid p39)

This statement precisely measures the distance between the two usages of the term "positivist". It shows the preoccupation with the characteristics of what I have called the D-N social world and with human subjectivity and control.

Writings in this area usually operate with dichotomous models: the two sociologies, normative and interpretive paradigms, etc. The discussion in this chapter so far has related approaches to the ontological and methodological dimensions of positivism and has differentiated between levels (systems and individual) and traditions (positivist and interpretive).
Implicit in this is a four-fold model which will be further elaborated as the argument proceeds. At this point we can express the situation by asking of any approach (a) is it methodologically compatible with positivist doctrine (i.e. committed to deductivism) and (b) is it ontologically compatible with the positivist doctrine (i.e. grounded in ontological atomism).

Strictly speaking these two things should go together - methods must be appropriate to their object - but I have argued that systems level positivism uses absolutism as a mechanism for reconciling a commitment to deductivism to the concepts of action and totality. These tensions are an intrinsic part of the field. The situation can be presented thus:

```
      O O
     /   \
    M   M
   +---+---+
   | A | B |
   +---+---+
   | C | D |
```

Figure 1:1

A = MO: the situation of an approach which is both methodologically and ontologically compatible with positivist doctrine. It combines ontological atomism with methodological individualism. For example, behaviourism. This is the **strict** application of positivism to the human sciences.

B = MO: the situation of an approach which is committed to the D-N model of explanation, but which incorporates basic concepts which are incompatible with positivist doctrine. Functionalism is an example of this. Its commitment to deductivism is combined with the concepts of **action** and **holism** which contradict strict positivism. **Absolutism**, i.e. treating the social world as a
given, unproblematically available fact world (by assuming conditions such as cognitive consensus), is a mechanism which attempts to reconcile this contradiction.

C = MO: the situation of an approach which is ontologically compatible with positivism in that it rejects systems level concepts and is reductionist in its explanatory principles, but which rejects deductivism as an appropriate form of explanation for the social science. This is the position of phenomenology and reflects the fact that both (strict) positivism and phenomenology are located within the same problem field (i.e. that grounded in the categories of the subject and experience).

D = MO: the situation of an approach which rejects the principles of both methodological individualism and ontological atomism. This is the implicit position, and the real problem, of the new sociology of education. The argument in this work is that the beginning of the solution to the problem of the new sociology of education is to see that this is the situation and that its implication is that the answer must be to transcend the field as such.

POSITIVISM, SCHOOLING AND CONTROL

With the "culture of positivism" we are now some distance removed from the philosophical doctrine outlined at the beginning of the chapter, but at the same time far closer to the preoccupations and concerns characteristic of the new sociology of education. In his article in "Knowledge and Control", Esland describes some of the ways in which the culture of positivism can be seen expressed in the school system:

Objectivism has been firmly embedded in the norms and rituals
of academic culture and its transmission. Through the procedures of psychological testing and school evaluation, the pupil and the curriculum have been reified. 'Bodies of knowledge' are presented for the child to learn and reproduce according to specified objective criteria. Educational psychology has been a powerful legitimating agency and rationalisation for objectivism. As such, it has become an important form of social control. (Esland G. 1971 p. 75)

Although in certain crucial respects Esland's paper is very phenomenological (in fact it is one of the most explicitly phenomenological papers in "Knowledge and Control" – the other contributors were not, in the main, phenomenologically inclined), we see with the use of terms such as "legitimating agency" and "social control" a terminology and concern more distinctive of the new sociology of education and less apparent in the writings of phenomenologists.

In the key area of curriculum studies, the new sociology of education was particularly concerned with the relationship between knowledge and the social relationships of the transmission process. The culture of positivism is associated with what Young called "curriculum as fact". He says that,

This conception of 'curriculum as fact', with its underlying theory of knowledge as external to the knower, both teacher and student, embodied in syllabuses and text-books, is widely held and has profound implications for our conceptions of teaching and learning. To say 'I teach history, or physics' implies a body of knowledge to be transferred from the teacher who has it to the pupil who has not, whether by rote and test or enquiry and project. (Young M. F. D. 1976 p. 186)

The significance of this relationship is indicated by Whitty's analysis of social studies teaching. He says that many students who train to teach this subject do so because they see it as being "more likely to encourage a
critical attitude towards the status quo and hence more likely to con-
tribute to social change." (Whitty G. 1976 p35) However, in practice,
this radical promise has not been realised and social studies teaching
has simply contributed "to the maintenance of the status quo." (ibid p36)
Part of this failure is that,

The view of knowledge embraced by the 'New Social Studies'
effectively maintains a situation in which knowledge about
the world is seen as something produced by scientists, and
then transmitted to school pupils via teachers. Social science
teaching - whether purely didactic in approach or employing
some sort of 'discovery method' - thus becomes almost by
definition, a process of transmission. The professional
social scientist is placed on a pedestal and, even at advanced
level, the study of sociology largely involves the consumption
of knowledge produced by these professionals.
(ibid p38)

Despite the 'radical' content of the social studies curriculum and
the aspirations and intentions of the teachers, the curriculum itself, in
Whitty's account, reproduces the characteristics of a "curriculum as fact":
the social relationship of the pedagogy reproduce academic and (implicitly)
social hierarchy; the teachers assume the superiority of 'academic' know-
ledge; social science disciplines are seen as yielding 'true knowledge' which
can encourage pupils to adopt critical attitudes. Behind the curriculum as
fact and the culture of positivism we can see the phenomenological concerns
with absolutism and objectivism - the school is clearly located in the D-N
social world. Less familiar in phenomenology are the concerns with the
immediate politics of classroom control, with criticism and with social
change. It is here that the new sociology of education distances itself from
phenomenology (9). Sarup has argued that,

Because some sociologists of education used relativistic arguments
drawn from different sources such as phenomenology and anthropology to criticise narrow and fixed notions of knowledge and education and to suggest other possibilities, alternative versions of the world, they are taken to be implicitly saying that all rationalities, or ways of looking at the world are equally acceptable; that all propositions are of equal value. This was, I believe, a misunderstanding of the position of the writers who, though they used a phenomenological approach, were also politically committed to changing the prevailing hierarchical conceptions of 'knowledge', 'ability', and, therefore, 'success'.

(Sarup M. 1978 p21)

Sarup is pointing to a fundamental tension between sociological and political radicalism. The implications of this will be looked at in detail in the next section - I will argue that this tension cannot be resolved within the problem field in which it has so far been located.

SUMMARY

I will now recapitulate the argument so far:

(a) although deeply influenced by phenomenology, the new sociology of education sought to avoid its relativistic implications.

(b) in order to understand the relationship between the new sociology of education, phenomenology and positivism it is necessary to see those relationships as structured within a specific philosophical problem field.

(3) positivism must be understood in the first place as a particular philosophical tradition. Its central doctrines entail the rejection of sociological concepts such as action and social holism, and an acceptance of deductivism as the model of scientific explanation.

(4) so-called 'positivist sociology' can be seen as occupying a contradictory position in relation to positivist doctrine because it is grounded in precisely the ontological categories which positivism rejects.
in order to understand the significance of this we have to look at the implications of deductivist explanation for understanding the social world.

positivist sociology accepts the D-N principle of explanation.

it constructs a model of the social actor and of the social world which enables the application of D-N method, despite the commitment to action and holism.

these categories are rendered unproblematical by treating the social world and the meaning of social action as directly available (objectivism and absolutism).

objectivism and absolutism entail the reification of social phenomena and the dehumanisation of the social actor.

anti-positivist sociologists take as their central point of reference, when using the term "positivist", not positivist doctrine but the social world which is constructed in order to accommodate deductivism to the concepts of action and holism.

the D-N social world is associated with social control through "policy science" and with "the culture of positivism".
The movement can be represented as follows:

(1) STRICT POSITIVISM

(the 6 doctrines)

↓

(2) D-N EXPLANATION → (5) THE D-N SOCIAL WORLD

(deductivism)

↓

(3) NATURAL SCIENCE → (4) SOCIAL SCIENCE

(individual level)

POLICY SCIENCE, CULTURE OF POSITIVISM, absolutism, objectivism, reification, cognitive consensus, technology of social control etc.

Fig. 1:2

The line from strict positivism, through deductivism to the D-N social world and the culture of positivism traverses the two major divides in the problem field: the first is that which divides systems from individual level approaches, and the second is that which distinguishes positivistic from interpretive sociologies. I have suggested that a four-fold model makes better sense of the relationships within the field than a dichotomous one.

Figs. 1:1 and 1:2 can be re-presented in this way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVELS</th>
<th>SOCIOLOGIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>system</td>
<td>positivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>functionalism (D-N social world)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual</td>
<td>behaviourism (strict positivism)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 1:3
Another significant feature of the proposed break between phenomenological sociology and the earlier interpretive approaches is that whereas the latter are shown to be 'positivist', the natural sciences are shown to be not really positivist at all. Firstly, the natural sciences are presented as being essentially no different from any other type of 'account' – they are denied any privileged epistemological status. Secondly, elements of the post-empiricist philosophy of science are selectively incorporated into the phenomenological argument where they are (mistakenly) seen as supporting it. On this basis, the traditional interpretive distinction between empirical natural science and hermeneutic social science is abolished.

In the account of science in phenomenology 'positivism' undergoes a number of displacements, being successively abolished and recovered. Firstly, by drawing upon the traditional distinction between things and people, behaviour and action, and by grounding the necessity for a unique "kulturwissenschaften" in that distinction, the positivist account of the natural realm and the conditions for knowledge of it is presupposed. Secondly, by then arguing that really the natural sciences are not like that at all, but are no different from any other kind of knowledge, positivism is apparently abolished. But, thirdly, by assuming that because positivism is abolished science as such is abolished (i.e. science is no different from anything else), it is presupposed that the positivist account of science is
correct. Hence positivistic assumptions underpin the very arguments which apparently abolish positivism.

This is a crucial point - the phenomenological argument does not show that the positivist account of knowledge is wrong, rather, it demonstrates that it is not possible: that the conditions necessary for such knowledge cannot be realised. Phenomenology is not an alternative theory of knowledge, but an attempt to demonstrate that there is no knowledge in the positivist sense. Because it implicitly assumes the positivist theory of knowledge and then shows empirically, i.e. by simply describing the world, that such knowledge is not possible within it, it ends up not by saying that everything is knowledge but that nothing is knowledge.

From this point of view science becomes just one more of the "multiple realities" of the social world. Peter McHugh, writing within this perspective, says that,

With regard to reality, and if we equate it with truth, we must admit that there are as many realities as there are describable procedures. Because there are in principle many rules of construal (sic), so can there be many realities, all with equivalent status as truths.

(McHugh P. 1974 p333)

McHugh argues that,

That a finding is 'true' (or false or ambiguous) comes to be so only after applying to it the analytic formulation of a method by which that finding could be understood to have been produced. Having discovered that collectively developed and enforced grammars of agreement and method are a determining and not merely tangential characteristic of science, we can summarise by saying that an event is transformed into the truth only by the application of a canon of procedure, a canon that truth-seekers use and analysts must
formulate as providing the possibility of agreement. By grammar I mean the way in which a statement can be understood to have been made. Thus, any claim to truth is successful if the claimant can analytically describe his method for us.

(ibid p332)

This statement by McHugh relates to what sociologists could do within a phenomenological programme. Walsh says that,

Now if, as the foregoing suggests, it is possible to generate an infinite number of accounts of any social scene, is there a point at which, for all practical purposes, the sociologist might cut off this infinite regress of meaning in his own account. One solution to the problem has already been suggested, viz that the sociologist is required to situate his own account. Another allied solution may be achieved in pragmatic terms whereby an adequate sociological account might be seen as one which was sufficiently detailed to provide a set of instructions which would enable a stranger to reproduce the scenes described in the account.

(Walsh op cit p33)

If truth is essentially procedural and contingent upon the rules current within a group, the granting of truth depends upon demonstrating conformity to the procedural rules for truth making. According to Walsh, sociologists should (a) attempt to explicate ("situate") the procedural rules underlying their own accounts, and (b) attempt to discover such rules in other people's so that anyone should be able to enter a group and make a 'true' statement by utilising the account produced by the sociologist. This bears a striking resemblance to the positivist principle that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification. For the early logical positivists, to be meaningful meant that a statement had to be empirically verifiable.

For phenomenologists the criterion is not empirical but conventional. Phenomenologists, and more generally conventionalists, argue that empirical
criteria in the original sense-data form are non-available - human perception (let alone cognition) is simply not like that.

It is interesting here to consider briefly a philosophical (rather than a sociological) phenomenologist discussing the empiricist notion of sense-data. F. Cowley in a discussion of A. J. Ayer's "The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge" says that,

What is at issue is not what is the case in the world but the nature of the experience whereby we can and do discover what is the case in the world. To hypostatise the look of things and make the looks our objects is to make nonsense of our actual experience and willfully to adopt a language in which no matter of empirical fact can ever be stated. (Cowley F. 1968 p144)

What is significant here is that for both the positivist and the phenomenologist it is the category experience that is central. They disagree over how "experience" should be understood. Cowley gives a fascinating example from Ayer:

.....in the case of the penny on the table at an oblique angle, Ayer's sense-datum is round, not elliptical. But a penny at an angle looks elliptical; if it did not look elliptical we should not see its roundness - a round penny lying flat on the table. If it looked round in the same sense, we should see it as an elliptical object. This is inseparable from seeing things in depth. (ibid pl42)

If we go simply by "the look" of things, a penny moving from the vertical to the horizontal will pass through an infinite number of points - does this imply an infinite series of individual sense-data? Or is this experience a single but richer and more complex thing - "seeing things in depth" so that to see the round thing as elliptical is simultaneously to see its roundness?
In sociology, positivism and phenomenology are usually seen as opposed and contending positions. They are customarily treated as if present together at the same time. This contrasts strongly with the situation in philosophy. It can come as a surprise to sociologists to read a philosopher saying that,

Positivism has now gone so far out of fashion that it is perhaps difficult to understand why anyone should ever have supposed that it should be acceptable.

(Hamlyn D.W. 1970 p60)

The philosophy of science that is roughly contemporary with the positivist debate in sociology can be characterised as "post-empiricist" (10). Kuhn, an historian of science, is part of this post-empiricist scene. The first half of the century can been seen as the time of positivism. Over that period, from its heyday with the early Wittgenstein, the Cambridge philosophers and the Vienna Circle, its doctrines were progressively weakened (e.g. verificationism) and the movement gradually withered away. Phenomenological sociologists tend to draw in an ad hoc and selective way upon the post-empiricist philosophy of science, and in particular upon those writers who express what Mary Hesse calls a "strong sociological" position (11). Because the debate in sociology has been conducted within a problem field underpinned by positivist categories and assumptions, the significance of the debate in philosophy, i.e. that it is post-empiricist, has not been fully appreciated or assimilated. This again reflects the fact that the sociologist's point of reference has not been so much the doctrines of strict positivism as the implications of those
doctrines for the model of the social world and the place of people in it.

As Bernstein says:

These debates are fierce because they are fundamentally political. They are about what view of social phenomena the sociologist ought to have and the relationship between the sociologist and his society. They reveal the dilemma of being a sociologist. Whom do we serve? Which side are we on?

(Bernstein op cit pl59)

The new sociology of education is crucially concerned with precisely these issues. The rehabilitation of the concept of social structure is central to the attempt to avoid relativism and to construct a politically radical possibilitarian sociology. The problems of doing so within a field which retains its positivist/phenomenological meta-structure are the issues of chapter two.

Despite their apparent (and real) differences, positivism and phenomenology share a common referent - an experiencing, knowing subject. They share the fundamental categories: the subject, experience, the empirical. They differ on how these categories can be treated. Essentially the phenomenologists show not that the positivist theory (the theory grounded in those categories) is wrong but that its specifically positivistic conditions are unobtainable. The categories are retained, but understood differently. The phenomenological argument is essentially empirical: it demonstrates that things are not, and cannot be, as positivism desires. Hence the categories have to be treated differently on substantive grounds and fundamental concepts such as 'truth', 'knowledge', 'objectivity' reformulated according to these new understandings. The phenomenological 'critique' of positivism is essentially
a series of reformulations of basic concepts according to an alternative treatment of the basic positivist categories.

Underpinning both positivism and phenomenology is a commitment to, what Bhaskar calls, "empirical realism". He sees this as embodying a sequence of three philosophical mistakes:

The first consists of the use of the category of experience to define the world. This involves giving what is in effect a particular epistemological concept a general ontological function. The second consists in the view that its being experienced or experiencable is an essential property of the world; whereas it is more correctly conceived as an accidental property of some things, albeit one which can, in special circumstances, be of great significance for science. The third thus consists in the neglect of the (socially produced) circumstances under which experience is in fact epistemically significant in science.

(Bhaskar R. 1975 p28)

We are habituated in sociology to see positivism and phenomenology (as they are constituted in sociology) as opposed and contending positions. More exactly, phenomenology is a transformation of positivism in which the values of the basic categories are reversed and associated concepts then revised according to the principle of that reversal.
This can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORIES</th>
<th>POSITIVISM</th>
<th>PHENOMENOLOGY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>subject</td>
<td>non-situated</td>
<td>situated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>passive</td>
<td>agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>receiver</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experience</td>
<td>sense-data</td>
<td>meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stimulus/</td>
<td>interpretation/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>response</td>
<td>intention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>behaviour</td>
<td>action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empirical</td>
<td>singular reality</td>
<td>multiple realities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(fact world)</td>
<td>(forms of life)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCEPTS
(examples)

"we needn't abandon the idea of objectivity so long as we recognise that objectivity is made possible by having met a generally accepted rule of procedure." (McHugh)

"to recognise the necessity of rejecting classical objectivity does not mean that we must or should relinquish our search for objective knowledge. It simply means that we must modify our theory of knowledge and our concept of objectivity." (Douglas)
ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND MORAL ORDER

The combination of ontological and methodological individualism and a voluntaristic model of the subject places phenomenology within the class of what Gellner has called "moral-order-preserving anthropomorphic doctrines" (Gellner E. 1974 p131). Gellner says that the point of "anthropomorphic doctrines" is that they "enlist the world on the side of our values or aspirations" (ibid p130). This reflects that preoccupation which Bernstein mentions with values and underlying models of man. Gellner points out that although anthropomorphism is dead within the natural sciences, this is not so in the social - "The plea for a humanist psychology or sociology is frequently heard" (ibid p130). In a perceptive description he contrasts "positive" or "offensive" and "negative" or "defensive" types. Whereas the former puts forward a specific doctrine, e.g. a religious faith, the latter,

....is not concerned with putting forward a specific positive picture, but merely with demonstrating that theories which necessarily make the world 'meaningless', which inescapably exclude meaningful visions, cannot be true. How can this be shown?....It argues that the very nature of knowledge, in the sphere in question, is such that no non-anthropomorphic theory can possibly be true. This leaves the field open for anthropomorphic theories, without however at the same time positively singling out any one of them.

(ibid pp130-131)

This describes phenomenology very well - it argues from "the very nature of knowledge", it does not single out any particular theory ("I cannot justify my ethnomethodology as a pursuit of privileged knowledge; every farmer, freak, witch and alchemist has such knowledge." Mehan and Wood 1975 p509).

Furthermore, as I have argued, it is not an alternative theory to positivism - it simply shows that positivism is wrong through an alternative description.
of the world.

These negative anthropomorphic doctrines,

...defend a whole class of meaningful visions against a whole class of, as it were, inhuman ones. The 'meaningfulness' defended need not be a crude picture in which sinners are punished and virtue prevails. It is rather a world in which things happen and are understood in human terms, in some sense to be clarified further. These thinkers are not concerned or able to demonstrate that the human world is a moral tale, with justice and truth vindicated and some noble purpose attained: but they are concerned to show that it is, at least, a human tale. They wish to defend the anthropomorphic image of man himself. (ibid p131)

The defence of "the anthropomorphic image of man" reflects what I identified earlier as the point of reference for phenomenologists in the debate about positivism, i.e. the D-N social world. Where this activity is strong, explanations, for reasons indicated by Bernstein and by Arnot and Whitty, tend to be weak. Explanatory theories are investigated not for explanatory power but for their anthropomorphic integrity. As Bernstein says, "The weakness of the explanation is likely to be attributed to the approach, which is analysed in terms of its ideological stance." (op cit p167). Theories are interrogated as to how far they preserve the human world as a "moral tale". Failure in this respect locates the theory as an accomplice of "policy science" and the dehumanising ideologies of control.

In these terms the new sociology of education is a positive anthropomorphism. By and large it has been concerned to demonstrate not just that the social world is a human tale but that it is a particular moral tale. The reification within positivist doctrine and the accompanying dehumanisation in
the corresponding social world has a specific social origin and a particular political function. The multiple realities of the social world are not simply alternative realities (a kind of epistemological fun-house) but contending and rival realities. This raises fundamental issues about the nature of explanation and the possibilities of analysis for a sociology which is in, but not entirely of, the phenomenological world.

THE POSSIBILITARIAN DISENGAGEMENT

Whitty has drawn a distinction between "analytic" and "possibilitarian" approaches within the radical interpretive camp. He says that possibilitarians,

...see, in the activity of doing sociology, a possibility of transcending the experienced realities of everyday life, while the advocates of the... 'analytic' stance do not seek, in exposing the constitutive features of lived reality, to actually challenge the mundane experience of that everyday world.
(Whitty G. 1977 p.31)

Sarup, whose work can be seen as an attempt to work out a coherent possibilitarian position in the sociology of education by synthesising radical phenomenology with a critical theory variant of Marxism, says more trenchantly, of the analysis school that,

...this kind of work has little bearing on the struggle to make a better world. The 'new' sociology of education has no sympathy with this type of apolitical theorising. It is felt that more is needed than merely 'showing' the form of life, and that, if possible, it should be challenged.
(Sarup op cit p48)
What is being expressed here is a conflict between sociological radicalism and political radicalism. There is a dilemma: sociological radicalism apparently leads to quietism and abolishes the grounds for political radicalism by virtue of its relativism.

The necessity to disengage from the relativism of phenomenology is not simply a consequence of strongly held value commitments. It follows from the, associated, necessity to produce analyses and explanations of a given type and to be able to claim for them not that they are simply 'accounts' but that they are 'knowledge' - in short, that they are right. This necessity was present in Young's work in particular (though as Whitty implies this was true of many others in the new directions movement) from the very beginning, i.e. from "Knowledge and Control".

It is illuminating to contrast these two statements, one from Young in "Knowledge and Control", the other by Walsh.

...the research implications of the meta-theoretical position being proposed is that the sociology of education (or any sociology for that matter) must take into account the historical and situationally specific character of both its phenomena and its explanations. Thus, in order to explore situationally defined meanings in taken for granted contexts such as schools, very detailed case studies are necessary which treat as problematic the curricular, pedagogic and assessment categories held by school personnel. However, such studies on their own, which give accounts of the realities which emerge from the interaction of members, cannot help avoiding the socio-historical contexts in which such realities become available...these interactional studies must be complemented by attempts to conceptualise the links between interactions and changing social structures in such a way as to point to the new kinds of research which at present seem almost wholly lacking. (Young M.F.D. 1971 pp4-5, my emphases)
It follows that sociology requires an examination of the commonsense world of daily life rather than a settlement of it by theoretical representation or a taken-for-granted assumption of it as the background to social activity. Instead of assuming the social standardisation of meanings in terms of objective categories, such as role prescriptions, norms and values, the sociologist should examine how action allows the actor to discover, create and sustain this standardisation. This, in turn, requires a reversal of the traditional sociological account of the relationship between social action and social structure which treats the former as determined by the latter - social structure cannot refer to anything more than members' everyday sense of social structure since it has no identity which is independent of that sense. (Walsh op cit p54, my emphasis)

The distance that separates Young from Walsh is obvious.

The new sociology of education actually requires a concept of social structure by virtue of its political commitment. A structural level analysis enables the delineation of a particular class of interpretations and analyses of educational practices - those which are politically radical and which might help to change the world rather than simply interpret it. In this way the infinite regression of analysis which occurs in the subjectivist relativism of phenomenology is avoided. Interpretations become legitimated through the conceptualisation of the link between interaction and social structures. This topic is developed in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to analyse the philosophical problem field in which the debate about the new sociology of education has been located. It has been argued that this field is grounded in two fundamental categories: the subject and experience. These categories are common both
to positivism and phenomenology. Their presence is indicated by their common reductionism, though they disagree fundamentally on how that reductionism can be achieved. The term 'positivism' has been shown as having quite different meanings within different theoretical contexts. For strict positivists it indicates **deductivism**, or the D-N method of explanation. For anti-positivist sociologists it refers to the characteristics of the social world and the social actor created in order to enable that type of explanation to be applied to human action. The typical concerns of anti-positivist sociologists are directed against the features of the D-N social world - the model of the social that is required if D-N explanation is to be made compatible with the non-positivist concepts of action and holism. By virtue of the political commitments of its advocates, the new sociology of education rejects the relativism of phenomenological reductionism. It requires a systems level of analysis to contextualise ethnographic classroom studies. As a **positive anthropomorphism** it needs to be able to interpret the world in a particular way and to perceive the knowledge so produced as not only correct but as potentially effective in bringing about social change.

The distinction between analytic and possibilitarian positions completes the journey from positivism in the strict sense to the new sociology of education. The problems and predicaments of a possibilitarian position 'within' the orbit of phenomenology are fundamentally based in the philosophical field that underpins it. Possibilitarianism resurrects the positivist spectres that phenomenology sets out to lay. **Exorcism is not in fact possible,**
for the visions that haunt phenomenology are not disembodied spirits but its own reflections. The problem of the new sociology of education is not relativism - it is the problem of finding a particular type of solution to the problem of relativism. This solution must involve a theory of knowledge as socially produced, an active model of the social actor as the producer of that knowledge, a theory of social structure as the material condition of that production and a corresponding methodology for its own knowledge production - these things without a return to 'positivism'. The solution will only be found outside the field that positivism and phenomenology share, and it will involve the recovery of science.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

(1) see Bhasker R. 1979 and page six in the Introduction.

(2) see, for instance, Sharp R. & Green A. 1975.

(3) examples of this can be seen in Flew A. 1976, Bernbaum G. 1977 and Musgrove F. 1979.

(4) for "metaparadigm" see Masterman's discussion of Kuhn in Masterman M 1970.

(5) see Karabel J. & Halsey A. 1977 Introduction.

(6) Karabel & Halsey ibid.

(7) see Bernstein B 1977 ch. 7 for an examination of this history.

(8) as Bhaskar points out: ". . . . it must be assumed that the world is such that it could be the object of such a cognitive operation of man".

(Bhaskar R. 1975b p33). Epistemologies are implicitly ontologies - they presuppose a model of the world they purport to explain.

(9) it should be mentioned that there are (or were) a number of approaches within 'phenomenology' - see, for instance Kockelmanns J. ed. 1967.

(10) on the "post-empiricist" philosophy of science see Hesse M. 1980.

(11) see Hesse ibid, and Barnes B. 1974 for an argument which explicitly relates issues in the philosophy of science to sociology.
REFERENCES IN CHAPTER ONE


Bhaskar R. (1975b)  "Feyerabend and Bachelard: two philosophies of science" in New Left Review No. 94


Esland G. (1971)  "Teaching and Learning as the Organisation of Knowledge" in Young M. F. D. ed. 1971


Giedymin J. (1975) "Antipositivism in Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science" in Brit J. of Philosophy of Science No. 26


Homans G. (1973) "Bringing Men Back In" in Ryan A. ed. 1973


McHugh P. (1971) "On the Failure of Positivism" in Douglas J. ed. 1971

Mehan & Wood (1975) "The Morality of Ethnomethodology" in Theory and Society 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Walsh D.</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
<td>in Filmer P. et al 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitty G.</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>&quot;Studying Society: for Social Change or Social Control&quot;</td>
<td>in Whitty G. &amp; Young M. F. D. eds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitty G.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;Sociology and the Problems of Radical Educational Change&quot;</td>
<td>in Young M. F. D. &amp; Whitty G. eds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young M. F. D. ed</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Knowledge and Control</td>
<td>Collier MacMillan, London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER TWO

EXPLANATIONS AND EXPLORATIONS

This chapter will review the development of ideas in the new sociology of education and its alignment with the neo-Marxist or 'political economy' approaches which emerged in the middle seventies. I will argue that as the relationship between educational practices and social structure increasingly became the key issue for new sociology of education writers so the need increased to contextualise classroom analyses within a macro, systems level theory. However, this requirement inevitably led to conflicts between the type of structural determinism which phenomenology had rejected and the radical humanism which the new sociology writers had found attractive in phenomenology. Essentially this is a form of the traditional determinism/voluntarism and macro/micro problems which have exercised the minds of sociologists for so long. The main argument in this chapter is that this conflict is endemic to the field described in chapter one. New sociology writers have tended to assume that if the education/production relationship (as the critical form of the classroom/social structure relationship) can only be theorised in a sufficiently complex and sophisticated manner, then all will be well. I will argue that this is impossible. I will characterise the manner in which that relationship is conceived as "indexical" and I will argue that this principle is fundamentally wrong.

This chapter will also look in detail at the political economy approaches
which have been influential in this area and the argument will be introduced that a fundamental feature which they share with the new sociology of education writers is the identification of the social relations of production with social relationships in production. This point will be returned to later in this work. The significance of this confusion is that it picks out social relationships in production as the focal point for processes of reproduction located in other areas of the social system, e.g. in the family or education. Consequently, maintaining an articulation between sets of social relationships in different systems comes to be seen as the mechanism for social reproduction. A presumed relationship between patriarchal relationships in the family and authority relationships in the work place would be an example of this.

EXPLANATION

I am going to consider the way in which the new sociology of education went about producing explanations of what happens in education. I will look at the kind of work actually produced and the problems it encountered. The distinctive feature of the new directions approach in the sociology of education was the manner in which it directed attention towards the classroom as a communicative context. "The texture of daily life in educational institutions" (Karabel & Halsey op cit p43) had been largely ignored by macro functionalist and conflict theories which treated the school as a 'black box' in an input-output system. Where attention had been paid to the classroom it had tended to be within a "psychometric paradigm - that
is the data of interaction, whether this be teacher talk, gesture or movement, or more rarely pupil talk, gesture or movement, are taken as fundamentally non-problematically open to measurement by existing instruments". (Robinson P. E. D. 1974 p252) (1) Apart from the 'positivist' character of this approach, it also involved researchers in simply "taking" rather than "making" problems (2). This 'taken for granted' posture was seen as obscuring rather than illuminating the reality of the classroom.

Within a strictly phenomenological approach the "taken for granted" character of psychometric type research is simply an instance of the blanket error of objectification to which human beings seem prone, i.e. treating what you believe to be real as real rather than "as if" real. The phenomenologists would attempt to redeem this error by revealing the grounds of the researcher's account, the grounds of his/her own account and the grounds of the 'subjects' accounts. This gives rise to a problem that is well described by Taylor et al in their discussion of phenomenology in deviance study:

..., it is apparent that if we follow the two methodological imperatives of phenomenology (the 'descriptive imperative' and the 'constitutive imperative') that we are caught up in a relativistic regress that only ends when we accept the actors' or members' phenomenological bracketing-off of their own accounts. One leading ethnomethodologist has called this 'The etcetera problem', for it is the case that no matter how hard we try to describe a phenomenon, the only limit to possible descriptions are the purposes or intentions of the members who have constituted the phenomena. Moreover even in such cases they could, of course, go on describing why they did what they did endlessly. (Taylor L et al 1973 p198)
As argued in the last chapter such a programme was not the intention of the new sociology of education. Given the political commitment of its writers the necessity existed of placing a limit on the construction of accounts, to limit accounts to a given type. What was going on in the classroom was to be understood in terms of power relationships explicated with reference to the wider social structure. What the phenomenologists merely saw as an 'error' becomes, in this perspective, an ideological mechanism disguising power relations and class interests. Whilst it is true to say, as Sharp has pointed out (Sharp B. 1980 p82), that writers within the new directions movement differed in how far they inclined towards the phenomenological posture, and that they changed their views through time, it remains the case that the new sociology of education has consistently distanced itself from phenomenology in this crucial respect.

KNOWLEDGE, CONTROL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

It is illuminating to consider Young's original formulations in "Knowledge and Control". He says that,

If the sociologist is able to suspend, in his enquiry, the taken for granted moral and intellectual absolutism of the teacher, who in his everyday situation has no such alternative, then the phenomena of the classroom and the school can be studied for what they might mean to the participants; such distinctions, then, as right or wrong, strict or slack, interesting or dull, which may be used by either teacher or taught, become phenomena to be explained. (Young op cit p7)

The significant term in this phenomenological sounding passage is "explained".

To make such taken-for-granted phenomena problematic in this way entails
producing sociological explanations in terms of "available meanings". Such meanings are "situationally specific". However, as this 'availability' will be a variable which is socially distributed, it needs to be conceived of historically as a structural contingency on action not accessible within an interactional framework alone." (ibid p4, my emphasis). Young argues that,

If logic, 'good' reasoning, asking questions, and all the various sets of activities prescribed for the learners, are conceived of from one perspective as sets of social conventions which have meanings common to the prescribers, then the failure to comply with the prescriptions can be conceived not as in the everyday world of the teachers as 'wrong', 'bad spelling or grammar', or 'poorly argued and expressed', but as forms of deviance. This does not imply anything about the 'rightness' or 'wrongness' of the teachers' or pupils' statements, but does suggest that the interaction involved is in part a product of the dominant defining categories which are taken for granted by the teachers. Thus the direction of research for a sociology of educational knowledge becomes to explore how and why certain dominant categories persist and the nature of their possible links to sets of interests or activities such as occupational groupings. (ibid pp5-6)

It is quite clear that Young's interest in the phenomenological approach was prescribed within a wider context of concerns that were in themselves incompatible with the phenomenological approach, as I indicated in the last chapter. Rather than a wholesale commitment to phenomenology, Young defines a space for its methodological injunctions. The phenomenological posture is seen as appropriate to micro-level classroom studies, but the idea that the logic of classroom interaction is ultimately intelligible in terms of power relations and the articulation of the educational system with
other interests and activities entails a concept of structure and a view

of explanation that is antithetical to phenomenology. Young, however,

points to another problem when outlining his approach:

We can make this more explicit by starting with the assumption
that those in positions of power will attempt to define what is to
be taken as knowledge, how accessible to different groups any
knowledge is, and what are the accepted relationships between
different knowledge areas and between those who have access to
them and make them available. It is thus the exploration of
how these processes happen... that should form the focus of a
sociology of education. Our understanding of the processes is
so rudimentary at present, that it is doubtful if we can postulate
any clear links between the organisation of knowledge at the level
of social structure and the process as it involves teachers in the
classroom.

(ibid p32)

The final sentence is highly significant. It suggests why Young should

become, in what Sharp defines as the middle period of his work (see Sharp
op cit pp76-77), preoccupied with classroom knowledge and why, given the
theoretical hiatus he describes, he should resort to an existential ethic of
commitment to the ideal of human betterment to ground his political concerns
in his work.

The criticisms of writers such as Bernbaum (Bernbaum G. 1977)
and Demaine (Demaine J. op cit) both overstate the significance of pheno-
menology in Young's ideas and overlook entirely the real problem. The
issue of defining the "link between the organisation of knowledge at the level
of social structure and the process as it involves teachers in the classroom"
is crucial because it is this link which provides the principle for limiting the
production of accounts of what is happening in classrooms. What has happened
in the new sociology of education since the early seventies has been largely to
do with exploring the possibilities and confronting the problems of conceptualising this link.

A central component of the radicalism of phenomenology was that it completely changed the idea of what sociology could be about. The traditional concerns of the discipline became meaningless within the phenomenological perspective - at best they could survive only as 'topics' to be accounted as types of members' meanings. It is significant that the new sociology of education retained the traditional concerns of the sociology of education. Michael Flude has written that,

> The main research programme so far undertaken in the sociology of education has been the attempt to establish and explain the marked variations in the educational attainments of pupils from different class and ethnic backgrounds. (Flude M. 1974 p.15)

The new sociology of education in effect proposed a new (or alternative) methodology for this research programme. In doing so it shifted the focus of concern to the classroom and the politics of classroom knowledge and raised a new set of issues. It proposed a phenomenologically inspired "ethnographic" approach to classroom studies (see Robinson op cit), an eclectic sociology of knowledge approach (drawing upon Marx, Weber, Durkheim and anthropological sources, as well as upon the work of Schutz) to the wider issues of knowledge production and distribution, and a yet to be specified (though obviously Marxian) approach to the key issue of the articulation between the educational system and the social structure. Of particular significance was the introduction of the idea that classroom processes could be
the effective mechanism producing the variations in educational attain-
ment.

This switch in the focus of concern for the sociology of education
correlates with the growing awareness of the failure of liberal educational
reforms to promote the social changes, in increased equality of opportunity,
social mobility, etc., that had been expected of them. The failure of
structural reforms such as comprehensivisation to seriously affect in-
equalities cast doubt upon the efficacy of purely structural levels of analysis
at a time when factors such as the raising of the school leaving age to sixteen
(1972/3) were throwing the established curriculum into sharp relief. That
educational inequalities 'cause', or are a mechanism for the reproduction of
social inequalities is the major domain assumption that the new sociology of
education shared with the established approaches. How education is implicated
in this process is the question to which the new direction contributed in an
original fashion. By making notions such as "success" and "failure"
problematic, it posed the problem of how such categories were constructed
and, by implication, suggested that it was this process of construction as such
that was the mechanism that created educational inequality. Conversely,
this view provided the principle according to which the analysis of educational
processes could proceed.

NEGOTIATION AND POWER IN THE CLASSROOM

A general description of the new directions approach which underlines
its phenomenological connection is provided by the Open University School and
Society Reader of 1971:

We can conceptualise the relationship between teachers and pupils as a process of negotiation. From their different experiences, they each bring to the classroom their own definitions of reality and their own understandings of the world. These differences between their social worlds have to be negotiated through the institutional rules and procedures which regulate the interaction in the classroom.

(Cosin B.R. et al 1971 p1)

This process of "negotiation" is further understood as "bargaining for control" (ibid). The relationship between teacher and pupil is asymmetrical. "The teacher's institutional position is based on his expertise in a particular field of knowledge, of which the pupil's own experience is, by definition, inferior." (ibid) The institutional relationship relates to a particular way of perceiving knowledge and the appropriate manner of its transmission. The view of the pupil as 'ignorant' places him or her, even when culturally at ease with the teacher, in the position of a "cognitive stranger"(3) by virtue of being continuously introduced to new knowledge.

Seeing negotiation in terms of bargaining within the framework of an asymmetrical relationship introduces the concept of power. At this point issues are being raised about the specificity of this relationship - its particular institutional form - that carries the approach beyond the normal bounds of phenomenology. Woods and Hammersley say that,

Central to this 'new approach' was a focus on teacher and pupil experiences as revealed in teachers' and pupils' own accounts, their interpretations and feelings emerging, changing, developing, converging, blurring, clarifying and so on in the course of everyday life in schools. This carries implications for the significance of the impact of schooling, for example on the pupil's conception of self and his construction of identity within the society of which he is part.

(Woods P. & Hammersley M. 1977 p14, my emphasis)
The notion of "identity formation" and the contentious nature of the 'negotiation' between teachers and pupils has been underlined by Bill Williamson:

> From such a starting point it becomes possible to regard interaction processes between teachers and pupils as processes of reality building and identity formation. Conflict in the classroom seen from this point of view is conflict about the legitimacy of what is being taught and about the self-conceptions and identities being offered to people. Teachers are no longer innocent pedagogues doing their bit to help children learn. In so far as they accept the principles upon which the school operates they are acting as agents of social control. What they are doing is to foster the development of cognitive patterns in children which do not allow for the easy emergence of oppositional thinking. Teachers are world builders not world destroyers; they are in the business of thought control.

(Williamson B. 1974 pp4-5)

The social control aspect that Williamson points to is indicated by Whitty and Young when, in their Introduction to "Explorations in the Politics of School Knowledge", they refer to contributions which,

> ...explore some of the assumptions which underlie both the explicit and hidden curricula of schooling and the contribution which they make to the status quo in society. They show how it is both the values embodied in current conceptions of curricular knowledge and the styles of pedagogy and assessment adopted by teachers, which help to sustain existing social hierarchies.

(Whitty G. & Young M. F. D. 1976 p2)

Against the general background with which we began, of "negotiations" etc., a set of more specific propositions are emerging that are not in themselves derived from the phenomenological approach and which, as I have already indicated, carry implications that conflict with it. We can specify these propositions as follows:

(1) The process of negotiation in the classroom should be seen as a
process of bargaining for control between teachers and pupils.

(2) teachers hold power in the classroom and are able to impose their categories and values.

(3) the processes they initiate and perpetuate construct particular types of pupil identities and cognitive patterns.

(4) these processes and their effects contribute to the maintenance of the status quo by sustaining social hierarchy.

These propositions constitute a set of rules for interpreting and describing what goes on in classrooms. They reflect an underlying set of assumptions about what education does in society, and they provide a theory of how it does it.

The key idea in all this is that it is educational processes, as opposed to say institutional structures or curricular content alone that are important. Assumptions about the nature of knowledge are seen as associated with assumptions about what counts as an appropriate organisation of pedagogic relationships, and these assumptions about the characteristics of knowledge transmission correlate with assumptions about the characteristics of the receivers, the pupils. Through the mediating factor of pedagogy, how teachers think about knowledge affects how they think about pupils and this in turn affects how pupils perform, because it is teachers who impose definitions of appropriate and inappropriate performances. Implicit in this is the idea that whereas certain ways of conceiving knowledge etc. do sustain hierarchy, support the status quo etc., other ways of doing those things do not. Hence there are notions of conservative educational processes and radical educational processes.
POWER, PEDAGOGY AND THE CURRICULUM

I will now illustrate these points by referring to specific works. I mentioned in the previous chapter Young's important distinction between "curriculum as fact" and "curriculum as practice". This distinction, based in Maxine Greene's discussion of the curriculum (4), effectively links concerns with positivism (at an epistemological as well as a social/political level) with the pragmatics of classroom teaching.

The concept of "curriculum as practice" directly takes issue with the "forms of knowledge" argument developed by P. Hirst (Hirst P. 1972). Using Popper's term, we can see this as an example of an "epistemology without a knowing subject" (Popper 1972). The concept of "knowledge" is strictly distinguished from the activity of "knowing", from the consciousness of a knowing subject (5). This clearly runs directly counter to any phenomenologically inspired concept of "knowledge" and within the anti-positivist sociological field of discourse counts as "positivist" (though in Popper's terms positivism itself would count as a "belief philosophy"!)

Young outlines the following features of "curriculum as fact":

(1) knowledge is seen as an external body of information (concepts, facts etc.) and techniques (methodologies, experimental practices etc.) to be 'mastered'.

(2) the established body of knowledge is given (e.g. enshrined in textbooks etc.) and is simply 'updated' as time goes by and new knowledge produced (through discovery not invention).
(3) correspondingly the curriculum is reified, i.e. treated as a thing with a life of its own (e.g. "How does the curriculum change?", as if it does it all by itself).

(4) transcribed into educational practice this view of knowledge presupposes a 'natural' hierarchy between teacher (he who knows) and taught (he/she who does not know).

(5) consequently teachers are active and dominant and pupils passive and subordinate.

(6) these relationships active/dominant, passive/subordinate are expressed in the character of the transmission process and the organisation of the school and its processes.

(7) the aims of education are given by what is contained in knowledge. The aim is to acquire knowledge - like a commodity.

(8) this theory of knowledge and its associated practices obscure the realities that knowledge is actively and collectively produced and that the hierarchies grounded in knowledge are arbitrary.

The concept of "curriculum as fact" draws together the various levels in the new directions approach. In order to describe how educational processes so understood are seen as acting as 'mechanisms' producing given effects it is useful to consider Whitty and Youngs' account of the concept of "the hidden curriculum":

Phrases like the "hidden curriculum", used by radical educationalists such as Ivan Illich, point to characteristics of schooling which are normally taken for granted. They emphasise that what is important about what pupils learn in school is not primarily the 'overt' curriculum of subjects like French and Biology, but values and beliefs such as
conformity, knowing one's place, waiting one's turn, competitiveness, individual worth, and deference to authority. The hidden curriculum teaches pupils 'the way life is', and that education is something that is done to them, rather than something which they do. (Whitty & Young op cit p63)

The significance of the concept is that it defines the level at which the socially effective processes of schooling are located. This enables an explanation of why it should be that apparently significant reforms such as the abolition of streaming, and the 11+ or the development of comprehensives have not produced the social changes expected of them - the hidden curriculum did not change.

Whitty's examination of social studies teaching illustrates this. Writing on the New Social Studies movement of the 1960s, he says:

Thus even those who were intensely critical of society at large adopted a strategy which accepted schools as they were. They accepted that high status subjects were derived from academic disciplines and merely argued for an additional subject to be placed alongside the other specialisms in the school curriculum - a social studies firmly grounded in the social sciences....The assumption seemed to be that social science disciplines yielded 'true' knowledge which, if taught to pupils would necessarily encourage such a critical stance towards the social world. (ibid p37)

He argues that despite the radical potential of the movement, its advocates "failed to look critically at the concept of knowledge upon which it was based, which was intensely conservative and implied a conservative view of the relationship between social scientists, teachers and pupils" (ibid). We see an association established between a "conservative" concept of knowledge and a "conservative" set of relationships within educational practice.
"many of us as teachers failed to look sufficiently critically at the social relations of our own practice". (ibid) Whitty concludes that,

There is a sense, then, in which the New Social Studies can be seen as a means of social control as effective as that of earlier courses in social studies. The failure of the movement to challenge the existing social relations of school knowledge has meant that, as much as other subjects, social studies has become something that is done to pupils rather than something which they do. (ibid p40)

Whitty's essay on the New Social Studies displays the characteristic concerns of the new directions approach and also indicates the reservations of those in the movement who were more inclined towards the 'structural' rather than the phenomenological wing. Young says that 'curriculum as practice" "as a kind of over-reaction to the pervasiveness of subjects, forms of knowledge and objectives, can itself be a form of mystification." (Young op cit p 185). This will be so to the extent that it simply "reduces the social reality of the 'curriculum' to the subjective intentions and actions of teachers and pupils." (ibid). He argues that it is necessary to understand,

....the historical emergence and persistence of particular conceptions of knowledge and particular conventions (school subjects for example). In that we are limited from being able to situate the problems of contemporary education historically, we are again limited from understanding and control. (ibid)

That Young should link "understanding and control" in this fashion is interesting and significant, because it is precisely a link of this type which is seen as characteristic of positivism and the associated policy science.
This underlines the point I have made earlier about the way in which the political commitment of the new sociology of education writers necessarily requires epistemologically powerful demarcation criteria to distinguish between possible 'accounts' or explanations and also a concept of effective knowledge. That is, it necessitates a non-positivist (and non-idealist) model of science.

DEVELOPMENTS

These consistently expressed reservations by Young and Whitty point to an internal source of development of ideas within the new sociology of education as the theoretical problems they imply are given increasing attention. Hence in the 1976 Open University Reader "The Process of Schooling" Hammersley and Wood write in their introduction that,

More recently there has been a swing back towards an emphasis on the determining effects of social systems, particularly of the capitalist system, and criticism of earlier statements which implied that change would occur if teachers changed the conception of teaching on which they operated. Rather than actors' perspectives and actions being seen as emerging out of interaction, they were now seen as being the product of social structural forces, either directly, or mediated by the cultural hegemony of the ruling class. In those versions of this tendency close to a neo-Hegelian Marxist position, the stress on the knowledge which underlies actors' constructions, is retained, but this knowledge is now seen as the product and reproducer of alienation. (Hammersley & Wood 1976 p2)

This "swing back" should not simply be seen as a pendulum swing of fashion, however. It indicates the development of concerns that were present in the new sociology of education from the beginning and a sensitivity to the kinds of criticisms presented by people such as Sharp and Green who complained that,

The phenomenological framework does not enable us to pose the
question of why it is that certain stable institutionalised meanings emerge from practice rather than others or the extent to which the channelling of interpreted meanings is socially structured and related to other significant aspects of social structure.
(Sharp R. & Green A. 1975 p24)

This work by Sharp and Green is particularly significant in that it also employed an 'ethnographic' approach to classroom interaction but located it within a more structural theoretical context. Their conclusions were in important respects at variance with the implications of phenomenology for such an analysis, in particular in relation to the central issue of identity construction.

The first phase of work in the new sociology of education can be seen as characterised by a concern with the details of classroom interaction and the organisation of school knowledge. Typically work of this kind involves observations concerning a particular topic such as school music (Vulliamy G. 1976) or English (Hand N. 1976) or the construction of categories such as pupil identities or appropriate behaviours (e.g. Keddie 1971, Stebbins 1977), or, less frequently, considerations on radical alternatives. Invariably these are small scale 'ethnographic' studies in which interpretations of educational practices are produced in terms of the general rules I outlined earlier. These interpretations were focussed, as it were, by a theoretical lens which had the form of a mainly implicit set of assumptions concerning what education does in capitalist societies and the character of the educational system's articulation with other sectors of that society. The development of the new sociology of education can be seen as the process whereby these assumptions became
increasingly explicit and consequently provided new topics for analysis and debate. In particular the limitations of these implicit assumptions became increasingly clear.

**SUMMARY**

In order to halt the infinite regress of accounts generated by phenomenological analysis, the new sociology required a rule to guide its interpretive work. This rule, whilst at one level operating as an implicit set of assumptions organising the 'accounts' of classroom interaction, at another takes on the specific theoretical form of the question as to why these educational processes have the particular forms they do as revealed in the analyses. This theoretical approach eventually functions as the guarantor of the descriptions produced. It explains why the processes appear as they do - they represent the interests of capital, power relations, etc. To ask why these particular conceptions of knowledge, taken for granted categories, pupil identities, etc. are the ones to emerge and persist is not only to pose a specific theoretical question, it is to seek a theory which underwrites the interpretive approach through which they gain those particularities.

At the theoretical level we can identify two main sources of inspiration for this project. Firstly there are the general criticisms of the phenomenological approach, such as those of Sharp and Green for instance, and secondly those non-phenomenological concerns specific to the new sociology of education itself by virtue of the political commitments of its advocates.

In combination these two sets of factors amount to a statement that phenomenology
cannot provide a sufficient base for the new sociology of education - it cannot accommodate the 'surplus requirement'. In the previous chapter I argued that the new sociology of education required a systems level theory, and in this chapter I have attempted to show how central figures such as Young and Whitty have consistently, in effect, reserved a space for such a theory in their work.

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE

In the mid-70s the combination of external criticisms of phenomenology and internal reservations about the limitations of the analyses of classroom interaction so far produced shifted the centre of gravity within the new sociology of education towards the structural wing of the movement. This shift is reflected in the changing concerns and content of Open University Readers and courses, for instance. Woods and Hammersley, reporting on the Cranfield conference of April 1975 organised by the Open University as preparation for the Schooling and Society course, say that:

The main polarisation was between interactionists and phenomenologists on the one hand and those who favoured more structural, materialist and historical explanations on the other. The latter criticised the former for being 'situationist' and 'idealist'. The critique ran like this: They have done valuable work, but if its value is to be realised and not distorted, it must be 'contextualised'. The 'autonomy of the individual' is important to interactionists, and they sometimes make great play of upgrading the individual in contrast to apparently monolithic, deterministic approaches which see him as a kind of puppet at the mercy of massive societal forces. Action is re-sited within the individual. However, without a context, without addressing the objective grounds for their own existence, the historic grounds constraining their production, they have the ironic effect of reproducing the alienative, reified relations which they themselves
denounce. While they focus attention on the situation that faces actors and on nothing else, and while they rely on subjectivist explanations, they are in danger of explaining things in their own terms, while the major forces, in fact, lie elsewhere. These are not always matters which impinge directly on everyday consciousness, and are not necessarily revealed there. The strategies and identities that teachers and pupils assume in classrooms are not produced entirely within the confines of these settings, but are in large part a product of a system of state education which itself is constrained by certain power relations and principles of social control. Should not these, then be the proper objects of study? (Woods & Hammersley 1976 pp14-15)

Underlying this divergence of views are the earlier dichotomies in the debate about positivism. At the same time it is also clear that the structural approach incorporates concerns expressed by Young in "Knowledge and Control".

In 1977 Young and Whitty edited "Society, State and Schooling" (the very title of which indicates the increasing preoccupation with 'the politics of contextualising'). In their Introduction they make clear their reservations about phenomenologically inspired accounts of classroom interaction and explore the problems involved in extending analyses.

Studies of what happens to pupils in school and the nature of the curriculum to which they are exposed are beginning to be given more significance than the sort of input-output analyses which until recently constituted the bulk of work within this field. Unfortunately, however, many of these studies about the minutiae of classroom interaction, or analyses of the assumptions underlying prevailing definitions of curricular knowledge, seem to present education as being carried on in a social vacuum, and whilst they often tell us a great deal about 'how' schools perpetuate social inequalities, their failure to discuss 'why' this may be so helps to obscure the difficulties of change. In other words, while the sociology of education has increasingly focussed upon 'cultural' aspects of schooling, it has failed to locate them in their broader historical and political contexts. (Young & Whitty 1977 pp7-8)
It is interesting to note once again here, in the comment on the "difficulties of change", the implicit assumption of knowledge effectivity and of the relationship between (radical) knowledge and control (social changes). Another significant assumption lies in the manner in which the "studies of the minutiae of classroom interaction" are seen as a problem. The idea that it is possible to show 'how' schools perpetuate social inequality without knowing 'why' assumes that the 'how' qualities are empirically available independently of any deeper understanding of the articulation between classroom settings and wider structures, as if all that is required is to slot a set of 'how' type descriptions into a wider theory of historical and political contexts - descriptions in search of a theory. The significance of the ideas of people such as Sharp and Green is that 'why' type theory is a necessary condition for understanding 'how' and that, on this basis, it might be discovered that the effective mechanisms are not located at the empirical level of ethnographic observation. Within the problematics of the new sociology of education the real significance of 'why' is that it provides the principle for 'how' type analyses. In fact a 'why' type theory was implicit all along - the problem was: to make it explicit.

'How' and 'why' type questions are intrinsically linked and can only be separated if one or the other is neglected but implicit. The new sociology of education itself began by criticising the implicit and neglected assumptions about transmission and learning in positivist macro approaches. We can say that 'how' type analyses are conducted on the basis of 'why' type
assumptions. As these assumptions are made increasingly explicit, under the auspices of the problem of contextualising practices, they also become increasingly problematical because they become available to critical examination. The primary postulate of ethnographic classroom analyses is that educational processes at the level of classroom interaction are to do with identity formation. Identity formation is the major effect of the constructions produced by teachers in their everyday interactions with their pupils. It is further assumed that these processes, in some important respect, both reflect and reproduce existing social inequalities and that there is a relationship between the organisation of knowledge and the hierarchies grounded in it and the social hierarchies of the wider society. The question of contextualising practices within their broader historical and political locations becomes the problem of specifying that relationship so that the particularities of processes can be precisely defined (and explained), and their effects (in the form of particular types of pupil identities) accounted for. What is at one level a genuine problem in the theory of the new sociology of education is also, at another level, a solution to the problem of phenomenological descriptive regress. This problem has adopted the specific form of defining the relationship between education and the sphere of production.

CORRESPONDENCE TO RESISTANCE

We can define two major phases in the development of this programme
since the mid 70s. The first phase can be called that of "correspondence" and the second, that of "resistance, autonomy and social transformation". The second phase of work is a response to the limitations and problems of the former. A general description of the position taken in both phases can be seen as being provided by Hall:

.....education is not simply shaped in a general way by the imperatives, arrangements and logic of the capitalist system. Education is specifically articulated with this system in certain very definite ways. (Hall S. 1981 p13)

It is this notion of "specific articulation" that is the key issue. Hall defines three major paradigms within Marxist approaches to the school-society relationship: the correspondence paradigm, the paradigm of hegemony and the reproduction paradigm. Each paradigm implies an increasingly complex and more deeply mediated relationship between school and society. Hall emphasises that there are variants within each paradigm - reproduction, for instance, includes Althusser, Bourdieu and Bernstein each of whom differs quite significantly from the other in major respects.

It is not the case that these paradigms represent a sequence of theoretical developments: Gramsci (the major theorist of hegemony) pre-dates Bowles and Gintis (correspondence) by forty odd years, but they 'feed-in' to the sociology of education as the requirements for a more complex model develop. R.J. Bates for example, argued in 1980 that Bourdieu's work could be incorporated into the new sociology of education in order to ground a concept of "relative autonomy". He explicitly relates this idea to the "overly mechanistic and simplistic model" of Bowles and Gintis' original correspondence theory. Young wrote in the same journal (British Journal of the
Sociology of Education) in the following year that,

Perhaps it is not too much to hope that the next book that aims to be a critical sociology of education will not just critique the sociologies of education of the 1960s and 1970s, but start from Gramsci's analyses of intellectuals, the state, and the role of the Party, and use them to develop more concrete empirical work and more specific political strategies.

It is also the case that the theorists mentioned by Hall, for the most part, write at a high level of theoretical abstraction and generality, as he himself acknowledges. For present purposes my interest is not so much in these theorists on their own terms, but in the way in which their views have guided or influenced work with more specific interests in the sociology of education.

CORRESPONDENCE

In the first, "correspondence", phase two works were of particular importance in influencing how people 'in' or allied with the new sociology of education came to think about the "specific articulation" between the educational system and production. One is Bowles and Gintis' "Schooling in Capitalist America", and the other is Althusser's essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses". Although there is no problem in describing the former as a "correspondence" theory, that the latter should be so described might seem contentious - especially as Hall defines Althusser's approach as a reproduction theory. However, on the specific question of how this essay orientates researchers towards the interpretation of what goes on in classrooms it is clearly, in my view, on the basis of a correspondence principle. A problem arises because Althusser's theory of ideology
and his complex model of the social system are very obviously at variance with the Bowles and Gintis approach. But on the specifics of defining the content of educational practices he is saying very much the same thing - and further has been treated as such. I will illustrate these points shortly.

Bowles and Gintis' book is exceptional in that it contains a great deal of empirical material, both historical and contemporary, to support its argument. They describe their basic position as follows:

(the educational system) is best understood as an institution which serves to perpetuate the social relationships of economic life through which these patterns (of inequality and repression) are set, by facilitating a smooth integration of youth into the labour force. This role takes a variety of forms. Schools foster legitimate inequality through the ostensibly meritocratic manner by which they reward and promote students, and allocate them to distinct positions in the occupational hierarchy. They create and reinforce patterns of social class, racial and sexual identification among students which allow them to relate "properly" to their eventual standing in the hierarchy of authority and status in the production process. Schools foster types of personal development compatible with the relationships of dominance and subordinacy in the economic sphere, and, finally, schools create surpluses of skilled labour sufficiently extensive to render effective the prime weapon of the employer in disciplining labour - the power to hire and fire.

(Bowles and Gintis 1976 p11)

We see here the central premise of the new sociology of education approach: namely, that educational processes are mechanisms of identity formation.

We also see how this process is given a specific definition - identity formation takes place according to the requirements of relationships in the economic sphere. In this manner they come to perpetuate social inequality.

The "ostensibly meritocratic" manner in which they do this provides an
ideological legitimation for the inequalities so created. This account of what education is doing provides a method for describing the processes through which it does it - in terms of the earlier discussion, 'why' accounts for 'how'. "Specifically, the social relationships of education - the relationships between administrators and teachers, teachers and students, students and students, students and their work - replicate the hierarchical division of labour." (ibid p131)

Roger Dale, following Bowles and Gintis' argument has written that,

Authority relations in schools then closely resemble those in industry. There is a hierarchical division of labour both within the staff,... and between the staff and the pupils. The further down the hierarchy one progresses, the less control the individuals involved possess until we reach the pupils/labourers with little or not control over the content of their work....It is, then, the central argument of this section that the 'hidden curriculum' of the school affectively prepares students for the 'hidden curriculum of the workplace'.

(Dale R. 1975 p30)

A complementarity between Bowles and Gintis' position and that of Althusser is suggested by Madeleine MacDonald when she says that,

Three factors emerge in Althusser's model of social reproduction. Individuals are accorded their place in the economic system by the school system, firstly by the amount of schooling, secondly by the type of schooling, (i.e. the content), and thirdly by acquiring specific moral and social attitudes towards work and towards a system of social control. However, the variety of ways in which schooling equips the individual with technical and social skills is not discussed in Althusser's analysis and for the possible mechanisms of social reproduction I shall turn to the work of Bowles and Gintis.

Bowles and Gintis identify a variety of structural features of schooling which, they argue, express a correspondence between the social relations of schooling and the social relations of production. The internal structures of the school and of the
educational system as a whole are seen as mechanisms for ensuring the reproduction of the class structure and hence of the economic mode of production from which it is derived. (MacDonald M. 1977 p15)

MacDonald's smooth transition from Althusser to Bowles and Gintis is achieved on the basis of an extensive quote from Althusser's essay - a much quoted section in fact. It includes the following:

(the school) takes children from every class at infant school age, and then for years, the years in which the child is most 'vulnerable', squeezed between the family State apparatus and the educational state apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of 'know-how' wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics, civil instruction, philosophy). Somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children are ejected 'into production': these are the workers or small peasants. Another proportion of scholastically adapted youth carries on: and, for better or worse, it goes somewhat further, until it falls by the wayside and fills the posts of small and middle technicians, white collar workers, small and middle executives, petty bourgeois of all kinds. A last portion reaches the summit, either to fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to provide, as well as the 'intellectuals of the collective labourer', the agents of exploitation (capitalists, managers), the agents of repression (soldiers, policemen, politicians, administrators etc.) and the professional ideologists (priests of all sorts, most of whom are convinced 'laymen').

Each mass ejected en route is practically provided with the ideology which suits the role it has to fulfil in class society. . . . (Althusser L. 1971 p155)

Ted Benton, approaching the topic of education and politics from Althusser's theory of Ideological State Apparatuses, has written:

....when the various mechanisms of selection which operate in the educational system segregate and distribute children according to their estimated ability or potential (i.e. their predicted place in the class structure) in order that they can undergo different processes of training and preparation, this is not some politically neutral exercise whose sole concern is the development of the child. The necessary attitudes,
skills and disciplines are being inculcated into the appropriate individuals in the appropriate proportions for the requirements of the capitalist-labour market.

That, of course, is an enormous over-simplification. The educational system is not a well-oiled frictionless machine, neatly interlocked with the labour market. Nor does it operate on an inert and malleable material! Kids resist being educated to a greater or lesser extent, and in many different ways.

(Benton T. 1974 p14) (7)

The similarities between his 'Althusserian' description and Dale's 'Bowles and Gintis' description are clear.

SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN PRODUCTION

These similarities are not simply superficialities at the surface level of the text, however. Despite the complexities of Althusser's more general arguments on ideology and the character of the social formation, on the specific issue of the genetic site of the content of educational practices, i.e. on the determination of their specificities as educational practices fulfilling a particular ideological function, his argument is clear. It is social relationships in production to which educational practices relate as practices constituting through ideology particular types of subjects. This is part of the basic logic of his argument in the essay and it is worth looking at in some detail as it has wider implications and will be returned to in chapter eight.

Althusser says that,

All ideological State apparatuses, whatever they are, contribute to the same result: the reproduction of the relations of production, i.e. of capitalist relations of exploitation.

(Althusser op cit p153)

The "number-one" ISA is the educational system. Its primary function is to reproduce what he calls the "competence" of labour power. The concept of
ISAs is developed in order to answer the question: "how is the reproduction of the relations of production ensured?" (ibid p148).

This question arises from the more general problem: how are the "conditions of production" reproduced? (ibid pp127-128) The answer cannot be found in production itself because, Althusser argues, there is a tendential law in capitalism for the skills of labour power to be decreasingly developed in production. This phase of the argument is developed through a series of distinctions which enable the question to be posed in increasingly specific forms. The argument unfolds as follows:

(1) Every society must reproduce its "conditions of production". This involves the reproduction of a) the forces of production and b) the relations of production.

(2) The reproduction of the forces of production involves the reproduction of a) the means of production and b) labour power.

(3) The reproduction of labour power involves the reproduction of a) its material conditions of existence and b) its competence.

(4) The reproduction of the competence of labour power involves the reproduction of a) its technical skills and b) its "submission to the ruling ideology" (ibid p133).

(5) "The reproduction of labour power thus reveals as its sins qua non not only the reproduction of its 'skills' but also the reproduction of its subjection to the ruling ideology or of the 'practice' of that ideology, with the proviso that it is not..."
enough to say 'not only but also', for it is clear that it is in
the forms and under the forms of ideological subjection that
provision is made for the reproduction of the skills of labour
power." (ibid pl33)

The final point indicates that "skills of labour power" and "ideology
of labour power" have to be 'bracketed' together - it is not the case that we
have skills + ideology, but rather that skills are always presented in a given
ideological form. This 'bracketing' represents the presence of ISAs. It
is within the practices materially active within the ISAs that consciousness
is developed in its appropriate forms. Given Althusser's definition of what
ISAs do, this developing of consciousness (the constituting through ideology
of the individual as a subject) is at the same time the reproduction of the re-
lations of production. The concept of ISAs 'closes' the system. The high
level general concept of "relations of production" is posed alongside the con-
cept "forces of production" and then set to one side. It is recovered at the
point when the most specific instance, the reproduction of the competence of
labour power is being considered. The answer to the general question, how
are the conditions of production reproduced is found in the answer to the most
specific question, how is the competence of labour power reproduced? Given
the formula: all ideological State apparatuses contribute to the reproduction
of the relations of production, and given the fusion of skills and competence
of labour power within the practices of the educational ISA, we find the identi-
fication of "relations of production" with relationships in production. Con-
comitant with this is the separation of the "material conditions of existence
of labour power" from the "competence" of labour power. It is important to keep in mind that Althusser develops the concept of ISAs specifically in order to answer the question of the reproduction of the relations of production (see ibid p133). Schematically, the argument can be represented in this way,

As far as the specificities of this process are concerned, Althusser argues as follows: Ideology has a material existence and always exists within the practices of an apparatus.

I say: the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but at the same time and immediately I add that
the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects. In the interaction of this double constitution exists the functioning of all ideology, ideology being nothing but its functioning in the material forms of existence of that functioning.

(ibid p171)

Hence the educational ISA reproduces through its material practices particular categories of subjects, i.e. concrete individuals constituted as subjects according to certain determinants. The specificity of the educational ideological practices is given by the function of the educational ISA which is to develop the competence of labour power, to secure its submission to the dominant ideology.

...it is not enough to ensure for labour power the material conditions of its reproduction if it is to be reproduced as labour power. I have said that the available labour power must be 'competent', i.e. suitable to be set to work in the complex system of production. The development of the productive forces and the type of unity historically constitutive of the productive forces at a given moment produce the result that the labour power has to be (diversely) skilled and therefore reproduced as such. Diversely: according to the requirements of the socio-technical division of labour, its different 'jobs' and 'posts'.

(ibid p131)

Although the educational system, as relatively autonomous, is doing things its own way (what Dale calls "relative autonomy of execution"), what it is doing is given in the manner of its articulation with the socio-technical division of labour. The latter, through its diversity, provides the principle of intelligibility for the diversity, or organisation, of education. Given that in both spheres ideology has a material form as practices, the practices of education will be continuous in some fundamental, if not immediately apparent
(in contrast to Bowles and Gintis), way with the practices in production. The key to this continuity is given away by the distributive functions of education – the manner in which it allocates "scholastically adjusted" youth to production. They will be allocated according to the competencies that have been developed in them in relation to the diverse requirements of the socio-technical division of labour.

The selection of the "socio-technical division of labour" as the site referenced by educational practices is highly significant. It crucially affects the way in which reproduction theories come to be formulated and the problems they come to experience and see as requiring solutions. Any theory of reproduction presupposes a concept of what needs to be reproduced as well as how that reproduction is secured. Althusser, in effect, argues that what needs to be reproduced if the general conditions of production under capitalism are to be reproduced are relationships in production, the "relations of exploitation". The key moment in Althusser's argument at which this 'choice' of site is made is when the material conditions of existence of labour power are separated from the "competence" of labour power. In terms of Marxist theory and debate the issues here are involved and complex (8). All I wish to do at this point is indicate a particular aspect of how the site of the "socio-technical division of labour" is selected because of its bearing upon subsequent discussion in other chapters.

Althusser argues that for labour power to be constituted as such it is not sufficient simply for its material conditions of existence and reproduction to be secured. It has to be developed as "competent" in terms of the diverse
requirements of the division of labour. The material conditions for the
existence of labour power are identified with: an historically variable
minimum of physical necessities required for subsistence, requirements
for procreation and child-rearing, and an amount that represents the
victories of class struggle. Althusser is referring here to the list of
These factors are, according to Marx, the factors determining the value
of labour power (9). In order for labour power to have a value at all it
has first to be constituted as a commodity. It is the conditions under which
labour power becomes a commodity that form the material conditions for the
existence of labour power. These conditions are intrinsically social and
specifically capitalist. Marx gives them as follows: (1) the worker must
be treated as the owner of his own labour power and free to offer it for sale,
(2) the worker must be separated from the means of production so that he is
forced to sell his labour power and not the products of his labour, (3) the
products of labour must be produced for exchange (i.e. for the realisation
of value) not for immediate consumption by the producer. In this way all
relationships become exchange relationships with the purpose of creating and
realising value. It is these conditions that constitute the social relations
of production under capitalism, not relationships in production. The material
conditions for the existence of labour power (in its specifically capitalist form)
are the conditions that constitute it as a commodity. The implications of this
for a theory of reproduction are considerable (10).

The significance of the work of Bowles and Gintis and of Althusser
was that it enabled the idea that social constructions in the classroom
were processes of identity formation to be given specificity. It enabled
the principle of this process to be enunciated and that, in turn, eliminated
the ad hoc subjectivism of ethnographic descriptions. Knowing why education
did what it was doing substantiated descriptions of how it did it. Paradoxically,
perhaps, the interest in producing such descriptions has tended to decline since
the mid-70s and more interest has been taken in the nature of the link between
education and production and the problems of conceptualising it, though Arnot
and Whitty argue (op cit) that a new, more sophisticated generation of studies
is being produced, mainly by Americans, with the benefit of these reflections
upon the problems of "correspondence". An important aspect of the way in
which the link between education and production was presented was that it
reduced considerably the significance of the technical aspects of schooling's
contribution to the economy and stressed instead the aspects of consciousness
and ideology. On this basis it became possible to see orthodox technicist
accounts of what education does as ideological, especially as, in promoting
the idea of 'skills', they proclaimed the political neutrality of schooling.
This resonated with radical criticisms of other 'objectivist' tenets in ortho-
dox approaches to schooling, e.g. I.Q. testing, the fairness of exams, the
impartiality of teachers.

INDEXICALITY AND EFFECTIVITY

The increasing convergence between the new sociology and neo-Marxist
approaches to education centred around this view of an ideological reproduction
function and the coextensive concept of identity formation along the axis of an articulation between education and production. There are two important principles associated with this complex of ideas whose effects upon work in this sector of the sociology of education are considerable. The first can be called the principle of indexicality, which proclaims an underlying material continuity between education and production, and the second is the principle of effectivity which proclaims that educational practices can produce the material effects that meet the requirements of production. Whereas the latter principle refers to the key concept of identity formation in educational practices, the former refers to the principle of the specificity of those practices and formations. In combination these two principles give a particular theoretical form to the fundamental tenet that education under capitalism reproduces class relationships. They underpin a particular theory of how that happens.

All the key concepts in the general formulation of the approach and in further, more detailed theoretical developments can be made problematical and open to intensive debate: for example, "class relations" can be understood in terms of a distributive relations/ruling-class model in which class differentials in access and opportunity is taken as the main issue. Politically, educational privilege (the public schools) and elite recruitment will be seen as the major problem. This approach can be broadly identified as the "old left" position (e.g. the treatment of education by writers such as Miliband or Westergaard). Reproduction is seen in terms of 'the ruling class' politically protecting its interests by controlling the educational institutions.
and bureaucracy. Conversely, a production relations/capital model can be employed in which the ideological reproduction function is stressed and the needs of capital (in the production process, problems of accumulation etc.) taken as the major determinant. In this case the question of access in itself is seen as a liberal/reformist concern and what happens in education is made problematical. Similarly there can be disagreements over what are the important cleavages within the social formation that need to be reproduced and are, therefore, to be replicated in education, e.g. is it a single broad distinction between mental and manual labour (e.g. Gorz, Poulantzas, Sohn-Rethal) or a more subtle range of distinctions based in the organisation and control of the labour process (as Bowles and Gintis seem to argue). A third major problem is that of nature of the 'fit' between education and production - is there 'simple correspondence' (Bowles and Gintis) or a more deeply mediated correspondence (Althusser) which introduces secondary concepts such as relative autonomy, resistance and struggle. All of these issues feed back into broader debates within Marxism - the value controversy, state theory, ideology etc.

**SUMMARY**

A broad outline of the position that emerges from the convergence of the new sociology of education and the various neo-Marxist approaches (recognising that a range of views can be found around any particular issue) can be given as follows:

(1) the educational system organises children into distinctive educational
categories on the basis of their class, gender and ethnic characteristics. This process is achieved through formal and informal selection procedures which claim to be objective and neutral.

(2) these categories are represented as educational career paths formally structured within educational institutions. They are not directly identical with institutional structures, however, because such structures can change (e.g. abolition of streaming, comprehensivisation) whilst these differentiated career routes remain in tact (failure of liberal reforms etc.)

(3) these distinctive educational career paths constitute long-term educational experiences for pupils specific to their categories. They articulate, on the one hand, with the family system from which pupils enter schooling, and, on the other, with the occupational system for which they are destined.

(4) educational careers are primarily to do with identity formation. Overt and covert practices inscribed within career paths develop distinctive forms of consciousness, cognitive patterns, values and aspirations, attitudes to authority and habits of discipline that are specific to the pupils' future locations in the division of labour.

(5) the educational system formally grades pupils according to the type of preparation they have undergone. Examinations, like selection procedures, claim to be objective measures of ability and merit. The system sanctifies and legitimates the system of differences, of success and failure which it itself creates. Educational credentials, or their lack, are treated as indexing the type of preparation that pupils have undergone and serve as the basis for allocating them to the appropriate sectors of the occupational structure.
A number of problems associated with this position can be noted: Firstly, how is the articulation between the educational system and the occupational structure actually maintained? This is not simply a problem of supply and demand at each level but of the underlying continuity between educational and occupational categories. Further: how are the requirements of occupational categories transmitted into the educational system and then translated into an appropriate educational form? Althusser's idea of "the ruling ideology" which orchestrates the various diverse and contradictory ISAs or the concept of "hegemony" in no real sense answers these questions. The principle of indexicality presupposes a set of complex underlying mechanisms which secure the specific material articulation between education and production and maintain the continuity between educational (identity constructing) practices and the practices of production. Defining these mechanisms - or even establishing their plausibility - is a major problem.

Secondly, a similar problem exists in the case of the principle of effectivity. At what level are the effective mechanisms of educational identity formation located and what is their form and mode of operation? This is a problem that has attracted attention and over which there is quite a variety of opinion. Young and Whitty, for example, say,

A common theme in the various perspectives proposed or discussed in this book is that schools act as agencies of social control and serve to reproduce the prevailing system of social relations. They differ, however, about the nature of what is being reproduced, about the mechanisms via which such reproduction is achieved, and about the extent to which schools can be regarded as merely agencies of reproduction....
The tendency of Illich (and Gintis with him on this particular score) to concentrate attention upon the hidden curriculum, while many 'new direction' sociologists stress aspects of the selection and organisation of curriculum knowledge, is a further example of the way in which particular styles of theorising can obscure the complex nature of the process of schooling.

(Young & Whitty 1977 p123)

This problem of level and mode of operation becomes particularly crucial in the cases of variations and changes in educational processes and practices both contemporaneously and through time. The generally ad hoc character of studies of classroom interactions has in no way clarified this problem and criticisms of 'positivistic' comparative studies such as those of Bennett (1976) and Rutter (1979) have tended to concentrate on their empiricist and objectivist 'shortcomings' rather than engage the interesting implications of their conclusions.

The generally established conclusion that variations and changes (including major reforms) seem to make very little difference is usually taken as confirmation of the basic principle that education is a social control agency reproducing social inequality (therefore no changes are to be expected) rather than seen as suggesting that maybe educational processes do not produce the strong effects attributed to them; that is, the failure of educational change to produce changes in outcome results not from the fact that education does generate strong effects, but from the fact that it doesn't and the mechanisms of reproduction are located elsewhere (11).

Related to this is the logical point that even if it can be shown through description that educational practices are organised on class lines and on the basis of class models, it does not necessarily follow that they also produce
class effects. The effectivity of educational practices has to be demonstrated not assumed, as it almost universally is. This demonstration would need to be accompanied by an appropriate learning or socialisation theory which made the link between the class structure of educational organisation and its supposed outcomes in the form of identity formation etc. I would suggest at this point that the idea that what is remarkable about educational practices is their lack of effectivity is more plausible than the assumption of effectivity.

RELATIVISM, DETERMINISM AND PESSIMISM

I have argued that the convergence between the new sociology of education and neo-Marxist approaches to education can be seen in relation to problems endemic to the new sociology by virtue of its phenomenological heritage and those non-phenomenological concerns of central figures such as Young. The "resistance" phase of this programme follows on from a growing awareness of the problems implicit in "correspondence" type theories - problems later recognised by some of the original contributors to that approach, e.g. Bowles and Gintis (1981) and Apple (1982). In general terms there have been two strategies adopted to these problems. The first, of which Sarup (op cit) can be seen as an example, is to look at the coherence of the approach and attempt to pull the various strands together into a more logically complete 'general theory'. R.J. Bates, for instance has argued that four issues have stood out as the new direction developed:

These are (i) the nature of the epistemological foundations of the new sociology of education, (ii) the adequacy of phenomenology as a basis for structural analysis, (iii) the stratification of knowledge and the power of elites in determining the curriculum,
(iv) the nature of the political action implied by the new sociology of education. Each of these issues is a matter of some substance from a theoretical point of view and of some importance to those whose practice is guided by the resulting analysis. Each was present in the early formulations of the new sociology of education, each has produced propositions which have been modified by subsequent debate and reflection. Collectively, the response to these issues forms the core of the emerging paradigm.

(Bates R.J. op cit)

Although Bates account is correct his conclusion is debatable. In the first place it is not really clear that there is "a collective response" to the issues he identifies. Particular individuals may have addressed particular items, but I personally do not see any unifying move which is drawing their conclusions into a consensus within the "epistemic community" of new directions sociologists. Neither does Bates satisfactorily demonstrate that the elements of this new paradigm are truly coherent rather than an ad hoc assembly of parts. Bourdieu's concept of relative autonomy for instance is fundamentally different from that of the writers most usually discussed in relation to this concept. Lastly, and from my point of view most fundamentally, Bates' solution draws heavily upon critical theory and does not escape the effects of the positivistic problem field described in the first chapter.

The second, and more common strategy is that denoted by Arnot and Whitty's reference to 'transformation' (i.e. "social change") theories. It involves concentrating on a set of specific problems arising from correspondence and, as it were, trying to get them right in order to get the whole thing right. Arnot and Whitty write that, increasingly, it came to be
recognised that,

....the political economy of schooling as presented by Bowles & Gintis had severe limitations. By and large, it failed to describe and explain classroom life, the conflicts and contradictions within the school and the distance and conflict between the school and the economy. Further, it could not account for the variety of responses of teachers and pupils to the structures of the schools - some of which were liable to threaten the successful socialisation of the new generation.

....(some writers) recognised the effects of class culture on the ways pupils made sense of and responded to the ideologies and culture of the school. They further argued that the hidden curriculum of schooling was not merely the terrain of social control but also the ground on which ideological and political struggles were fought and hence a potential site for change. (op cit p98)

It is interesting to note the way in which these criticisms of the "political economy" approach reflect the characteristic concerns of the new sociology of education: the issue of the social actors' responses in situations, the concern for the possibilities of change. It is as if the traditional themes of the new direction are reasserting themselves again within a more deeply structural theoretical context. Indeed, "Society, State and Schooling", whilst stressing the need for a more structural 'contextualising' approach was in many ways preoccupied with the problems this presented for the possibilities of action (12).

In an article that challenges the position taken by Arnot and Whitty on the character of the new "transformation" works, Hargreaves says that,

The cumulative effects of these criticisms from both within and outside Marxism, was to discredit such vulgar and simplistic theories of 'direct reproduction', to such an extent that they are no longer accorded much importance within the sociology of education. Indeed, even the most ardent proponents of direct reproduction theory went on to record substantial doubts and reservations about their earlier work (e.g. Bowles and Gintis 1981). Paradoxically, it is only now because
of the writings of its critics that direct reproduction theory survives at all, in effect supplying a readymade straw-man against which more subtle and sophisticated accounts of the relationship between schooling and society can be favourably compared. (Hargreaves A. 1982 p108)

Hargreaves argues that the failure of 'vulgar' Marxism has spurred Marxist theorists on to produce more subtle and sophisticated theories. He identifies two main lines of development: "explanations of resistance and social transformation and explanations of relative autonomy." (ibid)

Arnot and Whitty point to what they see as the positive features of the new American work: its concern for "interventions" and social change, its "intellectual and methodological pluralism", the openness of its theory to empirical "interrogation". But despite all this it is striking how far their description of this material reminds one of what Young was saying in the very beginning in "Knowledge and Control".

What this work certainly does recognise is that the precise relationship between the political economy of schooling, the form and content of the curriculum and the social relations of the classroom cannot be resolved at a purely theoretical level. Thus the theoretical exploration of the broader dynamics of capitalist societies and the historical and situational analysis of curricular practice need to be brought together. Even when we have established some understanding of the historical origins of school curricula and examined the ideological features of school texts, it remains important to recognise that the effectivity of curricula is also crucially dependent upon the pedagogical context in which they are used and the different knowledges, prejudices and resistances that pupils bring into the classroom. (Arnot and Whitty op cit p99)

Taken by itself, this does not seem particularly new. Rather it would seem to be the case that the concerns of the new sociology of education are being
reasserted in a context in which the problem that Young identified as
the inability to show "clear links between the organisation of knowledge
at the level of social structure and the process as it involves teachers in
the classroom" is being seriously taken into account.

Another line of continuity is indicated by Hargreaves. In much the
same way that I have argued that the new directions theorists were propelled
away from phenomenology in search of a systems level theory because of
their political commitments and the associated necessity to escape from
relativism, so Hargreaves argues, against the claims of Arnot and Whitty
listed earlier, that,

The movement from correspondence to resistance, from re-
production to transformation, then, has been born less out of
scholarly interest in the open and exploratory quest for know-
ledge about the schooling process, than out of the academic
left's political conscience about the revolutionary (or, rather,
non-revolutionary) implications of its own theorising... Specific-
ally, when the writings of Apple and Giroux are examined
closely, it becomes clear that their deep commitment to 'radical
educational change' has led them to privilege those kinds of
explanation and evidence which promise to make the achievement
of such change a more realistic proposition.
(Hargreaves op cit p111)

What is fascinating about Hargreaves' comments on the non-revolutionary
implications of this type of theory is that we see the same problem coming
up as in the first phenomenological phase of the new sociology of education
but for the opposite reasons. In the first phase it was the non-revolutionary
implications of phenomenological relativising theory that created the problem
and necessitated the quest for a 'contextualising' commitment-grounding,

system-level theory. Now it is this 'solution' that creates the same problem.

That this particular problem should be associated with structural theories
is not unexpected – after all this is precisely what phenomenology had against them in the first place, and as I noted earlier Young and Whitty and several of the contributors to "Society, State and Schooling" were concerned about the possible pessimism that could be generated by over-determining concepts of the social system. What is significant is the oscillation within the theoretical development from phenomenology to resistance. We can see this in relation to a sub-heading in Young and Whitty's Introduction to that book: "Education as Determined or Determining?". They argue that it is necessary to "overcome simplistic dichotomies" (ibid p.13) and suggest that the way to do this is to treat the categories relationally:

Only in society in which 'theory' is institutionalised as separate from practice, and in which thought itself is separated from action, can abstract categories such as 'determined' and 'determining' counterpose each other as opposites. In accepting them as such, rather than trying to formulate them relationally, we accept an ideology, in the sense that they present an appearance (or a particular experience of educationists) as reality. A relational approach would involve seeking the conditions in which such abstract opposites can be transcended as the real separations of the material world are transcended.

(Ibid p.12)

The manner in which the writers suggest this particularly intractable theoretical dilemma can be resolved has a certain ingenuity about it given their own concerns. But what does 'relationally' mean?

Michael Apple has also invoked the term:

To make the actual 'stuff' of curriculum problematic, to hold what currently counts as legitimate knowledge up to ideological scrutiny, can lead to a rather vulgar brand of relativism. That is, to see overt and hidden curricular knowledge as social and
historical products ultimately tends to raise questions about the criteria and validity and truth we employ. The epistemological issues that might be raised here are not uninteresting, to say the least. However, the point behind these investigations is not to totally relativise either our knowledge or our criteria for warranting its truth or falsity. Rather, the methodological dictum is to think relationally or structurally. In clearer terms, one should look for the subtle connections between educational phenomena, such as the curriculum, and the social and economic outcomes of the institution.

(Apple M. 1979 p34)

It is not obvious precisely how Apple's "clearer terms" clarify what is involved, however. These comments by Sharp and Green are appropriate to this context:

Vague terms like 'ideas mediating reality', the 'dialectical interplay between consciousness and the world', or 'the coincidence between consciousness and reality' still leave many of the issues unanswered. Since there is as yet no satisfactory theory of ideology which clearly articulates the mediation of ideas and the social context in which they arise, it is important to avoid taking up a position which involves a premature resolution of as yet unresolvable theoretical dilemmas.

(Sharp and Green op cit p23)

Whilst accepting the cautionary note they sound, the idea that the problem is one for a theory of ideology to solve is debatable. The particular opposition being discussed and which is causing the problem can be seen more precisely within epistemology.

This crucial dichotomy has been described by Bhaskar in this way:

It is customary to draw a divide between two camps in socio-logical theory: one represented above all by Weber, in which social objects are seen as the results of (or as constituted by) intentional or meaningful human behaviour, and the other, represented by Durkheim, in which they are seen as possessing a life of their own, external to and coercing the individual. With some stretching the various schools of social thought - phenomenology, existentialism, functionalism, structuralism, etc. - can then be seen as instances of one or other of these
positions. And the varieties of Marxism can then also be neatly classified.
(Bhaskar R. 1979 pp39-40)

This opposition is, of course, that which Dawe represents as "the two sociologies", and Wilson as "normative and interpretive paradigms". Bhaskar, then, considers a third model, that of Peter Berger and his associates, which attempts to overcome the problems of the opposing models by combining their respective moments in a "dialectic".

Bhaskar believes that,

"...this model is seriously misleading. For it encourages on the one hand, a voluntaristic idealism with respect to our understanding of social structure, and, on the other, a mechanistic determinism with respect to our understanding of people. In seeking to avoid the errors of both stereotypes, Model IIII succeeds only in combining them. People and society are not, I shall argue, related 'dialectically'. They do not constitute two moments of the same process. Rather they refer to radically different kinds of things.
(Bhaskar 1979 p41-42)"

I will look at Bhaskar's realist theory in detail in the next chapter. For the moment, the significance of his remarks is that the suggestion that the solution to the problem of oscillation between systems-level mechanistic determinism and person-level voluntaristic idealism lies not in attempts to work out specific problems within the field, e.g. the degree of correspondence between education and production, the degree of relative autonomy of the educational system, the class character of pupil resistance, the possibilities for radical educational change, but a fundamentally different theoretical approach to the concepts of the person and the social.

Once again we see how sets of 'problems' and 'solutions' are in reality oscillations between the opposite poles of the field. The apparent development
from phenomenology to 'resistance' is a development only at a descriptive level, i.e. positivism is shown to be a problem by phenomenology through a description of what the world is really like, social transformation approaches emerge from descriptions which show that the world of schooling is more complex than correspondence theory allowed. Neither the fundamental categories of the field, nor the basic model of schooling change. The model of schooling made explicit during the original convergence between the new sociology of education and neo-Marxist approaches is not altered fundamentally by social transformation, resistance and relative autonomy, it is simply made more complex at the level of empirical detail. This process occurs as positions which were originally implicit are made explicit and so open to critical examination, e.g. correspondence was implicit in ethnographic interpretations of classroom interaction - it provided the 'why' type assumptions that guided those interpretations. The notion of resistance does not change the basic model of the education-production relationship, it simply makes what is going on in classroom more complex. The principles of indexicality and effectivity are still there. A symptomatic effect of this, as I shall demonstrate in detail later, is the failure to recognise the real significance of Paul Willis' book, "Learning to Labour". Willis does not simply 'discover' working class pupils' resistance to schooling, he uses an entirely different concept of the mechanism of social reproduction through schooling.

CONCLUSION

I have now traversed the problem field constituted by empirical realism
and sociological individualism and in which the debate about the new sociology of education is grounded from three directions: from strict positivism to the D-N social world and "the culture of positivism", from phenomenology to the new sociology of education, and from correspondence to resistance. What might appear superficially as a process of development in theory involving a fundamental rupture between positivism and phenomenology can more exactly be seen as the repetition of a single episode comprising the oscillation between systems-level and individual-level ontologies and methodologies, and positivist and interpretive types. In the middle is the particular knot tied between the new sociology of education and its implicit systems ontology, its ethnographic (individual level) methodology, and correspondence theory. In its first phase the new sociology whilst rejecting the relativising, individualist subjectivism of phenomenology lacked an appropriate contextualising systems level theory. The intervention of correspondence theory answered that need whilst making explicit the assumptions which implicitly organised ethnographic descriptions. The new sociology of education was 'split' between a systems level position (but lacking an appropriate or adequately developed systems theory) and an individual level (phenomenological) methodology in which the 'absent' system theory was implicitly at work.
This set of isomorphic positions can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIVIDUAL LEVEL</th>
<th>SOCIAL SYSTEM LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>strict positivism</td>
<td>D-N social world culture of positivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(behaviourism)</td>
<td>(functionalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phenomenology</td>
<td>new sociology of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnography of the classroom</td>
<td>correspondence theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transformation, resistance, relative autonomy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the main reasons why Arnot and Whitty welcome the new American social transformation approach is that they see it as answering the criticisms of writers such as Lawton and Musgrave that Marxist approaches do not do justice to the complexity of educational situations. The concern with resistance, transformation and relative autonomy plus the belief that these writers are methodologically and empirically open and pluralistic is seen as the antidote to the simplicities of correspondence theory. Characteristically the move from one side of the field to the other involves criticisms that the established approach has been leaving important things out of account. The
move is always expected to complete the picture - to include both the social actor and the context in all its social and historical complexity.

It is interesting to read that even as Arnot and Whitty congratulate the new approach on its recovery of the rich texture and contradictory complexity of everyday life in the classroom they sound its death-knell:

Despite an apparent commitment to a broader transformation of society, some of this American work remains overly school-centred in its analysis of the politics of the curriculum and tends to assume that educational interventions will necessarily have radical effects.

(Arnot and Whitty op cit p102)

Are we forgetting nothing and remembering nothing?
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

(1) see Morrison A. & MacIntyre D. 1971 for examples of the "psychometric paradigm".

(2) on the distinction between "taking" and "making" problems see Young M. F. D. 1971 pl.

(3) see Schutz's essay, "The Stranger" in the Open University Reader School and Society (Cosin B. et al. eds. 1971). This appears to have provided new sociology of education people at the OU with a potent image of the child in the school.


(5) this 'objectivist' approach to knowledge can be contrasted with the view presented by Whitty (see ch.1) in which to separate knowledge from knowing is the hallmark of positivism. However, as positivism itself is a form of empiricism, it is also grounded in a view of knowledge as a type of 'knowing' (i.e. sense-data). It is precisely this theory of knowledge which Durkheim attacks in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (as Bernstein has observed, Durkheim's project was essentially Kantian). Yet for phenomenologists Durkheim is the arch positivist! These observations indicate the extremely confused way in which 'positivism' has come to be used in sociology.

(6) from "correspondence to transformation" is how Arnot and Whitty characterised this development in the article (Arnot and Whitty 1982) upon which I draw to a considerable degree here. See also the collection of
articles in *Apple M.* 1982.

(7) Benton's caveat in the second paragraph implies that the basic principle (indexicality) is correct but that in reality there will be unavoidable contingencies which prevent the relationship being actualised in a perfect form. This is in itself quite acceptable. However, I will argue in chapter four that the principle is in fact quite wrong and that the mismatches which occur are not simply a result of the contingencies of the real world. A result of Benton's approach to this problem can be a form of ad hocery which attempts to save the theory by inventing reasons to explain away difficult counter-instances: e.g. educationally successful working class students are not 'really' working class (they are sunken middle class, or whatever), the capitalist state promotes a degree of working class upward mobility in order to foster the illusion of equality of opportunity, etc.

(8) potentially the background material on this is enormous and much of it technical (if not esoteric) – see, though two recent volumes on the value controversy Elson D. ed. 1979, Steedman L et al 1981 and Holloway J. & Picciotto S. eds 1978 on the State debate.

(9) apart from Marx's own words on this, see also the collection of reviews by Engels of Capital (Engels F. 1956).

(10) see chapter eight.

(11) see chapter five for a detailed discussion of "effectivity".

(12) see Erben and Gleeson's essay on Althusser in Young & Whitty eds. 1977, for instance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFERENCES IN CHAPTER TWO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Althusser, L. (1971)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenin and Philosophy, New Left Books, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Apple M. (1979)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Apple M. ed. (1982)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arnot M. &amp; Whitty G. (1982)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;From Reproduction to Transformation&quot; in Brit. J. of Sociology of Education vol.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bates R.J. (1980)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bennett N. (1976)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Styles and Pupil Progress Open Books, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Education and Politics&quot; in Holly D. ed. 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bernbaum G. (1977)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge and Ideology in the Sociology of Education MacMillan, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bhaskar R. (1979)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Possibility of Naturalism Harvester Press, Brighton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bowles S. &amp; Gintis H. (1976)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schooling in Capitalist America Routledge &amp; Kegan Paul, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cosin B. et al eds (1971)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dale R. (1979)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Categories and Cultures Open University Press, Milton Keynes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demaine J. (1981)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 129 -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Publication Year</th>
<th>Source Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engels F.</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>On Marx’s Capital, Progress Publishers, Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erben M. &amp; Gleeson D.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;Education as Reproduction&quot; in Young M.F.D. &amp; Whitty G. eds 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorz A.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;Technical Intelligence and the Social Division of Labour&quot; in Young M.F.D. &amp; Whitty G. eds 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand N.</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>&quot;What is English?&quot; in Whitty G. &amp; Young M.F.D. eds 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hargreaves A.</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>&quot;Resistance and Relative Autonomy Theories&quot; in Brit J. Sociology of Education vol. 3 No. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keddie N.</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>&quot;Classroom Knowledge&quot; in Young M.F.D. ed. 1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MacDonald M. (1977) Culture, Class and the Curriculum
Schooling and Society Unit 17, Open
University Press, Milton Keynes.

Harmondsworth

Miliband R. (1973) The State in Capitalist Society
Quartet Books, London

Morrison A. & McIntyre D. (1972) Schools and Socialisation

Popper K. (1972) Objective Knowledge, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.

Poulantzas N. (1975) Classes in Contemporary Capitalism

Robinson P.E.D. (1967) "An Ethnography of Classrooms"
in Eggstone J. ed. 1974

Schutz A. (1971) "The Stranger" in Cosin B.
et al eds 1971

of Schooling

Sharp R. & Green A. (1975) Education and Social Control
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London

MacMillan, London

in Woods P. & Hammersley M. eds 1977


Taylor, I. (1975) Critical Criminology,
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London

Vulliamy G. (1976) "What Counts as School Music?"
in Whitty G. & Young M.F.D. eds 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s) and Year</th>
<th>Title and Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Willis P. (1977)</td>
<td>Learning to Labour, Saxon House, Farnborough</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 132 -
SECTION TWO

CRITIQUE

Section Two will develop a critique of the paradigm outlined in section one at both theoretical and substantive levels. It will outline an alternative theoretical approach derived from the realist theory of science and structuralism ("generative theory") and review the body of substantive data which explanatory theories in the sociology of education need to accommodate. Chapter three will be concerned with theoretical issues and will discuss generative theory in detail. Bernstein's work will be used to develop a generative model in the sociology of education. The concepts of classification and framing and code will be related to what will be termed "positioning theory" as an approach to the place of the pupil in the school context. Chapter four will concentrate on "indexicality" and will review a range of evidence concerning the occupational system and its relationship to education. It will be argued that this evidence casts severe doubts upon the plausibility of indexicality, and Boudon's model of the relationship between educational and social inequality of opportunity will be drawn upon in order to show that the conditions for indexicality cannot be met. Chapter five will address the principle of the effectivity of educational practices and it will be argued that the evidence does not support the view that educational practices are processes of identity formation in the sense defined by indexical type theories. The work of Bourdieu and Passeron will be referred to in order to develop an alternative model based in the implications of the systematic features of trend data for the social compositions of educational sites. Pedagogic
change will be seen in terms of responses to control problems created by these changes. These changes will be discussed in terms of classification and framing.
CHAPTER THREE
REALISM, STRUCTURALISM AND THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD

In the previous two chapters I have attempted to demonstrate that the problems surrounding the new sociology of education and the neo-Marxist theories more recently associated with it can be understood as effects of their underlying philosophical problem field. This field includes within its discourse the debate about positivism in the social science from which the new directions approach emerged. Specifically I have argued that what are usually seen as opposing positions are more correctly presented as the poles of a single field. Each pole carries with it a set of distinctive problems which can take various theoretical forms and the oscillation from one pole to the other can never do more than simply substitute one set of problems for the other. Substantive issues in the area of education are invariably approached through the theoretical matrix of this field and the movement of theory within it. This has proved unfortunate for the operation of the sociology of education as an explanatory area within sociology - as Bernstein has noted, there is little 'news'. There are two related sets of problems that need to be addressed on the basis of the argument in the first two chapters: firstly, how, in theoretical terms should the analysis of education be conducted, and secondly what kind of 'news' might be produced? I will address the first issue in this chapter and, hopefully, produce some interesting news in those that follow.

I will begin by looking in more detail at how explanations are produced in the new sociology of education. I argued earlier that the new sociology of
education 'needed' a contextualising system level theory in order to abort the infinite regress of accounts in phenomenological description. By virtue of its advocates' political commitment it was necessary to be able to 'tell the tale' of what was happening in classrooms in a particular way. It was necessary to re-establish the kinds of epistemological guarantees that phenomenology had abolished. As a type of critical knowledge the new sociology of education wanted to be able to (a) account correctly for existing repressive social relationships and (b) show how they could be changed. Hence it presupposed an intrinsic relationship between knowledge and control - right knowledge can also be effective knowledge.

The problem with phenomenological conventionalism was that, whilst recognising that knowledge is socially constructed, historically located, presuppositional etc., it could place no limit upon knowledge because truth criteria are seen as no more than conventions. All knowledge that meets some conventional criteria for truth is true. What this view cannot accommodate is the fact that in addition to being seen as true, knowledge must also have something else besides if it is also to be effective. This is not to say that effectiveness alone guarantees knowledge (pragmatism) because knowledge can be effective but untrue and true but ineffective. But the condition for effectivity (whether or not any particular knowledge is or is not effective or true) as such is that more than mere convention is involved.

Marxist approaches provided a theoretical context in which the analysis of classroom interaction could be placed and a guide to the interpretation of
those interactions. Although this might appear to prevent the infinite regress of accounts it does not solve the basic problem. Essentially what has happened is that a criterion has been established that differentiates between two classes of descriptions: all those which are 'radical' and all those which are not. What exactly counts as 'radical' is a matter for further elaboration, but whatever the exact details, a convention or rule is established which privileges a particular class of descriptions and debar all others. Analysis can now aim to conform to an established and recognised criterion. At the most general level the question raised is what can be inside the category and what must remain outside. This is debate at the level of approaches - it relates to Gellner's ideas about anthropomorphic doctrines. A certain class of doctrine is protected. Within that class - within the socio-logical community based upon it - there is the phenomenon of regeneration and renewal. Established work is constantly scrutinised for traces of heresy and new 'purer' approaches developed which supplant what has gone before. This essentially is the situation that Bernstein describes thus:

Every new approach becomes a social movement or sect which immediately defines the nature of the subject by re-defining what is to be admitted, and what is beyond the pale, so that with every new approach the subject almost starts from scratch.

(Bernstein op cit p168)

The problem for the new sociology of education, trapped as it is within the boundaries of its field, is to produce work untainted by either the relativist heresy of nihilism or the determinist heresy of pessimism. Basically this accounts for the problem mentioned by Arnot and Whitty - the paucity of substantive work. It becomes extremely difficult to get a research programme
established before it is anathematised.

**CONVENTIONALISM**

Because the rule which establishes the whole class of permissible descriptions is essentially conventional and because it is a class of descriptions that is constituted, the original problem of descriptive regress or proliferation is re-established within the class. This can be illustrated in this way: Imagine that at a particular point in time a number of sociologists of education set out, independently, to study examples of classroom interaction. They share a common approach which provides them with the basic principle, "education under capitalism reproduces social inequality". On the basis of this principle they each approach their case study with the aim of displaying how it is reproducing social inequality. The following examples of work are produced:

(1) this is a case of streaming. The teachers in the school believe that streams reflect the natural differences between children and that within them they are provided with the type of education suited to their needs. But really streams reflect the class structure and children are allocated to them on the basis of their class background characteristics. They are then subjected to processes of identity formation that prepare them for their predestined locations in this occupational structure.

(2) this is the case where streaming has been abolished. The teachers explicitly reject the ideology of natural differences etc. But implicitly they hold to class, gender and race stereotypes of pupils and treat them differently
according to these unexamined assumptions. Consequently the children are subjected to processes of identity formation that prepare them for their predestined places in the occupational structure.

(3) this is a case where critically reflective teachers do not hold class, gender or racial stereotypes of children. But the pedagogic relations of the school are based in a conservative epistemology and consequently the children are subjected to processes of identity formation that prepare them for their predestined places in the occupational structure.

(4) this is a case where critically reflective teachers have rejected conservative epistemologies and transformed the social relations of the classroom. But the effect of the ruling ideology in the state apparatus is such that the children are subjected to processes of identity formation that prepare them for their predestined places in the occupational structure.

The problem here is not that this offends against the principle of falsificationism or the hypothetico-deductive method but that the diversity of cases is represented in an ad hoc diversity of interpretations and explanations. The problem is underlined if we imagine that the following year a second group sets out and examines the same cases. Under the guidance of the same rule a whole new set of accounts can be produced. In principle this process could go on for ever. The basic problem of conventionalism is not avoided by simply defining a class of permissible descriptions.

It is useful to look at the logic of this type of explanation in more detail. The basic principle is: "education under capitalism reproduces
social inequality". The form of explanation here is deductive-nomological, i.e.

Education under capitalism reproduces social inequality.

This is a case of education under capitalism social inequality is being reproduced.

Whenever P then Q. These explanations also incorporate concepts of causally effective processes. The basic principle is understood in terms of two laws:

(1) Educational practices under capitalism replicate the system of social inequality.
    (this reflects the principle of indexicality)

(2) The replication of the system of social inequality in educational practices under capitalism has the effect of reproducing that system.
    (This reflects the principle of effectivity)

Of course the key terms, "capitalism", "replicate", "social inequality", are open to various interpretations. In terms of explanations, causal power is attributed to the manner in which the system of social inequality is represented in the educational practices. Streaming, teachers' unexamined assumptions, conservative epistemologies and educational practices ideological effects, both represent the principle of social inequality and effectively reproduces it (identity formation etc.).

We have a process of description and explanation:

(1) DESCRIPTIVE

i. educational practices under capitalism replicate
the system of social inequality.

ii. this is an educational practice under capitalism.

iii. it replicates the system of social inequality.

(2) EXPLANATORY

i. the replication of the system of social inequality in educational practices under capitalism has the effect of reproducing that system.

ii. the system of social inequality is replicated in this educational practice under capitalism.

iii. it is reproducing the system of social inequality.

The general principle and its associated laws provide the rule of method: "describe your educational practice in such a way that it can be seen as replicating the system of social inequality", and the injunction: "attribute causal effectiveness to the practice so described". The analyses carried out in this way under these rules are essentially descriptions compatible with the criteria that the rules establish. Ultimately the criterion of success is purely conventional - does the analysis celebrate the principle? Any number of descriptions of the educational practices are possible provided that they meet the rule.

Despite the disavowal of positivism, the explanatory logic of this approach remains within the basic structure of the D-N model - for all x, if x has the property P, then it has the property Q: if this x has the property of being an educational practice under capitalism, it has the property of reproducing social inequality. Explanation is at the level of events and there is
an implicitly Humean notion of causality in terms of constant conjunctions. Where, however, explanations reject Humean contingency and introduce material causes they do so within what, following Bhaskar, we can call an "action by contact paradigm of causality". There are two major areas where this happens: firstly in the area of the relationship between the education system and the socio-technical division of labour, and secondly in the area of the proposed effectivity of educational practices. For the former, associated with the principle of indexicality, State theories attempt to explain how, through material action, the dominance of the productive sphere is maintained and its requirement transmitted into education - the State acts on the educational system on behalf of the ruling class/capital in general or whatever securing the continued dominance of the ruling class/general conditions for expanded reproduction or whatever. For the latter, theories of ideology attempt to explain how educational practices (as constituted through State action) act on pupils in producing appropriate types of identity formation. The introduction of concepts like "relative autonomy" and "resistance" do not fundamentally change the paradigm, they simply save the face of the theory by accommodating awkward facts that cannot remain unacknowledged.

**REALISM**

The alternative to theories grounded in the field of empirical realism is found in the realist philosophy of science (1). Realism avoids the conventionalist problem of the proliferation of models and descriptions by making 'things' not events the objects of scientific explanations. Basic to realism is the distinction between the socially produced realm of knowledge and the
realm of independently existing real things which are the ultimate objects of knowledge (it is this separation between knowledge and its object that is significant as far as objectivity is concerned, and not the problem of the separation of knowledge from its conditions of social production as in the debate on positivism and relativism). The objects of knowledge are, complex, enduring and transfactually active as opposed to simple, instantaneous and invariant. Bhaskar describes the situation thus:

The world consists of things, not events. Most things are complex objects, in virtue of which they possess an ensemble of tendencies, liabilities and powers. It is by reference to the exercise of their tendencies, liabilities and powers that the phenomena of the world are explained. Such continuing activity is in turn referred back for explanation to the essential nature of things. On this conception of science it is concerned essentially with what kinds of things they are and with what they tend to do; it is only derivatively concerned with predicting what is going to happen. It is only rarely, and normally under conditions which are artificially produced and controlled, that scientists do the latter. And when they do, its significance lies precisely in the light that it casts on the enduring natures and ways of acting of independently existing and transfactually active things.

(Bhaskar 1975a p51)

On this basis scientific theories are to do with things not experiences. Neither sense data nor meanings. Experience gives us access to things, but in itself is no more (nor less) than the variety of socially produced, fallible and reconstructable ways in which we can come to know the activities of things. That we experience certain events is contingent upon the facts of our existence, that we experience them as we do is contingent upon the character of the socially produced ways of knowing available to us (socialisation/education), that things act as they do is necessary given their natures and the conditions under which they are active. Science addresses the necessities of things not the contingencies
of experience. It is precisely the non-identity of knowledge, its object and the chains of events produced at the empirical level that makes it possible for knowledge to be systematically reconstructed upon the basis of experiences informed, through scientific knowledge (education) and the process of knowledge production (scientific practice), by the necessities of things. Bhaskar says that:

Theory is not an elliptical way of referring to experiences but a way of referring to hypothesised inner structures of the world, which experience can confirm or falsify. We are not locked into a closed circle of thought: because there are activities, viz. perception and experimentation, by means of which, under conditions which are deliberately generated and carefully controlled, relatively independent cross-bearings on the intransitive objects of thought can be obtained. Such activities are not independent of thought, but their results are not implied by them either.

(ibid pp.158-159)

Theories, which are socially produced, are ultimately validated (though only ever provisionally) through their reference (2) to real objects as established through the practice of their science. Whether or not any particular theoretical model actually does refer to a real object is an issue that can only be settled within the practice of its own science. Hence the two principle activities of science are (a) the production from existing knowledge through established methods of knowledge production of new theories and in particular, models, and (b) the activity of testing those theories and models. This approach is neither absolutist nor essentialist - it does not imply that there is one correct representation of any thing which is apprehended in some ultimate or irreducible form. The character of any theory is dependent upon the conditions of its productions and upon the ontological
level at which its science is appropriating things. A scientific breakthrough (in theory or technique) can transform knowledge by shifting work into a new ontological stratum. The objective forms of knowledge in which objects are theorised are socially produced and developed through the material practices of science - practices positioned and conditioned by their material relations of production. Science is a process of production and transformation.

In the realist view, events at the empirical level, which can become the experiences of human beings, are to be explained in terms of the tendencies, liabilities and powers of real objects (what Bhaskar calls "generative mechanisms") active under given conditions which must be understood as complex conjunctures, i.e. interactions between mechanisms at their own level and the overdetermining effects of their fields of events. The event, Bhaskar says,

\[...\] is to be explained by reference to the circumstances and nature of the thing whose behaviour is being described. The scientist never doubts for a moment that something is generating the effect in question. His problem is: what is? That is, why does \(x\) behave the way it does, viz \(B\), in conditions \(C_1,...,C_n\)? The first step in the scientific explanation of \(B\) is to ascribe a power (or liability) of \(x\) to \(B\), i.e. to do \((\text{or suffer})\) \(\phi\). That is to say, very roughly, that \(x\) does \(\phi\) in virtue of its nature \(N\). The next step is to investigate \(N\) (defining stratum 11). This involves inter alia creative model building and rigorous empirical testing. As a result of this investigation we may say \(x\) comes to do \(\phi\) in virtue of its having a certain constitution or intrinsic structure, e.g. genetic constitution, atomic structure, or electric charge. Now it is contingent that \(x\) has the nature (e.g. constitution or structure) that it has. But given that it has, it is necessary that it behaves the way it does. One criterion of this is our capacity to deduce the tendency to \(B\) from \(N\).

(ibid pp 172-173)
The explanation of the event $E$ is in terms of a description of the tendencies, liabilities and powers $\phi$ of a mechanism $M$ with the nature $N$ active under a set of conditions $C$. The event, then, comes to be seen as $E(M)$: that is, as an effect of a mechanism with the nature $N - N(M)$ - and the tendencies, liabilities and powers $\phi$. We can represent this as a formula:

$$C + N(M) \rightarrow \phi \rightarrow E(M)$$

The theory $N(M)$ allows us, Bhaskar says, to deduce $E(M)$ in terms of $\phi$. Rather than prediction it is deduction that is scientifically significant. The theory of a mechanism enables us to deduce a range of effects only some of which may have hitherto been realised in our experience. Part of the testing of the theory will be to see if we can actually produce (by experimentally triggering the mechanism in controlled conditions) the effects which we deduce from the theory but are as yet unrealised within our experience. It follows from this that an important aspect of science is to study what does not (or has not) happen as well as what does. Science attempts to explain the events we experience, but scientific explanations are not at the level of those events, because that would not explain them.

**GENERATIVE MECHANISMS, STRUCTURES AND GENERATIVE PRINCIPLES**

The concept of "generative mechanism" is central to Bhaskar's realist theory. He says that,

For science to be possible then the world must consist of enduring and transfactually active mechanisms; and there must be necessary connections between some but not other matters of fact. Natural mechanisms are of course nothing other than the powers or ways of acting of things. Thus if
science is to be possible, there must be a relationship of natural necessity between what a thing is and what it tends to do, in appropriate conditions.

(ibid p202)

An important question is what could a "generative mechanism" in the realm of the social sciences be like? In general terms Bhaskar says that a generative mechanism,

...must be structured and complex; it cannot be atomistic or event-like. The concept of a field of potential seems closest to meeting these requirements.

(ibid p[80-181])

An idea like this is in no way unfamiliar to social science, but the material quality of 'thingness' or the term "mechanism" is intuitively difficult.

More specifically Bhaskar describes two general types of things that science can discover:

Now there are two possibilities here. One is that there is a nature, susceptible in principle to qualitative description, as yet unknown, which is the bearer of its causal powers. The other is that the nature of the thing just as its causal powers, as in the case of physical field theories.

(ibid p[80-180] my emphasis)

On their modality of existence, he says that,

There is an asymmetry between space and time here. For powers must be possessed and exercised in time, but they need not be localised at any point in space. Relations, for example, such as that of spin (in physics) and marriage endure through time and have causal effects. But they have no position in space.

(ibid p[81])

We can extract the idea of a 'thing' that "just is its causal powers" which are possessed and exercised in time but are not localised in space. The concept will be close to "a field of potential". We can relate this to Harre's distinction between "causal transforms" and "modal transforms".
Harre is here discussing model building in science. A causal transform "links sentences describing quite different states of the world" (Harre op cit p54), e.g. an event (the existence of which we are sure of because we have experienced it) and a mechanism (the existence of which we are not sure of) which might be its cause. We can (subject to plausibility controls etc.) construct a model of a putative mechanism (existentially in doubt) which could cause (therefore the model could explain) an event which we have experienced. In the case of a modal transform, however,

...the relation between the states of the model, considered as a hypothetical mechanism, and the phenomena, is not such as would give them independent existence. The state of the model is existentially identical with the phenomena. For instance, from an existential point of view, reflecting light of a certain wave-length and the being coloured a certain hue of a surface are identical states of the world.

(ibid p53)

Harre further discusses the character of modal transforms as follows:

Consider the discovery that crystals of common salt are cubical lattices of sodium and chloride ions. Here surely we have a modal transform between the shape of the crystal and the structure of the lattice. But to describe a substance as crystals of common salt invites one, in domestic situations, to classify the substance along with peppercorns, bay leaves and parsley, and not with other things. To describe it as sodium chloride invites one to classify it along with the electrovalent compounds, a class which quite excludes peppercorns and bay leaves.

(ibid p53)

The 'thing' called both 'salt' and 'sodium chloride' is the same thing. "Shape of the crystal" and "structure of the lattice" are different descriptions of the same thing. These different descriptions have important implications for the way in which we see things as being related. For example, in a
culinary world in which, say, marjoram was unknown, the rule that grouped salt, peppercorns and bay leaves could not enable us to deduce the possibility of marjoram, though if we by chance discovered it we would know where to put it. But the type of rule which enables us to define salt in terms of "the structure of the lattice" enables us not only to bring together things we do know, but deduce, and attempt to discover, things we do not yet know.

The case of a modal transform does not entail an existential problem. We know 'the thing' exists. We are not constructing a hypothetical entity which exists somewhere else, as it were, and causes the phenomenon we are interested in explaining. As Harre says,

In the case of the modal transform, there is no separate question as to the existence of the hypothetical mechanism and its states which the model represents, for they are the same states of the world looked at from a different point of view. But a causal transform links sentences describing quite different states of the world.

(ibid p54)

To point to the structure of a myth, for example, is not to point to some strange ontological realm separate from that in which myths are simply told as stories. The structure of the myth is a special type of description of the myths that are told. Furthermore, the structure is not localised in some part of space (least of all in some realm of Platonic essences) any more than the rules of kinship occupy space. Characteristically theories of 'things' in the realm of the social sciences are modal transforms of powers exercised in time but not localised in space. The structure of a myth is a modal transform of the myth qua story - one which reveals a structuring
principle or power.

The term "generative mechanism" would seem to be more appropriate to the situation of causal transforms. In the case of modal transforms applied to things that 'just are their causal powers', exercised in time but having no position in space, the term "generative principle" is more appropriate. The aim of explanation is to produce a description of the phenomenon in question (a modal transform) which reveals its generative principle. Bhaskar describes his view of social scientific "generative mechanisms" thus:

Now if social activity consists, analytically, in production, that is in work on and the transformation of given objects, and if such work constitutes an analogue of natural events, then we need an analogue for the mechanisms that generate it. Now if social structures constitute the appropriate mechanism-analogue then an important difference must be immediately registered - in that, unlike natural mechanisms, they exist only in virtue of the activities they govern and cannot be empirically identified independently of them. Because of this, they must be social products themselves. Thus men in their social activity must perform a double function; they must not only make social products, but make the conditions of their making, that is reproduce (or to a greater or lesser extent transform) the structures governing their substantive activities of production. Because social structures are themselves social products, they are themselves possible objects of transformation and so may be only relatively enduring. Moreover the differentiation and development of social activities (as in the 'division of labour' and 'expanded reproduction' respectively) implies that they are interdependent, so social structures may be only relatively autonomous. Society may thus be conceived as an articulated ensemble of such relatively independent and enduring generative structures; that is, as a complex totality subject to change both in its components and their interrelations.

(Bhaskar 1979 pp47-48)

The educational system is such a "relatively independent and enduring generative structure". Within such structures people are performing the 'work' of
reproduction and transformation. The principle governing that 'work' is the generative principle of the structure. It is this generative principle that the work of reproduction reproduces or, more rarely, the work of transformation transforms. At the same time, because structures cannot exist independently of their general conditions of existence, i.e. they can only exist within an "articulated ensemble" of structures or a totality, their reproduction entails the reproduction of the ensemble or the principle of its articulation. Hence the process of reproduction is not just the reproduction of the specificity of the structure but of its general conditions of existence.

GENERATIVE PRINCIPLES AND SOCIAL FIELDS

I now want to make this more specific by considering a statement from Bhaskar along with one by Bernstein. On the issue of the "society/person connection", Bhaskar says this:

The model of the society/person connection I am proposing could be summarised as follows: people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary condition for their activity. Rather society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. Society does not exist independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the product of it (the error of voluntarism). Now the processes whereby the stocks of skills, competences and habits appropriate to given social contexts, and necessary for the reproduction and/or transformation of society, are acquired and maintained could be generically referred to as 'socialisation'. (Bhaskar ibid p45-46)

What is on one level of analysis a "social context", on another can be understood as a "generative structure". Bernstein's concept "code" is a modal transform that 'switches' us from one level to the other by specifying the
structural principle that regulates activity in the social context. The practices based in (which are the realisations of) the "stocks of skills, competences and habits appropriate to given social contexts" do the work of reproduction/transformation. Bernstein says that,

Any socialising context must consist of a transmitter and an acquirer. These two form a matrix in the sense that the communication is regulated by a structural principle. We have suggested that the underlying principle of a socialising matrix is realised in classification and framing. The relationship between the two and the strengths show us the structure of the control and the form of the communication. (Bernstein op cit pp148-149)

The introduction of these concepts enables us to develop a substantive focus upon the issues involved.

I now want to delineate the terms I will use in order to avoid confusion – the term "structure" for instance is used in a number of different ways and contexts by writers I will be referring to. On the basis of Bhaskar's usage quoted earlier, I am going to adopt the term "field" for referring to what I take as the principle object of the sociology of education: "the educational field".

Field

In the first place a field is defined by its structuring generative principle. This structuring principle, its 'power', generates a set of transformations. By this I mean the following: On the subject of Weber's Ideal Type, Bourdieu says that it is a mistake to treat any particular exempler as a "theoretically privileged" and "paradigmatic case"; rather, it should be seen as,

....a particular case of the possible, as an element of a group
of transformations by referring to all possible or real cases of the family of which the ideal type is a privileged case, and therefore taking it as revealing the structure of isomorphic cases.
(Bourdieu P. 1968 p698)

In this sense the ideal type is not a "revealing sample which discloses the truth of the whole collection" (ibid, my emphasis), but a representation of the structure of one of the elements of a transformational group.

For example, a number of examples of educational practices might be defined in Bernstein's terms as strong classification (+C) and strong framing (+F), which indicates that they are a set of isomorphic cases. But the type +C +F is itself one element of the transformational group +C +F, -C +F, -C -F, +C -F. The transformational group defines the formal possibilities of the field.

It follows from this that a field cannot be defined by a structure to which all cases can be reduced and which is their generative source (a metaphysical concept in any case) - as Levi-Strauss has said: "structure has no distinct content; it is content itself, apprehended in a logical organisation conceived as a property of the real." (3) There is no instance of classification and framing which is in some manner prior to the others and to which they can be reduced. A field is not in itself a structure but rather it is structuring.

In the same way a field is not made up of pre-existing elements that are brought into relationships as a simple aggregate, or "combinatory" as Althusser has it (4). For example, Bernstein says that the educational field is constituted by three fundamental systems: curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. But this does not mean curriculum plus pedagogy plus evaluation, (although, of
course, the field can be analytically decomposed into those elements which can be treated as independent objects of study). As a material practice, education is a complex, internally structured totality in which those three systems are realised and articulated according to a given principle within a unitary form. These forms can be given structural specifications in terms of classification and framing which refer to the structuring of its internal relations. Educational practices can only exist within the structural modes generated by the principle of the field, hence there is no unitary or primary form to which they can be reduced.

Form

In abstract terms, a field is a field of possibilities defined by its generative principle. As such it has no substance - it is not a 'thing'. In reality a field will be inscribed within a material ensemble of conditions that are its conditions of existence. The manner of its articulation within the relationships of the totality of which it is a part will define its form; that is, the social space it occupies within society. This form is not a characteristic of the field but of the society in which it is active. Although it makes, for instance, no sense to talk of the size or shape of kinship rules, it can make sense to talk in that way of a kinship group, i.e. the people marrying and having relationships according to those rules. The form given to a field within a particular type of society will be an extremely important issue, especially as social transformation crucially involves changing that form. In the case of education, for example, the classification and framing involves defining and maintaining external boundaries, e.g. between
school and non-school knowledge, between who can be a transmitter (a teacher) and who cannot, who can be an acquirer (pupil, student, trainee, etc.) and who cannot (5).

Although the structural possibilities of a field are constant, the principles regulating the realisations of those possibilities, the form in which they occur and the functions they fulfil will differ. David Harvey, for example, has argued that,

(Urbanism) can assume a variety of forms depending upon the particular function of the urban centre with respect to the total pattern of circulation of the social designated surplus product. (Harvey D. 1973 p240)

The form is given by the principle of the mode of production and the manner in which the field participates in the reproduction of its own general conditions of existence (the social relations of production). In terms of function we can distinguish between the function of the field in maintaining the relations of production, and the functions of its contents, i.e. the realisation of possibilities within the field, in maintaining the form. On this basis we can see contradictions developing between fields, e.g. education and production (6).

In summary, we can say that the educational field is a field of possibilities constituted by the structuring, generative principle of the field - the modalities of curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation expressed in the structures of classification and framing. This field occupies a particular social space (the institution) whose form is given by the general social relations of society. The form functions to reproduce these general conditions of existence whilst its internal practices (realisations of the possibilities of the field within the
given form) function, at least in part, to reproduce the form. Hence we have to distinguish between the articulation of the educational system within the social relations of production in society and the systematic relationships between education and other systems, e.g. between the social relationships in education and those in production.

In terms of the earlier discussion, we can say that to describe an event within the educational field, \( E \), is to see it as a realisation of a particular possibility, \( \phi \), of the field given its generative principle, \( N(M) \), active within its general form and under certain conjunctural conditions. As Bhaskar says, the "actual is seen as an instance of the possible", which fortuitously echoes Bourdieu's phrase, "a particular case of the possible".

We can contrast this with the approach described in the earlier illustration where the event is described and explained with reference to the function of education as specified by general theory from which the covering principle was derived. In terms of the principle of indexicality all differences between educational practices have to be explained in terms of differing or changing requirements of the ruling class or capital as they are transmitted into the educational system, even if they do have to contend there with the problem of resistance. So, for example, the shift to progressive teaching methods might be understood in terms of changes in the labour process or work disciplines. Variations in educational practices are 'explained' in an ad hoc manner and treated as simply an aggregate - all the different ways in which the ruling class/capital organises education, through the mechanism of the state, to serve its interest.
From the point of view of the educational field, however, variations are seen in terms of a system understood as realisations of the field's possibilities. This system is approached in terms of its relationships of dominance, its contradictions and absences. The fact that possibilities unrealised are as much an issue for investigation as empirical data (as symptomatic of the principle of regulating realisations, unrealised, or repressed, possibilities are extremely revealing) indicates why experience cannot constitute the level at which explanation is directed. The practices that reproduce the field reproduce those absences as well as the system of empirically realised possibilities. The educational system is the realisation of possibilities within the educational field according to a principle (expressed in its form) which simultaneously represess other possibilities.

STRUCTURALISM

I now want to consider the relationship between realism and structuralism from the point of view of explanation (7). I will take as my starting point Boudon's "basic definition of the concept of structure in the context of effective definitions." (Boudon R. 1971 p76). Boudon approaches the issue of defining structuralism from this point of view because he believes that "the definition of the concept of structure cannot in this case be obtained by reference to its synonymic associations." (ibid) In the first instance, realism with its general concepts of complex, structured totalities, the distinction between appearance and the real etc. provides what Boudon calls an "intentional context" for the concept of structure. That is, it employs terms that are synonymic associations of "structure". But because realism is a theory of science it must hold not only
the intention that objects should be approached in this way, but maintain that some effectively are. Sciences are those practices which can effectively achieve a theoretical appropriation of their objects in terms of structures. Boudon says that,

Such considerations explain why it has been useful to term the first type of contexts intentional, since frequently the use of the word 'structure' in such contexts serves to describe an intention: the intention to construct or to present a theory analysing the interdependence of the elements of an object system. However, it is equally common for such an intent not to lead to an operative implementation and to be incapable of such implementation, be it because the object itself does not permit it or because the necessary mental tools are not available.

(ibid p51)

Boudon stresses that the possibility and success of a science depends upon the nature of its object (its availability) and the existence of "the necessary mental tools". This recalls the realist distinction between the intransitive dimension of real objects and the transitive dimension of humanly produced knowledge and means of knowledge production. Boudon also emphasises the role of scientific practice in guaranteeing a science. He says that it must be understood that,

....the structural analysis of a system is the product of a theory and that the construction of effective theories depends upon the nature of the object and the conceptual tools available. As structuralism has yielded undoubtedly spectacular results in such disciplines as anthropology and linguistics, some have come to believe that these revolutions were due only to a change of approach in the metaphysical sphere. In their view, linguists transformed their discipline as soon as they realised that the elements of language were organised in systems, in wholes of interdependent parts, in 'totalities distinct from the sum of their parts' etc. Such a statement is so oversimplified that it is both true and false. In fact structuralist revolutions are initiated not when it is understood that language, personalities, markets
and societies are systems, but when the conceptual tools are devised that permit the analysis of these systems as systems. (ibid p102)

Because the production of theories is contingent upon conditions such as these, they will vary in their operative effectiveness:

This will involve in some cases a mathematical model susceptible of verification, in others a group of verbal propositions whose inferences will be arrived at by a rough deductive procedure akin to that of a syllogism. Furthermore, in some cases the theory may be associated with a verificatory criterion of an unambiguous nature, while in others it will be impossible to relate a theory to a criterion of this kind. In the latter, one will have to be content with the degree of subjective certitude engendered by the theory. Finally, in certain cases the system analysed is borrowed directly from nature, while in others it is constructed by the research worker himself. (ibid pp52-53)

Within an operative context, an effective definition of structure can be given the form:

"A+Str(S) $\xrightarrow{\text{calculation}}$ App(S)"

(ibid p 73)

This formula is the model for that on page 146 above. I will consider their relationship in more detail later. Boudon describes his formula in this way:

this language includes the 'terms' $S$(system), $A$(axiom set), $App(S)$ (apparent characteristics of the system), Calculation, $Str(S)$ (structure of system S) and the relationships '$+$' and '$\rightarrow$'. The expression $x+y$ means the whole set of propositions in $x$ and $y$ is being taken into account, whereas the relationship $x \rightarrow y$ means that $y$ can be deduced from $x$.

(ibid p77)
By "apparent characteristics" Boudon means, "all the facts which define the system", and by "system" he means the facts at the empirical level ('E' in the Bhaskar type formula). In my example, each of the educational practices studied by the imaginary sociologists is a system. So we are to distinguish between the structure of a system, Str(S) and its apparent characteristics, App(S). A theory provides us with a set of axioms or a 'rule' whereby we can deduce the apparent characteristics from the structure ("calculation"). Although Boudon uses the term "calculation" for this process, it is clear from his remarks quoted earlier that this need not be taken only as meaning a rigorous mathematical calculation - it may have to be a "rough deductive procedure". The formula can also be reversed:

\[ \text{A} + \text{App(S)} \xrightarrow{\text{calculation}} \text{Str(S)} \]

in which case we can deduce the structure from the apparent characteristics. In the case of a general theory we can add at the end of the formula: "for any S". A general theory of the educational field, for example would allow us to deduce the structures or the apparent characteristics of any instance of an educational system ("system" in the particular sense that Boudon is using it). Clearly, the theory that enables us to deduce the structure +C +F would also enable us to deduce the set, +C +F, +C -F, -C -F, -C +F. In which case we can say that a general theory will be a theory of a field, i.e. it would have specified the generative principle of the field and the structures are a set of transformations. It is clear that Boudon's formula is for
a modal transform.

What is the relationship between Boudon's formula and that which I derived from Bhaskar? Leaving aside for the moment the question of conditions, the term C, the two formulae are:

Boudon: \[ A + \text{Str}(S) \xrightarrow{\text{calculation}} \text{App}(S) \text{, for any } S \]

Bhaskar: \[ \text{Th} + N(M) \xrightarrow{\phi} E(M) \]

It must be stressed right away that the terms in each formula are not equivalent: \( A + \text{Str}(S) \neq \text{Th} + N(M) \). The object of the Bhaskar formula is a field, the object of the Boudon formula is a structure, i.e. a realisation of one generative possibility of a field, though, as I have argued, a general theory would be a theory of a field. If we imagine the analytical processes to which the formulae refer as moments in time, the terms do not refer to the same moments - they are not, as it were, synchronised. But they do represent the same process, or, to put it another way, they are essentially similar representations of a process similarly conceptualised.

I will first describe the formulae in general terms:

1. "a theory which enables us to define the structure of a system enables us to deduce its apparent characteristics".

2. "a theory which enables us to define the nature of a mechanism enables us to deduce its effects".

We can now put these two things together in this way:

A theory (Th) enables us to understand an event E as E(M).
That is, as an effect of a mechanism $M$ with the nature $N$ and the
tendencies, liabilities and powers $\phi$: viz. $N(M) \xrightarrow{\phi} E(M)$.

To understand an event system as $E(M)$ is to deduce its structure
$\text{Str}(S)$ from its apparent characteristics. The condition for this de-
duction is the theory $\text{Th}$ which defines $E$ as $E(M)$ by virtue of the ten-
dencies, liabilities and powers, $\phi$, of a mechanism $M$ understood to
have the nature, $N$ - hence $N(M)$. The deduction of $\text{Str}(S)$ from $\text{App}(S)$
is a form of description of the $\phi$ of $N(M)$. $A + \text{Str}(S) \xrightarrow{\text{calculation}} \text{App}(S)$,
for any $S$ presupposes a general theory $\text{Th} + N(M) \xrightarrow{\phi} E(M)$.

An important aspect of this approach is that the structure is only a
part of the theory. For a system to be analysed in this way at all it has to be
seen as a system in the first place. This means more than simply holding the
intention to approach empirical data as systems. There has to be an effective
means (a theory) which constructs the empirical data as a system - which de-
fines and selects its systematic features. The system is a theoretical object
from the beginning. Hence there is no empiricist assumption about the un-
problematic availability of data. Apparent characteristics are not treated as
given and 'out there' in the world. Boudon says that,

\[ \ldots \text{the structure } \text{Str}(S) \text{ of a system } S \text{ is relative to } A. \text{ The} \]
very formulation of the axioms contained in $A$ implies that the
structural descriptions $\text{Str}(S)$ should comply with a number of
formal rules. In other words, the syntax of $A$ implies that
$\text{Str}(S)$ must in turn comply with a given syntax. In particular,
one sees that the structural description must analyse a system
in the form of a set of classified components so that the rules
of A are applicable. One cannot calculate the apparent characteristics of system S unless the structural description of S is formulated in an appropriate language. (ibid p73, my emphasis)

Once again we can relate this to Harre's "modal transform".

THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD

I now want to look at an example of this type of theory in the area of education. It is Bernstein's classification and framing theory of the educational field. I will try to show how Bernstein's approach conforms with the criteria discussed above.

Bernstein defines what he sees as the fundamental categories of the educational field, the categories whose relationships constitute the field's structuring, generative principles:

Formal educational knowledge can be considered to be realised through three message systems: curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. Curriculum defines what counts as valid knowledge, pedagogy defines what counts as a valid transmission of knowledge, and evaluation defines what counts as a valid realisation of this knowledge on the part of the taught. The term, educational knowledge code.... refers to the underlying principles which shape curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. It will be argued that the form this code takes depends upon the social principles which regulate the classification and framing of knowledge made public in educational institutions. (Bernstein op cit pp85-86)

He introduces the concepts of classifications and framing "which will be used to analyse the underlying structure of the three message systems, curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation, which are realisations of the educational code." (ibid p88) Classification is defined as "the degree of boundary maintenance between contents" and framing as "the degree of control teacher and
pupil possess over the selection, organisation, pacing and timing of the knowledge transmitted and received in the pedagogical relationship."

(ibid p89)

From the perspective of this analysis, the basic structure of the message system curriculum is given by variations in the strength of classification, and the basic structure of the message system pedagogy is given by variations in the strengths of frames...the structure of the message system evaluation, is a function of the strength of classification and frames. It is important to realise that the strength of classification and the strength of frame can vary independently of each other.

(ibid p89)

Defined in this way we can say that the educational field has the possibilities:

\[ +C +F \quad \text{form of collection codes} \]
\[ +C -F \]
\[ -C -F \quad \text{forms of integrated codes} \]
\[ -C +F \]

(ibid p180)

The terms "collection code" and "integrated code" indicate that the formal possibilities of the field can be specified in terms of the substantive features of actual empirical systems, i.e. as Es understood in terms of the possibilities (\( \phi \)) of the generative principles of the field, N(M).

This position can be summarised as follows:

(1) the educational field is constituted by the fundamental systems, curriculum (C), pedagogy (P) and evaluation (V).

(2) the possibilities of the field are given by the relationships of C, P and V.
these possibilities are realised in the structures of classification and framing.

these can be understood in terms of the structuring powers of the field's generative principles.

realisations of the field's possibilities are regulated by the social principles governing the classification and framing of transmission codes.

In terms of the earlier discussion we can say that the principle regulating the realisations of the field's possibilities is located in the form that the educational system adopts within the social relations of production in society - the relations that are its own conditions of production and reproduction and which it itself reproduces - and subject to conjunctural contingencies. The educational system is a specific realisation of the possibilities of the educational field under the regulating principle of the mode of production.

The general conditions of production in society produce the form of the educational system.

\[
\text{regulating CONDITIONS \hstretch{0.6}{\rightarrow} principle \hstretch{0.6}{\rightarrow} E (system)}
\]

\[
+ C + F, + C - F, - C - F, - C + F
\]

relationships of C, P, V (M(N))

Bernstein says that,

In the light of the conceptual framework we have developed I shall use the distinction between collection and integrated
curricula in order to realise a typology of types and sub-types of educational codes. The formal basis of the typology is the strength of classification and framing. However, the sub-types will be distinguished, initially, in terms of substantive differences.

(ibid p90)

The typology of types and sub-types, specified in terms of classification and framing and described in terms of substantive differences, is a realisation of the possibilities of the educational field within the given form and organised under its regulative principle. The types can be approached as 'events', E.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
\text{SYSTEM} & E_1 & E_2 & E_3 & E_4 & \text{possibilities } E(M) \\
\text{CONDITIONS} & \rightarrow & +C +F & +C -F & -C -F & -C +F & \text{structures} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[\phi\]

\[\text{N(M)} \quad \text{(C, P, V)} \quad \text{generative principles}\]

Fig. 3:1

Hence, \( \text{Th} + \text{N(M)} \rightarrow \phi \rightarrow \text{E(M)} \). Each \( E \), defined in terms of \( C & F \), will be made up of cases that are revealed as isomorphic. The question then will be how are these types distributed in the educational system and what are the relationships between them. Bernstein says that,

\[\ldots \text{it might seem} \ldots \text{that a school transmits only one code and therefore that there are no variations in its positional structure or transmission field. This may be the case. Certainly this was the position for grammar schools, for elementary schools and for many public schools. In primary}\]

- 166 -
schools which contain separate infant and junior departments, it was possible and often in fact the case, that the shift from infant to junior also entailed a shift in the transmission code. In contemporary schools, particularly comprehensive schools ...we are likely to find a range of codes... Variations within and between codes entails both variation in content and variation in forms of control. (ibid p180)

The distribution of codes will reflect principles and relations of power and control.

I now want to look in more detail at Bernstein's method in the paper "Class Pedagogies, Visible and Invisible". He begins the paper by describing the empirical features of a classroom situation:

(1) Where the control of the teacher over the child is implicit rather than explicit.

(2) Where, ideally, the teacher arranges the context which the child is expected to re-arrange and explore.

(3) Where within the arranged context, the child apparently has wide powers over what he selects, over how he structures, and over the time scale of his activities.

(4) Where the child apparently regulates his own movements and social relations.

(5) Where there is a reduced emphasis upon the transmission and acquisition of specific skills.

(6) Where the criteria for evaluating the pedagogy are multiple diffuse and not so easily measured. (ibid p116)

He proposes that "the crucial social relationship of cultural reproduction is that between transmitter(s) and acquirer(s)" (ibid p117) and suggests that this relationship has three basic features which can be defined in terms of the rules governing the social relationship of the transmission, the process of the transmission through time and the evaluation of the acquisition. These
rules vary the degree to which these features are explicit or implicit. Where they are explicit they constitute a "visible pedagogy", and where they are implicit they constitute an "invisible pedagogy". The system defined by characteristics 1-6 is an invisible pedagogy.

At this point we can say that the theory has transcribed the data of the system into an "appropriate language", or conceptual form, by defining its apparent characteristics as those denoted by the concept "invisible pedagogy". Invisible pedagogy can now be described in terms of classification and framing:

In terms of the concepts of classification and framing, the pedagogy is realised through weak classification and weak frames. Visible pedagogies are realised through strong classification and strong frames. The basic differences between visible and invisible pedagogies is in the manner in which criteria are transmitted and in the degree of specificity of the criteria, the more explicit the manner of their transmission, the more visible the pedagogy. (ibid p116-117)

An invisible pedagogy, then, can be specified as -C -F. It can be understood as one of the possibilities of the transformational group constituted by the generative principles of the relationships of C, P, V. The theory provides the means whereby the system described by the characteristics 1-6 can be defined as the apparent characteristics of "invisible pedagogy". These characteristics can be deduced from the structure (code) -C -F. In other words, Bernstein's theory enables us to deduce the system's apparent characteristics from its structural description (and vice versa). Hence it conforms to Boudon's formula:

\[
\text{calculation } A^+ \text{ Str}(S) \rightarrow \text{App}(S)
\]
In terms of a general theory of the educational field (if we add "for any S" to the formula), -C -F can be understood as one of the group +C +F, +C -F, -C -F, -C +F. In which case we can apply the Bhaskar type formula:

\[ \text{Th+N(M)} \xrightarrow{\phi} \text{E(M)} \]

This can be represented as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{App(S)} & \xrightarrow{\text{calculation}} & \text{Str(S)} \\
1-6 & \text{invisible pedagogy} & -C -F \\
E & \xrightarrow{N(M)} & +C +F \\
& & +C -F \\
& & -C -F \\
& & -C +F \\
\end{array}
\]

When we understand E as E(M) we have analysed it as App(S) \(\xrightarrow{\text{calculation}}\) Str(S).

When we can deduce Str(S) for any S, we can do so by virtue of a theory such that Th + N(M) \(\xrightarrow{\phi}\) E(M).

The analysis that takes us from elements 1-6, to "invisible pedagogy" to -C -F retains the same object throughout. The analysis is then, a modal transform. The structure -C -F is a model of the system described by 1-6. It is a description of that particular classroom, but one which differs fundamentally in kind from the ethnographic type descriptions considered earlier. It is an element within a rule governed transformational system. When we have
reached the point where we can describe a system as \(-C \cdot -F\) we can also, by virtue of the theory that makes that possible, explore the transformations of the code - explore the possibilities of the educational field. The code itself not only enables us to generate the system 1-6, it enables us, through its transformations, to construct unrealised possibilities of the field. The theory can be said to be a generative theory (8).

**STRUCTURE AND CODE**

Although I have described the codes \(+C +F, +C -F, -C -F, -C +F\) as structures, the concept code entails much more than "structure". Code acknowledges that structures are structuring practices and in so doing are positioning agents in relation to the relationships which they structure. If the concepts of classification and framing point us in one direction to the generative principles of the educational field, they also direct us to the morphogenetic principle regulating the form and specific realisations of the possibilities of the field. The code specifically embodies the principle of regulation - the relations of power and control. Bernstein says that,

The pupil does not experience directly a positional structure or a transmission field; the pupil experiences directly the classification and framing of local pedagogic relations. Our view is that in acquiring the Cs and Fs of those relationships, the pupil is also acquiring the macro representation of the code, the positional structure and the transmission field: the relations between the structure of power and the structure of control. (ibid pp179-180)

The realisations of the possibilities of the educational field are realised in and through practices. The regulation of those realisations is regulation
of practices. The relationships of curriculum pedagogy and evaluation are relationships of power and control experienced directly by pupils in their "local pedagogic relations". In this experience pupils are experiencing the principle of regulation as it is substantively expressed in the code. Their regulated practices reproduce the regulative principle. The realisations of the possibilities of the educational field are their realisations of the principle regulating their practices. The regulation of practice works through the positioning of agents within relationships which their practices reproduce. Their practices are, then, positioned practices realising the principle of the relationships regulating their positioning as subjects within the structure their practices reproduce.

Bhaskar has written,

....that social structures (a) be continually reproduced (or transformed) and (b) exist only in virtue of and are exercised in human agency (in short, that they require active functionaries). Combining these desiderata, it is evident that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis, designating the 'slots' as it were, in the social structure into which active subjects must slip in order to reproduce it; that is a system of concepts designating the 'point of contact' between human agency and social structures. Such a point, linking action to structure, must both endure and be immediately occupied by individuals. It is clear that the mediating system we need is that of the positions (places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc.) occupied (filled, assumed, enacted etc.) by individuals, and the practices (activities, etc.) in which, in virtue of their occupancy of these positions (and vice versa), they engage. I shall call this mediating system the position-practice system. Now such positions and practices, if they are to be individuated at all, can only be done so relationally.
(Bhaskar 1979 p51)

In these terms we can see Bernstein's theory as a theory of the educational system as a position-practice system.
POSITIONING

To see practices as positioned is to see them as regulated by the principle of the relationship which as practices they realise and in so doing reproduce. Positioned practices in education are realisations of the structural principle of the transmission matrix. An educational situation must be understood as a regulative context - a context whose structure and principles regulate realisations. To talk of the regulation of practices and realisations is to presuppose the competence of the human agents so positioned. The realisation in practices of the structural principle of a system of social relationships is the realisation of competencies under the regulative principle of that structure of relationships. This is a crucial point. A great deal of the criticism of Bernstein's theory has failed to understand that "code" presupposes competence rather than marks differences in competence (9). Bernstein says that,

The concept code presupposes competencies (linguistic/cognitive) which all acquire and share, therefore it is not possible to discuss code with reference to cognitive/linguistic deficiencies located at the level of competence. Code refers to a specific cultural regulation of the realisation of commonly shared competencies. Code refers to specific semiotic grammars regulated by specialised distributions of power and principles of control. Such grammars will have amongst other realisations specific linguistic realisations. (Bernstein 1982 p337)

The positioning of subjects within systems of relations that regulate their practices (the practices so regulated being the realisations of those relationships) differentially realises their competencies according to their cultural specificity as subjects.
The cultural specificity of the category of subjects determines their position within the system of relationships of the regulative context. But it is not the school that positions the pupil but rather the pupil who positions him/herself as a culturally specific subject interpolated within that system of relationships. The school as a regulative context works by simply being 'the school', i.e. a specific site articulated with broader sets of relationships into which individuals are interpolated as culturally specific subjects and towards which they take a position on the basis of their cultural specificity: as a bright/dull, black/white, middle class/working class, boy/girl, aged x years. It is the pupil not the school that does the work of cultural reproduction. In which case it is human agents who are the agency of the process and we do not need to invent pseudo agents, such as the State and its various apparatuses, invested with some yet to be discovered effective power.

Essentially the issue is that of the relationship between the logic of symbolic meaning systems and the structures of contexts into which people, as the bearers and agents of those systems are placed. What will an individual holding beliefs and values x (the holding of which defines that individual as a culturally specific subject) do in a situation y which, by virtue of x, he/she experiences as z?

The distinctive feature of positioning theory is that it presupposes the competence of the pupil. In this respect it differs fundamentally from both deficit and cultural distance theories which see certain categories of pupils as disabled by the school. In terms of positioning theory however,
the pupil is seen not as socially inadequate or as a victim of ideological manipulation, but as an agent working from the basis of his or her own values and commitments within a given structural context. Willis' book "Learning to Labour" can be treated as an exploration of this process in the case of a group of anti-school, working class boys whose aspiration is to leave school as soon as possible and take up manual labour. Arnot and Whitty (op cit) say that Willis' work has been a major impetus to the development of the concept of pupil "resistance". To see its significance simply in these terms is to miss the most important aspect of it. Willis demonstrates the subtle mechanism of cultural reproduction in the school.

The astonishing thing which this book attempts to present is that there is a moment - and it only needs to be this for the gates to shut on the future - in working class culture when the manual giving of labour power represents both a freedom, election and transcendence, and a precise insertion into a system of exploitation and oppression for working class people.

(Willis P 1977 p120)

The key lies in the manner in which the Lads achieve an affirmation of self and a celebration of identity and membership through the identification of manual labour with a particular cultural model of masculinity. The categories masculine/feminine are associated with the distinction between mental and manual labour and in relation to the school, the celebration of masculinity entails the rejection of intellectual achievement. The very act of opposition to the domination of intellectual labour through the affirmation of masculinity traps the individual within the subordinate term of the class relationship.

Willis' study shows how the Lads' behaviour at school, their lack of
achievement etc., reflects their values and their sense of identity and membership. It is not a result or symptom of immaturity, incompetence or an inability to cope with the social demands of the school. The Lads are not 'strangers' in the school society. They are skilled and competent members. They have a fully adequate understanding of its explicit and implicit rule system and they manipulate both with sophistication and success. To understand their behaviour we have to view it as a performance (even in a theatrical sense) not in terms of competence. The Lads are working the system not failing in it. It is not that they are bemused by the school culture, they simply don't agree with it. They understand the school's demands and reject them. This position is taken consciously and explicitly - it is a position that the Lads can articulate in detail and at length, as Willis shows. They reject the school because they see its claim to authority as spurious. From the basis of their own knowledge and experience of life they know it to be wrong, not only in details, such as what work is like and how to get it, but on the fundamental exchange that the school offers - the rewards for conformity do not compensate for what has to be surrendered. The Lads' are fully competent members of the school, but because of their position, a position they adopt in order to occupy, that competence is exercised as oppositional behaviour because mediated by oppositional values.

'Penetration' is meant to designate impulses within a cultural form towards the penetration of the conditions of existence of its members and their position within the social whole but in a way which is not centred, essentialist or individualist. 'Limitation' is meant to designate those blocks, diversions and ideological effects which confuse and impede the full
development and expression of these impulses. The rather
cumbersome but strictly accurate term, 'partial penetration' is
meant to designate the interaction of these two terms in a
concrete culture.

(ibid p119)

He argues that these penetrations are deprived of independence and
drawn back into the reality they are meant to be uncovering - "There
is ultimately a guilty and unrecognised - precisely a 'partial' - relation-
ship of these penetrations to that which they seem to be independent from,
and see into." (ibid)

I would suggest that these 'limitations' are not simply blockages
or ideological obstacles - it is not that the Lads have simply not gone far
enough in their penetration of their conditions of existence. In order to
grasp what is involved here we have to look at the mode of these penetrations
- it is essentially cultural. Its form is expressed in the Lads' group. It
is the principle of intimacy of their group - that which both binds them to-
gether and formally opposes them to the culture of the school. To say that
its mode is cultural and its principle intimacy is to identify it as a restricted
code. It is important to stress that this is not simply to refer to the way in
which the Lads speak. There is a tendency to interpret the concepts of
elaborated and restricted codes in this way. Demaine, for example, writes
of them as different "forms of speech" (op cit p35) which are fixed in people
through socialisation. Bernstein said in an important paper:

The concept of socio-linguistic code points to the social
structuring of meanings and to their diverse but related
contextual linguistic realisations.
(Bernstein 1973 p194)
Then, as in the more recent work quoted so far, social structure is seen not as the origin of different types of speech but as the regulator of linguistic realisations.

In the case of the Lads their (given/adopted) position within the regulative context of the school's social relations generates the realisation of an oppositional restricted code. The term "restricted" refers to the symbolically condensed nature of the code - it is particularistic, localised and intimate. Its purpose is to celebrate the solidarity of the group in an appropriate and distinctive cultural form that separates it in a critical fashion from that which its members are united in opposing. It is a form grounded in a perceptive, critical penetration of the conditions of existence of the members. This penetration is displayed in the rituals and symbols of opposition, in the mimicry and mockery of the school culture. It is precisely the penetration that provides the expressive, and effective material for the group's distinctive oppositional style. But it is also precisely its cultural mode that gives the limitation to the group's penetration. The manner of their affirmation of identity and rejection of school culture cuts them off from the means whereby their penetration could be critically elaborated. Because they encounter knowledge, and at least incipiently, the means of knowledge production in the cultural form of the school the mode of their opposition limits the possibilities of their penetrations. Bernstein says that:

It could be argued that whereas the principle of the classification of gender categories and that of the categories of the mode of production have an arbitrary base, the principle of the classification of discourses ('voices') of education, derives from features intrinsic to the specialised discourse and is therefore non-arbitrary.
This may be the case. We need however, to distinguish between the distinctive features of a form of discourse which give it its speciality and the social division of labour created for its transmission and reproduction, and it is the latter which is the object of our concern.

(Bernstein B. 1982 p316)

The "social division of labour created for its transmission and reproduction" mediates the access of groups (culturally specific categories of agents) to the critical (elaborating) cores of theoretical discourse (10).

It is important to remember that the positions that pupils adopt are at the same time positions given by the regulative principle of the context. Hence oppositional positions are positions generated by and within the classificatory principle of the school code. As Bernstein argues:

The strategies for challenging the code are given by the code's principles.... These disturbances and challenges are resistances called out by the specific code; they do not necessarily index a move to declassify let alone to re-classify. Challenge of, or resistance to, the framing of pedagogic practice by transmitters or acquirers may be within the terms of the classificatory principles.

(ibid p327)

It is this that makes for what Willis calls the "guilty and unrecognised... relationship of these penetrations to that which they seem to be independent from and see into". Oppositional forms, whatever their specific class base or academic orientation, necessarily have to increase the degree of insulation between their category (the pupil oppositional group) and the formal culture of the school. They do this by erecting their own distinctive cultural style and set of practices. Despite the oppositional nature of this move, its effect is to actually increase the strength of the classification. It is not the content of categories that is important but the relationship between them.
Oppositional groups, simply by opposing, mark their position within the classificatory system more strongly. In this way pupils do the work of the school in reproducing the classification. The crucial issue of re-classification will be the topic of a future chapter.

THE FIELD OF DOXA

The school positions groups in relation to knowledge and the means of knowledge production through the mediation of the social form. Oppositional positioning is as much a part of this process as orthodox. The distinctive feature of oppositional positioning is that it invariably finds expression in a cultural (i.e. restricting code) rather than a theoretical (i.e. elaborating code) form. In this way the position itself, and its constituting principle, remain protected from critical examination. We can relate this to Bourdieu's schema of orthodoxy, heterodoxy and doxa. The first two terms refer to positions that are explicitly articulated within a social field: the official and the oppositional. Doxa is the underlying, unifying (regulative) principle of the field: that which is tacit and taken for granted. Doxa is "the guilty relationship" of heterodoxy to orthodoxy. The partial character of the penetrations revealed by Willis signifies their position within the field of the doxa of the school code - they do not challenge the basic principle of the field. Bourdieu says that,

Crisis is a necessary condition for a questioning of doxa but it is not in itself a sufficient condition for the production of a critical discourse. In class societies, in which the definition of the social world is at stake in overt or latent class struggle, the drawing of the line between the field of opinion, of that which is explicitly questioned, and the field of doxa,
of that which is beyond question and which each agent tacitly accords by the mere fact of acting in accord with social convention, is itself a fundamental objective at stake in that form of class struggle which is the struggle for the imposition of the dominant system of classification. The dominated classes have an interest in pushing back the limits of doxa and exposing the arbitrariness of the taken for granted; the dominant classes have an interest in defending the integrity of doxa, or, short of this, of establishing in its place the necessary imperfect substitute, orthodoxy.

(Bourdieu P 1977 p169)

A critical discourse that questions doxa constitutes an oppositional elaborated position (11). This is where the forms of knowledge become available in the social forms of the dominated. Bourdieu says,

It is only when the dominated have the material and symbolic means of rejecting the definition of the real that is imposed upon them through logical structures reproducing the social structures (i.e. the state of the power relations) and to lift the (institutionalised or internalised) censorships which it implies, i.e. when social classifications become the object and instrument of class struggle, that the arbitrary principles of the prevailing classification can appear as such and it therefore becomes necessary to undertake the work of conscious systematisation and express rationalisation which marks the passage from doxa to orthodoxy.

(ibid)

The positioning of culturally specific categories of subjects under the regulative principle of the school system reproduces social structure (the structure of relationships) through logical structures (the system of values and meanings).
The positions described can be represented in this way:

![Diagram showing the relationships between Field, Elaborating, System, Orthodoxy, Specialised Elaborating Discourse, Social Relationship of Transmission, Formal School Code, Oppositional Elaborated (theoretical mode), Un realised, Positions/PRACTICES, Oppositional Restricted (cultural mode), Heterodoxy, DOXA (positioning principle), Realised, and Restricting.](image)

The regulative principle maintains the positioning of groups so that opposition remains within a cultural (restricted) mode and suppresses the possibility of transformations of transmission codes that would realise a dominated elaborated
position. Primarily this is achieved by reproducing the classification of agents (transmitters/non-transmitters, acquirers/non-acquirers) and of knowledge (the hierarchy of school knowledges and school/non-school knowledge) and by maintaining the boundaries of the categories so produced (regulating the relationship between the categories). Transformations of transmission codes primarily involve transformations of the modalities of control (values of framing) and modifications of classification (e.g. allowing limited categories of non-teachers to become transmitters) under teacher control. These processes will be the topic of section three.

CONCLUSION

I now want to summarise the theoretical position being taken. My view is that the realist position, by taking generative structures as its object of study rather than experiences provides a solution to the problem endemic to the new sociology of education which arises from its foundation within the field of empirical realism. By treating social activity as production and social structure as the condition for such production, and as enabling as well as coercive, the realist position preserves both the concept of human agency and the concept of the autonomy of structure whilst avoiding the problems of voluntarism and determinism. It does this within the context of a philosophy of science which retains epistemological guarantees for knowledge, which allows for the specific effectivity of such knowledge and incorporates transformation as an intrinsic possibility of knowledge production.

The approach to education can be outlined as follows:

(1) The educational field is constituted by the relationships of the three
fundamental systems: curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation.

(2) These relationships are realised in the structures of classification and framing: +C +F, +C -F, -C -F, -C +F.

(3) The educational field adopts different forms depending upon the mode of production of society. The form is a "relatively independent and enduring generative structure" articulated within the ensemble of such structures in the social formation.

(4) The regulative (or morphogenetic) principle of the form governs the realisation of the possibilities of the field within the material (conjunctural) conditions of the social formation.

(5) The educational system is the production of the regulation of the field by the form under given material conditions (relations of production and specific conjunctures). The educational system of realised possibilities compatible with the maintenance of the form and which, consequently, reproduce the relations of production (their condition of existence).

(6) Regulation of the field occurs through the structuring of the relationships of education (the transmission matrix). This regulation is expressed in the transmission code.

(7) The structure of relationships (given by the transmission code) positions culturally specific categories of agents.

(8) The positioning of culturally specific categories of subjects within the relational structure of the school (college, unit etc.) regulates the realisations of their competencies according to the cultural specificity of their category.
The practices of agents produced on the basis of the positions they take within the relationships of the school (given their cultural specificities) reproduce the regulative principle of the relational structure.

From the point of view of the system, categories of subjects are given positions within the relational structure. From the point of view of the individual, categories of agents take positions towards the relational structure. Logical structures reproduce social structures through positioned practices - the realisation of the logic of meaning within the structure of context.

I wish to emphasise that the educational system is positioning people in relation to knowledge. Whatever else the educational system may do or be about, it is crucially to do with knowledge. The importance of this fact has tended to be overlooked. The new sociology of education has inclined towards an idealist view of the significance of knowledge as the cultivation of the individual - the liberation of individual potential etc. Hence its identification with progressivism in education. Neo-Marxist approaches tend to stress the social control and allocation functions of education relative to the socio-technical division of labour. The realist perspective, on the other hand, underlines the importance of knowledge as knowledge. Within the realist perspective knowledge has as its object the independently existing generative structures of the natural and social realms. Where knowledge is seen as a process of production and transformation it is itself understood as a product (realised through human agency) of such structures (which constitute its conditions of
production). Knowledge can take its own conditions of production as its object. These conditions of production are social relations. The practices of knowledge production are practices positioned within the social relations of generative structures. Where the practice of knowledge production takes its own relations of production as its object, those practices come to be understood precisely as positioned practices. Such an understanding is a necessary (though by no means sufficient) condition for the intentional transformation of social relations. Bhaskar says that "social structures must be understood as in principle enabling, not just coercive."

(op cit p50)
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

(1) on "realism" in the philosophy of science see fn 1 to the Introduction of the present work and also Harre R 1970, Putnam H. 1978, Hooker C.A. 1974, 1975.

(2) for a discussion of "referencing" in this sense, see Putnam H. 1978.


(4) see Althusser L. 1976 section 2.

(5) reproduction is essentially to do with the reproduction of boundaries and the (morphogenetic) principles which they realise (see chapter 8).

(6) see Bernstein B. 1977 ch. 8.


(8) this account of Bernstein's analysis in this paper can be compared with the method adopted by Levi-Stauss in his study of the North American Indian myth, "The Story of Asdiwal" (in Leach E. ed. 1967). In a similar fashion this analysis moves from a simple description - a telling of the story - through a series of increasingly abstract transformations to a final structure. Likewise, this can be seen as a "modal transform".

(9) interestingly Labov's criticism of Bernstein (Labov W. 1972) in reality illustrates what is precisely Bernstein's point - changes in the regulative principle of the social context generate changes in performances.

(10) Bernstein says:

   Education necessarily is predicated upon, irrespective of the
dominating principles of a social formation, elaborated orientations; but the dominating principle of the social formation regulates their realisations; that is the classification and framing values and so the code/codes. (Bernstein B. 1982 pp329, 331)

(11) Bernstein sees the location and distribution of elaborated and restricted orientations as having their origins in the "class regulation of the principle of the social division of labour."

This creates differential access to meanings having different degrees of dependency upon a specific material base. Thus access to orientations is regulated by the principle constituting the social division of labour of production which in turn directly transforms and reproduces differential orientations in the family. However, access to elaborated orientations is available through agencies of defence, challenge and opposition, for example, trade unions, political parties. The institutional availability distribution and realisation of elaborated codes is established through the modality of education. We see education as a fundamental reproducing and producing agency crucial to, but not in a close correspondence relation with, the class regulation of the mode of production, and crucial to the class regulation of modes of social control. (ibid p312)

In chapter seven I will attempt to demonstrate through the application of transformations of classification and framing relationships between various categories of transmitters and acquirers how an educational system might move in the direction of an oppositional elaborated form.
### REFERENCES TO CHAPTER THREE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Series</th>
<th>Reference/Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willis P.</td>
<td>1977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this chapter the issues addressed will be more substantive. The topic is the relationship between education and production. I will review a range of evidence in order to see how far that relationship corresponds to that posited by the theories discussed in the earlier chapters. I termed that general view "indexical" because the relationship is seen in terms of an underlying continuity between education and production in that (a) production in some way (precisely how is a source of controversy) determines, controls or constrains education, (b) education prepares people for production (once again what this entails is open to dispute), and (c) consequently what happens in education is intelligible in terms of its relationship to production. Theories were seen to vary in how far education simply "corresponds" in a direct way to production or how far it is "relatively autonomous" and also as to how far educational processes are effectively able to determine outcomes or how far they can be "resisted". Despite these disagreements and variations, the fundamental principle remains the same: there is a determinant relationship between the educational system and the sphere of production. Educational processes are intelligible as processes of identity formation which prepare people for their places in the relations of production (invariably understood as relationships in production). Hence Frith states: "The importance of the school for labour socialisation has long been a commonplace of Marxist analysis". (Frith S. 1980a)
It is important to note that it is not only radical sociologists of education who hold to this fundamental principle. It is equally the basic assumption, though expressed in very different ways, of orthodox thinking: of human capital theory and technical functionalism, of manpower planning and forecasting and of the current "new training initiative". Geoffrey Holland, for instance, has written that,

It is through training that individuals - at all levels in the labour force - can acquire the skills and experience they need to increase productivity - and maintain or improve their employability.

(THES 2.7. '82 p18)

Conservative Education Secretary, Mark Carlisle, said in a speech at the Open University,

It is simply a matter of facing reality that education must do more towards serving those sectors which create wealth and prosperity, those sectors which earn rather than spend.

(THES 30.1. '81 p3)

The West Midland Economic Planning Council issued a document on youth unemployment in 1979 in which it stated that,

...the less rigid framework of study generated by the new ideas on education appears to have allowed substantial numbers of young people to reach school-leaving age without attaining competence in the basic skills of reading, writing and mathematics needed to obtain a job and occupy a full place in the adult world. It is also reported that among the many whose talents and personalities have been developed by the educational process there are now some, perhaps a disturbingly large number who lack the motivation and self-discipline necessary to obtaining and keeping a job in competition with others.

(quoted in Frith 1980b)

The more specific issues raised by these quotes will be examined in the next
Chapter. The general similarity to the radical view is clear - indeed statements such as these are often used by radicals to support their interpretation of the role of education and capitalist society.

A wide range of interpretations and variations exists around the basic principle of indexicality. We can make a broad distinction between radical and liberal orthodox approaches and identify a number of options within each broad perspective. Often the difference between a radical and an orthodox analysis is a different theoretical explication and interpretation of the same thing. For example the idea that education should be developing 'correct' attitudes and values towards work is seen by orthodox liberals as a politically neutral and benevolent pragmatism that increases productivity (to everyone's benefit) and improves the individual's chance of getting a job, but for radicals this same concern is interpreted in terms of the ideological imposition of capitalist authority relations upon the new work-force. Similarly there is a wide range of views as to exactly what it is in production that educational processes address: technical skills, attitudes and values, authority relations, the labour process, hierarchy and inequality, etc.

The quote from the WMEPC relates to the recent widespread view that a crisis has developed in the relationship between education and production. It was this that formed the core of the Great Debate on education initiated by James Callaghan's Ruskin College speech of 1976. The Great Debate and the theme of crisis can be located within a broader context. Husen has written that,

The growing realisation of the lack of adequate connections between schooling and working life was one of the reasons
why the OECD Council in 1973 asked the Secretary-General of the organisation to set up an ad hoc committee of experts to prepare a policy paper in which some major problems were brought into focus and recommendations made to achieve a better integration between education and the job world. The lack of adequate connections is... due to changes that have taken place in the roles of the family, school and work place. There has been a marked tendency to delegate more and more responsibilities to the schools, which have tended to become more isolated from society.

(Husen T. 1979 p155)

Finn and Frith argue that,

In the period of the Great Debate, there was a dual process at work. Not only were the aims and objects of education re-defined but, at the same time, the actual processes of the educational system were being restructured both to achieve those new goals and to fit the new patterns of state expenditure. However, this restructuring of the social relations of schooling was necessarily a long-term process, with contradictions and potential resistances.

(Finn D. & Frith S. 1981 p57)

Like Husen, Finn and Frith relate this restructuring of education to a complex set of changes which for them involves youth unemployment, employers' attitudes to young people and changes in the labour market.

Elsewhere Frith has given particular emphasis to fundamental changes in the labour market as the major factor behind high youth unemployment and the view that the schools have been failing to equip young people adequately for work.

As the Holland Report made clear, the root cause of youth unemployment is the disappearance of jobs for young people. Qualifications are not the determining factor in job opportunities. Employers define tasks as being appropriate for girls or boys, blacks or whites, young or old; qualifications only become relevant when everything else in the competition for jobs is equal. What has really happened in the 1970s has been that young people have found themselves increasingly in competition with adults, and in the competition CSEs and GCEs count for nothing against experience and proven employability.

(Frith S. 1980a)
From this point of view, the Great Debate about the crisis in education becomes a smoke-screen behind which the real cause of youth unemployment is hidden. The problem is not really the quality of education, and it cannot be solved by changes in education. It is a structural condition within the economic sphere focussed in the labour market. Such an argument raises a new set of issues and, potentially, a new perspective on the education/production relationship. The stress upon the employers' recruitment policies, pointing towards a consideration of symbolic representations of the division of labour, and the mediating role of the labour market, can call into question the principle of indexicality itself.

Despite the radical implications of his argument, Frith nevertheless retains a version of indexicality in his more developed position in the work with Finn referred to above. Finn and Frith offer a complex analysis which addresses an issue which will be a major theme of a future chapter of the present work, and I will outline their argument in some detail before addressing the more general problems of indexicality. The complex nature of the relationship between education and production is defined in terms of the following aspects:

(1) Education is commonly seen as preparation for life. Preparation for work is part of that process but the significance accorded to it has varied historically. At the same time the working class and other groups have pushed their own claims and objectives within education and so it cannot be simply seen as a direct expression of the needs of capitalists.

(2) Apart from preparing young people as workers, schools are also involved in preparing them as citizens and parents. Often teaching is only indirectly
concerned with the needs of production. Schools "help create and make legitimate (often in contradictory and paradoxical ways) forms of consciousness which deliver young people to work and home with complex orientations to their roles as workers and parents". (Finn & Frith op cit p43)

(3) Furthermore, the needs of employers are not immediately clear and unambiguous. They are often contradictory, confused and even unknown. Specific technical skills are often quickly obsolete. Their real concern is "with the general, social dispositions and characteristics of their workers than with their particular abilities to carry out specific technical tasks."

(ibid p44)

(4) In addition to the problem of actually articulating employers' needs, there is that of translating them into policy objectives within the state.

(5) An important distinction must be drawn between ideologies about the relationship between education and production and the ideological work that education does for production. These two aspects are distinct but interacting in that what goes on in schools (for production) will be affected by policies concerning the relationship between school and production.

The principle of indexicality is embedded within this complex context in the following way: Finn and Frith retain the idea that educational processes are concerned with identity formation (a) in the broad sense that schools create and legitimate "forms of consciousness" related to citizen, gender and work roles, and (b) that their ideological work is to do with developing the "general social dispositions and characteristics of...workers". We see implicit in this the second major assumption that I defined as underlying the approach discussed
in the earlier chapters, i.e. that of the effectivity of educational processes.

A key statement in their argument is this:

It is this concern with the subjectivity (i.e. the dispositions and social characteristics) of their workers which provides the key to understanding the 'stake' that employers have in the education system. When employers buy labour power they purchase what is on the one hand a potentially malleable commodity, but what is on the other hand a commodity ultimately controlled by an independent and often hostile will. That is to say, because the capitalist labour process in itself involves problems of labour control, it is difficult for employers to separate the problem of labour power's attitudes in work from its attitudes out of work. The labour process changes in response not just to its own inherent problems — for example competition, the declining rate of profit — but also in the context of labour discipline and class conflict. Employers necessarily have to treat labour as 'subjective' - not just as a hand or a machine - and labour's subjectivity obviously reflects ideological, political and educational processes outside as well as within production. Employers thus have a 'stake', an interest in, those institutions and apparatuses concerned with the production and reproduction of their labour force.

(_ibid p44_

We see here the basic logic of argument outlined earlier: (a) the general proposition that education reproduces class relationships, (b) the selection of relationships in production as the significant site addressed by education, (c) (specific to this particular argument) the labour process as the relevant aspect of that site.

Finn and Frith produce a two-pronged argument to account for the situation of young people in relation to education and work today: a labour market argument and a labour process argument. It is on the basis of the labour process argument that indexicality is maintained. I will argue, however, that the labour market argument alone is sufficient for their purposes, and,
indeed, renders the labour process argument highly suspect. Essentially the argument here is the same as that presented by Frith in the article referred to above (Frith 1980b). Finn and Frith point out that despite the employers' criticisms of the educational quality of young workers, youth unemployment does not apply to all young people in a blanket fashion. It affects different groups, e.g. young white males, blacks, girls, differently despite similarities in educational characteristics.

For both girls and blacks, qualifications are not the determining factor in job opportunities; employers, rather, define tasks as being appropriate (or inappropriate) for girls or boys, blacks or whites. And even for white boys, the general assertion that better school qualifications mean better job chances is not necessarily supported by the empirical evidence of how qualifications are regarded by employers in practice. The MSC’s study of Coventry, for example, found that employers were more concerned with attitudes and aptitudes. Qualifications were relevant if everything else was equal (which it is not for blacks and girls) but even white boys were rarely competing for jobs only against each other, and in the competition for adult jobs CSEs and GCEs count for nothing against experience and proven employability. (ibid p73)

The labour market situation of young people has been adversely affected by reforms which, paradoxically, were introduced for the general benefit of youngsters. Finn and Frith pick out the following factors.

(a) Trade Union pressure has brought the adult rate of pay down from twenty-one years of age to eighteen or nineteen. (b) the raising of the school leaving age to sixteen and the expansion in further and higher education have delayed the entry of young people into the labour market, so contracting the time period in which young people may gain work experience before becoming eligible for
adult rates of pay. (c) The Employment Protection and Redundancy Payment Act has put a premium on retaining existing employees rather than recruiting new ones. Consequently employers have less incentive in recruiting young workers who, through inexperience, are less value for money than adult workers (employers' attitudes to young workers are ambiguous - more so than Finn and Frith suggest - and will be looked at in more detail later). Combined with high unemployment this means that they simply do not need to employ them - plenty of adults are available. Employers are tending to replace what were traditionally 'youth jobs' with part-time adult labour, especially women returning to work.

The connection with the labour process is made through an argument about costs. During times of recession employers seek to reduce costs as much as possible and this will include transferring the costs of training to the state. But the nature of the training has become problematical:

...changes in the labour process are putting a premium on experienced, self-disciplined workers, who are at once responsible and malleable. Labour process analysts usually treat these changes in terms of deskilling, but from the perspective of young workers the crucial process is 'semi-skilling': tasks are being simplified and routinized, apprenticeship training is becoming increasingly irrelevant for the jobs craftsmen are actually asked to do, but there is, nonetheless, an increased demand for 'responsible autonomy', for workers who will do these simplified, routinized tasks without needing constant supervision and control, who will willingly subject themselves to, and service, costly machines.

(ibid p74)
Hence whilst transferring the responsibility (and cost) of training to the education sector, the requirement from the training process has fundamentally changed. These two aspects are linked: changes in the labour process are themselves responses to problems of accumulation. The educational institutions that have taken over the task of training young people for work are being expected to produce a new set of characteristics.

It is important to understand precisely how Finn and Frith link educational processes and labour processes. They argue that,

Educational sociologists since Durkheim have assumed that schools reproduce social relations, but in capitalist societies schools do not only reproduce class relations in broad terms - the relations between owners of capital and owners of labour power - they also reproduce the distinctions and divisions within classes. These distinctions and divisions are constantly changing, as the labour process changes, as class conflict produces new work-place alliances and organisations, new forms of workplace hierarchy, new problems of managerial control. It is in this respect that the relationship between education and production is always problematic, and it is with reference to the structure of the working class that the politics of state education must be understood. For the last hundred years the British school system has helped legitimate the differentiation of the working class: between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers, between the skilled and the unskilled, between foreman and hand, and, in general cultural terms, between the 'rough' and the 'respectable', the 'lads' and the 'ear'oles'. (ibid p80)

Hence the employers' concern with the "subjectivity" of labour-power, with "the general, social dispositions and characteristics of their workers", their "stake" in "those institutions and apparatuses concerned with the production and reproduction of their labour force" is clearly defined in terms of the detailed system of relationships in production, with broader cultural divisions and with the legitimation of those relationships and divisions.
It is not just a matter, however, of the educational system reproducing a system of relationships. Positions within that system are reproduced in terms of their specific contents, or socio-technical characteristics:

The school system is crucial for the central labour process distinction between mental and manual labour, between the conceivers of a task and its executors. Labour is controlled through the task and the technological processes that order the task. Employers expect workers to accept their technological place, but not necessarily to understand it. Education thus has a dual role: to develop the knowledge and skills for technological process and to train a technologically subordinate work-force. But this mental/manual split is not determined only by technology (by knowledge) but also by the capitalist appropriation of technology (by the problems of control). Schools are expected to reproduce this distinction and to legitimate it through the creation and control of particular types of ability (the A stream v. the D stream) even though there is nothing in the logic of knowledge itself that makes such distinctions necessary.

(ibid p80, my emphases)

We see here, quite clearly, that the principles of indexicality and effectivity are fundamental to Finn and Frith's understanding of the relationship between education and production. The complexity that they build into their model involves a set of contingent factors which prevent that relationship ever being expressed or realised in its pure form - mismatches and contradictions are inevitable. The problems arising from this situation can only be settled within a political context in which contending interests and positions place a further limit on how far education can ever be effectively wrenched into line with the needs of capital as specified above.

Finn and Frith give priority to the labour-process argument: "the education 'crisis' in Britain in the 1970s was, in fact, a labour process 'crisis'."
Due to changes in the labour process capital now requires flexible and responsible workers who will have "a 'general' skill base but will learn their particular tasks (always changing with technology) on the job." (ibid p76). They summarise their position as follows:

We have been arguing that the educational problems of the 1970s were caused by changes at work - by managerial strategies of labour control, by technological developments, by new divisions of labour - which left school-leavers at a disadvantage in the labour market. Their academic qualifications became less significant than their inexperience and lack of job commitment.

The disadvantage that young workers experience in the labour market is, of course, a disadvantage vis-a-vis other groups with which they are having to compete. Why are these other groups preferred? Finn and Frith provide a plausible answer:

Adult workers are, if available, preferable to young workers both because they have work experience and because they need less supervision. Adult workers are controlled, ultimately through the wage; they do what is necessary at work to get the steady income on which stable family life depends. School leavers do not have long-term leisure or family commitments, they have not settled down, they are more likely to mess around at work without fear of financial consequences.

They point out that this preference for older, experienced workers is by no means new - "Young people have never left school with experience and employability...older workers have always been preferable to younger ones..." (ibid p74). Indeed, we can add that employers' complaints about education are no new thing either. (1)
they prefer them, combined with the cost factors involved in the employment of young workers that Finn and Frith outline and the high level of unemployment is perfectly sufficient to explain why there is such a high level of youth unemployment. Neither is it in any way surprising that governments feel that something should be done about and for youth or that the educational system should be seen as the appropriate place for doing it. The introduction of the labour process argument adds nothing to the explanation. Why these policies should take the particular form they do - YOP, the New Training Initiative etc. - does need explaining and here, perhaps, the labour process argument may be relevant. However, we have to keep in mind the distinction that Finn and Frith themselves make between discourse about the relationship between education and production and the 'work' that education does for production. The question is not which account of what education does for production, the orthodox training rhetoric or the radical control rhetoric, is correct, but does education do anything for production in the strong sense of the fundamental principle which both share?

EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMIC DIVISION OF LABOUR

The idea that employers today need a new kind of 'general skill' from education as a result of changes in the labour process suggests some initial reasons why scepticism is appropriate towards the idea that education is preparation for production. In the first place, such a blanket approach towards something as immensely complex as the occupational structure is of questionable validity. It might well be the case that some employers in
certain sectors have such a new requirement, but whether or not this need is so wide-spread and homogeneous as to necessitate a total restructuring of education is an issue that needs to be examined not simply assumed. Even if it were the case it is not immediately obvious that this situation would be of particular disadvantage to young workers. If the argument is that work-skills and attitudes are developed in education then older workers would be just, if not more, disadvantaged than the young. At the same time their experience would not be a compensating factor because, presumably, it would be irrelevant to the 'new' requirement. Common-sense alone would suggest that young workers would be more open to new techniques because unencumbered by outmoded habits and expectations. Indeed, despite their general lack of enthusiasm for new teaching methods, the one advantage that employers do seem to find in them is that they encourage initiative and autonomy. (2) The characteristic demand from employers as far as education is concerned is not for a new education but a return to traditional standards and methods (3).

The idea that the demand for flexibility and a "general skill" is new is itself highly questionable. It is instructive here to turn to Marx. Marx saw the need for flexibility as an inevitable and developing aspect of capitalist production:

Modern industry never views or treats the existing form of a production process as the definitive one. Its technical basis is therefore revolutionary, whereas all earlier modes of production were essentially conservative. By means of machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it is continually transforming not only the technical basis of production but also the functions of the worker and the social combinations of the labour process. At the same time, it thereby also revolutionises the
division of labour within society, and incessantly throws masses of capital from one branch of production to another. Thus large-scale industry, by its very nature, necessitates variation in labour, fluidity of functions and mobility of the worker in all directions.

(Marx K 1976 p617)

Marx does relate this development to the provision of education. But he suggests no more than that education is providing practical skills and knowledge. His own view, one might say, is thoroughly technicist here. His reference is not to "the social combinations of the labour process" but to "a certain amount of instruction in technology and in the practical handling of the various implements of labour." (ibid p619). He also argues that the class relations of capitalism place a limit upon how far this development, which ultimately should lead to "the totally developed individual, for whom the different social functions are different modes of activity he takes up in turn" (ibid p618), can progress. But, "there can be no doubt that with the inevitable conquest of political power by the working class, technological education, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the schools of the workers." (ibid p619)

Marx' argument, however, does not rest simply upon a view of the technical characteristics of large-scale industry. The "fluidity" of labour power reflects the fluidity of capital itself and its indifference to the specific concrete forms in which it is realised in order to pursue its quest for _value_ (4).

Furthermore, although labour-power assumes a distinctive form in every particular sphere of production, as a capacity for spinning, cobbling, metal-working, etc., so that every sphere of production requires a capacity for labour that is developed in a specific direction, a distinctive capacity for labour, it remains true that the flexibility
of capital, its indifference to the particular forms of the labour process it acquires, is extended by capital to the worker. He is required to be capable of the same flexibility or versatility in the way he applies his labour-power. As we shall see, the capitalist mode of production itself raises obstacles in the way of its own tendency, but it pushes to one side all legal and other extra-economic obstructions standing in the way of this versatility. Just as capital, as value valorizing itself, views with indifference the particular physical guise in which labour appears in the labour process, whether as a steam engine, dung-heap or silk, so too the worker looks upon the particular content of his labour with equal indifference. His work belongs to capital, it is only the use-value of the commodity that he has sold, and he has only sold it to acquire money and, with the money, the means of subsistence. A change in his mode of labour interests him only because every specific mode of labour requires a different development of his labour-power. (ibid p1013)

This view of the "flexibility or versatility" of labour power and the indifference of both capital and labour to its distinctive concrete forms relates to Marx' view of the process of production under capitalism as "the immediate unity of labour process and valorization process". It is this unity of labour process and valorization process which is the distinctive characteristic of the production process under capitalism. Valorization - the process whereby capital increases its value (through the creation of surplus value) through its own movement - both presupposes and in its movement reconstitutes and reproduces the general conditions of capitalist production. These general conditions (see ch.2+3) constitute the worker as a worker (i.e. one for whom his/her labour power is a commodity) prior to any involvement in any particular production process (the worker is a worker even if not involved in production). The important implication of the logic of valorization is that the site of reproduction is not in production.
(i.e. the social relationships in production) but outside in the sphere of circulation, specifically in the sphere of "private consumption":

The means of subsistence are a particular form of material existence in which capital confronts the worker before he acquires them through the sale of his labour-power. But by the time the process of production begins the labour-power has already been sold and hence the means of subsistence have passed de jure at least into the consumption fund of the worker. These means of subsistence themselves form no part of the labour process, which apart from the presence of effective labour-power, requires nothing but the materials and means of labour. In fact, of course, the worker must sustain his capacity for work with the aid of the means of subsistence, but this, his private consumption, falls outside the process of producing commodities.

(ibid p1004)

I do not at this point intend to follow the logic of Marx' important argument any further but rather look at how he himself treated the "flexibility" of labour-power. He says that "With the real subsumption of labour under capital a complete (and constantly repeated) revolution takes place in the mode of production, in the productivity of workers and in the relations between workers and capitalists." (ibid p1035). How does Marx see this constant revolutionising of production in relation to the flexibility of the worker?

Except where labour-power has been rendered quite one-sided by the division of labour, the free worker is in principle ready and willing to accept every possible variation in his labour-power and activity which promises higher rewards (as we see from the way in which the surplus population on the land constantly pours into the towns). Should the worker prove more or less incapable of this versatility, he still regards it open to the next generation, and the new generation of workers is infinitely distributable among, and adaptable to, new or expanding branches of industry. We can see this versatility, this perfect indifference towards the particular content of work and
the free transition from one branch of industry to the next, most obviously in North America, where the development of wage-labour has been relatively un-trammelled by the vestiges of the guild system etc...

The constant development of new forms of work, this continual change - which corresponds to the diversification of use-values and hence represents a real advance in the nature of exchange-value - and in consequence the progressive division of labour in society as a whole: all this is the product of the capitalist mode of production.

(ibid p1034)

He makes the same point with regard to North America again:

Nowhere does the fluidity of capital, the versatility of labour and the indifference of the worker to the content of his work appear more vividly than in the United States of North America.... nowhere are people so aware that their labour always produces the same product, money, and nowhere do they pass through the most divergent kinds of work with the same nonchalance.

(ibid p1014 fn 23)

Elsewhere the following example is quoted:

A French worker wrote as follows on his return from San Francisco:

"I could never have believed that I was capable of working at all the trades I practised in California. I was firmly convinced that I was fit for nothing but the printing of books ... Once I was in the midst of this world of adventurers, who change their jobs as often as their shirts, then, upon my faith, I did as the others. As mining did not pay well enough, I left it for the city, and there I became in succession a typographer, a slater, a plumber, etc. As a result of this discovery that I am fit for any sort of work, I feel less of a mollusc and more of a man."

This quote Marx took from a book published in 1860! The condition that Marx is describing is one already completed in his time - before the advent of mass, compulsory education.

It is difficult to reconcile the "world of adventurers who change their jobs as often as their shirts", the model of the "free worker (who)
is in principle ready and willing to accept every possible variation in his labour-power and activity" with the image presented in the sociology of education of someone who needs to undergo lengthy and intensive preparation in a specialised socialising agency called "the school" before he or she is fitted to take up a place in production and where changes in production provoke crises that necessitate massive restructurings of that agency. Marx's model is not only a deduction from his theoretical system; as the quotes above indicate, it is a condition that he observes in his own time. The flexibility of the worker is something that Marx accepts "in principle". Restrictions upon that flexibility are in the first place residues of feudalism transmitted through tradition, and in the second place the internal limit, at a much higher level of development, of capital itself. This "in principle" acceptance reflects three inter-related, and fundamental, dimensions of his general theory: (1) the model of the human-being elaborated in his early philosophical works (in particular in the EPM), (2) the concept of "labour-power" as "labour capacity, the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical form, the living personality, of a human being, capabilities which he sets in motion whenever he produces a use-value of any kind." (ibid p270), (3) the material development of production through its capitalist phase and beyond, leading eventually to the possibility of "the totally developed individual" (introduced in philosophy in the early work and as a material possibility in the later).

Marx' own writings on the development of capitalism in this respect can be seen as providing support for Hickox's criticisms of the argument in
the Marxist sociology of education that schooling developed historically
directly to serve the interests of capital. He says that,

What is remarkable is the length of time between the onset of the industrialisation process and the provision of a system of mass compulsory education. The latter was introduced during a period of industrial peace and cannot be seen as a reaction to a crisis of industrial relations such as occurred in the 1840s. Moreover the slender financial allocation typically allocated to working class education within the state system in the nineteenth century must also tend to undermine the belief that education was seen as an important instrument of social control.
(Hickox M. 1982 p. 572)

He argues that writers such as Richard Johnson have confused the ideologies of philanthropists with the actual beliefs of capitalists. In addition to this, education has had more to do historically with the growth of bureaucracy than with industry:

...the development of an elite secondary sector, its curriculum linked to that of the university, in Europe in the early modern period was related principally to the recruitment needs of the expanding state bureaucracies and had little connection with the upper echelons of industry. In nineteenth century France, for example, the state secondary system was almost exclusively geared to providing personnel for the civil service and few of its graduates entered industry. Similarly in England the industrial elite in the nineteenth century tended to remain culturally and educationally distinct from the bureaucratic and professional elites.
(ibid pp570-71)

Similar historical observations have been made by Musgrove:

If we map types of educational provision and industrial development at different times over the past two centuries, we find, when we superimpose one map on the other, a quite astonishing lack of correspondence. Mass education developed as a rural phenomenon....In England in the middle of the nineteenth century the least schooled places were Oldham and Rochdale; the most schooled regions were the vast rural expanses of Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, and the East and North Ridings of Yorkshire.
(Musgrove F. 1979 p74)
Musgrove points to the important connection between schooling and religion. This relationship is underlined if the ancient market towns and Cathedral cities are placed alongside rural areas and compared with the new factory towns:

At Census Day in 1851, 52 per cent of the nation's children between the ages of five and fourteen were at school: among the towns with between 65 and 75 per cent were Chichester, Dorchester, Exeter, Lincoln, Salisbury, Truro, Winchester, and York (Gloucester, Bath and Canterbury were not far behind, with more than 60 per cent); among the towns with 36 per cent or less were Birmingham, Blackburn, Bolton, Bradford, Coventry, Manchester, Stockport and Oldham. (ibid p76)

Further discontinuities are noted by Collins at the comparative level:

Yet although education does discipline the lower social classes the demand for labour discipline per se does not explain why some industrial societies have large mass-education systems and why some have small ones. For example, the educational system is huge in the United States, relatively large in Russia and Japan, and tiny in Britain, France and Germany, even though the need for labour discipline is presumably the same in all industrial societies.... Nor does the demand for labour discipline explain the existence of segregated class systems in some societies but not in others. (Collins R. 1981 pp284-5)

Hickox also points to the lack of symmetry in the relationship between school system and economy:

...there is little evidence to suppose that these features are in any way systematically related to the needs of the capitalist labour process or that they can be seen as having any important effect in legitimating capitalist relations of production. This is not to say that there are not powerful vested interests underpinning 'traditional' forms of education which account for its continual survival but it is to suggest that these are not identical with the interests of Capital itself. Indeed the examples of the United States and Sweden point to the fact that a comprehensivised
non differentiated secondary educational system is perfectly compatible with the capitalist mode of production. In fact, as will be argued, there are some reasons for supposing that this type of education is potentially more effective in legitimating the social relations of capitalism than the 'traditional' alternative. Consequently the survival of the latter might be taken to demonstrate the relative unimportance of processes of formal education in the reproduction of these social relations. (Hickox M. op cit p. 570)

A second area in which both historical and comparative data have been used to look at the relationship between education and the economy is in the area of economics that has concerned itself with the relationship between educational provision and growth. The national growth approach begins from the observation that more developed countries tend to have more developed educational systems. The implication has been taken to be that education enables growth to take place. The further implication is that if past growth is a function of education, then future growth targets could be obtained by creating an appropriate structure of educational provision. As Blaug says, it is seen as a matter of "expediting economic growth by providing indispensable manpower with particular skill attributes." (Blaug M. 1972 p167) He points to two basic assumptions:

All this makes good sense if there are, in fact, no substitutes whatever for particular skills and if these skills can be produced in schools in one and only one way. Unfortunately, the approach itself provides no means of testing this strong assumption. At present, forecasts of manpower requirements cannot be made with any reliability beyond periods of three to four years - and even three year forecasts have frequently proved inaccurate - and yet the time perspective of almost all manpower forecasts is as long as ten to fifteen years. In other words, the assumption of low substitutability between highly qualified people has become an 'article of faith' that is inherently non-falsifiable. (ibid p167)
Radical theories also hold, as an 'article of faith', a version of the principle of low substitutability of workers with different educational backgrounds and the problems associated with technical-functionalist theories and with national growth and manpower forecasting are equally problems for radical theories.

The fundamental problem for national growth theories is one of causality - as Blaug says, "Are nations rich because they are better educated or are they better educated because they are rich?" (Ibid p100). More specifically there are the methodological problems of identifying valid economic and educational indicators: what should be correlated with what in each sphere? For example, the former could be per capita GNP, per capita energy consumption or a composite standard of living measure and the latter could be literacy rates, enrolment rates at different levels or the general/vocational education mix. When discussing these problems Blaug points out that international comparisons often treat education in terms of levels rather than in terms of types. He cites a study by Bennet (1967) which did distinguish between vocational and general education and which took as its economic indicators per capita GNP, caloric consumption per day per head and per capita gross energy consumption. This study produced results where,

....the correlation between economic indicators and secondary vocational education, when broken down by regions, was actually negative for the industrialised nations of North America and Europe; high positive correlations were found only for Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, that is, for the least developed nations. (ibid p68)
However, even the role of vocational education in underdeveloped countries is by no means simple, as Foster's work on Ghana indicates (5).

Collins notes similar anomalies in the study of Harbison and Myers (1964), which Blaug refers to as "the most famous of all these kinds of international comparisons". The authors divided seventy-five countries into four groups according to economic levels and related those levels to weighted enrolment rates at primary, secondary and higher education levels. The latter were combined to make a "Composite Index of Human Resource Development". Collins says that, despite a correlation of .89 between level and the index, within each level there is no significant correlation. For example, for the highest group of the European and English speaking countries "Denmark and Sweden have the lowest educational enrolment indices (77 and 79 respectively, as compared to a median of 105 for the whole group and a high of 261 for the United States) but have per capita GNPs well above the median; conversely, France, Japan and the Netherlands have educational indices above the median (108, 111 and 134) but per capita GNPs below the median," (Collins R. op cit p14). Blaug, somewhat scathingly, says that this study deserves its fame "for it embodies virtually every mistake that it is possible to make in international comparisons of income and education." (Blaug op cit p68). M.J. Bowman, more charitably, describes it as "an enlightening and perceptive discussion" (Bowman M.J. 1972 p61) but concludes that "Unfortunately, however, their statistical evidence does not support the inferences they try to draw with respect to emphasis upon secondary schooling and especially vocational and technical education." (ibid)
Collins concludes his review of this area of analysis with the statement that,

The main contribution of education to economic productivity, then, appears to occur at the level of the transition to mass literacy and not sufficiently beyond this level. (Collins op cit p15)

Blaug concludes his review by saying that,

Even at the level of an occupation within a given industry, no universal relationships can be laid down between the education of workers and the output of the productive processes in which they participate. Countries progress along a variety of manpower growth paths and the range of alternatives is almost as wide as the range of their living standards. (Blaugh op cit p100)

Mace concludes a review of forecasting programmes by saying that they have been "almost universally disastrous". (Mace J. 1977 p27).

The failure of the national growth approach to discover either significant historical or comparative correlations between educational provision and development beyond the most trivial associations or to provide effective forecasting could simply be laid at the door of inadequate techniques, but given the significant degree of support and funding that this approach has received from governments and international bodies this is not altogether plausible. Mace argues that the failure of forecasting can be related to its underlying assumptions, and in particular to its approach to the production function and labour elasticities of substitution. The production function specifies the amount of output resulting from different combinations of inputs (labour, capital etc.) under a given state of technical knowledge. Substitution has to do with how far elements in the production process (e.g. workers for machines, machines for other machines, workers with varying educational

- 214 -
qualifications) can be substituted for each other. Mace says that the approaches he examines assume that it is impossible to substitute factors. The relevance of substitution to the radical argument is obvious: if there are sets of attitudes and values, forms of consciousness or ideology specific to given sectors of the socio-technical division of labour and if these things are developed in education, then we would expect to find low elasticities of substitution for different categories of workers on the basis of their educational characteristics. In that education is preparation for production and individuals are allocated on the basis of education, work experience should provide an intensification of what is developed in education and not an alternative source of attitudes, values, etc. Hence we should expect a systematic and enduring relationship between education and work.

Mace reports that numerous studies show that elasticities of substitution are invariably found to be extremely high. If substitution is impossible then its value is zero. A value above 1 indicates that it is relatively easy. The studies referred to by Mace found values between 2.4 and more than 8. Empirical studies (e.g. Layard et al. 1971 which looked at labour utilisation in 68 factories in the electrical engineering industry) have found wide variations in the educational characteristics of workers at given levels.

Mace writes:

A more recent study of the engineering labour market in the UK indicates not only that substitution is possible but also suggests why it is possible. The study examined data from 12 British firms and concluded that 'the scope for substitution of people with different qualifications (even) in (engineering) jobs which have been defined by qualifications, is much greater
than manpower forecasters would have us believe'. Further evidence that qualified people can move into different jobs was shown by the fact that 25 per cent of the sample of people with engineering qualifications were working in non-engineering jobs. The authors found one possible reason for the employment of differently qualified people in engineering jobs was that there is no rigorous link between an engineering job and formal education. Experience and on-the-job training were at least as important as formal education to the successful performance of engineering jobs, and people without formal qualifications seemed to be able to compensate for any lack of formal education through these alternative means of acquiring engineering skills.

(Mace J. op cit pp29-30)

Bosworth and Wilson, in a study of the labour market for scientists and technologists found that only about 25% of holders of science degrees found work as scientists although around two-thirds of scientists are graduates and that over 50% of qualified engineers and technologists were employed as such but less than one-third working in those occupations were qualified (Lindley R. ed. 1980 p297). Interestingly the proportion of scientists and technologists who were qualified actually fell within the occupational group between 1961 and 1971 - from 51.3 to 46.7%.

Phelps-Brown, in his authoritative study of income inequalities, presents a similar review of findings:

It has also been found that those now filling a given position adequately have very various educational attainments, many of them a good deal slighter than those stated as prerequisite for the position. Surveying 15 firms in the British electrical engineering industry, Blaug et al (1967 pp49-50) reported that 'over two-thirds of the jobs for which educational requirements were specified are filled by underqualified men, or else by men with the right level but wrong type of qualifications. It is noteworthy that only one-fifth of the occupants of jobs were observed to have the precise qualification corresponding to the job-analysis conception of what was required by the job.' When the survey was extended to cover 68 factories, Layard et al (1971 c. 9) found no systematic relation between occupation and level of education,
or between the subject studied in education and the subject matter of the present job.
(Phelps-Brown H. 1977 p242)

These findings on the indeterminacy of the relationship between education and occupation and on the possibilities of substitution are reinforced by Collins' systematic critique of technical-functionalism (6). Once again I will stress that the disagreement between radical and orthodox theories is not on the basic issue of whether or not education does prepare people for production but on the 'how' and 'what' of that preparation - hence the evidence being reviewed here is relevant to both as it addresses the basic premise and not the specifics. Collins' findings on retraining are particularly relevant. He found from one survey that 84% of firms were able to retrain their workers for new technologies informally in not more than three months and that "Formal education was little used in retraining..." (Collins R. op cit p.17).

EDUCATION AND RECRUITMENT

A detailed study by Ashton, et al (1982) has provided illuminating information on the way in which educational qualifications are articulated with the occupational structure in the labour market. The process is complex and varies according to a number of criteria. Only half of employers interviewed in Leicester, Sunderland and St. Albans thought that educational qualifications were useful "as yardsticks of a candidates' ability' (ibid p55). Twenty-three per cent thought that "they could possibly be of some use with certain reservations" and twenty-seven per cent considered them to be no use at all. Of the first group 45% (i.e. 45% of 50%) thought them to be a true measure of ability and a third saw them as useful indicators of attitude.
In the second group 69% of employers thought that other factors were more important than qualifications and in the third 75% ignored qualifications altogether or saw them as meaningless. Ashton, et al. found that employers adopt a wide range of recruitment strategies in which educational qualifications are combined with other factors in varying degrees. The most common approach was where "the balance between academic and non-academic criteria shifts in favour of the non-academic." (ibid p52).

It is important to note that educational qualifications are not being treated as an index of non-academic criteria. The other factors which figure in employers' calculations are treated as independent of education and include: self-presentation, attitude to work, interest in the job and family background. Five strategies are defined:

(1) Educational qualifications perform determinative function. Here the educational qualification is the most important criterion although other factors will be taken into account at the interview stage, though in a subordinate role.

(2) Educational qualifications perform screening function. Qualifications are used as a means of pre-selecting candidates. A minimum qualification level is set and candidates at or above that level are selected according to non-academic criteria. Qualifications above the minimum do not give any advantage.

(3) Educational qualifications perform focussing function. A number of qualifications are stipulated but will be waived if the candidates have
appropriate non-academic qualities. This is the point where non-academic criteria take precedence over academic.

(4) Educational qualifications functionless.

Decisions are based on personality or physical attributes which are seen as relevant to the job and having nothing to do with education.

(5) Educational qualifications perform negative function.

Qualifications actually disqualify people from jobs, usually because the work is seen as being too restricted for people with qualifications. However, although the function is negative, it is the case that a relationship between jobs and education is being assumed here.

The third strategy was the most commonly used (53%), followed by the fourth (39%). Hence non-academic criteria have clear priority.

The use of the different strategies varied according to occupational category:

TABLE 4:1

Use of educational qualifications in the selection of young workers by numbers of employers adopting each strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGY:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL OF RECRUITMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical/sales</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and managerial</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from Ashton D. et al 1982 table 49 p54)
At the professional and managerial level 82% of employers use strategy 2 and at the technician level it is used by 72% (the similarities for these two groups is significant, as will be discussed further later). Strategy 3 is the most used for clerical/sales workers (57%) and for skilled manual workers (60%). At the operative level, strategy 4 is the most common.

Different use of strategies relates also to the size of the firm. In general larger firms made more use of educational qualifications and more reliance was placed on 'O' levels than on CSEs or 'A' levels.

TABLE 4:2

| % of employers using educational qualifications by size of establishment | % of employers using different strategies by size of establishment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| STRATEGY: 2 | 3 | 4 |
| GCE 'A' | GCE 'O' | CSE | NONE | STRATEGY: 2 | 3 | 4 |
| up to 25 | 8 | 29 | 26 | 50 | 15 | 35 | 55 |
| 26 - 100 | 9 | 40 | 24 | 40 | 18 | 48 | 40 |
| 101 - 250 | 14 | 19 | 17 | 18 | 25 | 54 | 44 |
| 251 - 500 | 23 | 72 | 47 | 14 | 28 | 70 | 28 |
| 501 - 1000 | 38 | 77 | 54 | 12 | 50 | 65 | 23 |
| over 1000 | 50 | 94 | 65 | 3 | 50 | 76 | 21 |

(from Ashton D. et al 1982 tables 46 and 48 pp52 & 54)

The study found that 72% of employers in the top size band saw qualifications as useful as against only 30% in the smallest where 49% saw them as not useful as against only 16% in the largest (see ibid table 50 p56).

The size of the establishment could be expected to affect the number
of young people being exposed to different strategy orientations and the study did find that in general larger companies tended to recruit more young people each year. However, the relationship was not straightforward:

... a number of large establishments took on very few young people. Indeed, over 20 per cent of establishments employing more than 1000 workers recruited ten or fewer young people per year. In St. Albans, a third of the employers interviewed in this category only took up to five young people per year. Thus the relationship between the size of the employing unit and the number of young people recruited per year was not as close as might have been expected.

(ibid p.47)

Considerable variations were found between areas and sectors:

In Leicester, 69% of the employers recruiting over 30 young people each year were in the service sector, while of those recruiting up to five young people per year, 64 per cent were in the manufacturing sector. In contrast, in Sunderland the greater proportion of employers only recruiting up to five young people were in the service sector, with an equal number of service sector and manufacturing sector recruiting over 30 young people a year. The pattern in St. Albans was different again, with the manufacturing sector having a greater proportion of both smaller and larger recruiters. In all three areas, employers recruiting over 30 young people per year were noticeable in Distribution and Public Administration, but apart from these industrial orders, the pattern of entry was determined by the local industry mix.

(ibid p.47, my emphasis).

This detailed study indicates the dangers of generalising about the education/production relationship. The complex variations and interactions between factors such as recruitment strategies, size of firm, sector, area, and industry mix introduce a wide range of contingencies into the situation.

There is another significant way in which the size of the establishment is important. Commenting on the relationship between size and the use
made of educational qualifications in recruitment of young people, Ashton, et al. say that,

...these larger establishments, with more specialised personnel departments, are more likely to be geared to the workings of the educational system, and to have a better idea of curriculum content, and what qualifications are attempting to measure. Among representatives of smaller firms where it was usually the proprietor or manager who was interviewed, it was often the case that they themselves had no formal educational qualifications, and, therefore placed little reliance on them. (ibid p56)

One implication of this is that there are types of employers whose attitudes in many ways resemble those of 'the Lads'. Firstly, because they themselves owe little or nothing to academic qualifications they will set little store by them in others, and secondly they will tend to place emphasis upon doing and proving in practice what an individual is capable of and worth.

Professional personnel officers are themselves dependent upon the possession of qualifications for their own positions and, in comparison to the proprietor-employers, indirectly related to the production process itself. It is illuminating to consider this description of the background and career of such a professional:

Keith Mackney is a typical personnel manager. He currently works for Technitron International, which is a distributor of computer peripheral equipment. Like most personnel Managers, Keith is a member of the Institute of Personnel Management and qualified as a personnel professional when he successfully completed the Diploma in Personnel Management course at Slough College of Higher Education. This was a postgraduate course which he had entered on the strength of his Higher National Diploma in Business Studies and several years practical experience in Business Administration. (Executive Post 21.10. '83 p1)
The IPM has a membership of over 22,000. Corporate Membership is achieved through a mixture of training, experience and examination, and Affiliate Membership is possible for those not wanting to take the professional examinations. This type of career route is significant and will be discussed in more detail later. Such professionals are doubly dependent upon inferring significance to educational qualifications: firstly in order to support their own position and expertise and secondly to compensate for their lack of direct knowledge about production.

On this basis it can be suggested that reliance upon educational qualifications in recruitment increases as those doing the recruiting become themselves more dependent upon the possession of qualifications. This implies that, at least in part, credentialism will reflect the increasing professionalisation of personnel management. Professionalisation within the category generates credentialism outside it. However, Ashton et al suggest that,

...qualification inflation may not be widespread. We suspect that it is primarily located among employers using strategy 2 for recruitment to professional and managerial occupations, and is confined to a narrow range of occupations. (ibid p56)

This is in line with the more general conclusion that credentialism has predominantly occurred within occupational categories. Collins says that increasing educational requirements in the occupational structure are to only a small degree the result of decline in the number of jobs requiring low or no qualifications.

Available evidence suggests that this process accounts for
only a minor part of educational upgrading, at least in a
society that has passed the point of initial industrialisation.
Folger and Nam (1964) found that 15% of the increase in
education of the US labour force during the twentieth century
may be attributed to the occupational structure... The bulk
of the educational upgrading (85%) has occurred within job
categories.
(ibid pp12-13)

Tyler states that Folger and Nam's conclusion

...finds support in a note of Halsey (1974) on the Nuffield
Study of social mobility in Britain where it appears that
a large part of the educational differentiation of the work-
force is largely based on part-time and vocational training.
The upgrading does not, therefore, fall along a single line
of occupational status, but is distributed within a grid
according both to general social status and to position
achieved at the workplace.
(Tyler W. 1977 p38)

Like Collins, Tyler concludes a review of relevant evidence and trends
with the opinion that there is no substantive evidence to support the idea
of an indexical type relationship between educational and occupational
categories.

The principle of indexicality would lead us to expect two things:
firstly that individuals are systematically distributed in the occupational
structure on the basis of their educational characteristics and that there
is little or no possibility of movement or exchange between categories, and
secondly that there is an enduring relationship through time between educational
categories and occupational categories. The evidence suggests that neither
of these two situations is the case. There is in fact a high degree of in-
determinacy between an individual's educational background and occupation
and to a large extent people can switch between different types of work or be
retrained for new production processes without much apparent difficulty.
The situation is, in short, much more as Marx described it over a hundred years ago than it is like the account given by contemporary neo-Marxists in the sociology of education. The significance of the trend data will be discussed in more detail later - it is of fundamental importance. It is also important to note that we see here not simply a conflict between a theory and empirical evidence, but rather a paradox. The paradox lies in the fact that by and large the structure of social inequality in our society as measured by such criteria as income inequalities, rates of social mobility, educational differentials, has remained much the same over this century and has proved resistant to major social reforms, yet the relationships between the systems in which this inequality has been expressed have changed considerably. The liberal assumption was that by radically changing the structure of opportunities in one system, i.e. education, corresponding changes would be generated in the others. Radical theories are largely explanations of why this has not been and cannot be so. Liberal theory argued that because there is a determinate relationship between education and the occupational structure, changing the opportunity structure in the former would lead to changes in the opportunity structure in the latter - to meritocracy, 'openness', equality of opportunity etc. Radicals explained that precisely because there is such a relationship there cannot be such changes - 'meritocracy' and the liberal argument itself is an ideology legitimating the inequality it rhetoric assails. The key to the significance of the indeterminacy that has been observed is that there is no such relationship.
THE STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS OF EDUCATION

The range of evidence reviewed above suggests that empirically severe doubts can be cast upon the idea that there is an indexical type relationship between education and production. However, as I have pointed out, several writers have recently produced models of increased complexity which can be seen in various ways as accommodating (if only in an ad hoc way) these empirical problems. Hence empirical arguments alone might not be seen as sufficient to refute the principle. It is necessary now to approach the issue in a systematic fashion and to demonstrate that the indexical type relationship is impossible in principle, i.e. that the educational system cannot act as an agency of social reproduction in the manner described because the fundamental condition of indexicality cannot be met. I will here draw upon the arguments of Boudon, Bourdieu and Bernstein and will argue that their approach is fundamentally different from that of the other theorists considered so far. I will define theirs as "generative theories" and their models as "structurally dynamic". They can be located within the broad realist/structuralist paradigm described in the previous chapter. In doing this, I obviously part company with writers such as Hall who see Bourdieu and Bernstein as simply offering particular variants of a general reproduction position. This overlooks the distinctive feature of their theoretical approach and ignores the most important implications of their ideas for the sociology of education.

I am using the term "generative" in relation to these theories in two senses: firstly in order to indicate that they work by producing relational models whose principles generate systematic effects in theory which refer to (or are
homologic to) conditions or changes occurring in empirical systems (i.e. they are "modal transforms"), and secondly in order to signal that those models are models of generative mechanisms, i.e. their principles represent the generative principles of empirical systems. We can say that they are systemically as opposed to causally predictive in that their rules enable us to generate sets of transformations within systems (and, by implication, in the relationships between systems).

Their most important practical implication for the sociology of education is that they force us, at last, to abandon the false notion of indexicality.

I will begin by examining trend data relating to class differentials in educational attainment and attendance. One of the earliest and most systematic reviews of such data was that of Little and Westergaard (1964). Drawing upon official statistics they were able to examine data on class differentials in educational attainment in England and Wales over the first half of the century. They summarised their findings as follows:

Social inequalities in access to selective secondary education have been somewhat reduced over the past 50-60 years. But the reduction has, in the first place, been small - so small as to disappear should one choose to look at the differentials in failure to obtain a grammar school type education, rather than at the differentials in successful admission to such an education. In the second place, the reduction of social inequalities is not a new, post-1944 phenomenon, but the continuation of a long-term, gradual trend. And in the third place, it has been confined to entry into selective secondary education, whilst access to the universities has remained more or less unaffected. The general increase of grammar school places has benefited children of all social classes, but working class children proportionately rather more than others. The general increase of university places has perhaps, if anything, benefited children of the upper and middle strata more than those
from the lower stratum. Certainly, the overall expansion of educational facilities has been of greater significance than any redistribution of opportunities.

(Little A. & Westergaard J. 1964 p312)

The most important aspect of Little and Westergaard’s approach to their data is the view that expansion in itself is without particular significance in that it tends to benefit all classes. In relation to this the changes that have occurred are relatively inconsequential.

Some ten years later Westergaard and Resler (1976) presented a similar review with the benefit of additional data. Their summary states that,

Probably, class inequalities in access to academic secondary schooling continued to narrow in the 1960s: at least the figures for grammar and independent school entry alone suggest that. And the corresponding inequalities in chances of getting to university - stable or even widening, in proportionate terms, until the 1950s despite university expansion - appear also to have become a little smaller in recent years.

(ibid p323)

They make the following comments upon this state of affairs:

So the expansion of educational provision has not involved a major redistribution of opportunities between children of different classes. The benefits went to children of all social levels. As in the case of material standards of living, the average rose fairly steadily; but disparities between the classes remained sharp. Nevertheless, some element of redistribution followed in the process: the range in inequalities of educational opportunity became rather less extreme. This was still only barely visible by the early 1970s, so far as access to university and other higher education was concerned. But a gradual and modest narrowing of class differences in the chances of admission to secondary schooling of an academic type can be seen at work throughout this century. The fact that this trend goes back over many decades is important. For it could have been expected, by itself, to make for some limited increase in social circulation between the generations. Yet there was apparently no such acceleration of mobility at least till about
the 1950s: nor even by the early 1970s, except by very uncertain and short-lived signs. It seems, then, that the moderate widening of education as an avenue of mobility was counteracted, at least for long, by a contraction of other channels of circulation.

(ibid p324)

It is indeed true that the long-term nature of the trend identified by Westergaard and his collaborators is significant, though for reasons other than those suggested above. Westergaard and Resler say that their final point is "plausible inference", though detailed studies addressing precisely this concept of "promotion blockage" can by now be fairly said to have shown it false (7).

The most recent and most detailed information on these issues is that provided by the Oxford Mobility Study (Halsey et al 1980). The four cohorts in the educational sub-set of the Oxford sample were of men born in the periods 1913-22, 1923-32, 1933-42 and 1943-52. The relevant findings can be summarised as follows:

(1) chances of attending grammar school improve for all three social classes except for some "small and uneven retrogression" in the final cohort (ibid p204).

(2) class differentials narrowed "appreciably" over the period with the chance of a upper class boy going to grammar school falling from about four to about two times that of a working class boy.

(3) there are marked differentials at the points of school-leaving and entrance to university: upper class boys are four times as likely as working class boys to be at school at sixteen (even the last cohort is pre-ROSLA), eight times as likely at seventeen, ten times as likely at eighteen, and eleven times as likely to enter university.
however, survival rates have converged through time. In the earliest cohort the upper class boy was six times as likely to be in school at sixteen as was the working class boy, but in the final cohort the chance was less than three times as high.

for those working class pupils who do survive in the system after the minimum leaving age, performance tends to converge with that of upper class pupils: sixty-three per cent of upper class and fifty-three per cent of working-class six-formers with at least one 'A' level or RSC went on to university. However, whilst only one in forty working class pupils reached that level of secondary education, one in four of the upper class pupils did so.

The overall picture is of declining inequalities in educational opportunities within a context in which expanded opportunities helped everyone, but working class pupils disproportionately more than others. Inequalities still remain and are considerable, but concentrating on this (important) fact has the effect of deflecting attention from the implications of the changes that have occurred. It is important to note not simply the gross differences that remain after the passage of time, but the systematic characteristics of the changes that occur through time. Halsey et al, writing about the increasing numbers of working class pupils staying on until sixteen or later, say that,

while the rate of increase was greater for the working class, their absolute gains were less. Thus for every 100 working class boys there were an extra twenty-two staying on until 16 or later by the end of our period; but for every 100 service-class boys there were an extra twenty-six staying
on. In this sense, then, the difference between the classes had actually widened...
(ibid p205)

Hence we have to distinguish between absolute gains and rates of increase. Emphasising absolute gains underlines inequalities, but at the expense of obscuring important changes that are occurring in the schools as a result of relative changes in rates of increase. Whilst all the writers considered above are correct in pointing out the relatively insignificant nature of the changes in gross terms it must not be overlooked that small changes at one level generate considerable changes at another - specifically in terms of the social composition of the school fifth and sixth forms. Hence whilst relative to the population of working class pupils the absolute gains may not seem great, relative to the composition of the classroom both the absolute gains and the rate of increase can be significant.

It is important to note the particular systematic features of the trend data in class differentials. Relating their findings to the work of Raymond Boudon, Halsey et al show that the trends for staying on until sixteen or later take the form of logistic or 'S' curves. Curves of this type rise from a zero asymptotic level on the left to an upper asymptotic level on the right with an inflection point in the middle before which the slope, or rate of increase, is greater than 1 and after which it is less than 1. It is the type of trend often encountered in relation to the sales of commodities, e.g. colour televisions in the recent past or video recorders today. Basically what happens is that when the commodity is new on the market and therefore unfamiliar and relatively highly priced, sales start off low and rise only
gradually. As times goes by and the commodity 'catches-on' sales increase at an accelerating rate until the mid-point or inflection point is reached and then begin to tail-off in absolute terms as the market reaches its saturation point (the upper asymptotic level) a point never actually met because there will always be some new consumers entering the market and others replacing their equipment or adding to their existing stock.

As the graphs from the Oxford Mobility Study indicate, the trends for staying on until sixteen or later are of this type. Furthermore, disaggregated on the basis of class, the data shows distinctive curves for each group. Each curve has its own numerical and time characteristics. Cross-sectional data at various points along the curves, e.g. at the points A and B on the third set of curves, would show apparently random fluctuations in absolute gain, relative rates of increase and changing relative chances. Indeed just such fluctuations can be discerned in the comments on university entrance in Little and Westergaard, and Westergaard and Resler - if we imagine a similar set of curves for university entrance placed above and to the right of those for the sixth-form we would see from the relative slopes a tendency for differentials to narrow in the sixth form, expand and then contract for the university. It is interesting to note that the trends for school-leavers with different levels of qualifications over the same period of time have a similar form.
TABLE 4:3  % STAYING ON UNTIL 16 OR LATER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fathers' social class</th>
<th>BIRTH COHORT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1913-22</td>
<td>1923-32</td>
<td>1933-42</td>
<td>1943-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(174)</td>
<td>(185)</td>
<td>(136)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3, 4, 5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6, 7, 8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Halsey A.H. et al 1980 Table 8:10 p136 figures in brackets give the log distance)
Trends in % staying-on until 16 or later, Oxford Mobility Study (Halsey et al 1980 pp118,119).
Given technical problems in making the calculation (in particular in estimating the inflection points) and the condition that all things remain equal, Halsey et al estimate that these trends indicate that "there would eventually have been a striking narrowing of class differentials. The most conservative estimates suggest that in another twenty or thirty years class differences would have narrowed to 20 percentage points.... Less conservative estimates suggest that the gap between the social classes might have been eliminated altogether." (ibid p138). However, it is important to stress that this process of equalisation is occurring at a particular level in the school system. Halsey et al point out that,

....if a process of 'credentialisation' is occurring in which higher levels of educational attainment are required as more pupils attain the lower levels, the trend towards equality that our logistic curves revealed may be fundamentally misleading. While differentials may be closing at one level, they may be widening at a higher one, and the 'overall' situation may remain relatively static....There is a process of continual movement. In contrast, if we turn from the growth in attendance at different ages to the position of different percentile groups, we find a completely static situation. If we assume that there is no change in the size or IQ distributions of the different classes, then the class differentials among, say, the brightest five per cent of pupils will remain absolutely unchanged. The top 5 per cent will be receiving more and more education as the process of credentialisation continues, but class differences must necessarily remain as they are. (ibid pp140-141)

The process described here represents not so much a redistribution of educational opportunity as what Bourdieu and Passeron term "an upward translation of the structure of the educational chances of the different social classes" (8). We see from this that the way to approach educational inequalities is not to minimise the significance of the changes that have occurred by stressing
simply the grossest comparisons but by addressing the subtleties of the system.

The most significant feature of structural dynamic theories is the demonstration that changes occur within the various systems of social inequality, e.g. in education, income distribution, social mobility, without generating corresponding sets of changes throughout the other systems. Bernstein, for example, has argued that contradictions can arise between the form of regulation in education and that in production. Boudon has in a number of places shown how changes in the structure of inequalities in educational opportunity do not produce similar changes in social mobility - in the structure of inequality of social opportunity. In the paper "Education and Social Mobility: a structural model" (Boudon R. 1977) he relates the complex model developed in his book "Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality" to an article by L. Thurow (Thurow 1977) in which Thurow shows how, and gives reasons why, the tendency towards an equalisation of educational opportunities in the USA has not been accompanied by a corresponding equalisation in income distribution. By building a model which generated trends of the type described above Boudon is able to produce the structure of changes that have been observed in the empirical data:

These tables reproduce the structural properties that can be observed from school records when these provide longitudinal data. Two observations are noteworthy:

(i) From one period to another, the probability of attaining the higher levels in the educational system is multiplied by a coefficient that increases proportionately with a decrease in social class background.
However, for a thousand individuals, the increase from one period to another in the number of additional persons who are able to attend college is much lower for those of lower social class background than for those of higher social class background. These results are in accordance with the empirical data from school statistics.

(Boudon R. 1977 p189)

The tables also show that "the rate of growth in school attendance is greater, the higher the level of education" (ibid p190) - a feature also consistent with empirical findings.

Boudon's structurally dynamic simulation model reproduces the empirical features of the real world situation. He says that intuitively one would expect these changes in educational opportunity to produce changes in social opportunity - in social mobility. Just such an intuitive expectation lies behind the "promotion blockage" theory discussed above in relation to Westergaard and Resler. However,

The model simultaneously generates important changes in the structure of educational achievement and educational opportunity, but these changes have no effect upon the structure of social mobility.

(ibid p194)

This state of affairs occurs not because education has little or no effect upon determining status but precisely because it does. For the purposes of his model, Boudon assumes that educational level strongly affects status - "those individuals of the highest level of education will tend to receive the highest social status." (ibid p191). He fixes a "meritocratic parameter" of 70%, i.e. 70% of those with the highest educational level will acquire the highest social level ($C_1$). He distributes people from education into the social system.
in the following way:

\[0.1967 \times 10,000 + 0.0340 \times 30,000 + 0.0053 \times 60,000 = 3,305\]

It will be assumed that a high proportion of these individuals, say 70%, will receive \(C_1\)-type social positions. Then there will remain:

\[10,000 - 3,305 \times 0.70 = 7,686\]

available positions in \(C_1\).

(ibid p192)

The remaining places will be filled by the 70% of people with the next highest education level, and so on until the places are filled. The same procedure is followed for the next social level, starting with those with the highest educational level who were not allocated to \(C_1\) (i.e. 30% of 3,305) with the meritocratic parameter applying throughout. Although computationally complicated, the principle is straightforward.

The set of tables generated by Boudon's data produce the changes in educational trends described above and a stable structure of social mobility. The model involves three time periods and, as Boudon says, "The only element that varies from one period to another is...the distribution of the levels of schooling that characterises each of the four cohorts."

(ibid p192). Essentially what happens is that the mean level of educational attainment increases in each group but disproportionately so at the lower social levels. At the same time the social opportunities associated with
any given level of attainment declines. Consequently at each point in
time individuals need to acquire more education than did similar indivi-
duals at an earlier point in time simply in order to achieve the same
degree of social opportunity (9). A further point can be made. Although
Boudon's model generates a stable pattern of social mobility, it also in-
volves a high degree of mobility. An implication of the parameter method
of distribution is that there will be a complex structure of mobility routes.
This feature is best illustrated by referring to the paper "Social Mobility
in Utopia" which uses a similar model in order to explore the situation that
occurs when (a) the highest degree of influence of family background on edu-
cational attainment is combined with (b) maximum efficacy of education in
determining social status. This combination of "dominance" and "merito-
cracy" can be seen as the optimal reproduction situation. Boudon demon-
strates that even under these conditions a high degree of social mobility is
generated. I will not detail Boudon's assumptions in this case but simply
summarise the material generated by the model.

"Utopia" is divided into three social classes: C3 (upper), C2 (middle)
and C1 (lower). For every 1000 Utopians there are 200 C3s, 400 C2s and
400 C1s. There are three educational levels: S3, S2 and S1. At time 1 for
every 1000 Utopians 200 reached level S3, 400 S2 and 400 S1. Utopian is
committed to a programme of educational expansion and in each generation
levels S2 and S3 are expanded by 10% of their places. Consequently, for the
second generation there are 220 S3 places, 440 S2 and 340 S1 for every one
thousand places in the educational system. We have the two tables:

**TABLE 4:4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Boudon 1975 table 3)

**TABLE 4:5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C1</th>
<th>C2</th>
<th>C3</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Boudon 1975 table 4)

Using this material and following Boudon's method of computation, we can construct the following table:

**TABLE 4:6 EDUCATIONAL MOBILITY CAREER PATHS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL SYSTEM</th>
<th>EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM</th>
<th>SOCIAL SYSTEM</th>
<th>CAREER PATH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status Nos.</td>
<td>level</td>
<td>places</td>
<td>composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 400</td>
<td>S1</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>340 C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LOW)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 400</td>
<td>S2</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>60 C1 380 C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MIDDLE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3 200</td>
<td>S3</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>20 C2 200 C3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(HIGH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(nb Nos. = numbers per thousand)
Boudon's Utopia model demonstrates that even where the maximum continuity is assumed between categories, i.e. social status of family of origin, educational level, achieved status, social mobility will occur and a variety of career routes develop. This particular model of Boudon's generates an increasing amount of mobility in future generations. The important point is that the distributional structure is not determined by the relationships between categories but by the ratio of agents to places. This relationship can be further complicated by building into the model factors such as dominance and meriocracy effects and ecological and demographic factors (e.g. the geographical distribution of places, class difference in fertility, changes in the occupational structure) which increase its realism.

At the same time the distributional structure itself produces emergent effects, e.g. changes in the values that social groups give to given levels of educational attainment and in their orientations to extended educational careers and social mobility, which affect the evolution of the structure.

It is important to emphasise the significance of the relationship between stability and change in structural dynamic models. Following Halsey et al's and Bourdieu and Passeron's comments on "credentialism" and "upward translation" we can say that a given structure of class differentials is reproduced within a changing pattern of relationships between points within the educational system. In some cases this can mean, as a result of the increasing equality of attainment as measured by level attained, that differences which at one time were represented vertically, e.g. the difference between leaving school at sixteen and staying on, come at a later time to be represented in a horizontal dimension, e.g. in the difference between following a CSE or 'O'
level course, or in the combination of subjects studied. At the same
time a stable structure of social mobility is reproduced through a system
of changes within the structure of educational differentials. Hence there
is no simple transmission of stability in one area into stability in another
but rather a complex process of evolution and translation – a process which,
as will be shown in the next chapter, generates corresponding transformations
of educational transmission codes.

The implications of this for the principle of indexicality are, of
course, fundamental. The structural dynamic approach demonstrates that
it is in principle impossible for an indexical type relationship to exist between
education and production. Whatever role the educational system might play
in the reproduction process, it does not function in the manner prescribed (or
assumed) by indexical type theories. The problems raised by the empirical
data surveyed above are not simply inevitable mismatches between theoretical
accounts and the real world – they are not even the contradictions suggested by
more complex developments of the theory. They are symptomatic of the fact
that the theory is wrong.

EDUCATION, OCCUPATION AND SOCIAL CAREERS

I now want to look at two important areas in terms of the implications
of the structural dynamic approach: firstly, the relationship between edu-
cational and occupational categories, and secondly (in the next chapter) the
changing social composition of educational sites.

Indexical type theories, whether of the simple correspondence type
or of the 'relative autonomy of execution type', treat educational careers as processes of identity formation in which individuals are prepared for their places in the socio-technical division of labour. On this basis we would expect (a) that individuals are systematically distributed in the occupational structure according to their educational characteristics, and (b) that there is an enduring relationship through time between educational categories (distinctive educational career paths) and occupational categories (sets of corresponding occupational groups). We have seen that this situation does not pertain empirically, and could not in principle. Individuals are not systematically distributed in the occupational structure on the basis of education, and the relationship between educational and occupational categories changes continuously through time.

The tendencies generated by Boudon's simulation models can now be related to the real world through the data from the General Household Survey. Table 4:7 overleaf shows the educational profiles of the socio-economic groups used in the GHS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree or Equivalent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Ed. Below Degree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE 'A' Level or equivalent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE 'O' Level or equivalent /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE Grade 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE Other Grades/Commercial/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprenticeships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from GHS 1982 table 6.2 nb Ø = less than 1)
The most obviously striking feature of this table is the high profile of the professional group. Perhaps equally striking is the relatively low one of the employers and managers group. To an extent this reflects the fact that the latter group will be far less rigorously defined than the former. However, it also reflects the fact that mobility routes within the two groups are very different, and educational qualifications are much less significant for employers and managers.

Using Oxford Mobility Study data, Heath shows the following about the social origins of men in elite occupations:

TABLE 4:8 SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MEN IN ELITE OCCUPATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Class</th>
<th>Respondent's class (%)</th>
<th>Self-emp. prof.</th>
<th>Salaried prof.</th>
<th>Senior admin.</th>
<th>Industrial managers</th>
<th>Large proprietors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,111,1V</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V, VI, VII</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Heath A. 1981 Table 2.3 p66)

As Heath points out, there are major differences in the backgrounds of men in the various groups. Whereas a high degree of elite self-recruitment is apparent amongst self-employed professionals and large proprietors, over half of industrial managers have working-class origins. The lower class
percentage amongst senior administration is also high. Of these last two
groups, Heath says:

Industrial management...recruits have somewhat lower edu-
cational levels, but above all there is a big difference in the
proportions who served their time on the shop floor. Well
over half the managers started their careers as manual workers
or technicians. In contrast nearly two-thirds of the admini-
strators started off in white-collar jobs, routine clerical work
being far the most common starting point.
(Heath A. 1981 p68)

In this sample only 9% of industrial managers have degrees, whereas 38.7%
have apprenticeships, and the largest group went to non-selective schools
(38.2%). Heath gives the following table on the educational backgrounds:

**TABLE 4:9 Channels of mobility into elite occupations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent's Education</th>
<th>Self-emp. prof.</th>
<th>Salaried prof.</th>
<th>Senior admin.</th>
<th>Industrial managers</th>
<th>Large proprietors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammar</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-selective</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtained degree</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtained apprenticeship</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| First job in Class 1   | 61.7            | 40.9           | 9.9           | 15.5               | 14.6              |
| In Classes 11-1V       | 22.3            | 28.2           | 55.5          | 27.6               | 32.4              |
| In Classes V-V11       | 16.0            | 30.9           | 34.6          | 56.8               | 52.9              |

N 94 447 472 199 34

(Heath A 1981 Table 4 Appendix 1 p249)
The bottom half of the table gives some indication of the variations in career routes. The precise nature of the role played by education in careers needs more detailed investigation.

The GHS also gives a break-down of the information in table 3:7 by age, and, for the first time in 1982, of time data over the period from which it began in 1971/2. As is to be expected, the age data show how the population has become progressively better educated. The percentage with no qualifications declines from 65% of males and 74% of females in the oldest group to 33% and 34% in the youngest. The percentages with higher qualifications rise from 9% to 23% and from 7% to 20%. However, what is more noteworthy is the similarity in the educational backgrounds of the three youngest groups of professionals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4:10</th>
<th>Highest qualification levels of professionals by age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUAL.</td>
<td>AGE: 25-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(MALES ONLY from GHS 1982 table 6.3)
**TABLE 4:11**

Socio-economic group by sex by age by highest qualification level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUAL.</th>
<th>Prof.</th>
<th>Emp/mang.</th>
<th>Inter-med.</th>
<th>J. non-man.</th>
<th>Sk. man &amp; o.a.</th>
<th>S &amp; Un. sk man. &amp; per. service</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from GHS 1982 table 6.3, MALES ONLY. Figs in () are numbers not %)

It is clear that in this respect the professionals are different from the other groups where the general tendency is for successive cohorts to differ more obviously. We can note here that the intermediate non-manual has more people in the higher group in the 30-39 cohort than in the 25-29 and, as table 4:7 shows, it is closest in educational level to the professionals.
The significance of the feature of the professional profile noted above is best brought out by considering the equivalent data in the 1980 GHS. Here the percentage in the cohorts of professionals with higher qualifications are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60-69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGHER %</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from GHS 1980 Table 6.6)

We see here that in every group but the last, the percentage is higher than that in the youngest (note that the age range has changed between the two surveys, from 20-29 in 1980 to 25-29 in 1982). We have to take into account an important feature of the data which is emphasised by Stewart et al: namely that the groups represented in the GHS age groups are not simply successive generations of managers - young managers growing older - but rather groups made-up of people with varying lengths of time in the category irrespective of age.

The different age groupings of managers are not equivalent to succeeding cohorts. The evidence from various countries is that a very small proportion of those employed as managers start their careers in management. As a first job category it is very small indeed...Thus managerial employment has to draw massively from other starting occupations, and the proportion of a cohort in managerial positions increases with age. It should be obvious, therefore, that those who start as trainees represent a category which not only may decrease in size with age as its members move into other areas of employment, but in any case cannot increase, and as a consequence must at succeeding ages form a declining proportion of a rapidly growing occupation.

(Stewart A. et al 1980 pp174-5)
The age-related educational profiles of occupational groups represent a complex underlying system of movements.

These data indicate that significantly large numbers of people are acquiring educational qualifications after leaving full-time education and are doing so within the context of established career development. It is important to note that much more is involved here than the traditional "second chance" view of this situation. Firstly, the numbers involved are quite substantial. The GHS (1982) calculates that 13% of those with degrees or equivalents and 35% of those with higher qualifications below degree level acquired them by part-time study. We see that although 67% of male professionals had degrees or equivalents in the 1982 sample (table 4:7) only 40% attended university as their last full-time educational institution (10). It is quite clear that a substantial amount of education linked mobility occurs outside full-time study (it should not be automatically assumed that such education is the mechanism of such mobility - it could be serving a consolidating function rather than an enabling one). It is also clear that professional qualifications play an important part in this. Stewart et al provide the following data on how people come to acquire the different types of qualifications:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUALIFICATION</th>
<th>FULL-TIME</th>
<th>PART-TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>major professional</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minor professional</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HND/HNC</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OND/ONC</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(From Stewart A. et al 1980 table 9.1 p212)
By contrast only 10% of degree holders acquired their qualifications in part-time study. In Stewart et al's white collar sample 52% gained their highest qualification through part-time study. This compares with 38% who gained their highest qualification in full-time post-school education and 22% who gained theirs at school.

The Cambridge Study authors also noted class differences in the uses made of part-time study:

...respondents with skilled manual fathers have higher mean qualifications than those with clerical or technical fathers ...In the case of those with 'O' levels, etc., the sons of clerical and technical fathers have lower mean qualifications than those with unskilled manual fathers. In general this lends support to the view of part-time education, at least at some levels, as a working class route to qualifications, though it should be remembered that the sons of professional and managerial fathers have the highest qualifications from part-time, just as from full-time, education. An initial examination of our data suggests that there may be a class division in the type of part-time qualifications acquired, with the middle class more heavily represented in professional, especially minor professional associations, and the working class concentrated in technical education. (ibid pp237-8)

The writers make a distinction between qualifications as "reflections of careers already started" and qualifications as "criteria of access". In both cases, however, the significant factor is the way in which the qualifications are embedded within work-life patterns - complex pathways towards which qualifications are orientated in a predominantly instrumental fashion by individuals.

The similarity between the professional and the intermediate non-manual groups has already been noted. Undoubtedly the tendency for professionals to become better educated with age reflects the movement into
this group of people from the intermediate non-manual group. These are people who tend to hold higher qualifications below degree level (see table 4:7). Although the men are almost equal in the proportions in the degree or equivalent and higher below degree categories (25% and 26% - compared with professionals, 67% and 17%), the women are very highly represented in the lower of the two: 14% degree level, 43% below degree level (professional women are 66%, 10%). This reflects the representation of 'feminine' semi-profession such as nursing, non-graduate primary school teaching, social work, etc., in this group. The group also includes people who can gain professional and technical qualifications which would switch them from the lower to the higher GHS education category and could open up corresponding career changes - moving into full professional or managerial positions. The lower of the two higher education categories includes, apart from teaching and nursing qualifications, awards such as HNC/HND, City and Guilds Full Technology Certificates, qualifications from colleges of technology and lower professional qualifications. The higher includes, apart from degrees, university diplomas and certificates, awards from colleges of technology and higher professional qualifications.

Aston et al's work shows the similarities in recruitment strategies for professionals and managers, and technicians (who would come into the intermediate group). The following diagrams from Blaug (1972) and Prately (1982) show how movement between categories can be achieved.
What is really interesting about mobility data is not so much the volume of mobility revealed as the complex patterning of mobility routes. It is this that is theoretically significant because it shows the wide variety of experiences that individuals can undertake and the flexibility they obviously possess in order to do so. Again, this is reminiscent of Marx's adventurers who change their jobs as often as their shirts and has little point of contact with the socialisation/allocation model that is found in sociology of education. It is the complex patterning of life-work histories and social movement that is missed when attention is given to average levels of attainment and factors such as occupation or earnings alone. Crude correlations between means not only obscure the importance of intra-class variance, they also obliterate the complex networks through which mobility is realised and which crucially mediate the superficially arresting but fundamentally spurious relationships that appear to exist between education and the dimensions of social inequality. Even the "three point" mobility patterns constructed by Goldthorpe from the Oxford mobility data reveal a complex pattern of movement. The more detailed life-work histories reported by C.J. Richardson and represented in the diagrams reproduced below vividly illustrate this condition.
(work-life patterns from Richardson C.J. 1977, tables 5:1, 5:5)
CONCLUSION

Against the general background outlined above, we see that the way in which education articulates with the occupational structure varies considerably according to a number of factors: sector, size of establishment, recruitment strategy etc. In some areas, for some groups education is very important, but in others (including very important ones) it seems to matter little at all. Similarly individuals appear to have a pronounced tendency and ability to move around within this complex system without necessarily being either helped or hindered by their education or lack of it. How much it helps or hinders depends very much on what an individual wants to do - the lack of education matters more to aspiring self-employed professionals than to aspiring managers. In this respect the latter have more in common with their more lowly employees (operatives etc.) than with the more elevated ones (their accountants, legal advisers, etc.).

The argument being advanced on the basis of this critical examination is not that there is no relationship between education and the division of labour but rather that it is nothing like the relationship posited by theories which assume a principle of indexicality. The examination of part-time qualifications indicates a particularly tight relationship in certain areas, but it is the way in which people figure in that relationship that is the important factor. The principle illustrated by the part-time pursuit of professional qualifications is that of the instrumentality of the individual's use of education. Educational
opportunities are taken up to the extent that people see them as pragmatically advantageous within the context of their social career path. The necessity to do so is itself contingent upon given labour market conditions and will change in the course of time. It can be fairly objected that professional qualifications are atypical, but I will argue that the general trends in educational attainment in the schools can also be made good sense of in terms of a principle of instrumentality. The trend data show that members of different social groups have tended to increase the demand for education in step with credential inflation in the labour market, i.e. they ask for just enough but no more than enough to keep pace. As Little and Westergaard, among others, have noted, the consistency of this trend is remarkable and apparently unrelated to (or unaffected by) educational changes and reforms. Not only ambitious professionals, but the great majority of people have pursued educational goals in an instrumental fashion, adjusting their sights to labour market conditions. The implications of this for what happens in the classroom is the next area for investigation.

In relation to the theoretical position outlined in chapter three, the substantive issues and areas addressed here have established the following things:

(1) empirical data must be seen as casting severe doubts upon the idea that there is an indexical type relationship between education and production. We find that individuals with different levels and types of education are widely distributed in the occupational structure and that elasticities of substitution
are high and occupational mobility considerable. More significantly, the manner in which educational credentials are utilised by employers differs greatly between sectors, and that the relationship between educational levels and occupational categories changes through time. (2) relating the last point above to Boudon's analysis and models indicates that the problems for the indexical approach are not simply the inevitable mismatches and shortcomings that any theory can reasonably be expected to come up against in the real world. Rather they reflect the fundamental situation whereby the necessary conditions for indexicality to be met are not possible. In keeping with the theoretical discussion of the previous chapter, we must come to see both education and production as independent systems which are open to internal changes which reflect endogenous conditions and are subject to endogenous principles. These changes undoubtedly reflect the manner in which systems are related and articulated with the general ensemble of systems within the social totality, but these relationships are complexly mediated and overdetermined. The translation of these changing relationships into educational forms through the transformation of positional relationships is the topic for the remainder of this work.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

(1) for a general discussion see Reeder D. 1979, and Wright N. 1977.

(2) see, for instance, the London Chamber of Commerce's "Memorandum on the Great Debate" in Education and Training, May, 1977.

(3) employers' attitudes are discussed in more detail in chapter 6.

(4) Marx's theory will be returned to in chapter 8.

(5) see Foster P. J. 1979.

(6) see Collins R. 1979.

(7) see in particular Stewart A. et al 1980 ch. 7.

(8) see Bourdieu P. & Passeron J-C 1977 p224. Bourdieu and Passeron's approach to the data on educational expansion in France can be contrasted with that of Little and Westergaard to the equivalent British data (Little A. & Westergaard J 1964). The cross-sectional approach of the latter neglects the systematic features of the trend data.

(9) as Bourdieu & Passeron put it, a situation in which "'you can't do anything without the bac'" becomes one where "'the bac gets you nowhere nowadays'" (op cit p227). The 1982 General Household Survey shows a dramatic decline in the relative monetary returns to different levels of qualification in the UK.

(10) see GHS 1982 table 6.1 - unfortunately it is not possible to calculate in a straightforward way from the table how many people got their qualifications part-time. Although some with degrees could have got them at Polytechnics, not everyone at Polytechnics was studying for degrees, and some people would have obtained qualifications from Polytechnics which could also have been obtained from CFEs, etc.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FOUR


Executive Post (1983) Executive Post, Professional and Executive Register (MSC)


Frith S. (1980b) "Who s to Blame?" in Youth in Society 39


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Work Title and Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heath A. (1981)</td>
<td>Social Mobility, Fontana, Glasgow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland G. (1982)</td>
<td>Times Higher Education Supplement 2.7. '82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Chamber of Commerce (1977)</td>
<td>&quot;Memorandum on the Great Debate&quot; in Education and Training May '77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace J. (1977)</td>
<td>&quot;The 'Shortage' of Engineers&quot;, in Higher Education Review Autumn 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson C.J. (1977)</td>
<td>Contemporary Social Mobility Pinter, London.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

West Midlands Economic Planning Council (1980) quoted in Frith S. 1980b

In this chapter I will translate the educational trends discussed in chapter four into changes in the situation of schooling. I will argue that curriculum change occurs largely (though by no means exclusively) in response to control problems that develop at different points in the system as a result of changes in the social composition of the pupil population. These changes are the result of rising educational levels induced by (or associated with) credential inflation. Problems arise when the necessity to acquire more education conflicts with the pupils' own desire to leave school and enter "the world of work". For some pupils extended schooling interrupts the development of a social career which is deeply embedded within the culture of their class background. This includes a sense of self-identity and membership which is profoundly associated with work. The issue here is the effectivity and the principle of intelligibility of educational practices. I have argued against the view that educational practices are processes of identity formation which develop in pupils forms of consciousness specific to given sites in the occupational structure. Hence I am arguing, here, for an alternative approach to the analysis of educational practices.

The trends discussed in the preceding chapter appear to be unrelated either to major educational reforms or to changes in approach in the classroom. Jenck's book, "Inequality", raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of schooling. The debate it engendered continues today (2). More recently the
study by Rutter et al suggests that schooling can make a difference to important aspects of pupil behaviour and performance. However, precisely how is not at all clear - Rutter's concept of "ethos" does not seem to me to explain much at all (3). The argument in this work is that the effectivity of schooling has to be understood in terms of a complex set of relationships between pupils, schools and a macro context in which the labour market plays a crucial mediating role. Hence we cannot ascribe any simple or unimodal effectivity to schooling. I will return to Rutter's work later in order to develop this point.

THE EFFECTIVITY OF EDUCATIONAL PROCESSES

The new sociology of education approach to the curriculum reviewed in chapters one and two makes a very clear distinction between curricular types based in the political and ideological characteristics of the teaching practices (e.g. Young's distinction between curriculum as fact and curriculum as process). The general identification is made between educational radicalism and political radicalism (as defined by the "new sociology of education"). Traditional educational practices (associated with positivistic approaches to knowledge) are identified with the interests of capital or the ruling class. With the major exception of Gramsci, this kind of broad association is typical of left approaches (4). The William Tyndale affair indicated its problematical status (5). As Demaine points out, it was precisely "the main party of the working class movement" (Demaine J. op cit p131) which brought pressure on ILEA to intervene in the radical educational experiment taking place at the school.
A number of studies have attempted to evaluate the virtues of different approaches: streaming v non-streaming (Barker-Lunn 1970), traditional v progressive methods (Bennett N. 1976), mixed ability teaching v setting (Davies B. 1977), etc. It is probably fair to say at the outset that in no case can any strong effect be ascribed to any particular approach relative to others. It must also be stressed at the beginning that work of this nature is extremely problematical. For example, both the Barker-Lunn and the Bennett studies illustrate the difficulties of defining types of approach. Barker-Lunn discovered that many teachers in unstreamed schools personally favoured streaming. As this could affect results, she divided her sample into three groups: streamed schools/pro-streaming teachers (teachers in streamed schools were virtually unanimous in supporting streaming), unstreamed schools/anti-streaming teachers, and unstreamed schools/pro-streaming teachers. Bennett found great difficulty in actually specifying clear cases of traditional and progressive approaches. He began with twelve types on a spectrum from very formal to very informal which were then collapsed into three broad groups. Of course, even taking these methodological problems into account there is still the issue of defining 'success' or 'failure' or relative merit - whose criteria should be employed, and how tangible (or measurable) are the really important things in teaching?

Barker-Lunn's conclusion is typical for work in this area:

Comparisons between the streamed and the non-streamed schools revealed that there was no difference in the average academic performance of boys and girls of comparable ability.
and social class. The effect of being taught by a particular teacher type also appeared to bear little relationship to academic progress. (Barker-Lunn J. 1970 p273)

Although she discovers little impact as far as performance is concerned, the differences in approach do seem to have some effects at other levels. For instance: non-streamer teachers in unstreamed schools seem to encourage the development of "divergent thinking" and to have better relationships with less able pupils. On the other hand, boys of below average ability have better academic self-images in streamed schools. This kind of variation is typical. Bennett found that in reading the pupils with 'mixed' teachers (i.e. aspects of both traditional and progressive approaches) did best, but in maths the formal approach was better. Overall the best individual result was produced by an experienced informal teacher but in total formal methods came out 'best'. There was found to be a range of subtle variations between boys and girls (6) according to ability, class and personality type. W. Anthony has concluded a critical, systematic examination of this tradition of research with the following statement:

...progressive methods are not generally superior to non-progressive for the teaching of reading and English, and that progressive methods are generally inferior to non-progressive methods for the teaching of arithmetic. Both these conclusions are damaging to the theoretical demands of progressivism but of course they do not deny all merit to progressive teaching. Freedom, activity, discovery, concern for the whole child and other aspects of progressivism may be regarded as intrinsically worthwhile. ...

(Anthony W. 1979 p180)

Wright concludes a similar, though less exhaustive, review as follows:

Enough research has already been done to suggest that it is
highly unlikely that there is one right way of doing things. Different ways will suit different children. Different parents judging various aims more or less important will prefer different ways. Different purposes are served by different methods: there is enough evidence that mechanical arithmetic is best learned under quite formal conditions, but that these conditions are not appropriate for developing ingenuity or friendly social relationships. Different teachers will feel that one way or another is more suited to their personality. 
(Wright N. 1977 p46)

The patterns of variations associated with differences in educational practices do not appear to be marked. At most they might explain differences between schools at any point in time, but they do not explain the trends over time. It is not the case that working class pupils have improved their general levels of attainment as a result of changes in teaching as such. Class differentials in educational attainment cannot be attributed to what schools do to pupils (7). Not only have lower class pupils significantly improved their position over this century, but there is, and has always been, a significant degree of intra-class variance. As Lane (8) points out, theories which attempt to explain inter-class differentials usually fail to explain also intra-class variance (or do so in an ad hoc way – e.g. working class grammar schools pupils are not really working class). Musgrove has argued strongly for a view of the grammar school as a working class success story (9). Although clearly under-represented relative to their proportion in the population (although, as Musgrove points out, the children of skilled workers are 'fairly' represented), working class pupils tended to achieve, on average, better results than middle class ones. The reasons for this will be explored later with reference to Bourdieu and Passeron. Similarly Boudon has pointed out that what needs to be explained is not so much
why working class pupils fail at school as why they leave earlier than middle class ones even when they succeed. It is not failure but self-elimination which generates the greatest amount of the differential between class levels of attainment (10).

Halsey et al (11) argue that education has tended to 'create' cultural capital rather than merely reproduce it - significant numbers of grammar school pupils this century have been 'first generation' members. Hence the school as a cultural institution does not decisively block working class advance. Boudon argues that it is choice which makes the difference and this is a cultural factor.

THE EDUCATIONAL DECISION FIELD

The evidence suggests that theories which attempt to account for lower levels of working class attainment in terms of differences in competence between working and middle class pupils are wrong. Boudon has argued (12) that we must distinguish between two distinct sets of factors influencing class attainment in education: "primary effects of social stratification" and "secondary effects". The former include the material and cultural deprivations which sociologists have traditionally invoked in explanations of working class 'failure' (13). Boudon argues that these primary effects have not only been reduced by social and educational reforms and working class advance, but in any case decline in significance as educational careers progress (14). By the time degree level education is reached they have ceased to have any effect. Secondary effects, on the other hand, increase
in significance. Basically they involve values relating to social membership, identity and mobility. These are expressed in terms of "costs" associated with different educational careers for members of different social groups. These costs are not simply economic, but cultural and psychological. Essentially all pupils are inclined towards educational careers which are commensurate with their social membership both in terms of the modal level of attainment for their group and the current relationship between educational levels and the occupational structure taking credential inflation into account. Educational decision making is deeply entwined with a developing sense of self and membership. This is very clear in the case of Willis' Lads. Indeed, Willis' work can be treated as a case study of the cultural logic of the educational decision field of a particular group.

Secondary effects are focussed within "educational decision fields" in which pupils evaluate the 'costs' of particular courses of action. On this basis we would expect that in general class levels of attainment would be adjusted to keep pace with credential inflation in the labour market - which is in fact the case (this is why the reduction in educational inequality does not lead to increased social mobility). Boudon sees an underlying association between the effects of individual decision making in this way and credential inflation. The aggregate effect is to constantly increase the requirements for education in each generation. The educational decision field is the focal point of the cultural processes involved in the positioning practices discussed in chapter three. Secondary effects increase in significance with age as a
function of the culturally developing sense of self and membership. Hence they are culturally expressed in affirmative and (sometimes quite militantly) celebratory forms such as those of the Lads.

ORIENTATIONS AND VALUES

An important aspect of Boudon’s approach is that it does not presuppose an inferior competence on the part of working class pupils. Nor does it assume that working class pupils are less well motivated or less highly aspiring than others. It involves the important recognition that different groups of pupils are starting from different points in the social system to begin with. In essence what this means is that the son of a doctor who aspires to become a doctor himself has no higher level of aspiration than the son of a dustman who aspires to become a dustman. Aspirations must be judged relative to pupils’ origins not to some assumed common base-line. Empirical support for Boudon’s idea comes from the study of class attitudes and values undertaken by Roberts et al. They found that “the ‘implications of occupying different positions’ argument best explains our findings….” (Roberts K. et al 1977 p79).

In absolute terms, manual parental aspirations were modest compared with white collar respondents’. However, in relative terms, when levels of parental aspirations were measured against respondents’ own starting points, the relationship between occupational status and ambition disappeared. Whether thinking of themselves or their children, according to our evidence, there is no clear qualitative contrast between working and middle class mobility orientations. (ibid p77)
As Tyler points out in a discussion of Boudon's theory, "The 'secondary effects'... are not to be explained simply in terms of the value of cultural systems of the social classes, but by the costs and benefits associated with each particular social level." (Tyler W. op cit p106). Tyler associates Boudon's theory with the theory of educational decision making proposed by Lane (Lane M. 1972) who argues that such a theory must be able to account for intra-class variance at the same time as explaining class differentials (this will be returned to in chapter 8).

Ultimately the concept of "the educational decision field" will have to be explicated in cultural terms (15). It implies a complex of factors to do with the development of self-image, of models of society, of identity and membership and ideologies of work, gender and mobility. It is important to stress that although the major implication of Boudon's view is that as far as educational decision making is concerned, social groups should be seen as similar rather than as different it is nevertheless the case that each particular social group will be operating with a cultural construct specific to its position and its material location within the social formation. Class values in relation to education and mobility are relative to class position, not homogeneous.

The implication of the cultural positioning approach in relation to educational trend data is that individuals have an essentially instrumental approach to education. In chapter four it was noted how people in work utilised part-time educational opportunity to facilitate career movements. Similarly research in schools has shown the same things for pupils (16).
This instrumentality is reflected in the low degree of significance generally attributed to education in relation to 'success'. Hickox, for instance, has written that,

...there is little evidence to suggest that educational credentialisation, in the context of a stratified educational system, does in fact legitimise capitalist control. Indeed there is some evidence which might indicate that the industrial working class accords relatively little legitimacy to educational qualifications. Only 2.5 per cent of the sample of English workers interviewed by Richard Scase ranked educational qualifications as an important determinant of social class. A far greater emphasis was placed on economic factors and on family background. (Hickox M. op cit p571)

He points out that Willis' Lads have obvious contempt for theoretical knowledge. Davis' study of the class images of various groups of workers provides information on how different groups see the relevance of education to personal advancement:

TABLE 5:1
Assessment of Factors Relevant to Personal Advancement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Craftsmen</th>
<th>Steelworkers</th>
<th>Clerical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hard work</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowing the right people</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambition</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intelligence</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>character</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>luck</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social background</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(constructed from Davis H. 1979 ch.4 tables 1, 2 & 3)
It is interesting to note the marked differences between the three groups, but at the same time, a general emphasis upon intrinsic personality factors: "hard work", "ambition", "intelligence" and "character". The specific sense in which education is perceived as significant has to be explicated within its context:

**CRAFTSMEN:**

However, it is indicative of the changing circumstances of the craft worker and his increasingly ambiguous position within highly complex technical systems that education (theoretical knowledge and formal education as opposed to understanding gained through experience) is highly valued but is regarded for the most part as a means of advancement in technical, professional occupations and not within the craft occupations. This may be the reason why many of the craftsmen wished to equate intelligence with education and account for their own experience in terms of innate capacity, leaving education as an equivalent factor in other occupations. (ibid p69)

**STEELWORKERS:**

For the majority of the steelworkers, education was lacking and was not missed, nor did it constitute a threat in the line of promotion. Its importance was recognised in other occupations and increasingly in steelmaking with more subtle instrumentation and manufacture of special steels. However, nearly all the first hands thought intelligence rather than education to be the necessary quality in their own sphere of work. (ibid p79)

**CLERICAL WORKERS:**

Like the steelworkers, but unlike the craftsmen, they regarded intelligence (which includes notions such as commonsense and an ability to learn quickly) as more important than education. In fact, many of the sample were furthering their education in preparing for professional examination and interpreted education as the formal qualifications obtained at school. There is therefore a deliberate emphasis on intrinsic, personal attributes and ability combined with application which is a feature of the other two samples. (ibid p86)
Stewart et al also found evidence that professional qualifications were not treated as "education" within the instrumental context of career advancement (17).

Within the context of Davis' work (which is returned to in chapter 8) these attitudes to education must be located within more complex cognitive frameworks (class images of society). Further light on these processes is provided by a study by M. Harrop on popular conceptions of mobility. Harrop found that individuals can 'guess' mobility rates in Britain with a surprising degree of accuracy. He went on to ask about the factors which people saw as influencing mobility. He discovered the following pattern:

TABLE 5:2

The perceived influences on upward mobility, by respondent's social class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent's Class</th>
<th>MIDDLE</th>
<th>WORKING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most important influence:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social background</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from Harrop M. p93)

In general terms this is in line with the data in Davis' book.
Harrop went on to construct a more complex model by combining elements in the answers:

**TABLE 5:3**

Models of Mobility, by respondent's social class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Respondent's class</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Working</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple Meritocratic</td>
<td>ABILITY → SUCCESS</td>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Meritocratic</td>
<td>ABILITY → EDUCATION → SUCCESS</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple Class</td>
<td>BACKGROUND → SUCCESS</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Class</td>
<td>BACKGROUND → EDUCATION → SUCCESS</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=) (113) (159)

Harrop concludes that,

...the preference of the British public for an individualistic interpretation of mobility is apparent. A majority of both middle-class and working-class respondents adhere to a simple meritocratic model of the opportunity structure in which success is attributed directly to ability. This model is much more popular than either of the class-based models shown in the table; indeed, less than one in ten respondents supports the complex class model in which 'getting ahead' is attributed to success in the educational system, which in its turn is regarded as a function of social background. Yet, of the four models listed, this complex class model is probably the one to which many sociologists would be most attracted.

( Ibid p94)

Of course, all that is being recorded here is what some people think is the case.

The sociologists may be right and Harrop's respondents wrong, but the significance of these findings lies in what they indicate about how people's beliefs may orientate
them towards education.

The dominant attitude towards education might be characterised as "sceptical instrumentalism" - people in general tend to have little faith in its intrinsic value or its relevance, but see it as possibly helpful and/or as symbolically significant as a marker of class or status. It is striking how in Harrop's study middle class respondents are even less likely to attribute significance to education than working class ones - a feature of Davis' data also, though to a lesser degree. The problem with education as a type of social accoutrement is that even if it is not seen as especially significant in itself, not having it (in the right amount), or even having the wrong type can become a positive liability. To return to the employers' strategies discovered by Ashton et al and described in chapter four: even where employers' claim that educational qualifications are not significant, a young person applying for a job who has no qualifications when the norm is for some will stand out as different. Even if the qualifications are seen as having no positive significance in themselves, their absence in circumstances where they are expected can be problematical. In a similar fashion, for middle class parents the failure of their children to acquire a typical middle class education is traumatic even if they themselves believe, like so many of Harrop's respondents, that it is ability or character or whatever that really counts. It is the embeddedness of education within group culture that counts - the manner in which it functions as a symbolic marker of membership and identity.
OCCUPATION AND ORIENTATION

Class in itself is a relatively crude index as far as education is concerned. The degree of intra-class variance is so great that more sensitive measures are required and as this happens the link between educational performance and crude measures of class becomes increasingly tenuous. Numerous studies now indicate that the educational background of parents is more significant than class background as measured by conventional indices of socio-economic status.

Relative to education we know that different social groups do not simply acquire more education proportionate to their social level. There are extremely significant and important distinctions between groups at the same level: e.g. between professionals and managers for instance. Not only do professionals and managers themselves have distinctively different types of educational experience but so do their children, despite the fact that both groups can be seen as members of the occupational and educational elite. Recalling the information in chapter four on the educational characteristics of the different GHS SEGs, we can look at the educational experiences of children from the different occupational groups (it is important to note that the occupational background is more important than class level). Halsey et al give the following for the percentages of university students from the three social classes in the Oxford study.
TABLE 5:4 UNIVERSITY STUDENTS BY CLASS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>% of university population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I, II</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III, IV, V</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI, VII, VIII</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from Halsey et al op cit p.183)

The degree of class inequality is clear. However, the following table from Tapper and Salter gives a breakdown somewhat closer to the GHS categories:

TABLE 5:5

Parental Occupation of Accepted Home Candidates, 1968-74 (%) (UCCA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>manual and agricultural</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other non-manual</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>admin. &amp; managers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prof. &amp; technical</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from Tapper & Salter op cit p183)

The clear difference between the administrative and managerial group and the professional and technical group recalls that between professionals and employers and managers in the GHS.

I do not at this point wish to take up the more conceptual issues raised by this use of the term "class" or the implicit assumptions about class effectivity. The concern at the moment is at a purely empirical level. The type of intra-class variation which is so significant is observable in the different educational profiles of socio-economic groups in the GHS. In the
previous chapter attention was drawn to the difference between the educational characteristics of professionals and of employers and managers. A survey by the Inner London Education Authority casts some light on the educational experiences of children relative to their parents' occupations. Unfortunately the ILEA data does not allow us to distinguish between professionals and employers/managers, neither does it retain throughout the initial eight-fold set of SEGs, preferring a simple manual/non-manual dichotomy in some places (18).

The ILEA surveys were carried out in selected schools in two ILEA divisions (1 and 6) in the Christmas term of 1981. 557 fifth-year leavers were questioned about their reasons for leaving school, their situations and intentions. A survey of 808 first-year sixth formers gathered information on their family backgrounds, their reasons for staying at school, their aspirations and intentions. Together these surveys give us information about two categories of sixth formers: those following traditional 'A' level courses and those not doing so (the 'new sixth'), and about four categories of leavers: those in employment, those unemployed, those at college and those on YOP courses. The data is also broken down by gender and ethnic background, as well as by socio-economic status of parents (including mothers' occupation). Hence the reports are extremely interesting and provide far more information than will be reported here.

The tables below show the pupils' socio-economic backgrounds. A measure of the representation of groups in the respective populations has been
taken from the ILEA Pre-School Survey of 1980.

TABLE 5:6

FATHERS' SEG FOR ILEA SIXTH-FORMERS AND LEAVERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's Occupation</th>
<th>POP</th>
<th>'A'</th>
<th>Non 'A'</th>
<th>ALL</th>
<th>LEAVERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Managerial</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Manual</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Manual</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ. Inactive*</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/No Info.**</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
380 428 808 557

* e.g. 'housewives'
** note the high % in this line
constructed from ILEA 1982a tables 4 & 8, and ILEA 1982b table 5

TABLE 5:7

ILEA SCHOOL LEAVERS: CURRENT SITUATION BY FATHERS' OCCUPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCHOOL LEAVERS</th>
<th>CURRENT SITUATION</th>
<th>FATHER'S OCCUPATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>Non-Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In employment</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time college</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOP</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Info.</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(constructed from ILEA 1982b tables 8 & 10)

The most obvious feature of table 5:6 is the 'over representation' of professionals and managerials in the sixth form and, in particular in the traditional sixth.
Other non-manuals are more evenly distributed between 'A' level and non-'A' level course relative to their proportion in the sixth as a whole (numerically the two groups are relatively similar - 380 'A' level, 428 non 'A' level - and comparing the percentages gives a tolerable measure) but whereas getting on for half the 'A' level people are non-manuals, they make-up only a quarter of the non 'A' group. Against this general background, the surveys provide information on young peoples' attitudes to schooling, college and work.

Table 5:8 summarises the reasons that were given for continuing in education either in the sixth form or at college.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Continuing Education</th>
<th>'A' Level</th>
<th>Non 'A' Level</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To obtain the qualifications for the job I want</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I could not get a suitable job</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To obtain qualifications to go on to college or university</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am interested in the subjects I am studying</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I needed time to decide what I wanted to do</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With more qualifications I will have a wider choice of jobs</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was attracted by the idea of being a sixth former/student</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure from my family or teachers - it was expected of me</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With more qualifications I will be able to get a better job</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I enjoy studying</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(constructed from ILEA 1982a table 10 and ILEA 1982b table 17 (some replies have been omitted)).
What is most striking here is the common instrumentality of the reasons. The cluster of reasons relating to jobs are clearly at the top of the list. Even the 'A' level sixth form group's priority of getting qualifications for college or university is intelligible in terms of their aspirations towards jobs demanding higher education qualifications. Twenty-three per cent of sixth form 'A' level boys and 24% of the girls did so as opposed to only 7% of non 'A' level boys and 7% of the girls. In the case of college students the figure was 13%.

The groups varied in their aspirations. In addition to those just mentioned, non 'A' level sixth-form boys were most likely to aspire towards skilled work (17.6) and in the case of the girls, clerical and secretarial (32.7%). The second most common choice for boys in this group was 'technician' (9.2%) and for girls, nursing (16.8%). The single most common career aspiration in the college group was for clerical and secretarial work. But this is exclusively a female area. The second most common category, skilled trades, is virtually an exclusive male preserve (cf Ashton et al's labour market segments in ch. 8). In general terms, non 'A' level sixth formers are more like college students than they are like 'A' level sixth formers. However, of the three groups in education they are least happy with their situation. Table 5:8 shows that they are least likely to enjoy studying, least likely to be attracted by the idea of being in education, and least likely to be interested in their subjects. When asked what their preferred situation would be, 35.2% of the boys and 50% of the girls said that it was studying in the sixth-form as against 68.2% of 'A' level
boys and 77.2% of 'A' level girls. Amongst college students 65% of those were in their preferred situation. The tables below show the preference and alternatives considered. We can note that the unemployed/YOP group is least likely to want to be in education in any form.

Table 5.9  Current and preferred situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Situation</th>
<th>'A' Level</th>
<th>Non 'A' Level</th>
<th>Unemp. &amp; YOP</th>
<th>Emp.</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working in a permanent job and attending college part-time</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in a permanent job and not studying at all</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying in the sixth-form at school</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Studying full-time at college</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(From ILEA 1982 table 12, & ILEA 1982b table 20. College students are not differentiated by sex)
TABLE 5:10  Alternatives considered at 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALTERNATIVE</th>
<th>'A' Level %</th>
<th>Non 'A' Level %</th>
<th>Unemp. &amp; YOP %</th>
<th>Emp. %</th>
<th>College %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COLLEGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considered going to college</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>applied for a place</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>were offered a place</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>considered getting a job</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tried to get a job</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>were offered a job</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from ILEA 1982a table 11 & ILEA 1982b table 20)

We see that 'A' level sixth-formers and college students are most happy with their situation. Although a quarter of 'A' level sixth-formers considered going to college only 6.6% applied for a place and 5.3% of them were actually offered one. This contrasts markedly with the position of the non 'A' level people where a third considered going to college, 14.3% applied for a place but only 4.4 were actually offered one. Twenty-nine point nine percent of the non 'A' level sixth-formers considered getting a job and 20.6% applied. Although only 4.4% were offered jobs, this figure is similar for that for 'A' level people who applied for jobs.
The difference between the 'A' and non 'A' level sixth-formers reflects the differences in their aspirations and the relevance of educational qualifications to their aspirations. Whereas 81.7% of 'A' level pupils were intending to stay on for two years (i.e. the length of an 'A' level course), only 10.6% of non-'A' level pupils were going to; 54.8% of them intended to leave after one year. However 25.1% of the non-academic sixth-formers were not sure about how long they would stay as against only 8.7% of academics. This suggests that the experience of being a sixth-former is less familiar to the type of pupils in the non-academic sixth. The situation is summarised as follows:

Fifty-three per cent of the 'A' level students were girls and 47% were boys. Among the non 'A' level students this difference was considerably greater, with girls out-numbering boys by more than two to one. The 'A' level students were more likely to have fathers in professional and managerial occupations than the non 'A' level students (31% and 14% respectively).

Indigenous students accounted for a higher proportion of the 'A' level students than of the non 'A' level group. For the West Indian students, this situation was reversed. Seven per cent of the 'A' level students were West Indian compared with 14% of the non 'A' level students.

Sixty per cent of the girls were taking no 'A' levels compared with 42% of the boys. Boys were also likely to be taking more subjects at 'A' level. 32% of the boys were taking three or more subjects, compared with only 20% of the girls. Almost all the students for RSA examinations were girls.

(ILEA 1982a pp11-12)

These differences along the lines of class, gender and race indicate the changing patterns of participation in schooling and further education in response to credentialism and, more crucially for young people, high youth
unemployment. Their situation in the educational institutions reflects the nature of the changes those institutions are themselves having to make in response to these circumstances. The data suggests that we can identify a 'traditional' academic sixth-form and sixth-former who is contented with his/her situation, is happy to stay in school, is reasonably interested in study (without necessarily having any great commitment to an 'intellectual' or academic life), and who knows where study leads - i.e. to university and a job commensurate with their class origins. The sixth-form is also, however, having to accommodate a new type of pupil who is far less happy to be there and for whom the sixth-form is both unfamiliar and problematical. Most pupils who choose to go on to college instead of staying on to the sixth-form do so because the school does not offer the type of course that they want.

Only a third of the non-academic boys (and half the girls) actually wanted to be in the sixth-form. Nearly half would have preferred to be either part-time at college and working or working and not studying at all. Dislike of school figured very largely in the reasons for going to college rather than staying on and college students saw their situation as more adult.

Amongst those who neither stayed on into the sixth form nor went to college dislike of school and a desire to acquire an adult status were of particular significance.

The desire to 'earn some money' was the most important reason for leaving school. The desire to be treated like an adult was an important contributory reason for both
groups (i.e. employed and unemployed/YOP - RM), as was dislike of school. This last reason was seen as more important by the unemployed group who, in general, appeared to have more negative attitudes towards school than those who found work. They were also more inclined than the employed leavers to report not performing 'well enough in my exams to stay on' and non-acceptance in the sixth form as reasons for leaving. These differences were also echoed in other statements. Those given by the employed group were mainly that they were bored with school and looking forward to a degree of independence or simply that they had been offered a job and decided to take it. Some of the unemployed, on the other hand, said that 'disliked' was too mild a word - they had 'hated school' and a small number said that they had been suspended or expelled from school.

(ILEA 1982b p15)

The unemployed/YOP group are those most likely to want to be doing no studying at all - 59.3% as against 45% of the employed, 16% of the non 'A' level sixth-form boys and 12.2% of college students. Hence the non-academic sixth-formers, though very different from the academics (and the boys more so than the girls), are still closer to those in education in general than they are to those not in education. Tables 5:9 and 5:10 show that whereas the alternatives considered by the employed and by the unemployed/YOPs were quite similar, their preferences are markedly different. The latter are both more anti-school and less inclined to pursue further study, even on a part-time college basis. They are also considerably more likely not to have acquired the qualifications to stay on (26.8%/7.4%).

We can now compare the groups in terms of their career aspirations and relate that date to the above.
TABLE 5.11  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASPIRATION</th>
<th>SIXTH FORM</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'A' level</td>
<td>non 'A' level</td>
<td>unem-</td>
<td>YOP</td>
<td>College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. jobs normally requiring degree or equivalent</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts, performing, sports</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business and admin.</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Secretarial</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled trades</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail distribution</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi or unskilled</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces, police</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/anything</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from ILEA 1982a table 15 & ILEA 1982b table 21. * category not in original)

= MODE  It is important to note the high numbers in the "don't know/anything" category. The YOP group is the most representative here.

'A' level sixth-formers stand out from the rest in terms of their aspirations - 23.3% for jobs requiring higher qualifications. In keeping with
this 51.9% of these students said that they would be continuing in full-time education, and of those 56.4 said they would be studying for advanced qualifications. Only 8.7% of these pupils said that they would be going on to follow non-advanced courses compared with nearly half of the non 'A's who said they would be continuing their studies (36.1%). If the 12.9% of college students who are also aiming for higher qualifications are ignored, then there is a general tendency for all other groups to be focussing upon clerical and secretarial work (mainly girls) and skilled trades (mainly boys). Of the girls 32.7% of non-'A' level sixth-formers had clerical and secretarial aspirations, as did 20.7% of college students (all girls, so we are told - ILEA 1982b table 15) and 25.5% of YOPs. Of the boys, 17.6% of non 'A' level sixth formers, 15.4% unemployed, 31.9% YOPs and 14.7% college students aspired to skilled trades. On balance non 'A' level sixth formers and college students tend to aspire more above the mode, and the unemployed and the YOPs, below it. At all levels significant numbers either don't know or would take anything (it would be useful to be able to differentiate these two categories). The groups vary significantly in the extent to which they acquired examinations in the fifth year.
TABLE 5:12  Fifth-year examination results for different groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>College</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>YOP</th>
<th>Sixth Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No exams taken</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No graded results</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+ CSE grade 4-5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+ CSE grade 2-3/ 'O' level D-E</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 CSE grade 1/ 'O' level A-C</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5+ CSE grade 1/ 'O' level A-C</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>100.0</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ILEA 1982b table 11)

In the main it is at the 1-4 CSE grade 1/'O' levels A-C point that sixth formers begin taking 'A' levels (see ILEA 1982a table 9).

Leaving aside the more complex pattern which would emerge if ethnic and gender factors were fully considered, this examination of the ILEA data enables a number of points to be made:

(1) the type of course followed is clearly associated with social background in a manner which is superficially similar to the educational profiles of the GHS SEGs (unfortunately the non-availability (at present) of ILEA's data sets do not allow any finer distinctions to be made relative to the GHS). We can note, following Musgrove's position, the relatively high percentage of skilled workers' children in the 'A' level sixth-form (more than 'other non-manual').
(2) Table 5-8 indicates that pupils/students are very similar in their reasons for seeking qualifications, i.e. what I earlier termed "sceptical instrumentalism".

(3) They vary considerably, however, in their preferences as regards to being in school/college; that is, in the degree to which their scepticism is constrained by their instrumentalism. Hence, despite their attitude, 'A' level sixth formers will stay-on by preference whereas non-college leavers will not.

(4) The pattern of preferences generally follows the degree of hostility to school, as does the pattern of attainment as given by fifth-year exam results.

(5) However, academics aside, the pattern of aspirations is very similar between categories (though it differs between groups).

It is important to keep in mind that these studies do not take into account the time factor. Both the 'new sixty' and YOP are new, and both are rapidly developing and changing arrangements - YOP is about to be superseded already by the Youth Training Schemes! The ILEA sixth-form in general is in a difficult situation because of falling rolls, and high youth unemployment is an obviously problematical background factor. At the same time the colleges are having to absorb an entirely new type of 'student' and develop appropriate courses. The ambiguous and ambivalent position of the non 'A' level sixth-formers best exemplifies this fluid and unstable situation. ILEA 1982a describes their situation as follows:

Of those sixth-formers who were not following 'A' level courses, the majority (64%) were following 'O' level courses. Fifty-two
per cent intended to take CSE, 44% CEE and 39% RSA examinations. RSA examinations represent one of the few areas of vocational work undertaken by the schools. Those sixth-formers who were following RSA courses were doing so in typing, shorthand or book keeping, or were studying for the RSA's Diploma in Office Studies or Certificate in Basic Clerical Procedures.

A small number of sixth formers (6%) were following vocational courses. They included City and Guilds Foundation and craft level courses, BEC General and TEC level 1 courses. These courses were sometimes offered by the school in collaboration with a local college of FE.

(HILEA 1982a p9)

Hence their situation is extremely confused and suggests that both they and the schools are in a difficult situation.

POSITIONAL DYNAMICS

The ILEA data indicates a set of groups positioned differentially towards the school on the basis of their aspirations, preferences and attitudes towards school authority. These groups are sub-divided by gender and ethnic characteristics as well as by the socio-economic features of their backgrounds. As the GHS data shows, there are significant differences within 'classes' as far as education is concerned which reflects their more specific positioning within the socio-technical division of labour. Bourdieu's analysis of the life-styles of different groups highlights the systematic character of these differences, especially as far as the 'consumption' of culture is concerned (19).

Bernstein argues that,

The major factors affecting the behaviour of pupils are four: the family setting and social origins of the child, the age group
of friendship patterns of the child, the school itself, and the pupil's perception of his occupational fate. Any analysis of the pupil's involvement in his role must take into account these four factors - family age group, school and work - and show the relationships between them.  
(Bernstein (1966) 1977 p37)

He goes on to distinguish between the instrumental and the expressive orders of the school. The former has to do with the acquisition of specific skills and the latter with the moral order - conduct, character, manner. The interaction between these two orders within the constellation of factors orienting the child determines the positioning structure of the school. Bernstein says of the expressive order that it,

...attempts to transmit an image of conduct, character and manner, a moral order which is held equally before each pupil and teacher. It tends to bind the whole school together as a distinct moral collectivity.  
(ibid pp38-39)

It is towards the school as a "distinct moral collectivity" that the pupils in the ILEA survey are differentially positioned despite their similar orientations in other respects, e.g. sceptical instrumentalism or career aspirations. Bernstein further distinguishes between families on the basis of how far they understand the means whereby the orders of the school are transmitted and how far they accept the ends or/goals of the school. On this basis it is possible to construct a positional system. The diagram of pupil roles is reproduced below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INSTRUMENTAL</th>
<th>EXPRESSIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>means</td>
<td>ends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Comittment</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Detachment</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Deferment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Estrangement</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ibid p44)
Commitment occurs where the pupil is a loyal member of the school who spontaneously produces the desired behaviour. Detachment is where the pupil is negatively predisposed towards the ends embodied in the expressive order. This could be the bright working class pupil who finds that the "image of conduct" strains his familial identity, and also, we can summarise, the child from the middle-class radical family (20) (an interesting conflict because the parent will require the child to do well at school despite themselves rejecting its 'reactionary' attitudes).

Deferment is where the child is "watching the state of play", unsure as to the rules or how far he/she wishes to become committed. In estrangement the child has difficulties with the means of the instrumental order. He/she cannot cope with the actual learning, despite being loyally committed to the ends of the school and its expressive order. This is the position of the not too bright middle-class child (for whom private education is a possible solution). In the case of alienation the pupil is in a state of rejecting both the expressive and the instrumental orders.

This paper enables us to envisage a complex positional system based on how pupils react to the messages of the school. Its importance lies in the manner in which it brings together a number of distinct dimensions as an interactive totality within the school rather than simply positing a unidirectional determination (countered, perhaps, by relative autonomy and resistance). The more subtle dynamics of the most recent papers suggest that the schema above can be extended in various ways. We have to take into account two important factors. Firstly the issue of competence and, as argued in chapter three,
the degree to which rejection of both means and ends can be associated with the ability to manage, and 'work', the system of rules underlying both instrumental and expressive orders. Under certain conditions pupils or students who were apparently compliant can radically change their orientation. Essentially this is what happened in the student revolts of the late sixties (21). Secondly we have to take account of the dynamics of positioning. The situation just mentioned occurs when hitherto compliant groups are fundamentally repositioned by developments within the macro-structure in which their family situation is contextualised (e.g. the radical devaluation of higher qualifications by credential inflation and university expansion). The positional system, then, is not given by characteristics intrinsic to types of home, pupils or schools but evolves within the system of relationships traced by the trend data reviewed in the previous chapter. It is to this that I now wish to turn.

THE DIMENSIONS OF PEDAGOGIC CHANGE

If the trends in education outlined in chapter four are related to the school itself, they translate into complex changes in the social composition of the pupil population at those points ("branching points") after the official leaving age. Over the past decade, this phenomenon has been relevant to the school fifth-form at the time of the raising of the school leaving age of sixteen (ROSLA) in 1972/73 and from the late seventies into the eighties in the sixth-form (non-'A' level) and CFEs. Social composition must be understood as involving a number of different factors and dimensions;
class, sex, ethnicity, ability, previous attainment, orientation to
mobility, attitude to school, aspirations, etc. Bourdieu and Passeron
describe the situation in this way:

Knowing on the one hand the relations between the social
or scholastic characteristics of the different categories
of receivers and the different degrees of linguistic com-
petence, and on the other hand the evolution of the rela-
tive weight of the categories characterised by different
levels of reception, we can construct a model making it
possible to explain, and to some extent predict, the
transformations of the pedagogic relationship. It is
immediately clear that the transformations of the system
of relations between the educational system and the class
structure, which are expressed, for example, in the evo-
lution of the rates of enrolment of the various social classes,
lead to a transformation (in accordance with the principles
which govern it) of the system of relations between the levels
of reception and the categories of receivers, that is, of the
educational system considered as a communication system.
The capacity for reception characteristic of receivers of a
given category is a function at once of that category's lin-
guistic capital (which we may suppose constant for the period
in question) and the degree of selection of the survivors in that
category, as objectively measured by the rate of elimination
of that category from the educational system. Analysis of the
variations over time of the relative weight of the categories of
receivers thus enables one to detect and explain sociologically
a tendency towards a continuous fall in the mode of distribu-
tion of the receivers' linguistic competences, together with
an increased dispersion of this distribution.

(Bourdieu P. & Passeron D-C 1977 pp90-91)

Bourdieu and Passeron's model of transformations is complex.
The "evolution of the rates of enrolment of the various social classes" can
be related directly to the trend data in the form of logistic curves described
in chapter 4. The authors locate groups within that process on the basis of
their positioning along two dimensions, the first, "linguistic capital", can be
understood in terms of their ability to cope with the cultural demands of schooling,
and the second, "degree of selection", can be treated as an index of academic
performance and competence. Pupils can be high to low on both dimensions independently, though there must be a sense in which being high on the first affects the position of the second (a similar interaction effect must realistically be assumed between Boudon's "primary and secondary effects" also). The relationships can function in a compensatory way. Hence high performance, low status pupils can attain higher levels of achievement than low performance high status pupils who will, still do better than low performance, low status pupils.

The principle of the first dimension is cultural distance, and this work has argued against this principle, favouring instead what has been called a positioning principle. Hence, in what follows, positioning will be substituted for distance. Positioning affects orientation towards education. Performance reflects the capacity to cope with the cognitive and epistemological aspects of learning. Within an educational site, e.g. the fifth-year or the sixth form, groups will vary according to how they are relatively distributed along the two dimensions. In a site which is the modal level of attainment for, say, middle class pupils the dispersion of performance for such pupils will be wide and the mean relatively low. For working class pupils, on the other hand, the mean will be relatively high and the dispersion narrow. On average the lower class pupils will do better than the higher class ones. This is because they are at that level mainly by virtue of their superior performance rather than because of their "cultural capital" and the background expectation that they should stay-on to at least that point. In this sense they are "over-selected" - i.e. more rigorously selected by
academic criteria than are the middle-class pupils who are aided by their social background. As time goes by and the necessity to acquire more education compels more pupils to stay-on, so the proportions of different groups will change. The number of low performance middle class pupils will increase and the dispersion in the working class group will widen as the mean drops as numbers there also increase.

A simple model can illustrate the complex changes which can occur in education as a consequence of the trends discussed. The situation being imagined is as follows: each year there are one thousand pupils who have to decide whether or not to leave school or to stay-on. As a result of credential inflation, successive generations need to acquire more education in order to maintain their social position. Hence the numbers of all pupils staying-on increases year by year. The composition of each successive group changes as a function of social background (S), performance (P) and orientation (O). O is a complex function of S and P and some other unknown factor(s) which varies both between and within Ss - hence although generally speaking O becomes increasingly negative as S declines, some low Ss will have both a positive O and sufficient P to stay-on, as will some high S/low Ps whose positive orientation will keep them in school despite their inability to cope (of Bernstein's "estrangement").

The comparison is between the social composition of those staying-on at two points in time (T1 & T2) (which can be related to the points A and B on Halsey et al's logistic curves graph reproduced in Ch. 4). The population of pupils equals 1000 individuals each year, and is divided into three social
groups: S1, S2 and S3 in the proportions of 15%, 30% and 55% respectively.

Orientation to school tends to become more negative as S moves from high to low. Performative competence is randomly distributed. There are three categories of performance: high (H), medium (M) and low (L). This is a continuous variable (which could be represented on a scale from 0 - 100, for example), hence H, M & L are ranges. The top 5% are H, 30% are M and 65% are L. The population is, then, divided between S and P as follows:

**TABLE 5:13 POPULATION, S x P**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(rounding off of numbers leads to slight inconsistencies)

There are nine S/P groups. At T1 there is a total of 162 places made available for those staying-on, and at T2 398. If the nine groups were fairly represented at both times we would expect the following:

**TABLE 5:14 FAIR DISTRIBUTION FOR PUPILS STAYING ON AT T1, S x P**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5:15 FAIR DISTRIBUTION FOR PUPILS STAYING ON AT T2, S x P**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 300 -
However, because the society is a class society, there is at work what Boudon calls a "dominance effect", i.e. upper class groups are more likely to get places and therefore will be over-represented. The class distribution is as follows:

TABLE 5.16 FAIR Vs ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF PLACES, T1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ti</th>
<th>EXPECTED</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
<th>INEQUALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Ind. = index of association, and L. D. = log distance)

TABLE 5.17 FAIR Vs ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF PLACES, T2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ti</th>
<th>EXPECTED</th>
<th>ACTUAL</th>
<th>INEQUALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Ind. = index of association, and L. D. = log distance)

As the conventional measure of inequality in the tables indicate there is a high degree of social inequality in the system. At T1 50% of S1s are in as against only 5% of S3s, and at T2 the corresponding figures are 92% and 20%. Even at the later time it is still the case that 80% are not staying-on as opposed to only 8% of S1s. The degree of inequality can also be represented by considering the extra people per 100 that each group is able to
send between T1 and T2: S1 + 42, S2 + 30 and S3 + 15. This trend reflects that in Boudon's simulation model: "...for every 1000 lower-class youngsters there are over time, a much smaller additional number of students than there are for the middle or upper class." (Boudon op cit p98). But he immediately adds that "nevertheless the model predicts an increase in the proportion of students from lower class background."

This model shows the same:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%T1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%T2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing these two trends illustrates the complexities of discussing inequalities in this type of situation.

These complexities can be developed by extracting further details from the class figures. The shape of the trend curves (i.e. S curves) is the crucial factor. At T2, S1 is approaching its ceiling having moved from having 50% of its members staying-on to having 92%. The figures for S2 and S3 are 20% to 50%, and 5% to 20%. Although S1 has virtually exhausted its potential for membership, its proportion in the population of the site actually declines between T1 and T2 – from 46% to 35%. Whereas S1s outnumbered S3s by nearly 3 to 1 at T1, by T2 they do so by only 1.25 to 1. They added an extra 63 people to their total, which is a percentage increase of 84%, but whereas S3 only added 83 people to their total, their percentage increase was 300%! Hence the rate of change was very much faster for the lower class group. The reason for this is that the upper class curve is flattening out whereas that for the lower class group is rising.
Both groups are moving, though from opposite directions, towards a 'fair' representation, i.e., an index of 1. The S1 index dropped from 3.13 to 2.3, and that of S3 rose from 0.31 to 0.5. The dramatic change in the S1s' position relative to S3 (rather than to itself) is given by the change in the log distance: from 102 to 23.

The position of the middle class group, however, has remained relatively stable in certain respects. As a proportion of the total membership they changed their position by only 1%. Yet they added 90 people to their total! This is a percentage increase of 150%, but their index changed only very slightly - from 1.25 to 1.26. Their position did change, however, relative to other groups. Their log distance fell from 80 to 31, whilst the numerical difference between them and the S3s rose from 33 to 40. In fact there is a greater degree of inequality at T2 between the lower class group and the middle class group than there is between the former and the upper class group. By T2, S2s outnumber S3s by only 1.36 to 1, as against the 2.22 to 1 at T1.

Given that S1 is reaching its ceiling at T2 (92%), its position in the site cannot improve. At T2, S2 is where S1 was at T1 (i.e., 50% staying on), so its rate of improvement must now decline having passed the mid-point on its curve. Its future will repeat the history of S1. The position of S3, on the other hand, can only improve. It is obvious that the relative positions of the groups must lead to 'quantum changes' in the site. Once the S1 ceiling is attained all future additions will come from S2 and S3, and disproportionately so from the latter. Eventually all new members will be S3s.
If the performance factor is now re-introduced alongside the class dimension, the situation becomes increasingly complex. In addition to the "dominance" effect which builds a class bias into the model, a "meritocratic" principle can be included which refers specifically to performance. This means that high performance can compensate for low status. As the groups are entering the site, the order of precedence reflects both S and P factors. At a certain point in the S1 group, low P will disqualify from membership. High P, S2s will take priority over low P S1s, and so on. The queue is as follows:

S1H, S1M, S2H, S1L, S2M, S3H, S3M, S2L, S3L

The resulting pattern of inequality is complex:

**TABLE 5:18**  
DISTRIBUTION OF PLACES  
S x P, T1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1</th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5:19**  
DISTRIBUTION OF PLACES, S x P, T2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T2</th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The indices of association for each group are as follows:

**TABLE 5:20**  
INDICES OF ASSOCIATION T1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T1</th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5:21**  
INDICES OF ASSOCIATION T2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T2</th>
<th>S1</th>
<th>S2</th>
<th>S3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relating this to the principles of Bourdieu and Passeron's approach in "Reproduction" we can see a complex set of changes occurring in the social composition of the population along the two dimensions of S and P. The widest dispersion of P is with the H group. At T1 all the S3s are High Ps. They make up 55% of the High group. Because all the Highs are in the site by T1, all additional members at T2 will be of lower performance. At T1 the modal S1 group is M and at T2 it is L. It is this type of relative distribution which explains the phenomenon of working class success at the grammar school which Musgrove documents. The additional 63 S1s at T2 are all Ls. Hence S1's declining proportion in the total membership is accompanied by a decline in the 'quality' of its membership. The extra 83 S3s at T2 are all in the middle range, and the extra S2s are equally divided between M and L. Forty-six per cent of the new members at T2 are Ls and all are either S1s or S2s. The index of association figures show that at T1 S3 Highs were as much over-represented as S1 Highs, and at T2 they are slightly more favourably represented than the upper class group. This more subtle representation of the model data indicates that the full significance of inter-class differentials in education cannot be fully appreciated without taking into account intra-class variance.

CRISIS AND CONTROL

I now want to consider the implications of these changes for pedagogy and the curriculum. Bourdieu and Passeron say,

The analysis of differential reception of the pedagogic message presented here makes it possible to explain the effects which
the transformations of its public exert on pedagogic communication, and to define by extrapolation the social characteristics of the publics corresponding to the two limiting states of the traditional system - what might be called the organic state, in which the system deals with a public perfectly matching its implicit demands, and what might be called the critical state, in which, with the changing social make-up of the system’s clientele, misunderstanding would eventually become intolerable - the state actually observed corresponding to an intermediate phase.

(ibid p90)

As has already been made clear, the approach to the "transformation" of publics in this work is in terms of positioning, not distance (i.e. relationship to "implicit demands"). From this point of view it is orientation which is important. In terms of the ILEA data reviewed above, we can say that the traditional, academic sixth-formers are in an "organic" relationship to the sixth-form given their preferences and aspirations, whereas the non-academic, "new" sixth-formers are approaching a "critical" state. This is reflected not only in their own less than happy view of their position, but also in the, at the moment, confused, attempts by the schools to accommodate them. Whereas 68.2% of the academic sixth-form boys were in their preferred situation, this was true of only 35.2% of the non-academic boys. In the case of the employed and unemployed/YOP boys, the percentages who would prefer to be at school were only 1.4% and 1.1%. Should a situation arise where they were forced to remain in school, the critical condition would undoubtedly pertain.

It is important to acknowledge that the fact that levels of educational attainment and participation have risen does not mean that through the years the desire of pupils to acquire more education for its own sake has increased.
The aggregation effect associated with credential inflation is experienced by the great majority of pupils as an externally imposed necessity. The instrumentality of pupils' approach to education reflects their real interest in getting out of school altogether and into work. The critical state approaches as the dispersion of performative competence in the least typical groups widens and the mean level falls. At the same time the orientation to education becomes increasingly negative. As a group's representation in a site increases, so the readiness of its members to conform to traditional expectations and patterns of authority declines. This tendency is amplified by the fact displayed in the model that the rate of increase in membership will be most rapid for the least typical group and that 'quantum' leaps will occur in its degree of representation as the more typical groups reached saturation level and can add no new members. The critical condition is approached through a sudden and accelerating pattern of change. The dissatisfaction of the "reluctant attenders" (as they were termed by the Schools Council at the time of ROSLA) is exacerbated by the fact that not only is the necessity to remain in school experienced as a radical interruption in the evolution of the social career, but it brings with it no tangible returns either in terms of possibilities for mobility or for getting better jobs or pay (cf GHS data in ch. 4).

The critical state within a site takes the practical, everyday form of control problems in the classroom. These occur not because the pupils are unable to handle their situation - to respond to the implicit demands of the school - but because they simply do not want to be there. It is not so much a matter of pupils' performance but very much of what they will or will not do.
In formal terms the schools respond to this situation by transforming the modalities of control. By changing the value of framing. Although the Bourdieu & Passeron argument illuminatingly exposes the systematic structure of transformations, it does not provide us with any rules whereby we can generate the characteristics of the changes themselves. For this purpose we have to turn to classification and framing (see ch. 7). The schools' response is to develop a set of differentiated pedagogies. If we look at the numbers taking public examinations in the schools in the five years following ROSLA, we find the following:

**TABLE 5:22 NUMBERS TAKING PUBLIC EXAMINATIONS 1973-78**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>% increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>1,227,864</td>
<td>2,575,181</td>
<td>101.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODE 1</td>
<td>1,024,981</td>
<td>1,828,628</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODE 2</td>
<td>32,010</td>
<td>73,553</td>
<td>129.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODE 3</td>
<td>220,873</td>
<td>673,000</td>
<td>204.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'O'</td>
<td>1,354,257</td>
<td>1,629,982</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'A'</td>
<td>314,564</td>
<td>368,847</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These figures represent more than simple changes in numbers, they indicate complex changes taking place in the social composition of educational sites (in particular the fifth year of schooling) and in their pedagogic relations.

The growth of Mode 3s in particular represents an adaptive transformation of the educational transmission code. The Schools Council, through its various curriculum projects, developing the CSE etc., played a central role in controlling this process.
The development of CSEs alongside the GCE represents an internal differentiation of pedagogies within a given site. At the same time as providing an adaptive response to the control problems (22) created by the changes in the social composition of the site, the process reproduced in the horizontal dimension a set of differentiations which had previously been inscribed within the vertical hierarchy of the school - "staying-on", 'O' and 'A' levels etc. A similar pattern of changes can be identified within GCEs themselves.

**TABLE 5:23 School leavers with two or more A-level passes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>1966/7</th>
<th>1975/6</th>
<th>(Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>science</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>BOYS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soc. sc.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arts</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBINATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including science</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>science</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>GIRLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soc. sc.</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arts</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMBINATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including science</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from HUTT R. et al 1978 p12, table 2.4)

The number of girls taking 'A' levels and leaving with two or more passes increases by 12,000 against an increase of 8,000 boys. Most significantly as far as the girls are concerned, the increases are greatest for sciences (23).
Boys taking sciences alone decrease slightly in number, but those taking science in combination with other subjects increase sharply. In all cases the most marked rises are in combinations and in the 'new' social science subjects. This marks a shift towards what Bernstein has termed an "im-pure specialised collection code". This shift involves changes in boundary maintenance between subjects and subject areas and this in turn entails changes in the organisation of relationships in the school (e.g. between teachers). We can see these changes in relation to changes in the demography of the pupil population.

The process of symbolic differentiation through education continues, but in a fundamentally modified form - namely through transformations of the transmission code. In general terms the development of Mode 3 marks a move towards an "interpersonal pedagogy" (24) at the secondary level. Crucially (and in contrast with the 'A' level situation) this involves a reduction in the boundary between school and community knowledge, as well as a move towards integration which is also more typical of primary schooling (in England, at least). This will be the topic of the next chapter.

PUPILS, PEDAGOGY AND STRUCTURE

The approach to educational processes and practices being advocated in this work differs fundamentally from that which is associated with the new sociology of education. I will term the latter approach "essentialist". This term is to be taken as indicating that particular types of educational practices are seen as containing certain intrinsic characteristics and as bearing given implications.
at the political and ideological level. Hence, as shown in chapters one and two, Young's dichotomous model of curricular types and Whitty's analysis of social studies both identify certain deeply embedded features of educational practices as intrinsically conservative or radical with the implication that each set serves a particular class interest and that it is possible, on this basis, to define a politically radical curriculum. This was the assumption behind the approach of the William Tyndale teachers.

The argument in this work is that the essentialist approach is wrong - educational processes and practices are in fact intelligible in terms of their position within a complex and internally dynamic set of structural relationships. Any particular example can only be fully comprehended by reconstituting the system of relationships and its transformations. The model of structural causality outlined by Bourdieu and Passeron can be translated into a generative model by applying the principles of classification and framing.

The Tyndale affair dramatically illustrates the tensions and conflicts which arise when a particular approach is accorded a given value and significance and effectivity. The durability of the traditionalist approach in English education arises solely from its association with a selective principle - schools of this type are able to maintain an organic state vis-a-vis their public by simply excluding problematical groups. Teachers in non-selective state schools do not (and should not) enjoy this luxury. In the state system we have to be able to respond to the needs of all pupils. The distinctive feature of Bernstein's approach is its concern with the school as a system of relationships.
constituting a regulative, communicative context. It is not content that counts but relations between categories. These relationships constitute the school as a "distinct moral collectivity". The deep structures of schooling realise distinctive 'forms of life'. The principle of the differential positioning of groups relative to each other and to the site of educational practices is their relationship to production - this will be further developed.

CONCLUSION

The processes examined in this chapter represent the translation of the trends reviewed in chapter four into the educational system and into educational forms. A combination of exogenous factors focussed in the labour market are expressed in the form of credential inflation which 'forces' successive generations of pupils to acquire more education simply in order to maintain their position. At the lower branching points in the educational system this trend is expressed in a rapid expansion of the numbers of working class pupils 'staying-on'. This leads to radical changes in the social composition of the pupil population at those levels. This in turn leads to the development of critical situations which are experienced as crises of control in the classroom. These demand solutions which take the form of transformations of transmission codes - in particular in changes in modalities of control (framing). Hence these trends generate a condition of educational pluralism. There is a proliferation of pedagogies within the critically affected sites. The creating of pluralism necessitates the creation of a range of corresponding educational ideologies. Although the new educational programmes are pragmatically responses to control problems,
they are represented and expressed through theoretical forms and accompanying rhetorics as specific educational paradigms to which their advocates and practitioners are professionally and ideologically committed. I will now turn to a more detailed examination of this condition.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

(1) it is important to acknowledge that the manner in which such responses will be formulated will be shaped by available recontextualising discourses and rhetorics, e.g. those produced by agencies such as the Schools Council or DES. An example of an analysis of an educational crisis in the terms being suggested here can be found in Boudon R. 1980 ch.10.


(4) see Entwistle 1979 on Gramsci and education.


(6) recent information which demonstrates the subtlety of the situation of girls in school is to be found in the ILEA surveys, ILEA R&S 1981/2c.

(7) it is important to note that the changes which occur through time in educational trends involve periodic repositionings of groups vis-a-vis the educational opportunity structure, e.g. relative to examinations or higher levels in the system and that this can have important implications for different groups' perception of their possibilities.

(8) see Lane M. 1972.

(9) what Musgrove leaves out of account is the differential between classes in leaving the Grammar School. As writers such as Bourdieu and Boudon have emphasised, what needs to be explained is why it should be that even when working class children do just as well as middle class ones, they still end up with fewer years of education.
(10) see the summary of Halsey et al. 1980 in ch. 4.

(11) Halsey et al. 1980 ch. 5.

(12) see Boudon R. 1974.

(13) see Flude M. 1974 for a discussion of approaches to differentials in attainment.

(14) it should be remembered (as Bourdieu and Passeron emphasise) that the population of educationally successful working class pupils changes as the educational career progresses as a function of its more rigorous academic selection. It becomes increasingly atypical of the working class as a whole, but also less like the average middle class students (because its mean level of performance will tend to be so much higher).

(15) on a "culturalist perspective" see ch. 8.


(17) see Stewart A. et al 1980.

(18) at the time of writing the ILEA data-set is not available for secondary analysis - it could usefully be related to the GHS education data-set.

(19) see Bourdieu P. 1980.

(20) see Parkin F. 1968 on middle-class radicals.

(21) see Boudon ref. in fn 1 above.

(22) see for instances of educational change as responses to control problems Dawson P. 1981, White and Brockington 1978, and Eggleston J. 1977.

(23) see also the ILEA survey referred to in fn 6 above.

(24) "interpersonal pedagogy" see Bernstein B. 1977.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barker-Lunn J.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Streaming in the Primary School, NFER Windsor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis H.</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Beyond Class Image Croom Helm, London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Inner London Education Authority (1982c) Sex Differences and Achievement RS 823/82 ILEA R&S London


Lane M. (1972) "Explaining Educational Choice" in Sociology vol.6 1972


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rutter M. (1979)</td>
<td>Fifteen Thousand Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Open Books, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools Council (1970)</td>
<td>Sixth Form Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Books for Schools, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smithers A. et al (1974)</td>
<td>&quot;Conceptions of Schooling Among Pupils Affected by the Raising of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the School-Leaving Age&quot; in Educational Research vol.16 No. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart A. et al (1980)</td>
<td>Social Stratification and Occupations,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MacMillan, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapper T. &amp; Salter B. (1978)</td>
<td>Education and the Political Order,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MacMillan, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White R. &amp; Brockington B. (1978)</td>
<td>In and Out of School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Routledge &amp; Kegan Paul, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willis P. (1977)</td>
<td>Learning to Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saxon House, Farnborough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wright N. (1977)</td>
<td>Progress in Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croom Helm, London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION THREE

THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD

Section three will look at various ways in which "the world of work" has been incorporated into the curriculum. It will attempt to substantiate the generative approach by examining particular examples of educational practices in terms of the principles previously outlined. Chapter six will concentrate on the school curriculum and in particular upon social education. The social education philosophy will be interpreted as an attempt to accommodate within the school fifth year a group of pupils whose behaviour is not amenable to traditional forms of discipline and pedagogy. It will be shown how this philosophy can accommodate a number of varying positions occupied by groups with different sets of interests. This discussion will be set against the wider background of various ideologies about the relationship between education and production. Chapter seven will examine the more recent cases of vocational preparation, social and life skills training and the rise of the Manpower Services Commission, YOP and the Youth Training Scheme. The similarities between these educational ideologies and that of social education will be examined, but it will also be argued that the MSC involves a fundamental shift away from the traditional liberal-humanist educational paradigm within which social education was based. The new "technicist-training paradigm" will be contrasted with the liberal-humanist, and reasons for this shift will be discussed.
CHAPTER SIX
SCHOOLING AND THE WORLD OF WORK

In this chapter I will examine a particular set of educational practices in terms of the general analysis presented in the preceding chapter. I have argued, firstly that the relationship between education and production does not directly provide the principle for understanding what happens in education, and secondly that what happens in education is intelligible in terms of conditions internal to the system. Specifically I translated the educational trend data presented in chapter four into effects within education and argued that the decisive feature is the changing social composition of the pupil population. I am now going to look at the topic of "the world of work" as a theme in the school curriculum and attempt to show that it functions primarily in terms of the argument presented above and not in terms of the requirements of industry. That the solution to problems in education should take this specific form is, of course, something which itself needs explaining. The main impetus to this concern within the schools in recent times can be traced back to the Newsom Report (1963) and is now the central focus, though in a new form, of vocational preparation and the programmes developed by the Manpower Services Commission (YOP and the Youth Training Scheme). The rise of the MSC is an event of great significance and its implications will be considered in the next chapter.

The specific proposition to be argued is that the introduction of "the world of work" into the school curriculum is an attempt to make schooling more relevant to pupils rather than education more relevant to industry. The
requirement for 'relevance' is part of the schools' response to the problems posed by a group of pupils who are 'reluctant attenders', forced to remain in school by the forces analysed earlier and, more recently, by the advent of high youth unemployment. A central tenet of this argument is that the young people who are most likely to receive work experience are those least likely to need it and that their problematical position in the school derives from their desire and competence to enter the real "world of work". I will argue that from Newsom until the rise of the MSC and high youth unemployment, "the world of work" was located within a liberal-humanist educational paradigm.

THE WORLD OF WORK

Since the Great Debate on education initiated by James Callaghan's Ruskin College speech (1976) there has been a strong current of criticism of the quality of education in schools. In particular it is often argued that schools do not adequately prepare young people for working life. This is a significant element in the rationale of post-school vocational preparation. However, this type of criticism is by no means new. The history of English education is punctuated by crises of this type (1). In a review of this "recurring debate", Reeder has related the issues to a wider historical framework:

The issues which determine the character of the debate derive in one sense from the ambiguities and tensions within Western educational thought in a society permeated by technological change. Take, for example, the argument for useful knowledge as the basis of the curriculum. This argument has a very long and respectable ancestry. During
the nineteenth century, it was taken over by groups of intellectuals, from the Utilitarians to the Fabians and to the modern philosophers of technocratic society, most of whom supported changes in schooling in order to adapt future generations to the conditions of living and working involved in modern industry. Such views conflicted, however, with ideas about schooling embodied in another tradition of educational thought which rejected, in the main, many features of urban-industrial society. Within that second and more pervasive tradition, schooling was regarded for example as a means of combating the disruptive and dehumanising effects of technology and 'technicism' in modern industry. (Reeder D. 1979 p117)

The basic tension identified by Reeder is fundamental and underlies debates at all levels of the educational system. It can be related to Tapper and Salter's discussion of "elite conflicts" in higher education for instance (2).

Reeder makes the important point that education and industry developed as largely independent and autonomous systems. The weak nature of the systemic link between the two was examined empirically in chapter four. It is a central factor in Bernstein's analysis, and he has pointed to the fact that the major principles of the educational system were established well before the emergence of industrial capitalism (3). Reeder also poses this issue in a form which can be traced through the arguments which will be considered in this chapter.

One of the most fundamental issues is that of conflicting priorities, between education's role as a critical force, monitoring social and economic developments, and education's role as an adaptive force, matching these developments. (ibid p145)

This conflict reflects the fact that education is primarily about knowledge and hence, intrinsically a potentially critical force. The conflict between the critical and adaptive roles of education will be shown to be reflected in the distinction
between social education and social and life skills training.

The major criticism of schooling in recent times is that it is too far removed from the needs and interests of everyday life. In the section of the Newsom Report entitled "Going Out Into The World" reference is made to work experience:

We have had a number of examples, all quite separately sponsored, brought to our notice, of schemes in which schools, the youth employment service and groups of firms have co-operated in various ways. Girls have made extended visits to shops or offices, intensively for a fortnight or in a series of half-day visits spread over a term. Boys have attended factories on Saturday mornings. In a scheme organised through a Rotary Club, pupils of sixteen and seventeen have spent a week with firms, covering eleven different types of occupations between them. Another school is at present engaged in arranging for small groups of pupils to pay extended observation visits to particular firms, and in one case to participate in some of the activities of the training school there.

(Newsom 1963 p75 para 223)

This comment indicates the essentially ad hoc nature of work experience in English schools at the time (4). It is, perhaps, significant that Newsom also reports that the committee did not actually see any of these schemes in operation. He adds: "We record them, nevertheless, as examples of efforts by the schools to inject an element of realism in the content of the final year's course." (ibid p76 para 225).

The Newsom Report also points to another feature which is a recurring issue in this area: the fact that teachers have little experience of the working worlds of the majority of their pupils. "A major problem is how to ensure that the teachers themselves... really understand the work situation as
their pupils will meet it." (ibid p78 para 237). Work experience for teachers is as much a necessity as work experience for pupils.

Despite the somewhat desultory treatment of work experience in Newsom, the Report is nevertheless usually taken as the starting point for the development of such schemes by the schools. Richards reports (5) that by the beginning of the seventies only between two and four per cent of pupils actually took part in work experience and that by the then current DES criteria many so-called schemes prior to the 1973 Education (Work Experience) Act would not have counted as such in any case. In the Newsom period, the introduction of "the world of work" into the school curriculum is associated with attempts to make the last years of schooling seem more relevant to pupils - "an element of realism". It is important to keep in mind that "the world of work" can mean different things:

1. teaching about industry so that pupils know how the economy works.
2. teaching for industry in order to provide specific technical skills.
3. preparing for work by providing "social and life skills". The advocacy of these different approaches varies through time and provides competing, and often conflicting, aims for different groups.

A broad distinction can also be made between the idea that "the world of work" makes education more relevant to the needs of pupils and the idea that it makes education more relevant to the needs of industry. The latter, usually emanating from industry itself or from manpower planners, can provide a rhetoric within which the former can be developed within a set of concerns characteristic of teachers. Rhetorics of this type can provide an
illusion of unanimity of aims, but what is important to see is that there
is in fact no direct transmission process from the State, through edu-
cational policy makers, to the pragmatics of classroom teaching. From
Newsom, through ROSLA and until the rise of the Manpower Services
Commission, the "world of work" was in fact located within an educationa-
list paradigm. For instance, the Newsom Report says that,

An education which is practical, realistic and vocational
in the sense in which we have used these words, and which
provides some ground in which to exercise choice, is an
education which makes sense to the boys and girls we have
in mind... But if their education could be completely described
in these words it would be sadly lacking. An education that
makes sense must provide opportunity for personal fulfilment
- for the good life as well as for good living.
( ibid p117 para 328)

The contrast between "the good life" and a "good living" reflects the
broad liberal humanist approach which orientates the Newsom Report to its
subject. It embodies that fundamental tension identified by Reed. The
expressive moralism of the former notion implies a contrast with the prag-
matic instrumentalism of the latter. We shall see later a similar dicho-
tomy from the employers, but with the opposite emphasis.

The liberal-humanist paradigm in which Newsom is grounded
unites, at its most general level, both traditional elitist and egalitarian
progressive wings of the educationalist tradition. Both, in their different
ways, see education as essentially concerned with the cultivation of an idealised
subject. Newsom posed the problem in this way as far as his own concerns in
the Report were concerned:

How is it possible to devise for pupils of only moderate,
and in some cases very limited, skills, a content of
education which exercises their minds and emotions and feeds their imagination? What kinds of experience will help them to develop their full capacities for thought and taste and feeling?
(ibid p27 para 77)

These sentiments will be immediately recognisable to any teacher trained in our colleges of education - they express precisely what most of us would like to think our work is all about. The contrast with the newly emerging technicist-training paradigm associated with the MSC is stark. A striking feature of the rhetoric of the Newsom report is the manner in which its advocacy of practicality and relevance is continually linked with higher aims.

For example:

Discussion should be used to develop judgement and discrimination. This may apply to enjoyment in music or art or literature; to taste and craftsmanship in the workshop; to a sense of what is appropriate behaviour in a particular situation, which will generally involve some consideration of other people's feelings and points of view; or to an appreciation of what is relevant to the immediate task in hand. It does not follow, because the actual tasks undertaken may be relatively simple, that the pupils cannot be guided into thinking about them critically. They badly need this general strengthening of critical powers.
(ibid pp29-30 para 87)

It is precisely this relationship between practicality and critical thought which is now under attack.

THE EMPLOYERS' VIEW

The dissatisfaction expressed by employers about the quality of young recruits to industry has been a major factor in the justification for a radical reorientation of educational practices. The evidence reviewed in chapter four strongly suggests that the idea that education can make a major
contribution to economic efficiency is mistaken. It is, then the case that the employers are mistaken in their view, or should we be as sceptical about the received image of the employers' attitude as we should be about the orthodox and radical claims concerning the school/work relationship?

In general the employers criticise the schools for failing to supply the types of manpower they feel that modern industry requires. Their objections were summarised in the Labour Government's Green Paper which was formulated against the background of the Great Debate:

It was said that the school system is geared to promote the importance of academic learning and careers with the result that pupils, especially the more able, are prejudiced against work in productive industry and trade; that teachers lack experience, knowledge and understanding of trade and industry; that curricula are not related to the realities of most pupils' work after leaving school; and that pupils leave school with little or no understanding of the workings, or importance, of the wealth producing sector of our economy. (GP 1977 p34)

The London Chamber of Commerce sent a Memorandum on the Great Debate to the DES in which it expressed views in line with those above. A major difference existed between the employers and the Secretaries of State over the question of standards. The Green Paper rejected the view that standards had declined. But the Memorandum reported that the situation in London was so bad that many firms believed that they would have to leave the area because of, "The lack of numeracy and the low standard of education in school leavers." (Education and Training, May 1977 p156). Wright's extremely thorough study (6) of the evidence on this issue seems to suggest that the
employers are, at least in general terms, mistaken in this (this does not preclude the possibility that certain sectors will be experiencing problems as a result of changing patterns of recruitment). However, the character of the education received might be as significant as the standard. This Memorandum says that, "Whilst appreciating the magnificent conceptual aspects of the modern mathematics syllabuses, the businessman has considerable difficulty in persuading many school-leavers of the need for ordinary arithmetical accuracy." (ibid)

The employers' view is that education is too far removed from the everyday pragmatic needs of working life. The extension of educational provision has taken place within an educationalist paradigm which excludes more mundane concerns. The basic difference between the educationalist and the industrialist's view is succinctly summarised in the Memorandum's statement that "Education for living is by no means a bad slogan; but if the living is to be provided then we shall need to have education for making that living." (ibid).

(Compare with Newsom's "good life" and "good living" above ). In practical terms this distinction is reflected in what is seen as the promotion of "fringe subjects" and trendy experiments at the expense of the 3Rs. The Green Paper shares this concern with "the building blocks of education". Ironically it was precisely Newsom's concern with curriculum reform for relevance which ushered in the new progressivism in teaching methods.

The employers feel that the educational world is actively hostile to industry and commercial values: "Many employers maintain that schools and colleges are biased against industry and commerce, and appear to discourage
students from seeking employment in those fields." (ibid). It is particularly the more able students who are seen as being subjected to this antipathy. This view is shared to some extent by the Green Paper. It is interesting to note that the implication of this criticism is not that employers want these pupils to receive a different type of education, but rather they simply want them to bring the traditional one into industry. The employers' criticisms reflect a conflict of views about the role of education and which groups in society it should be responsible and accountable to. The changes which they advocate are aimed primarily at restricting the freedom and autonomy of teachers, and their ability to develop their activities purely according to educationalist criteria. This is reflected in their view of who is to blame for education's failings: "Some Chamber members who have served for many years on a variety of committees concerned with schools and education are concerned at the overwhelming influence which vociferous academics have on such committees." (ibid). By establishing direct links between schools and industry, it is hoped that these people can be by-passed.

The employers have quite clear recommendations for reform. They want direct links with schools and representatives on governing bodies who would be involved with curriculum planning. Children should be made more involved with industry through better careers guidance and vocational preparation, and through work experience schemes. There should be more standardisation of teaching methods and content and more central control over what goes on in the classroom. There is a good measure of agreement on this in the Green Paper and even more so from the present Conservative government.
On the question of the type of education that pupils should receive, their view is, however, more ambiguous. This reflects the fact that the relationship between educationally developed skills and job requirements is less than clear. The Memorandum concedes that, "many schools complain that they find difficulty in communicating with industrial and commercial organisations, they find it difficult to ascertain employers' needs, and that employers constantly change their criteria." (ibid). The Green Paper observed that, "employers often lay down unrealistic standards of attainment for school leavers well beyond what the job requires." (Green Paper p34). This situation is interesting given the certainty that employers feel that schools are failing them. The London Chamber of Commerce calls for detailed research into "the actual abilities and skills which are needed in the early days of industrial and commercial work." The confusion on this issue is understandable in terms of the material discussed in chapter four. Husen concludes a review of evidence on this issue with the statement that, "there is not much direct evidence as to the functional skills that constitute actual job competence or the extent to which the school has been successful either in providing them or in laying the ground for their acquisition on the job." (Husen T. 1975 p48). Significantly the MSC has initiated a major research programme in this area using the concept of generic skills families (7).

The ambiguities that appear when employers' views are studied in detail are magnified when their attitudes to young workers themselves are considered. I have argued elsewhere that the data on employers' attitudes
should be treated with some caution. A central argument in the Holland Report was that employers in general have a very low opinion of young people and tables were presented as demonstrating this fact. I have suggested that a more detailed examination of that data does not bear this out. The following table is derived from the Holland Report.

**TABLE 6:1 Employers' evaluations of young workers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employers' Ranking of Essential Attributes for 'Other Manual'</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% saying that young people are:</th>
<th>rating (b-w)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no dif. /</td>
<td>are better worse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>non. comp.</td>
<td>dif.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 willingness/attitude to work</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>46  54  11  43</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 good level of general physical fitness</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70  30  24  6</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 appearance/tidiness</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>60  40  6  34</td>
<td>-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 specific physical attributes</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72  28  22  6</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 basic 3Rs</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46  54  10  44</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 mature/stable</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40  60  5  55</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 ability to communicate well verbally</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53  47  11  36</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 willingness to join union</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>89  11  8  3</td>
<td>+ 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 good level of numeracy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50  50  8  42</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 past experience</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39  61  2  59</td>
<td>-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 good written Eng/literature</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40  60  9  51</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 existing union membership</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>85  15  4  11</td>
<td>- 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 specific educational qualifications</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>49  51  28  23</td>
<td>+ 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(constructed from "Young People and Work" HMSO 1978 tables 7.1 & 7.2)
* "other manual" is unskilled & semi-skilled
(from Moore, R. 1983)
In the original presentation of this data in the Holland Report, in two different tables, the discussion of employers' attitudes to young people is based mainly on the rating that is produced by subtracting the numbers of employers who think that young people are worse than older workers from those who think that they are better. On this basis young people come out very badly, getting negative ratings on nine out of the thirteen attributes. But inspection of the tables shows that there are in fact three employers' positions: those who say they are either no different or are non-comparable, those who say they are better, and those who say they are worse on each attribute. The rating is calculated from the fraction of employer who believe that they are different from older workers on a comparable basis. It is a simple arithmetical exercise to reconstitute the original data. When this is done (as in table 6:1) we see a rather different picture. In fact young people come out worse in view of the majority of employers who think they are different on only three counts out of thirteen: past experience (59% - ranked tenth in importance), mature/stable (55% - ranked sixth in importance), and good written English/literate (51% - ranked eleventh in importance). All these percentages are only of those proportions of employers who thought that young people are different in these areas, i.e. 61%, 60% and 60% respectively.

Ironically the attribute on which young people do best, "specific educational qualifications" (better 28% (of 51%)) actually comes bottom of the employers' list of essential attributes for this group of workers, being mentioned by only 2%! Indeed, all the specifically educational attributes are given a low
priority: "basic 3Rs" ranked fifth (21%), "good level of numeracy" ranked ninth (13%), "good written English/literate" ranked eleventh (6%) and "specific educational qualifications" ranked last (2%). Young workers are judged to be worse on these attributes by 24%, 21%, 31% and 12% of employers respectively.

If we can take the attribute which is far away the most important from the employers' point of view, "willingness/attitude to work" mentioned by 81% of the sample, we find that the rating of -32 reflects a negative evaluation of young workers by only 23% of employers (54% said that they are different and of those 43% said they are worse). This in fact indicates the exact opposite of the Holland argument - that employers tend to be reasonably satisfied with young people. This is also the conclusion of Ashton et al:

Despite the many grumbles and adverse comments, 70 per cent of all employers interviewed claimed to have been satisfied with the standard of work of young people taken on by them during the previous two years, and only 14 per cent expressed dissatisfaction. Indeed, of the respondents in the 60 establishments employing over 5000 workers, all but one expressed satisfaction. (Ashton D. et al op cit p56)

The probable significance of this is that it is wrong to generalise about employers and young workers. Clearly many employers are dissatisfied with young recruits and can point to declining standards in certain areas but this is most likely to be a reflection of changing patterns of recruitment in specific sectors. For instance, the very improvement in educational attainment and the expansion of opportunities in FE and higher education can lead to
certain categories of young people furthering their education rather than going into work and their places in the labour market being taken up by young people of lower general performance than used to be the case. If the employers in these sectors (e.g. engineering) tend to be particularly 'vociferous' then their particular point of view could be widely broadcasted and taken as the norm rather than an exceptional (or particular) case - especially if it is a point of view which serves some wider political interest (e.g. in the context of the Black Papers' argument).

A more detailed investigation of engineering employers in Coventry provides information specifically relevant to work experience. Richards asked employers about the factors they took into account when recruiting apprentices. His findings were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>% of firms taking 1-7 into account when recruiting apprentices (no. firms = 107)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Work experience at school</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Holiday jobs</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Saturday jobs</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Paper rounds</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Evening classes</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Membership of clubs and social societies</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Hobbies/Interests</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Richards G. 1982 p7, table B)
The poor showing of work experience is striking. The reasons for this are illuminating. The contrast between work experience and spare/part-time jobs lies in the fact that the latter are taken as evidence of initiative, an interest in earning money and of the ability to sustain the discipline necessary to get up and go to work regularly. Paper-rounds in particular were seen by employers as showing that the young person can get up early in the morning and do a job without supervision. Work experience, on the other hand, is seen as part of schooling and its compulsion and discipline.

Richards says that:

The features that impressed these employers about the spare/part-time jobs of young people applying for apprenticeship in their firms were mainly elements which were absent in W.E. schemes. W.E. schemes did not involve the 'initiative' involved in going out and finding your own part-time job. This was all done by the school following DES and LEA guidelines. The element of 'reliability' (getting up early consistently for a substantial period of time etc.) was also absent. (Richards 1982 p9)

Where employers did see value in work experience it was in terms of information about career choices. Pupils would be able to find out directly about engineering and if they then still chose to go into engineering work this could be taken as evidence of commitment. The relationship between knowledge about the work and commitment to it is a crucial element in the employers' view.

Richards found amongst his sample a major preoccupation with the image of engineering. Employers were very concerned that young people, and especially the bright ones, should have a positive image of the
industry and, therefore, be attracted to it. This was the value they saw in work experience. It was not seen as something which in itself could prepare young people for the work as such. The important conclusion reached by Richards is:

According to these employers it was teachers who needed W. E. more than pupils, so that they could get a picture of what engineering was really like (as opposed to media misrepresentations - strikes, redundancies etc.) and so put across a 'good image' of engineering, hopefully attracting more of the 'brighter pupils' into the industry.

This approach is commensurate with the views discussed earlier.

As far as the actual content of education was concerned the employers seem simply to want a solid 'old fashioned' schooling in the basics and, above all else, that the 'bright pupils' are actually encouraged to seek jobs in manufacturing industry rather than in the academic world or public services. The major problem is seen to be the fact that the ignorance and hostility of teachers deflects these bright, traditionally educated, young people away from industry. It is not direct preparation for work which the schools should be providing, on this account, but a good image of industry. This has an extremely important implication as far as "the world of work", work experience and its traditional target group of pupils is concerned - it is aimed at the wrong pupils. Richards says:

Some writers went on to argue that attracting high ability youngsters into manufacturing industry was one of the conditions for a regeneration of the British economy. Employers making these connections between the 'ignorance' of 'our brightest children', W. E. the entry of these youngsters into manufacturing industry and the rejuvenation of
British capitalism were clearly not interested in the notion that W. E. was essentially concerned with ROSLA or the 'average and below average ability ranges'.
(ibid pl.6, my emphasis)

We can say that the problem was not so much that pupils were seen as getting the wrong education as that industry was getting the wrong pupils!
The implications of all this for "the world of work" in the school curriculum and for vocational preparation under the auspices of the MSC today are immense.

Richards argues that what is likely to emerge is a dual system of work-experience - "image building" for the high-fliers and "realism" for the rest. In the case of the former group, a traditional education is seen as appropriate and worthwhile. For them what is needed is an inducement to enter careers in industry. The case of the latter group, however, is more complex. A number of points need to be made in relation to these pupils as a background to the next section.

(1) as the above discussion and the information on employers' recruitment strategies in Ashton et al indicates, employers are not particularly concerned about their educational standards anyway.

(2) this in large part reflects the fact that the skill levels in the sector of the labour market to which they are recruited are of a low order and 'training' is hardly an appropriate concept to apply. This is born out by Blackburn and Mann's study of the unskilled and semi-skilled labour market in Peterborough (8) for instance, and is explicitly acknowledged by the Further Education Unit (a fact which, as we shall see later, has considerable implications for vocational preparation).
(3) most significantly, pupils of this type tend to acquire a large degree of work experience in part and spare-time work whilst still at school. Recent research by Finn (9), for example, shows that not only are non-academic pupils more likely to have work experience of this type, but they are also likely to have had more such jobs than academic pupils. Richard's work shows how highly employers favour this type of experience. Clarke, in a review of research on the transition from school to work, says that an overview of the literature supports the idea that "the majority of early leavers adjust fairly painlessly to working life." (Clarke L. 1980a p10). She concludes a section on youngsters 'at risk' in the transitional period with the statement that,

This suggests, rather unpalatably, that apart from bright children who do well at both school and work, it is those children who are apathetic about, or even alienated from, school who adjust best to work. (ibid p11)

THE GREEN PAPER AND THE GREAT DEBATE

The Great Debate on education initiated by James Callaghan's Ruskin College speech (1976) had two major, related areas of concern: standards and behaviour in the schools, and the supply of skilled manpower (sic), especially of scientists, technologists and engineers. The Green Paper of 1977 summarised the complaints that were being made about the schools:

Children's standards of performance in their school work were said to have declined. The curriculum, it was argued, paid too little attention to the basic skills of reading, writing
and arithmetic, and was overloaded with fringe subjects. Teachers lacked adequate professional skills, and did not know how to discipline children or to instil in them concern for hard work or good manners. Underlying all this was the feeling that the educational system was out of touch with the fundamental need for Britain to survive economically in a highly competitive world through the efficiency of its industry and commerce.

(GP 1977 p2)

Whilst the Secretaries of State rejected the view that educational standards had declined, they did agree that schools were failing to meet the requirements of industry.

The Green Paper sets the crisis in the educational system in the seventies against a background of complex changes in British society to which education has had to adapt.

Britain has ceased to be the centre of an Empire, and has become instead a medium-sized European power, albeit one with wide international connections and responsibilities. The country's economic well being depends upon its own efforts and its standard of living is directly related to its ability to sell goods and services overseas. At home, our society has changed substantially; because of the large-scale movement of people within Britain, for instance to New Towns and expanded towns; and also of people into Britain, many from the New Commonwealth. Ours is now a multi-racial and multicultural country, and one in which traditional social patterns are breaking down.

(ibid p4)

The educational system, it is argued, has coped well with the social changes but has failed to respond to the new needs of the economy: "...only a minority of schools convey adequately to their pupils the fact that ours is an industrial society - a mixed economy; that we depend upon industry to create the wealth without which our social services, our education and arts cannot flourish; and that industry offers scope for the imagination and even the idealism of young
people." (ibid) The pre-monetarist tone of this social-democratic tract is striking.

Although it is tempting to see the GP in terms of manpower planning, its fundamental concerns are socio-political rather than economic. It has little to say about the provision of specific skills. Its real theme is teaching about the world of work, and this is something much broader than simply teaching for it. It is a way of teaching about (and for) the social order, of promoting a particular vision of "our society". This vision is the social-democratic model of the new, modern Britain - a vision more clearly displayed today with the SDP than when Shirley Williams was preparing her Green Paper.

The GP includes amongst its list of aims for schools: "to help children to appreciate how the nation earns and maintains its standard of living and properly to esteem the essential role of industry and commerce in this process (ibid p7, my emphasis). The issue of "esteem" can be related to the hostility towards industry that employers report coming from teachers. But there is a difference between the employers' view and that of the GP. The type of society signified by "the world of work" when teaching about industry is not the same. In the GP industry should be esteemed for its part in creating the wealth which makes possible the range of provisions quoted above: "our social services, our education and arts." The GP's vision is of a society dedicated to social welfare and collective, cultural enrichment rather than to privatised consumption and leisure. It is a society based on welfarism, not consumerism. Within this vision, teaching about the world of work, making education more relevant to industry, involves a particular
view of the role of industry in a particular type of society and of the
claims which that society can make upon the wealth that industry creates.
These claims are not (and certainly were not) ones that industry itself
would welcome.

The GP is concerned not so much with the technical aspects of
manpower planning as with defining the role of industry within its particular
vision of the good society. "The world of work" signifies this vision of
"our society" - the new, modern Britain. It attempts to construct a common
view of "our nation". The world of work in its inter-relationships with the
wider social order provides the infra-structure of that ideal. The role of
industry and the reason why industry should be esteemed must be understood
in terms of that wider vision. Teaching about the world of work is not a
technicist exercise, it is not directed towards the technical requirements of
the division of labour but towards promoting a common vision which integrates
the citizen within a shared purpose and community. The reason for labour in
the new, modern Britain is to participate in and contribute to the good society
of social democracy.

Young people need to reach maturity with a basic understanding
of the economy and the activities, especially manufacturing in-
dustry, which are necessary for the creation of Britain's national
wealth. It is an important task of secondary schools to develop
this understanding, and opportunities for its development should
be offered to pupils of all abilities. These opportunities are needed
not only by young people who may have careers in industry later
but perhaps even more by those who may work elsewhere, so that
the role of industry becomes soundly appreciated by society in
general.

(ibid p35, my emphases)

The sense of communality is invoked not only directly by the phrase "society
in general", but indirectly by "Britain's national wealth" with its implication that wealth is a common possession. Similarly with the reference elsewhere to the economy: "ours is an industrial society - a mixed economy". "Mixed economy" in conjunction with "ours" suggesting partnership in industry, etc.

The essence of the GP's vision is a society without inner conflicts and divisions. The aspects of social change denoted by the phrases "technological change", "multiracial", "multicultural", "the disappearance of the old stereotypes of the sexes" are associated with "challenge", "idealism" and "imagination" rather than with the frustrations, tensions and conflicts they actually entail. The role of the schools is to forge that communality by promulgating the ideal community of the GP's inner vision. If at the level of its programme, as set out in its recommendations, the GP seems to be in line with the views of employers and manpower planners, at this deeper level it fundamentally parts company with them. The GP's concept of making education more relevant to industry must be explicited in terms of its view of the relevance of industry to society. It must be seen in terms of its ideal of the good society and of the social good. It is this rather than the technicism of manpower planning that organises its discourse.

At its deepest level the GP resonates with the values of the major traditionalist and progressive educational paradigms. The role of education is related not simply to the development of skills, but to the cultivation of an idealised subject. The world of work is not merely to do with labour and its fruits are not merely consumer goods. It signifies "challenge", "idealism" and "imagination" and it creates "social services", "arts" and,
indeed, "education". The GP's rhetoric generates a sympathetic framework within which teaching about the world of work can be assimilated to the familiar ideals of the educational ideologies. Within that rhetoric education can be found reconstituted as an expressive rather than an instrumental process - something very different from the utilitarianism of manpower planning. If at the level of its programme the GP appears to be acceding to technicist instrumentalism, within its rhetoric it preserves a space for education as traditionally conceived within the educationalist's view.

WORK EXPERIENCE

The GP's main strategy for making schooling more relevant to the needs of industry - teaching about the world of work - involves teaching about what industry does. The world of work is a concept which gains its particular significance from the wider vision of society in which it is contextualised. In educational terms the GP provides a rhetoric and a framework within which schools can formulate programmes for teaching about the world of work. The need for such a framework in the school situation arises from the fact that teachers themselves tend to have little direct knowledge or experience of "the world of work". One of the employers' main complaints about schools is the distance between education and ordinary working life. Teachers are seen as being not only ignorant about industry but hostile to it. A number of projects have attempted to close this gap by providing teachers with opportunities to gain 'work experience'. The Newsom
Report provided the impetus for a joint CBI/Schools Council project in the middle sixties. The CBI chairman at the time said,

When we were assembling our evidence to the Newsom Committee, it became clear that there was a general feeling amongst employers that children in their final year at school would benefit from teaching more closely related to the kind of life they would lead after leaving school.
(Schools Council 1966)

The Report on the project describes the problem that this idea encountered in the schools:

...many secondary school teachers felt they neither knew nor understood the industrial and commercial environments in which most of their pupils would eventually have to work.
(ibid p2)

The Report goes on to outline the position of employers - it is essentially the same as that expressed over ten years later in the Great Debate and, indeed, as that encountered today.

There is indeed too great a gap between schools and industry....teachers have no conception of the working of commercial and industrial life; even in their private lives, teachers tend to associate with other teachers and this further lessens their chance of contact with the 'outside' world. There is even, perhaps, an inbuilt antipathy towards industry and commerce in our educational life.
(ibid p13)

Reading the other criticisms and the demands that employers put forward in the Report shows that contemporary complaints echo familiar propositions.

Work experience schemes are one of the most obvious ways in which the world of work can be introduced into the school curriculum, and they were enthusiastically backed by the employers and the GP. But clearly the teachers' lack of experience is a problem. The major impetus behind such schemes was
provided by the Newsom Report and the raising of the school leaving age to sixteen. Newsom contains the features which have remained until recently the major characteristics of work experience schemes in schools. The Report says that,

...in the examples brought to our notice the experience has been designed as part of a wider educational programme of general preparation for school leavers rather than as an introduction to any specific field of future employment.
(Newsom 1966 p75)

And:

Most projects of this sort could only be carried out by a few pupils at a time, but related to a larger programme they might encourage the pupils to see some relevance in their school work to the interests and work of the adult world.
(ibid p76)

The distinction between "a wider educational programme" and "an introduction to any specific field of future employment" is important. It is crucial for retaining a specifically educational definition of work experience, and remains to the fore in all the pre-MSC accounts of the activity.

The Newsom view incorporates from the very beginning the idea that work experience might help schooling seem more relevant to pupils. This is a significantly different emphasis from the view that it is a means of making education more relevant to industry. These two things are not necessarily incompatible, but given that teachers are largely unqualified to prepare pupils for work and the insistence that such schemes form part of a wider educational programme, then teaching about the world of work can come
to mean something very different. There is a significant difference between teaching for the world of work and in so doing making education more relevant to the needs of industry and making it more relevant to the needs of pupils by teaching about the world of work. Whereas the former can be located within a manpower planning approach the latter can be assimilated to the anti-utilitarianism of the educational paradigms, and this can be accommodated within the rhetoric of the GP.

The important question is: to which pupils will work experience make schooling seem more relevant? DES Circular 7/74 on work experience states that it "should have value for pupils of varying ability and aptitude and should neither be designed as vocational training nor aimed at a limited range of pupils only." It was this Circular which spelt out the principles for organising work experience in the schools.

The principle which should underlie any work experience scheme is that pupils should be given an insight into the world of work, its disciplines and relationships. This principle and the requirements of the Act that schemes for pupils of compulsory school age must form part of an educational programme would not be satisfied by arrangements made whether in school or elsewhere whose purpose was specifically or mainly to assess individuals for particular forms of employment, or to occupy pupils in producing articles for sale. Schemes should provide provision within the school curriculum for preparation before the pupils take part in work experience and for following up and discussing the experience gained.

These principles were adopted wholesale by the Inner London Education Authority in its guideline for teachers on work experience schemes. The idea that work experience should be available to all pupils departs from the Newsom position and that of the Schools Council/CBI project discussed above. The latter's Report, for instance, relates the introduction to industry scheme for teachers
to Newsom in the following way: "The Newsom Report emphasises the value of increasing the obvious relevance to adult life of the school studies of pupils of average and below average ability." (op cit p2, my emphasis). It is this position rather than the DES view that worked out in practice. Work experience schemes, and the wider educational programmes in which they were located, tended to be directed towards a particular category of pupils. These pupils were (and in the new YOP and Super YOP successors still are) in the main those destined for a particular sector of the labour market, and it is that sector that tends to provide the work experience opportunities.

The ILEA Guideline says that,

Obviously school pupils cannot be given experience of work calling for a high level of skill or anything more than a very short period of training. For pupils of less than average ability this usually means that they have opportunities to work in shops, on simple assembly work in factories where they can be given tasks requiring limited skills...

(ILEA GL p3)

The limitations of the types of 'opportunities' which can be made available are reinforced by others working in the schools. The amount of time that has to be spent on work experience is relatively large. Circular 7/74 stresses that a variety of experiences should be offered to pupils and that "it would be undesirable if the time spent in any place of work were so short as to give only a superficial impression." The ILEA recommended one full day per week or two weeks per term. In addition there is the time spent in the classroom in preparation and follow-up work. As ILEA's careers inspector, Catherine Avent pointed out this amount of time excludes pupils
following examination courses. She says, "it is unlikely that enough employers could be found to provide work experience for all fifth years even if those sitting public examinations were excluded on the grounds that they had not time to spend on these extra-mural activities."

The Guideline makes an interesting distinction between "large-scale work experience for fifth form pupils, mainly those not sitting for public examinations", and "work appreciation" for sixth formers. Work appreciation is described in this way:

...work appreciation... has been successfully undertaken by science sixth-formers, for example, who have already acquired certain techniques which they can immediately use in a laboratory, or girls from commercial courses whose typing skills can be utilised in an office; just as some girls spend part of the end of the summer term in junior schools before embarking upon a course in a college of education. In the case of these older pupils, the scheme is primarily designed to help them see the occupational applications of skills and interests acquired in school. It is also helpful in motivating some of them to continue their education and in helping them to distinguish between a variety of milieux in which to seek employment when they have completed their education and training.

(ILEA GL p3)

Apart from its quite remarkable gender stereotyping, this account gives an interesting insight into perceived differences between categories of pupils. Work appreciation is seen in terms of occupational choice and decision making. These pupils are seen as having a range of options open to them, including continuing their education. Pupils on work experience on the other hand, are in an essentially closed situation. Whereas work appreciation might be "helpful in motivating some of them to continue their education", work experience can "induce a welcome realism in the minds of youngsters with fantasy ideas about
the level of career they can aspire to" (ibid p4). There is a suggestion that the two groups are distinguished only by age ("in the case of this older pupils"). In reality they are quite different sets of pupils - those on work experience will never become "these older pupils".

It is interesting to note that a similar distinction exists in relation to community education. In the case of academically able pupils community work is usually approached through a "service to" philosophy. The pupils 'serve' the community by using their social and academic accomplishments to aid the elderly, the handicapped etc. Non-academic pupils on the other hand are usually seen as being involved in a therapeutic exercise which does them good (developing 'character', 'self-confidence', 'social and life skills' etc.) as well as those they help. This also tends to be incorporated within a 'wider educational programme' in which teachers and supervisors observe and evaluate pupils performance. We see here another example of the wide-spread tendency to associate social competence with academic attainment.

These wider educational programmes are essentially interpretive frameworks within which teachers can provide accounts for pupils of their work experience. Lacking detailed personal experience of production, teachers can only draw upon their background assumptions about the world of work. These will reflect their own social backgrounds and the views and values they have internalised during their professional careers. Their accounts will, therefore, be some distance removed from the experiences, expectations and interpretations of the pupils. Neither, the evidence suggests,
will they correspond too closely with those of the employers. The idea that education must be made relevant to the needs of industry implies expertise on the part of teachers. The type of vision of the world of work in the GP will make more sense to teachers than the pragmatisms of either pupils or employers. Teachers should be in a position to determine what the needs of pupils and industry are, but it is precisely this knowledge which they lack. The dismal history of manpower forecasting suggests that no-one really knows what industry needs and the relative isolation of teachers from the world of work as well as from the worlds of their pupils suggests that they are in no position to know what their needs are.

PUPILS' KNOWLEDGE AND SCHOOLS' AUTHORITY

The factor that is continually left out of account is that pupils do have knowledge of the world of work. They are members of working communities and they are brought up to work. They gain indirect knowledge through parents, relations and friends and direct knowledge from out-of-school jobs (10). But more than this - the world of work is the experiential core of class culture. It is the everyday world of the pupil. Its introduction into the school curriculum can have the effect of reversing the normal relationship between teacher and pupil. Work experience introduces a field of knowledge in which the pupils' authority may be superior to the teachers'. Teachers can be doubly disadvantaged through knowing neither the specificities of the skills required by industry nor the ethnography of the working worlds of their pupils.

The Schools Council/CBI Report contains a significant passage which
reflects this situation:

Some teachers, who met former pupils of their own in the firms to which they were seconded, were surprised to see how purposefully young people who had been difficult at school went about their work. Among the possible reasons for the change was the difference in atmosphere. Although by no means all the school leavers seen at work were contented, many of them had responded positively to a situation they found easier to understand than that which confounded them at school, where they had been at odds with their teachers.

This difference between the pupils' difficult behaviour at school and their apparently successful adjustment to work is reflected in research in this area. Roberts has drawn attention to the fact that,

In Britain enquiry after enquiry over the last twenty-five years has reported school-leavers ill-prepared for their entry into employment, drifting into the labour market armed with little job knowledge and uncertain as to their objectives.... However, successive studies of young people in employment have concurrently been reporting a state of scarcely relieved satisfaction and vocational adjustment. Although typically vague, British school leavers' ambitions have been notably realistic, and no matter what their level of employment, the majority of young workers have been found content with their attainments, satisfied with their jobs and little inclined to seek new opportunities.

This view is confirmed by the review of research in the area which has been undertaken by Linda Clarke. Interestingly Clarke reports that it seems to be those pupils most alienated from school who adjust best to being at work.

I would argue that both orthodox and radical approaches have grossly overestimated the extent to which schools act as agencies of occupational socialisation. The reason why some pupils are difficult at school, and why they see schooling as irrelevant to their needs is because it
irrelevant given their needs. These are pupils who feel themselves ready for labour and who need to take up work in order to affirm and fulfil their wider social aspirations and roles. The role of pupil is incompatible with their developing sense of self and status. Children develop their occupational aspirations and, by extension, their sense of self identity and group membership within a network of relationships that exist outside the school. It is within these networks that they acquire the knowledge and social skills required to function as competent members of occupational groups.

Willis has shown how for working class boys who want to take up manual labour and who reject schooling, the continuity between school and work is at the level of their informal culture:

Although the teacher's notion of the continuity between school and work is rejected by 'the lads', another kind of continuity is profoundly important to them. In terms of actual job choice it is 'the lads' culture and not the official careers material which provides the most influential guide for the future. For the individual's affiliation with the non-conformist group carries with it a whole range of changes in his attitudes and perspectives, and these changes also supply over time a more or less consistent view of the sort of people he wants to end up working with, and what sort of situation is going to allow the fullest expression of his developing cultural skills. We have seen that shop-floor culture is importantly borne back to 'the lads' in many ways - not least in the working class home via parents. (Willis P. 1977 p95)

The key to understanding the rejection of schooling by pupils such as 'the lads' is in their evaluation of the significance and relevance of school knowledge in terms of their own view of things. Within that view school not only contributes little or nothing to the acquisition of the skills they need; it is also wrong in its account of how things are. These pupils know that the world of work is not as the
teachers describe it. Given this position and its inherent dissonance, the behaviour of such people is powerfully affected by the demands that schooling makes upon them, and especially by the compulsion to remain within the system by forces acting in the labour market.

The pupils' view of things carries with it its own criteria of relevance. They evaluate formal accounts of the world of work in terms of these criteria. Willis' 'Lads', for example, have this to say about the career teacher's account of the world of work and job finding:

Fuzz: He's always on about if you go for a job, you've got to do this, you've got to do that. I've done it. You don't have to do none of that. Just go to a place, ask for the man in charge, nothing like what he says.

Joey: It's ridiculous. (11)

Schools' demand the allegiance and compliance of pupils on the grounds of the validity and efficacy of their formal accounts of the way things are. It is on these grounds that they can claim that pupils need them. Where pupils can discount these formal accounts on the basis of their own knowledge and experience they effectively abolish the grounds for compliance with school authority. The behaviour of such pupils is intelligible in terms of their evaluation of school knowledge and its relationship to their world of work. They act from the basis of their confidence in their ability to assume membership of working groups and of the superiority of their knowledge of the way things are. On the basis of that confidence they reject what the school has to say and resent the compulsion to remain within a role which frustrates their wider social aspirations.
On the basis of their own experience and of the received culture of their class, pupils discount the knowledge of the world of work presented by the school. They see its claim to authority as spurious. But in a similar fashion, the school discounts pupils' knowledge. Because of the way it is held and expressed, their knowledge does not appear as knowledge to teachers. It does not conform to their formal and informal criteria for defining 'knowledge'. Consequently pupils appear to be ignorant. Furthermore, the pupils' behaviour at school is interpreted as symptomatic of a basic social inadequacy, of a general lack of competence if not actual maladjustment. The familiar cry of the teacher is: "If you are like this at school how do you expect to get on at work?" The apparent inability of pupils to cope with the demands of school is interpreted as an inability to cope with any social situation. It is this difference between pupils' reasons for rejecting school and teachers' interpretations of the behaviour in which that rejection is expressed which lies behind the kinds of discrepancies noted by the Schools Council and Roberts above. In terms of their behaviour at school, pupils appear to be ill-equipped to enter the world of work. But that behaviour in fact reflects their very ability to successfully do so.

Willis provides a case which illustrates this point:

Altogether, in relation to the basic cultural groundshift which is occurring in relation to the school and the development of a comprehensive alternative view of what is expected from life, particular job choice does not matter too much for 'the lads'. Indeed we may see that with respect to the criteria this located culture throws up and the form of continuity it implies, most manual and semi-skilled jobs are the same and it would be a
waste of time to use the provided grids across them to find material differences. Considered therefore in just one quantum of time - the last months of school - individual job choice does indeed seem random and unenlightened by any rational techniques or means/ends schemes. In fact, however, it is confusing and mystifying to pose the entry of disaffected working class boys into work as a matter of particular job choice - that is, in essence a very middle class construct. The criteria we have looked at, the opposition to other, more conformist views of work, and the solidarity of the group process all transpose the question of job choice on to another plane: 'the lads' are not choosing careers or particular jobs, they are committing themselves to a future of generalised labour.

(ibid pp99-100)

In a similar vein, Roberts writes that:

Rates of occupational mobility are often taken to indicate a state of vocational maladjustment. The young worker who flits between numerous short-lived unskilled jobs is thought to be in need of vocational advice and guidance, if not psychologically disturbed in general. But really the young worker who enters and leaves a succession of routine jobs in a constant attempt to obtain the highest possible earnings and to ward off boredom is not displaying symptoms of maladjustment. In fact he is making a realistic adjustment to the job opportunity structure that his particular career situation opens up.

(Roberts K. 1974 p151)

Work experience schemes are aimed mainly at a group of pupils for whom schooling seems least relevant and which the school finds difficult to accommodate. I have argued that these pupils are 'difficult' because in terms of their own aspirations and values they are ready for work. They resent the compulsion to remain within the pupil role. They discount the school's formal account of the world of work on the basis of their own knowledge and experience. Occupational aspirations and the appropriate social skills are developed outside the schools. Pupils judge their own competence and the validity of school knowledge by outside criteria. Inflationary forces in the labour market compel pupils to acquire increasing amounts of education. The widening gap between
pupils' own estimations of their needs and the necessity to remain at school beyond the point they feel to be justified creates the tensions which give rise to a crisis of control in the schools. I now want to examine how work experience is a response to control problems by considering social education as an example of the type of wider educational programme within which work experience schemes have been located.

SOCIAL EDUCATION

The rise of social education, like work experience itself, is associated with Newsom and the raising of the school leaving age. The Schools Council ran a social education project in four Nottingham secondary schools between 1968 and 1971 (Schools Council Working Paper No. 51). The experiment was part of the Schools' Council's concern "to develop programmes suitable for implementation following the raising of the school leaving age" and with "the educational problem of the irrelevance of schooling as seen by at least a third of its recipients... Its aim was to explore how far it was possible to achieve a less one-sided education, a more active pupil participation and a greater awareness and involvement in relation to community affairs."

(Schools Council 1974 p11). Also like work experience, social education claims a wider constituency than it in fact serves:

The fact that this project was concerned with the less able children in non-selective schools does not mean that social education is only for the 'Newsom child'. The basic principle of social education - that everyone needs to develop the skills to challenge and control his immediate situation in school and community - is a principle that ought to be applied in every school in the country, and for children of all (so-called) levels of ability.

(ibid p119)
Once again here we see a striking contrast with the YOP-inspired sentiments and objectives of today (see, for instance, the MSC's "Instructional Guide to Social and Life Skills").

A more distinctive statement of the principle of social education defines it as:

...an enabling process, through which children will receive a sense of identification with their community, become sensitive to its shortcomings, and develop methods of participation in those activities needed for the solution of social problems. (ibid p10)

The social education philosophy is developed by the authors of the project against the background of a particular vision of community and an urgent sense of crisis in community relationships. The general situation is described as follows:

...in modern urban society, government is remote and often seems incomprehensible. Even the interests and occupations of our neighbours can be a mystery. The individual is all too liable to feel isolated, trapped, manipulated by agencies which he cannot understand, even though they are benevolent. (ibid p7)

The situation described here is contrasted with that which is assumed to exist in other contemporary or historical societies.

In a tribal community every member knows how the group is organised and how it achieves its ends, and every member plays a part. Much the same was true of the Greek city state – at least for its freemen. (ibid p7)

The characteristic which these societies are held to share is "a generalised active involvement in the community" (ibid p11). The same thing can be found, it is claimed, in modern Cuba, China and the Israeli kibbutzim. It is this common condition, a radical organic community, that social education seeks
to restore:

The ideal which animates social education harks back to an
older concept of democracy: the democracy (real or legen-
dary) of the Greek city state in which the chief pursuit of
citizens was deemed to be their participation in running their
collective affairs.
(ibid p10)

The specific focus of the approach is described in this way:

We exclude any rigorous examination of the organisation of
social structures. Both institutions and persons participate
in several structures. Hence they have many roles. Social
education is not concerned to formalise the relationships be-
tween roles. It is concerned with the understanding of social
roles - in particular awareness of different roles, and of the
sources of social conflict. This points to the need for under-
standing people, and the effect this has on role behaviour.
(ibid p130)

The significance of the concept of community, in association with the focus
upon "roles", lies in the way in which it enables the construction of a par-
ticular model of the pupil.

The project organisers report that they were unsure as to how
far their wider, radical aims could be achieved within the context of a modern,
urban society, but they felt that the crisis of community relations was so acute
that they should nevertheless go ahead with their experiment.

Would the introduction of social education be likely to help in
alleviating the problems of the community as a whole, to miti-
gate the alienation of some of its members, or even to bridge
gaps between youth and the older generation, between home and
school, between school and the surrounding community?
(ibid p9)

The difference between the pragmatic concerns of the Schools Council and the
ideals of the practitioners is striking. Within the ideology being formulated
by the committed advocates of social education, the starting point for the
reduction of anomy in the community is the classroom. The pedagogy of social education is seen as leading to an increasing degree of control by the pupils themselves. By learning control in the classroom, it is argued, they will come to practice control in their communities. The transformation of classroom relationships will lead to a transformation of community relationships. This process will be encouraged by the involvement of social education in the community itself. Its activity is directed outside the classroom to the world at large. This activity may come to alleviate the anomic state described above. This model of community-based participatory democracy stands as a radical counterpoint to the patronage of the benevolent social democratic state implicit in the Green Paper, but its essentially utopian vision and psychologistic orientation make unlikely any critical examination of basic powers relations within a capitalist social formation.

Like the Green Paper, the social education project was conceived within a particular vision of community. The community from which the pupils are drawn is seen as "socially handicapped" and is contrasted with the idealised model comprised of eclectic fragments of Ancient Greece, tribalism, and modern Cuba, China and Israel. Social education's wider vision provides a framework and rhetoric within which a particular type of programme can be implemented and a source of commitment for its practitioners. Like the Green Paper its theme is adaptation to new conditions.

If our students are to fulfil roles in society which will bring satisfaction to themselves and be beneficial to others, education must not only help them in the development of personality and academic ability, but also provide them with skills which are necessary to cope with a sophisticated and expanding technology.
This is true even of those who will not be directly involved in development and design or in large scale organisation and planning. Equally, a good education should enable the student to cope with the increasingly bewildering pressures of life in a modern society.

(ibid p7)

There is a striking resonance here with the Green Paper. The social education vision and rhetoric organise an interpretive schema in which to account for and accommodate a category of pupils who were becoming increasingly problematical for the schools.

Given the model of their communities as "socially handicapped" the pupils themselves, as the products of these communities, can be defined in the same way. The vision of community generates a particular model of the pupil, and this in turn makes possible a particular type of accommodation of the pupil within the educational paradigm and institution. It assimilates the problem they pose for the school to a wider account of their place in the social order. By defining the pupil as the socially handicapped product of a socially handicapped community, it displaces the explanation of his/her problematical behaviour in the school. That behaviour comes to be seen not as a specific response to the conditions of schooling in relation to the pupils' own values and aspirations, but as a general condition of the pupil, as a state of basic maladjustment. This move preserves the adjustments of the pedagogy which attempt to reduce the tension and conflict in the everyday, classroom situation. The gap between the philosophy of social education and the pragmatics of its implementation is reflected in the difference between the wider aims of the movement - the regeneration of community etc. - and the mundane concerns of the Schools Council with the "educational problem of the irrelevance..."
of schooling as seen by at least a third of its recipients". The social education philosophy (articulated by its committed advocates and practitioners) functions as an ideological device which positions both pupils and teachers in a particular way towards the social relations of school and the wider formation in which they are inscribed. It is important to note that in this ideological position of teachers it is precisely their radical commitment and precisely the genuinely radical character of much of the social education philosophy that enables it to function as a reproducer of the dominant system of relationships. In just the same way that the Lads' resistance leads them into working class jobs, so teachers' radicalism leads them into this. The true subtlety of the process of cultural reproduction is that it is the contending position that ends up doing the real work.

Having defined the pupil in this way, it then becomes necessary to construct an educational space in which he/she can be accommodated. This space contains the content and pedagogy of social education. The authors describe how they devised a strategy for dealing with the fact that their pupils were predominantly low achievers:

Their self-confidence had already been sapped and their willingness to display initiative in the school setting had been drained by their previous failure. They had to be made to feel that past 'failures' in academic work were not signs of uselessness or stupidity on their part. In order to do this, children were encouraged to think of intelligence as having four parts: abstract intelligence which enables us to understand abstract concepts; technical intelligence which allows us to remember processes; creative intelligence which enables us to understand new ideas and things; and social intelligence which enables us to understand people and relationships. (ibid p19)
Although this schema was developed for strategic reasons, it was nevertheless felt to be "not without psychological validity" (ibid). Social education pupils, of course, were located in the social intelligence quadrant. There is some degree of inconsistency in this in that it is precisely in "social sensitivity" that these pupils are seen to be lacking. On the other hand, the 'discovery' of "social intelligence" enables an educational programme to be developed which can be placed alongside those concerned with the other types of 'intelligence' - it legitimates the approach. The concept carves out a space in which the practitioners of the subject can operate and claim a special expertise.

It is useful to contrast this account of a social education project with that given by Peter Dawson, ex-headmaster of Eltham Green, a large mixed comprehensive in South East London. Dawson was head of the school from 1970 to 1980. When he took over, the school had considerable difficulties and a poor reputation in the local area. When he left it was one of the most oversubscribed schools in the ILEA. An index of its relative lack of problems in the later period is given by the fact that it had an extremely low repair bill! Dawson was a highly controversial head and his style - authoritarian and egocentric - aroused as much opposition as it did support. Leaving aside the inevitable value problems raised by his example and by the very idea of a 'good' school or a 'successful' head, at a purely pragmatic level the role of social education at Eltham Green is instructive. Firstly, Dawson is quite clear about the pragmatic interest in constructing a social education department (12) as far as the school as a whole was concerned.
The creation of a social education department at Eltham Green was without doubt the most important single factor in the school's emergence in the seventies as one of the most heavily oversubscribed in the capital. Once the needs of the most disruptive element in the school population had been met, everything else followed almost as a matter of course.

(Dawson, P. 1981 p26)

However, this pragmatism was in no sense purely instrumental, let alone cynical. The social education department was seen as genuinely addressing the needs of the pupils in it and was highly privileged in terms of resources and staffing. The department was housed in its own wing of the school and its teachers spent all their time in the department. Pupils entered it in the fourth year and spent all their time there. The department, consequently, offered a full range of subjects and in addition to the standards such as English and Maths, organised numerous link courses with local FE colleges as well as community work and work experience. Subjects could be examined as CSE Mode 3s or as 'O' levels in some cases. The stress as far as the department's Mode 3's were concerned was practicality and 'relevance' - traditional Newsom values. Relationships between pupils and staff in the department were far less formal than in the rest of the school but 'high standards' were insisted on in areas such as school uniform and behaviour.

As the difference between the Schools Council's conception of their social education project and that of those implementing it, so at Eltham Green the teachers in the department had a far more radical and a much broader conception of what they were doing than did Dawson and the senior staff in the school. Obviously a programme such as social education demands a highly
articulated ideology both to motivate its practitioners and to provide them with a sense of commitment. This ideology invariably will tend to bring the teachers themselves into conflict with the senior staff or other interest groups in the school and a major problem becomes that of managing this tension. We see here the key to understanding what happened at Eltham Green. As Dawson makes clear in his book, he did not attribute any particular ideological significance to any given form of pedagogy, e.g. mixed ability teaching vs. streaming, integrated studies vs. subject specialism, etc. His concerns were purely practical - does this best meet the needs of pupils. 'Needs', of course, is a problematical concept, but we can interpret it as meaning basically cognitive, emotional and social requirements of pupils and functional requirements of the school as an organisation. Essentially, Dawson's strategy can be understood as the construction and maintenance of a structure. That is, he determined the mixture of approaches which seem to be appropriate to the school's problems, translated it into an organisational form and then worked extremely hard at maintaining the resulting structure. In particular it was extremely important to 'police' the boundaries between the various sectors, segments and enclaves in the school.

In retrospect, I feel now from my own experience as a social education teacher in the school that this was how Dawson worked. It is important to note that the early seventies in particular was a time when different types of pedagogies were very closely identified with specific political and ideological positions. We see this in a theoretical form in the ideas of the 'new sociology of education' and the de-schoolers, and at a practical level in the events at William Tyndale School.
Dawson refers to the study carried out by Michael Rutter and his team and to a conference for ILEA head teachers which Rutter addressed:

The successful secondary school the speaker explained, was one with a tight structure, firm discipline, streaming and setting, school uniform, and a commitment to similar traditional approaches. He developed his theme further. A successful secondary school was one with a flexible structure, no great emphasis on discipline, mixed ability teaching, no school uniform, and a progressive approach to educational issues. Could one have it both ways? Indeed, one could. The truth which the Rutter Report put forward on its publication a year after the conference was blindingly obvious when one thought about it. What makes a school successful is not its organisation but its ethos. It is not what you do but the way you do it that matters most. Style and atmosphere are more important than particular methods.

(Ibid p168)

The term "ethos" is particularly unsatisfactory. As Dawson himself points out, "Michael Rutter and his colleagues have nothing new to tell us, but they remind us of some important old truths which have become somewhat neglected." (Ibid p170). He then goes on to list three factors which together can be fairly taken as defining a good professional approach to doing the job of teaching regardless of any particular commitments to approach or method. Of course, there is nothing new in this and any experienced teacher would think he or she could have saved Rutter the trouble. Of course professionalism is important. But the term 'ethos' should not simply be taken as a gloss for professionalism. Although it is true that in general the particular method does not matter in the sense that mixed ability teaching has no intrinsic virtue over streaming or vice versa, particular method is important within the specific context or set of relationships to which it might be applied. In other words, we need to approach
methods in terms of the kind of structural dynamic approach I outlined earlier. Pragmatically, in the school context, teachers are able to judge the kind of approach most appropriate to particular groups of pupils at particular times. As Dawson says, "The best teachers move from one method to another between different classes and age groups". (Ibid, p168). An intuitive grasp of this may well be an important aspect of the good teacher's professional skill, but it is fairly obvious that simply being a conscientious professional is not enough. Ethos, I feel, should be taken as indicating that a professional group of teachers have managed to construct a system of relationships in their school, an organisational structure, in which the various groups are accommodated in a way that at least establishes a basic cohesion and stability.

In certain cases, for particular groups, the precise character of the 'solution' will be crucial. This might be so for pupils like 'the lads', or for West Indian children, or academic working (and middle) class white girls. For others far greater latitude is possible because their position in relation to the school is less tense. In any particular positional complex this will determine the appropriate mix of approaches and the nature of the optimum organisational structure. It is important to note that in certain cases what is being done for one groups will preclude certain options being employed for others, e.g. because some pupils will be seen as unfairly privileged, being allowed to 'get away with things', etc. It is this that leads to the variability that Rutter notes and makes it impossible to generalise or be dogmatic about particular methods or approaches. Selective schools insulate themselves from
problems by being able to maintain an organic relationship between their pupil body and their structure. Non-selective schools do not enjoy this privilege. They need to be able to continually adjust to the changing character of their intake (in response to demographic changes in their catchment areas for instance) and to changes in "climate" generated endogenously. Dawson's very success at Eltham Green changed the character of the school's intake. As the years went by the spread of ability widened, the level of attainment increased and the proportion of low achieving problem children declined. These changes would change the requirements for particular pedagogic responses in the school. Perhaps by the end of the ten year period Eltham Green was no longer the type of school that needed a headmaster like Peter Dawson? All the factors within the school have to be located and evaluated within the structural complex of factors and trends operating outside the school. Hence the structural totality in which we have to locate these processes is extremely complex.

THE PRAGMATICS OF IMPLEMENTATION

The detailed analysis of the Schools Council Project attempted to trace the logic of an educational ideology and to show how it achieved a specific accommodation of both teachers and pupils within the social relations of the school. The case is particularly significant because of its radicalism. The social education ideology achieved a number of things: (1) it provided an explanation of the pupils' behaviour and position in school which preserved the integrity of the school by positing that behaviour as a general condition of the pupil (as the product
of a socially handicapped community) rather than as a specific response
to school itself. (2) it achieved this within the rhetoric of a radical
perspective which both enabled the transformation of the pedagogy away
from the traditional form and engaged the commitment of the teachers who
wished to be engaged in such an exercise. (3) it overtly denied (once again
within a radical analysis and rhetoric) the actual competence of the pupils
whilst covertly trading on their real skills, knowledge and interests (under
the auspices of 'relevance'). We see quite clearly here the contrast between
the pragmatic concerns of higher level policy makers (in this case the Schools
Council with its interest in accommodating the "reluctant attenders" created
by ROSLA) and the teacher practitioners and the 'inventors' of the project
at the University of Nottingham Institute of Education with their wider, utopian
vision of community regeneration through participatory democracy. I now
want to translate this into a more formal level of analysis.

I argued that schools respond to the crises of control created by
the changes in pupil composition by transforming the modalities of control
within the educational transmission code. Formally this entails changes in
the value of framing. Particular emphasis was placed above on the notion
of 'relevance'. Within its particular ideological formulations (in recent times
going back to Newsom), 'relevance' enables changes to be made in the boundary
strength between school and community knowledge. In his original introduction
of the concepts, Bernstein used "classification" to refer to the relationships
between categories (of knowledge, agents etc.) and "framing" to refer to the
regulation of relationships within the transmission. An important aspect of
framing is,

...the relationship between the non-school everyday community knowledge of the teacher and taught, and the educational knowledge transmitted in the pedagogical relationship. We can raise the question of the strength of the boundary, the degree of insulation, between the everyday community knowledge of teacher and taught and educational knowledge. Thus, we can consider variations in the strength of the boundary between educational knowledge and everyday community knowledge of teacher and taught.

(Bernstein 1977 p89)

The transformation of the pedagogic relationship within social education, of the social relationships of teachers and pupils, depends upon both being able to incorporate aspects of their everyday knowledge and experience into the teaching relationship, and this, in turn, presupposes some degree of continuity at some level between teachers and pupils. This is largely a matter of style, of teachers adopting what might be called a 'Starsky and Hutch' approach.

This is part of the radicalism of the approach and a source of tension between staff.

More recently Bernstein has extended the concept of framing in this way:

We can distinguish at a greater level of delicacy between the internal values of the strength of framing (F(i)) and the external values of the strength of framing (F(e)). If we consider a school where F(e) is strong, then the transmitter regulates what features of non-school communication and practice can be realised within the school's specific pedagogic context, such as the classroom or equivalent F(i). Where F(e) is weak, then the acquirer has more regulation over what features of non-school communication and practice may be realised within the classroom or equivalent F(i). It is possible for F(e) to be weak and F(i) still to be relatively strong. Further the relations between F(i) and F(e) may change over the time span of the transmission. When the acquirers are young in age F(e) may be relatively weak, whereas with advancing age F(e) may increase in strength for one group of acquirers such as the successful, whereas
F(e) may be weakened or remain weak for the unsuccessful (social education, community projects, education for work, etc.)
(Bernstein B. 1982 p326-7)

This is precisely the case as reflected in the figures for examinations at CSE and GCE discussed above and corresponds to what I called an internal differentiation of pedagogies within a site. Similarly we see the same thing in the distinction between the traditional and the 'new sixth' forms. The move can be expressed as follows:

\[ +C +F (+1, +e) \quad \text{TIME: 1} \]
\[ +C +F (+1, +e) \quad \text{TIME: 2} \]
\[ +/C -F (+1, -e) \]

The variability of C at T2 reflects the category of pupils and the manner in which they are problematical: i.e. *scholastically* as 'non-academics' or behaviourally. In the first case they will be accommodated in, say, a social education department, and in the latter in a special unit or 'sanctuary'.

The situation can be represented another way. Dawson's description of Eltham Green, for example, provides a case where specific enclaves are established within the school. In this case boundary maintenance within the organisation becomes a prime concern for senior staff. Both pupils and teachers specific to distinctive enclaves have to be kept apart - their practices and ideologies which give them their specificity relative to their positioning within the school structure are potentially at odds. The art of
senior staff in this situation is to maintain an effective overview perspective which orchestrates the internal unity of the system, especially in terms of the potential conflicts between teacher ideologies. Hence the heads of social education and the remedial department at Eltham Green were accorded an unusually high status within the school because of their crucial mediating roles between their own teachers, the senior staff and teachers in other enclaves (this term is more appropriate than 'department' in this case). Similarly, restricting teachers to their enclaves (whilst giving them a great deal of freedom within the enclave) both enabled the development of specific specialist identities and ideologies and minimised possible conflicts between them.

Consequently, we need to be able to distinguish between the classification and framing relationships within and between enclaves, between the classification of categories (of agents and of knowledge) and the framing (i.e. regulation) of relationships within and between categories. In the case of knowledge, for instance, we can ask: are knowledge areas strongly or weakly classified (i.e. are there well defined 'subjects' or is there integration, is the 'content' of the knowledge academic or everyday - do pupils study textbook geography or their local area?)? Further, we would want to ask about the sequencing and pacing of the transmission and acquisition of knowledge. Associated with these issues are questions of specific teacher/pupil identities and sets of skills required or acquired for and within the transmission. Social education can preserve the traditional classification of knowledge whilst radically reducing the strength of framing.
It lowers the boundary between school and community knowledge. Every
day knowledge is introduced under the auspices of the concept of 'relevance'.
The practical content of the knowledge transmitted ('survival maths' etc.)
is seen as a response to the needs of the pupils as they are understood in
terms of the model discussed above. Similarly the more personalised
relationships between teachers and pupils are justified in terms of the pupils'
need to experience good social relationships - having a good relationship with
' the kids' can become more important than actually teaching them anything.
At the same time, through its numerous outside activities, social education
breaks through the physical boundaries between school and community.

Within the educational space defined by the quasi-psychological theory
of 'social intelligence' and the restructuring of pedagogy which it makes possible,
the formal, academic demands made upon pupils are reduced to a minimum. A
different set of criteria can be invoked in order to define and evaluate 'success'.

Williams and Rennie say of the Schools Council project:

We describe the results here as successful, not because the work done was all of a consistently high standard, not because all the children were influenced - or even interested - by the work, but because a number of children were given, for the first time, opportunities for decision making, for working on their own, and because a significant number of them were influenced enough by the work to want to take action about community problems they had discovered.
(Williams W. and Rennie J. 1972 p162)

The idea that an educational programme might be judged succesful whilst not
producing work of high quality, influencing or even interesting the pupils would
probably seem shocking to most teachers. The concept of 'success' being applied
here is one which makes sense only on the assumption that the programme really
did give the pupils the opportunities listed for the first time. And this assumption
is credible only on the basis of the model of the pupil as the product of the socially handicapped community.

CONCLUSION

At the pragmatic level the transformation of the authority structure is an attempt to accommodate a category of pupils whose rejection of schooling leads to behaviour problems which the school cannot accommodate through traditional means - largely because, for the reasons given earlier, these pupils do not accept the legitimacy of those means and the authority they embody. The accommodation of these pupils is achieved by a managed 'retreat' from traditional forms of authority and school work and the demands which they make on pupils. This move is contextualised by the theory and rhetoric of the educational ideology. The social education philosophy - its vision of the community and model of the pupil - provides an ideological mechanism for defining the situation in such a way that the integrity of the educational paradigm is preserved. By generalising the pupils' behaviour, their resentment at being at school and their scepticism regarding its authority, into a basic lack of competence, adjustment or maturity, it becomes possible to view their behaviour as symptomatic of the pupils' 'need' rather than as a specific response to school itself. Pupils can be accommodated for as long as they can be seen as 'in need'. The resilience of the educational paradigm lies in its ability to discover needs in pupils - in this case, the need to learn how to 'cope'. This particular need is self-confirming - the very response to the frustration of having to remain
in school leads to patterns of behaviour which are treated as evidence of lack of maturity etc.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

(1) see, for instance, Wright's study of the Black Papers (Wright N. 1977), Donald's analysis of the 1977 Green Paper (Donald J. 1981) and Reeder D. for a more general historical background (Reeder D. 1979).

(2) see Tapper T. and Salter B. (1978) ch. 7. These writers show the problems involved in talking simplistically about "the ruling class" or hegemony in relation to education.

(3) see Bernstein 1977 ch. 8

(4) note the gender stereotyping here, and see the quote later in this chapter from the ILEA Guideline for Teachers on Work Experience. This view can be contrasted with the situation today following on from ILEA's anti-sexist initiative (see ILEA R&S 1983 Report RS 868/83).

(5) see Richards G. 1982 (University of Warwick, unpublished).

(6) see Wright N. (1977).

(7) see Banks M. et al (1981) for the work by the Social and Applied Psychology Unit at Sheffield University, Townsend C. (1982) for the programme carried out for the MSC by the Institute of Manpower Studies (Townsend was employed at one time by the MSC and carried out an investigation in Canada and the US of research and programmes on skills and training. This material appears to have provided the background against which the programmes referred to here are being developed), MSC 1982 for work by the Tavistock Institute.

(8) see Blackburn R. & Mann M. (1979)
(9) see Finn D. (forthcoming) for information on school children's knowledge and experience of work. Both the Holland Report (MSC 1977) and the ILEA School-leaver and Sixth-Form surveys give information on how young people come to get jobs primarily through informal, personal contacts rather than through agencies such as the Careers Service. See also Clarke L. 1980a, 1980b for reviews of work in this and directly related areas.

(10) It is important to recognise how far the everyday life of young people is embedded within the working lives of relations, friends and communities. Experientially 'the world of work' is not confined to the work place - Willis stresses the continuities between the school counter culture of the Lads and the culture of the shop-floor (Willis P 1977), see also Moore R. 1983, and the forthcoming collection of papers edited by Clark and Willis in note 9 above.

(11) Fuzz and Joey's view of things can be related to the employers' recruitment strategies discovered by Ashton et al (see ch. 4). Their attitude is consistent with the employers approach to recruiting young people in their sector of the labour market.

(12) see Dawson P (1981), White and Brockington (1978) and Eggleston J. (1977) for instances of curriculum change in response to control problems.
**REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Work Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author/Institution</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finn D. (forthcoming)</td>
<td>&quot;School Children and the World of Work&quot; in Clark J. &amp; Willis P. eds 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner London Education Authority (1983)</td>
<td>Anti-Sexist Initiatives in ILEA Schools RS 868/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Chamber of Commerce (1977)</td>
<td>&quot;Memorandum on the Great Debate&quot; in Education and Training May 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Services Commission (1982)</td>
<td>Learning at Work, MSC, Sheffield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools Council (1974)</td>
<td>Social Education: an experiment in four secondary schools, Evans Brothers/Methuen, London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tapper T. & Salter B. (1978) Education and the Political Order

Townsend C. (1982) Skills Needed for Young Peoples'
                                Jobs Institute of Manpower Studies,
                                Brighton

                                Kegan Paul, London

Williams W. & Rennie J. (1972) "Social Education", in Rubenstein D.
                                & Stoneman C. eds 1972

Willis P. (1977) Learning to Labour Saxon House,
                                Farnborough

Wright N. (1977) Progress in Education, Croom Helm,
                                London

- 379 -
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE LOGIC OF CHANGE

In this chapter I will address the more contemporary issues associated with the rise of the Manpower Services Commission and the shift towards vocational preparation and social and life skills training. We are so close to these events that it is probably imprudent to attempt to make detailed claims about what they represent, however it is possible to present a general interpretation in terms of the principles developed in the preceding chapters. I will approach with scepticism the official view that YOP and the Youth Training Scheme (which is officially starting on the first of April 1983 and being fully implemented in September for that year's school-leavers) are effectively addressing problems to do with the supply of skills to industry or the employability of young people. I will argue that they are primarily to do with the position of youth in society under conditions of high unemployment and the displacement of young people from the labour market. These conditions radically extend the time of the transition to work, and, most significantly, open a space in the social career of young people where they (or large numbers of them) are outside the sphere of a social control agency. They become marginalised, in this sense, in a particularly critical fashion - firstly because their desire to enter the working world is frustrated and secondly because they cannot be provided with incomes sufficient to satisfy their desires as consumers in the youth market. The significance of these facts is that a critical interruption occurs in the cultural reproduction of citizens, i.e. social members located and defined within given positions in the complementary systems.
of production and consumption (of the social division of labour). The significance of the new developments is not so much that they make a positive contribution through the supply or inculcation of required skills and forms of consciousness, but that they close down a critical space which has opened up in the cultural reproduction process.

I will argue that the new institutions which are currently emerging in response to this problem represent a fundamental paradigm change in educational ideologies. There is a radical break between the liberal-humanist educational paradigm which contained and accommodated critically positioned youth in the schools from Newsom until the late seventies and the technicist-training paradigm which is being institutionalised today. The principle upon which the accommodation of youth is being accomplished has changed. This change reflects the tension within Western educational thought identified by Reed (see ch. 6) – the tension between the critical and the adaptive roles of education. In terms of the approach being adopted in this work, we can see this in terms of a shift from an elaborating to a restricting orientation in the educational mode of control. As argued in chapter three, the positioning which occurs in education is positioning relative to knowledge. Bernstein says that we need "to distinguish between the distinctive features of a form of discourse which give it its speciality and the social division of labour created for its transmission and reproduction." (Bernstein B. 1982 p316). The latter factor constitutes the regulative structure of the school through which positioning is managed. The former represents the epistemological cores of the forms of knowledge themselves. It is
within knowledge that the oppositional possibilities of education lie. For critically positioned groups the possibility exists of the development of an elaborated orientation towards their position itself - a critical penetration of the situation partially grasped through the cultural penetrations of the oppositional restricted codes.

The distinction between an elaborating and a restricting orientation within an educational paradigm resides in the character of the relationship between the forms of knowledge and the social division of labour created for their transmission and reproduction. The crucial factor is the principle regulating the access of groups within that division of labour to the forms of knowledge. Bernstein has written,

Any collection code involves an hierarchical organisation of knowledge, such that the ultimate mystery of the subject is revealed very late in the educational life. By the ultimate mystery of the subject, I mean its potential for creating new realities.

(Bernstein 1977 p97)

Transformations of transmission codes involve transformations of the principles regulating access to the ultimate mystery of the subject. The previous chapter investigated certain such transformations which have occurred as responses to problems associated with the social division of labour within the school. These transformations, which serve the interests of control within the school, necessarily entail transformations of the principles of access to the forms of knowledge. Where groups are critically positioned socially, their positioning relative to the critical possibilities of knowledge, to its potential for creating new realities, is a crucial issue. Within the Newsom period, sections of youth were becoming increasingly critically positioned relative to the school
itself. Today, with high youth unemployment, those same sections of youth are becoming critically positioned relative to the society as such. I will attempt to demonstrate how the internal logic of the transformations which took place in the schools in the former period become increasingly dangerous in a period in which a space has been opened between school and work.

CRITICISM AND ADJUSTMENT

The analysis of social education in chapter six concentrated on one well-documented case - the Schools Council Social Education Project. The field of social education is, however, much wider than the model presented there. An extremely thorough review has been produced by Rosemary Lee for the FEU. She says that a great deal of confusion and disagreement exists as to the meaning of the term. This reflects the often contradictory relationships which can be seen to exist between "social studies", "social education", and "social and life skills training". She says that,

Central to many definitions is some formulation about the development of understanding of self, of others and of society. But disagreement is evident (though often not explicit) about where the emphasis should lie (on self, others, or society); how the understanding is to be achieved; and to what ends it is being developed. (Lee R. 1980 p4)

Whitty concludes his discussion of social studies referred to in chapters one and two by suggesting that the Schools Council project might present a radical alternative approach to social studies. The link between social studies and
social education indicates an aspect of the latter which is extremely significant in relation to social and life skills. Through the connection with social studies, social education retains a link with the abstract forms of elaborated knowledge of the social sciences. Whitty favours social education because it involves radical changes in teaching methods. The FEU document "Developing Social and Life Skills" says that social studies tend to "emphasise the understanding of society at an abstract level, 'Social and Life Skills' tends to emphasise the acquisition of practical competencies or 'coping skills'." (FEU 1980 p5). Social education occupies an ambiguous position between the two extremes of understanding and coping.

The contrast between social studies and social education lies primarily in the difference between their approaches to teaching methods and the fact that the latter can include a concern with personal development and social relationships. But this concern is nevertheless contextualised within an elaborating discourse. This is because social education is orientated towards change. Lee defines seven approaches within the field as a whole which she summarises as follows:

Information-based: reception of knowledge and information with either theoretical or practical relevance in the social education area.

Enquiry-based: practice in a variety of modes of enquiry through a search for knowledge.

Creative: self-expression through the practice and/or appreciation of the creative arts.

Experiential: participation in activities considered to be inherently social educative.

Awareness-raising: participation in and reflection on group activities and experiences.
Skills training: structured practice in tasks, behaviours, and strategies.

Modelling: spending time with adult 'non-teachers'.
(ibid p49)

She represents the manner in which these approaches tend to be distributed in the following diagram:

Fig. 7:1

She goes on to provide a more abstract representation of the relationships between the different approaches which is based on two dimensions. The first is whether the approach focuses on society or
the individual, and the second is whether or not the approach is concerned to initiate change. She presents this as follows:

For present purposes it is the contrast between social change and social control approaches which are of interest. The Schools Council Social Education Project is clearly an instance of the former, and social and life skills of the latter.

Lee contrasts them in this way:

Courses and projects with social change aims often emphasise the need for education in political and economic awareness (see for instance, Davies 1979). Importance is placed on cooperative learning and group solidarity. Individual progress is viewed as only being ultimately meaningful in a context of societal change:

"The self-emancipation approach insists that the great majority of young people can only fulfil their cultural potential if they join together in a struggle to over-throw the institutions and
ideologies of the dominant classes, and that neither the harmony of 'their society' nor the happiness of all its citizens, can be guaranteed in the process.' (Review Steering Group, 1978, pp43-44)

In contrast, social control programmes are concerned to help young people to 'adjust' (often a key word) to the demands of adult life, and in particular to working life. Programmes will often include references to personal development, but this is viewed within a framework of social norms:

'One of the main aims in Life Skills training will be to adjust trainees to normal working conditions, giving attention to such matters as time keeping, discipline, and the maintenance of satisfactory relations with other trainees and members of the staff. This calls upon the tutor or instructor to have an understanding of young people as human beings.' (MSC 1977 p10).

(ibid p52)

The shift from a social change to a social control approach occurs when the link with elaborated knowledge is broken. It is in this sense that I characterised the newly emerging approaches as "restricting". Firstly they refuse to contextualise practices within an elaborated system of discourse, and secondly they train people in socially appropriate performances. This latter point reflects the origins of social and life skills training in therapeutic techniques for various categories of socially inadequate or disabled people (1). The shift towards social and life skills marks a shift from an essentially sociological knowledge background to an essentially psychological one. Obviously a scheme like social and life skills is produced by people who themselves are located within an elaborated knowledge context - agents of symbolic control - but the breaking of the link with that knowledge background renders it non-available to those who are the subjects of its practice.
Because social and life skills training is evaluated purely at the level of performances, it is also the case that those who actually implement the programmes do not themselves require a background in or access to the elaborated knowledge from which it is derived. Hence the MSC actively promotes the recruitment of non-teachers as trainers (2).

Whereas the ultimate mystery of the subject in social education is available to teachers and potentially accessible to pupils, the ultimate mystery behind social and life skills remains a mystery.

An important feature of the psychologistic perspective of SLS is that it individualises problems, programmes and evaluations. The literature in this area stresses the virtues of an individual approach to trainees and discourages group teaching. Programmes are developed on the basis of an individual profile of trainees' needs which is translated into the form of an individual 'contract', specifying what the course will involve. The profile serves as a check-list against which the individual's progress can be measured. The paradigm shift being described here involves fundamental changes at a number of levels. The approaches can be contrasted in this way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIENTATION:</th>
<th>ELABORATING</th>
<th>RESTRICTING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>function:</td>
<td>critical</td>
<td>adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perspective:</td>
<td>sociological</td>
<td>psycholigestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>principle:</td>
<td>collectivist</td>
<td>individualist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I now want to outline the conditions under which a shift of this type occurs. I argued that the development of programmes such as social
education take place in response to control problems in the schools which occur as a result of critical changes in the social composition of the pupil population. These changes are generated by credential inflation in the labour market. Hence social education is being accorded a control function. It was on this basis that the analysis in the last chapter was conducted. I argued that the Schools Council Project was a good case study because (apart from its being well-documented) it was obviously radical in its aim. The question to be answered now is: why should it be that a programme which, presumably, fulfilled its control function (despite its radical intentions) in the recent past not simply be allowed to continue to do so? Why is it being replaced by a paradigm of a fundamentally different type? The answer, I believe, lies in the growth of youth unemployment and the opening of a space between schooling and the entry into work.

I argued that the mechanism whereby social education fulfilled its function in the schools was the incorporation of young peoples' knowledge and interests within a non-traditional educational programme under the auspices of the concept of relevance. I argued that in reality the characteristic of the young people following these courses was their desire and competence to enter 'the world of work'. Social education incorporates that competence within an educational ideology which formally denies its existence. The contradiction within social education is that its transformation of pedagogy changes the principle of access to elaborated knowledge. By moving, as it were, towards the community knowledge of the pupils it opened the possibilities of their access to the ultimate mystery of the subject - its potential for creating
new realities. The transformation of the social division of labour for the transmission of knowledge transformed the principle regulating access to the knowledge. But the active principle of the young peoples' position within the school was their aspiration to leave it and take up their places in work and in 'the world of goods'. To become both workers and consumers. In the seventies that transition was a real possibility for the great majority of young people. Today it is not. The principle whereby social education actively engaged the pupils (incorporating their interests and knowledge) effectively negated its radical implications because that principle was continuous with the uninterrupted evolution of the social career.

The transition from school to work is a crucial moment in the development of identity and membership. The interruption in that transition brought about by high youth unemployment removes a large mass of young people from the complementary disciplines of work and consumption. By being denied the validation (and celebration) of identity through these processes, young people can come to critically question those identities themselves. The radicalism of social education opened a space for the ultimate mystery of the subject in the school lives of pupils who never usually approach it. The real possibility of an uninterrupted transition to work - the validation of a developing identity - occluded it. That condition no longer obtains. Youth unemployment, by interrupting the development of identity, opens a cultural space with a potential for the exploration of new realities.
TRANSFORMATIONS

I now want to approach this argument through a more formal level of analysis by demonstrating how transformations of the principles of classification and framing in the transmission process can progressively change the social division of labour within the school in such a way as to change fundamentally the principle regulating access to elaborated orientations. This happens through changes in the relationships between the categories of agents included within and excluded from the transmission process. In the previous chapter I emphasised the importance of internal and external values of framing in Bernstein's most recent formulation of the theory. These are the principles to be developed here. My starting point is Shelton's study of community education and his description of four "fairly distinctive strategies" which he labels: "voluntary", "pragmatic", "credentialist" and "radical"(3). The first is where community education is a voluntary extra curricular activity by pupils and teachers taking place within an ethic of 'service to' disadvantaged members of the community. The second is where community education is a response to control problems amongst older non-academic pupils. The third is where it is part of an examination course. And the fourth is where pupils are encouraged to develop a critical understanding of the social, economic and political forces in their environment in order to bring about social change.

I will group Shelton's categories in the following way in order to construct three axes:
The strategies that Shelton outlines reflect the basic relations: school - community; school - pupils; pupils - community. Following his lead, we can summarise the features of the three axes in this way:

(1) The voluntary strategy is practice within a "service to" philosophy. It assumes that the pupils possess a high degree of competence - they have skills and resources that can be of use to disadvantaged social groups. In the rhetoric of this approach traditional concepts of service and duty will be evoked. The type of community work is that which can be done on an extra curricular basis. The public it serves is a narrowly defined set of disadvantaged people - 'the disabled'. Whereas the input from the school is strong, that from the public is weak. This reflects the competence of the pupils and the disabled condition of the public. This strategy is adopted in the case of non-problematical groups of (usually) academic pupils. It is likely to be the strategy adopted by grammar schools, for example.

(2) Pragmatic and credentialist strategies can be grouped together because they are both responses to problematical groups of pupils. In the pragmatic case the pupils are behaviour problems and in the credentialist case they are a scholastic problem. For the former community education is seen as a
type of therapy and for the latter it is part of a 'relevant' curriculum. For both groups 'the community' is seen as a teaching resource. The public for this type of community work is broader than in the previous case. It includes not only people in disadvantaged or disabled conditions but categories such as pre-school children who are simply in dependent roles. It also actively involves professional and semi-professional adults such as play group leaders, nurses and workers in old peoples' homes. It can also take in environmental and conservation type activities and might also include work experience. The pupils are seen as relatively low in competence (or in 'social and life skills') and community work is seen as an opportunity for them to develop social skills or aspects of 'character'. The supervisory adults will be involved in the evaluation of the pupils' performance and development. This can be organised within the framework of a CSE Mode 3, e.g. social education. The pupil input into the situation is relatively weak and that of the public relatively strong. Whereas in the first case a strong boundary is maintained between school knowledge and everyday knowledge, in the resource type that boundary is weakened. Everyday knowledge will be incorporated into the programme under the heading of 'relevance'.

(3) The radical strategy tends to reverse the value assumptions of the previous two types. Although usually dealing with the same categories of pupils as the pragmatic and credentialist it tends to affirm their values and skills rather than to deny them. The pupils will be seen as members of disadvantaged or politically oppressed communities and the aim of 'community education' is to make them aware of the nature of that repression and to provide
them with skills for mobilisation for change. Problems are collectivised rather than individualised. Pupils come to solve their own problems through collective action rather than other peoples' problems through individual service. The public in this case will involve not only those represented in the previous types but will include individuals and groups in what could be called 'citizen roles', e.g. representatives of ethnic minorities, trade unionists, community activists etc. Hence the boundary between school and everyday knowledge is further weakened and the legitimacy of the official form of the former is challenged. The input from the public will be strong as will that of the pupils (at least potentially). This type of strategy can be seen as a critical extension of the resource position. It tends to occur when committed teachers implementing programmes within that paradigm attempt to follow through the issue of social problems to their causes in the political relationships of the community. The literature in this area gives a number of instances where social education projects have run into problems because the teachers have been seen as "going too far" (4). Controlling this tendency is the major problem for schools which run social education departments and the major source of conflict between the teachers involved and the head teachers and governors.

These descriptions have incorporated a number of factors on each axis:

(1) the strength of boundary between school and non-school knowledge;
(2) the model of the pupil in terms of perceived competence;
(3) the composition of the public involved in the project;

- 394 -
the relative strengths of the school and community inputs.

(5) the orientation of the axis: whether individual/psychologistic or collective/sociologistic.

The principles of classification and framing are implicit in these descriptions. I want to move towards making them explicit by describing a set of 'pedagogic types'. In some cases these will be types of school, in others they might be encountered as specialised enclaves within schools, or as special units set apart from schools. Aspects of each type might be represented within a single institution. For example: in the pragmatic case a special sanctuary unit might exist within a school. It might well cater for children from other schools as well as for those in that where it is based.

Many schools have separate social education departments where the pupils following the course spend all their time under a different type of regime from that in the rest of the school. In cases such as this there will be a strong internal boundary (framing value) which insulates the enclave from the rest of the school. At the same time there will be a relatively weaker external boundary between school and everyday knowledge ('relevance'). Social education departments are examples of a "credentialist strategy" and sanctuary units of a "pragmatic strategy". In some cases these two situations might be covered together, e.g. the social education department will cater for 'difficult' pupils who will not be expected to follow examination courses alongside the other pupils.

TYPE 1 THE TRADITIONAL SCHOOL

Here we have strong classification and framing. Community education is of the voluntary type. It is extra-curricular, i.e. set apart from
'real' knowledge and scholastic activity. Pupils are seen as highly competent - community education (or 'service') in effect celebrates that competence. The public is narrowly defined - disabled and dependent groups. It is almost as if these model pupils have such an abundance of competence that they can bestow a surplus upon those 'less fortunate than ourselves'. The public provides no real input into the situation because it is not seen as possessing any meaningful knowledge or experience. Such knowledge and experience is enshrined within school knowledge - that which is set apart and sufficient unto itself. The public passively presents an opportunity for the model pupils to develop an extra dimension of character through service - humility and compassion and a sense of duty. Parental involvement in the school's activities is ritualistic. They come, at set times (founders' day etc.) to bear witness to the distinction that the school is bestowing upon their children.

**TYPE 2 THE NEIGHBOURHOOD SCHOOL**

Here we might still find strong values of classification and framing. The distinctive feature of this type of school is its approach to school knowledge and to its distribution. Rather than being seen as a 'sacred' property to be hoarded and guarded and bestowed only under sanctified conditions to carefully selected individuals who have shown themselves worthy of distinction, knowledge is seen as a commodity which should be spread as widely as possible. The school will open itself up to the community and will cultivate community and parental involvement. This could include allowing parents to follow examination courses with the sixth-formers, opening sport and craft facilities in the
evenings and the holidays, encouraging parental involvement in the running of the school. Members of the community are involved in their 'private citizen' roles – they can 'use' the school but not necessarily modify it.

**TYPE 3 THE SANCTUARY**

The sanctuary is considered to exist for pupils who, whilst not seen as strictly maladjusted, are highly disruptive in the classroom situation. Community education or community work will be seen as an essentially therapeutic exercise, as an opportunity for them to develop 'social and life skills' and to gain confidence etc. Because these pupils are seen as extremely low in competence their input into the situation will be relatively weak. They will be seen as practicing skills rather than as exercising them. Because of their low degree of competence they will be closely supervised both by teachers and by the professionals in the situations in which they are placed, e.g. the staff in old peoples' homes. These people will also be involved in evaluating the pupils' behaviour and progress. In this respect a section of the public will be making a strong input. These adults can be seen as citizens in specialized occupational roles.

**TYPE 4 SOCIAL EDUCATION**

Here pupils are seen as a scholastic problem. They have not succeeded within the traditional academic framework of the school. The social education department attempts to provide an alternative 'relevant' curriculum. It might well preserve a strong classification of knowledge e.g. the traditional subjects, but will have only a weak boundary between
school and everyday knowledge (weak framing), e.g. a CSE Mode 3 in 'survival maths' or 'practical English'. The community is utilised as a learning resource both as a topic for study and as a provider of learning opportunities. The public involved will include not only supervisors but other adults in their occupational roles who will provide knowledge and information for the pupils, e.g. a supermarket manager talking about his shop, an interview with the community policeman, talking to old people about how the community used to be. The public will be seen as possessing relevant knowledge to be passed on to the pupils within the framework dictated by the school.

**TYPE 5 THE AMELIORATIVE PROGRAMME**

This can be seen as a radical development of the social education type. It occurs where the orientation shifts from individual/psychologistic to collective/sociologistic. Here a critical attitude towards the community is adopted and problems are explored in terms of their political implications. Pupils are seen as future agents of social change and are encouraged to explore ways of bringing change about. There will be a negative attitude towards formal school knowledge and the teachers are likely to see themselves as educational radicals forging a new teaching paradigm. Although pupils will be seen in a positive manner as possessing valid knowledge and competence, they will also be seen as 'victims' of the ideological distortions that accompany the repression of their community, e.g. they will hold sexist, racist views etc. The programme is also an exercise in consciousness raising. The public will include people in a role of 'representatives' of oppressed groups or of community action movements.
TYPE 6 THE OPPOSITIONAL TYPE

This is a yet to be realised possibility. It would occur where the community effectively colonises the school, where representatives are present not simply to provide knowledge or a point of view within a radical teacher based educational programme but as agents directing activity and drawing upon the resources of the school (including most crucially the intellectual resources of the teachers - the representatives of the forms of knowledge) according to their own criteria of relevance. Essentially this position can be seen as the imposition of the social forms of the dominated upon the forms of knowledge or an expropriation of the means of knowledge production.

I want to draw attention to some of the more significant dimensions of these descriptions. Of particular importance is the progressive expansion of the categories of publics involved in the community education programme.

We have the following sequence:

- disabled/
- dependent
- private citizens
- supervisors
- functionaries
- representatives
- agents

The significant features of these groups are: (1) the manner in which they are constituted as categories (principle of classification) and, therefore,
the way in which the members are positioned as culturally specific subjects; (2) the strength of their inputs into the programme (representing the relationship between school and non-school knowledge - the more 'relevant' the curriculum, the greater the status accorded to non-school knowledge) (principle of framing); (3) the degree of control they exercise over the transmission process (reflecting the degree of specialisation of transmitters, the insulation between categories of transmitters, and, ultimately, the criteria governing the definition of the transmission process as such (classification and framing)).

I want to be able to give a fairly precise specification of the codes in particular in respect of the categories of transmitters and acquirers (t and a) - that is, to the degree of specialisation of each category and the degree of insulation between the categories t and a and those who are neither t nor a (t, a) - and to the internal and external values of framing (F, F).

The internal value of framing is particularly significant in the case of an enclave (e.g. a social education department or a sanctuary within a school). The external value of framing provides an index of the strength of the boundary between school and community knowledge. It can be the case that we have a strong classification of knowledge (+C), i.e. strong subject boundaries, but only a weak external value of framing, i.e. a weak boundary between school and everyday knowledge. In which case we could have a strongly defined subject called 'maths' the content of which is largely made up from 'everyday' or 'practical' maths - it could be a CSE Mode 3 course entitled 'Survival Maths' and taught in a social education department. The course could include visiting
the local supermarket and talking to the manager about shopping and budgeting. This would involve a weakening of the degree of insulation between specialist (i.e. teacher) transmitters and non-specialist transmitters (i.e. members of the public in their occupational roles). But it is important to note a) the restriction placed upon the non-specialist transmitter and the knowledge he or she transmits, and b) that control of the transmission is maintained by teachers. The code will be written:

-t+a  +i-e
+C   -F

This means: there is a strong classification of knowledge areas (subject boundaries) but a weak classification on who can be a transmitter of knowledge; there is a strong classification of who counts as an acquirer; there is a weak regulation on relationships between teachers and pupils within the department (i.e. a liberal regime within the regulative context); there is a strong boundary between the department and the rest of the school but a weak boundary between the department and the outside world.

It must be stressed that the move to the oppositional type in the typology marks a reclassification. It is not the case that what is being represented is simply 'the opposite' of the traditional type — an opposition that could be expressed as closed vs open, structured vs non-structure, for instance. Superficially it is quite possible that a traditional type and an oppositional type could resemble each other, e.g. in both cases we might find formally taught lessons. The difference lies in the principles governing the categories and regulating the relationships within and between categories. Consequently there is no sense in specifying the oppositional code within the context of the typology because the oppositional position lies outside the system in which the other types are located.
**Fig. 7:3 (6) THE DOXA OF THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD: LIMITS AND TRANSFORMATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Traditional School</th>
<th>Neighbourhood School</th>
<th>Sanctuary Unit</th>
<th>Social Education Project</th>
<th>Ameliorative Action Project</th>
<th>L.M. Oppositional Elaborating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principle</td>
<td>SERVICE</td>
<td>DISTRIBUTIVE</td>
<td>THERAPEUTIC</td>
<td>RESOURCE</td>
<td>* ACTION</td>
<td>* SOCIAL CHANGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of Pupil Competence</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>variable</td>
<td>very low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>* nascent</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category of Public Specific to Type</td>
<td>disabled/deeply</td>
<td>private citizens</td>
<td>supervisors</td>
<td>functionaries</td>
<td>* representatives</td>
<td>XA agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of relative pupil/public contributions</td>
<td>very high/low</td>
<td>variable</td>
<td>very low/high</td>
<td>low/high</td>
<td>* high</td>
<td>* potential/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>$+C^{++}t+a+F+i+e$</td>
<td>$+C^{+}t-a+F+i-e$</td>
<td>$-C^{+}t+a-F+i-e$</td>
<td>$+C^{-}t+a-F+i-e$</td>
<td>$-C^{-}t+a-F+i-e$</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ORIENTATION OF EDUCATIONAL PARADIGM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individualist/Psychologistic</th>
<th>Collectivist/Sociologistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>ORTHODOXY</em></td>
<td><em>HETERODOXY</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NB** the codes written here do not refer to the rules regulating the acquisition of knowledge: sequencing and pacing could remain strong. Similarly the oppositional form could affirm strong classification of knowledge.
In each case the category listed under the heading "public" is that which is distinctive to the type. The categories listed to the left might also be present but those listed to the right would not. The progression of categories registers changes in the values of $C^t$ and $F^e$.

To the left of the line of doxa the key change taking place in the progression through the types is that in the values $C^t$ and $F^e$. In the former register we see changes in the definition of who can count as a transmitter, and in the latter in the status accorded to the knowledge they transmit. Progression in the former marks a decline in specialisation in the transmitter categories and in the degree of insulation between categories. In the latter we see a shift in the definition of what counts as valid knowledge and in the degree of control that non-teacher transmitters have over the knowledge that is transmitted. It is the limit upon the latter that is the key factor in defining the limit of the field of the doxa as such and which represents, therefore, the principle of the doxa. It is possible that even in the traditional type members of the public might be invited into the school to talk to pupils. But they will be present within the knowledge context only as models, as a kind of living visual aid to illustrate points being made by teachers. Their contribution confirms what is already known to be the case rather than extends school knowledge. In the social education situation the public will be seen as having a contribution to make in its own right and supervisors will play a role in the evaluation process. However, the public is still defined within the principle of the field of doxa under the dominating social principles of the social classification - they will be defined in their specialised occupational roles and located within a school controlled
paradigm. The significant point about the ameliorative position is that although representatives are speaking from a much wider existential base than functionaries, they are still present within a teacher controlled paradigm.

The key factor that takes us to the very limit of the field of doxa is the degree of control that publics exercise over the transmission process. This reflects a) the residual specialisation and dominance of 'the teacher' (as specialised transmitter) and b) the concomitant restriction on the category acquirer, i.e. the category of specialist transmitters called 'teachers' are not acquirers. This is not to imply that in the oppositional situation the specialist category 'teacher' is abolished but rather that the conditions under which teachers are also acquirers change, e.g. teachers may become acquirers and vice-versa within the same institutional context rather than in separated contexts (e.g. on higher degree courses).

All educational transmission processes involve the two fundamental categories transmitters and acquirers. 'Teachers' and 'pupils' are specialised categories of transmitters and acquirers. All educational transmission processes involve the three fundamental systems: curriculum, pedagogic practice and evaluation. The construction and articulation of the categories of transmitters and acquirers within the construction and articulation of the systems of curriculum, pedagogic practice and evaluation is given its specific structural definition in terms of classification and framing. Where there is more than one category of transmitter and more than one category of acquirer we can ask questions not just about the classification and framing of the relationships
between the transmitters and acquirers but also about the classification and framing of the relationships between the categories of transmitters and between the categories of acquirers. The key question is the degree of control that the categories of transmitters exercise over the transmission process. This is actually much more important than the question of the degree of control that acquirers exercise over transmitters. A transmission relationship is necessarily asymmetrical - if the acquirer knew more than the transmitter there would be no sense in his or her being the acquirer. Simply liberalising or democratising that relationship (though justifiable on other grounds) does not fundamentally challenge the principle of the relationship. It is the category transmitter that is critical because it is here that fundamental questions about what counts as knowledge and as a valid realisation of knowledge are ultimately raised.

The final phase of the analysis involves defining a pathway along which the transformations of classification and framing lead us into the position occupied by the dominated groups - a position where the means of knowledge production are, as it were, delivered into the hands of the dominated and where the forms of knowledge can take on their social forms. We have to track the progression of categories of transmitters alongside an increasing control by transmitters over the transmission process to a point where that control can transform the principle regulating the categories as such - a point where the public becomes the agent of the transmission process. The progressive expansion of the categories of transmitters from teachers to agents will be signified by the signs +C, -C, --C, and the decreasing level of
control over the transmission process by teachers by $+F$, $+F$, $-F$. It must be noted that this movement does not simply index a shift of function from one group of personnel to another. It signifies a fundamental change in the principle regulating who can be a transmitter and what counts as a valid transmission. It marks a shift from a principle of exclusion in which strictly defined categories are kept apart and hierarchically ordered, to a principle of inclusion in which categories (both of knowledge and agents) can be mixed (according to a different principle). As far as the category of acquirers is concerned the weakening of the principle of classification involves a) the relationship between categories of acquirers and b) the relationship between those who can be acquirers and those who cannot. For instance: conventionally in a school pupils are acquirers. Pupils are selected according to certain criteria (mainly age). Neither teachers nor parents can be acquirers where pupils are acquirers. If teachers are acquirers it is in a different context (e.g. an in-service training course, a higher degree course). If parents are acquirers it is once again in a different context. Hence knowledge is distributed within a system of contexts that are hierarchically organised. Individuals are selected for an appropriate context by symbolic criteria derived from the social division of labour. The basic logic of the system is as follows: if 'a' is a transmitter in context x and 'b' is an acquirer, then 'a' cannot be an acquirer in context y in which 'b' is a transmitter. Underlying this is the principle: 'a': 'b' in education :: 'a': 'b' in the social division of labour. The shift in the value of C indexes a change in the principle generating and regulating categories of acquirers. The change in the value of F indicates
that the change is from a principle of selection to one of election, i.e. acquirers elect for membership of categories (and in so doing generate categories). It must be stressed that none of this implies the abolition of specialist teachers or 'standards' or distinctive realms of knowledge. What is changing is the principle generating and regulating categories and the relationships between them and within them.

The transformation of the categories transmitters and acquirers are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tr.</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>--</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- categories: teachers citizens agents
- principle: exclusion inclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ac.</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>+</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>--</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- categories: pupils citizens teachers
- principle: selection election
- position: SCHOOL → COMMUNITY

(note: "citizens" = categories of publics)

**Fig. 7:4**

**DESCRIPTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tr.</th>
<th>+C</th>
<th>teachers only are transmitters and exercise strong control over the transmission process.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>++F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
citizens can also be transmitters but under the control of teachers

agents control transmission process

pupils only are acquirers and have no control over selection criteria.

citizens can also be acquirers but teachers control criteria. This entails some modification of relationships within the transmission context because citizens are adults not children.

the social principle of hierarchy and exclusion which separated teachers-as-acquirers from other categories of acquirers is abolished. All agents can in principle freely exchange knowledges regardless of social hierarchy.
We can now represent the transformations in relation to the types outlined earlier and to their positions within the field.

Fig. 7:5
The transformations are indexing a) changes in the categories making up the public of transmitters and b) in the power relationships between the categories - in particular their power to influence, modify or control the transmission process. These changes correlate with changes of values of $C^t$ and $F^e$ in the typology (where the power dimension has not been made explicit).

The corresponding chart from "acquirers" is as follows:

Fig. 7:6

```
\begin{figure}
\centering
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (H) {HETERODOXY};
\node (D) at (6,0) {DOXA};
\node (O) at (6,6) {OPP.};
\node (A) at (0,0) {ACQUIRERS};
\node (T) at (0,-6) {TRAD.};
\node (O1) at (12,0) {community};
\node (O2) at (12,6) {school};
\draw[->] (H) -- (D);
\draw[->] (D) -- (O);
\draw[->] (A) -- (T);
\draw[->] (H) -- (A);
\draw[->] (D) -- (A);
\draw[->] (O) -- (A);
\draw[->] (T) -- (A);
\draw[->] (H) -- (T);
\draw[->] (D) -- (T);
\draw[->] (O) -- (T);
\node at (0,0) {$C$};
\node at (0,-3) {$+$};
\node at (0,-6) {$+$};
\node at (12,0) {$-$};
\node at (12,3) {$-$};
\node at (12,6) {$-$};
\node at (0,3) {$-$};
\node at (0,6) {$-$};
\node at (6,0) {$+$};
\node at (6,3) {$+$};
\node at (6,6) {$+$};
\node at (3,3) {$+$};
\node at (3,6) {$+$};
\node at (9,3) {$+$};
\node at (6,1.5) {$-C$};
\node at (9,1.5) {$--C$};
\node at (6,-1.5) {$++F$};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{figure}
```
It is significant that a progression of categories of acquirers and types cannot be superimposed upon the acquirer chart in the way that they can upon the transmitter chart. Whereas the public of transmitters is governed by a principle of successive incorporation under teacher control and within a school based educational paradigm, the public of acquirers is governed almost entirely by a principle of exclusion from transmission processes in the school. We can understand why this is so if we look in more detail at what is involved when the positions occupied by the publics of transmitters become part of the subject matter of an educational transmission.

The first point to note is that the categories of transmitters are represented within the educational programme in their specialised occupational roles - as supervisors and functionaries. In other words, they are positioned according to the principle of the dominant system of social classification. The educational programme both defines their position and the knowledge that they can transmit. These citizens function within the programme as exemplars of the position they occupy in the social division of labour. To the extent that they are involved in the evaluation process of the programme, e.g. reporting to teachers on pupils' performance on community work, they are in effect reporting on how well the pupils are meeting the requirements and criteria of performance in that situation. In that educational transmission processes are fundamentally to do with constructing specific categories of subjects, the pupils are being inculcated in the performance-practices that are appropriate to the positions that the transmitters represent. The
practices form the content of the transmission. Now if the transmitters became acquirers within that same educational programme it would not be the practices that constituted the content (because they are already competent performers) but the positions themselves. Because education necessarily involves the development of elaborated orientations, where the individual (as a positioned subject) takes his or her own practices as the object of study, then they stand to be revealed precisely as positioned practices.

We can now see more clearly what is entailed by the oppositional elaborated position. Willis has demonstrated the continuities between the school counter-culture and that of the shop-floor. Positions in the social division of labour are accompanied by their informal cultures representing, in varying degrees, partial penetrations of their conditions of existence. These partial penetrations are expressed in a cultural mode and represent oppositional restricted codes. The oppositional elaborated position represents the possibility of agents positioned within those conditions developing elaborated orientations towards their practices. It is notable that education operates in our society almost invariably as a mechanism for shifting subjects from one position to another within the social division of labour: from children outside the labour process to adults within the labour process, from positions in one part of the occupational structure to positions in another part. In other words, the development of elaborated orientations through education invariably occurs where individuals are directed towards new sets of unfamiliar positioned-practices so that it is the practices not the positions which become the object. In the few
cases where this does not occur, the educational programme is invariably constructed within an individualising, psychologistic paradigm, e.g. as in management training.

The social education paradigm is inherently unstable because by virtue of its field of study - social life within the pupils' own community - and its connection with critical social science disciplines (reflected in the backgrounds of the teachers most likely to be recruited to teach it), plus its radical position within the educationalist field it contains the possibility of shifting into a collective/sociologistic form and adopting a radical ameliorative programme. Where citizens can participate in the programme not simply as supervisors or functionaries but as representatives then the possibility arises for critical discourse between representatives, pupils and teachers. Any programme that can actually entertain the view of citizens as representatives is automatically conferring such status upon their knowledge that it becomes a coherent move for control to pass from teachers to representatives. This takes us to the limit of the doxa.

The outstanding feature of the social and life skills/vocational preparation paradigm that is massively replacing social education is its individualistic/psychologistic character. The explicit aim of social and life skills training is to focus upon precisely defined sets of narrow behavioural objectives. At the same time as focussing upon practices it occludes positions by ejecting any elaborating knowledge content. In its institutional arrangements the new training programme is taking effective control out of the hands of educationalists (who have an indirect relationship to production) and placing it in the hands of
representatives of industry (who have a direct relationship to production).

At the same time the implementation of the programme is becoming the responsibility not of teachers but of supervisors with no theoretical knowledge background. At both levels the link with the forms of knowledge is being broken.

THE NEW PARADIGM

The analysis in the preceding section attempted to indicate why a particular logic of development within an educational paradigm with an elaborating orientation can necessitate a shift towards a paradigm with a restricting orientation. Essentially this shift can be interpreted as a repositioning of youth in relation to the critical potential of theoretical knowledge. It involves a fundamental change in the principle regulating access to knowledge and the relationship between practices and knowledge. The earlier contrast between social education and social and life skills training showed how the latter divorces practices (performances) from the possibility of critical reflection. The years in which the Manpower Services Commission has been in existence have seen a remarkable development in its scope, powers and aspirations. Prately describes the early development in this way:

When the MSC was established, the TSA (Training Services Agency-R.M.) prepared the report "Vocational Preparation for Young People"(1975), which describes some of the then limited facilities for training unemployed young people, and largely excuses itself for limiting training opportunities by describing the lack of motivation among the young (Paragraph 3.36-38). However, it does give great attention to the need for general vocational preparation for the large numbers of employed young people who receive no training, and suggests that more unemployed youngsters could be accommodated on
these 'gateway' courses, on 'short industrial courses' for skills improvement, and on 'Wider Opportunities' courses for the least well motivated. In short, in 1975, the TSA was seeing the solution for the unemployed in a small expansion of its existing provision. By 1977, it was obvious that something much more dramatic was called for, as youth unemployment continued to rise, and the MSC published a feasibility study on a large scale programme of new opportunities for unemployed young people called "Young People and Work", otherwise known as the Holland Report, after Geoffrey Holland, its committee chairman. Most of the initiatives from this point onwards stemmed from recommendations in this report, and after the MSC was reorganised in 1978, these initiatives became the responsibility of the new Special Programmes Division, headed by Geoffrey Holland. The "Holland Programme" as it was frequently referred to, later to be named the Youth Opportunities Programme, consisted of a development of the new schemes, supplemented by some new proposals, all brought together in a single programme which was designed to respond to the many different needs of young people in various parts of the country.

(Prately B. 1980 p42)

Although YOP is the best known of the SPD schemes, there were in fact a range of provisions provided and the most recent developments, associated with the New Training Initiative (1981) White Paper which laid the basis for the Youth Training Scheme (1983), have been mainly concerned with unifying and extending the system. The NTI lead to the creation of the Youth Task Group which comprised representatives from the CBI, TUC, Local Authorities, Youth organisations, the careers service and teaching unions. The YTG report outlined the framework for the YTS (at variance on some issues with the government’s proposals). The aim was that,

In 1983/4 the scheme would cater for employed and unemployed 16 year olds (including apprentices) who have left full-time education, and 17 year old school-leavers who become unemployed in their post-school year. It would serve 460,000 young people.
In 1984/5 and beyond the aim is to extend provision to other 17 year olds as well, so that by 1985 opportunities on the scheme might be offered to all 16 and 17 year olds leaving education for work, whether employed or unemployed. (Farley M. June 1982 p14)

In 1979/80 there were 216,000 young people on YOP type courses, and 22,400 (including people aged 19+) on the Special Temporary Employment Programme. The total costs of the MSC were £174.6 million pounds. The YTS will be costing £1.1 billion by 1984/5 and catering for over half a million young people. The rapid development of the MSC has been accompanied by the growth of agencies (both internal and external) which have constructed the approaches and programmes employed.

It is not possible to examine these developments in great detail here, but there are three important aspects of the MSC's growth and position that need to be emphasised:

(1) in contrast to the DES, the MSC is a centralised organisation. Many of the features referred to in the Green Paper and advocated by employers in particular (though, it should be noted, by the unions too), such as greater standardisation of teaching methods and evaluation, representation of industry, concern with basic skills, which were difficult to implement within the traditionally decentralised and teacher dominated educational system are being built into the MSC directly. An extremely important aspect of the MSC structure is the limitation upon teacher autonomy and the fact that it has a direct relationship to production. It represents a fundamental shift in the systemic relationship between education and production. The educationalist paradigm has not been so much subverted as by-passed.

- 416 -
(2) the FE sector has had to accommodate a sudden influx of students who differ fundamentally from the traditional craft, vocational and academic students. These people have required a new type of provision - vocational preparation etc. In this respect the situation in FE directly parallels that in the schools in the Newsom period, although FE's response has been developed within a radically different paradigm. FEU documents such as "Vocational Preparation" (1981), "A Basis for Choice" (1979) and "Basic Skills" (1982) have developed the fundamentals of a new, unified approach with social and life skills training as its core. Numerous other agencies concerned with youth work (e.g. National Youth Bureau, Youth Aid, Community Service Volunteers) and with industry (7) have produced teaching materials.

Prately distinguishes between a number of different types of provision in FE in addition to the traditional academic and vocational courses. She says that,

Both the increase in youth unemployment and the gradual rising of educational aspirations have had some dramatic implications for further education. Not only has this sector become involved in courses for those who have actually been unemployed..., but the spectre of youth unemployment seems to have caused an increased demand for further education from those who are aware of their possible deficiencies in the employment market. There is a feeling that more education is good insurance, although the demand is often ill-defined.

(ibid p29)

She points out that young people following full-time voc-prep courses prior to starting work are a different category to those who are unemployed:

With courses for the unemployed, one is not catering for young people who do not yet feel ready for work, and therefore ask for a college course, but for those who are ready for work, who have attempted to find it, and are registered as unemployed because they have failed in their search. More
than the others, these young people may have to be persuaded that a further course of education and training is in their interest.

(ibid p41)

Despite these differences between the groups of young people, the type of provision being suggested is essentially similar, as a comparison of appropriate FEU documents (e.g. "Supporting YOP", "Experience, Reflection, Learning") shows. The diagram from Prately reproduced on the next page indicates the variety of provisions available at that time.

The FEU's "Vocational Preparation" (1981) outlined the basis for a unified approach to provision for the 50% of 16-19 year olds who are not served by existing facilities: young people in the great variety of pre-employment courses, those in employment with no training opportunities, and those who are unemployed. The more recent document "Basic Skills" follows-up that initiative. The central concept is that of "skill". "Vocational Preparation" distinguishes between three broad categories of young people: those following traditional academic courses, those following traditional vocational/technical courses, and those on vocational preparation - the latter being further sub-divided in the manner just described. This organisation is associated with the manner in which curricular objectives can be derived as the bases for courses. In the first case the curriculum is defined by the demands of higher education, in the second it is defined by the skill requirements of the craft or vocation (e.g. nursery nursing), in the third it needs to be 'negotiated'. The practice of 'negotiation' is indicative of the personalised approach of voc-prep type provision. Not only does it individualise the range of problems addressed in the course, but it breaks down the sense of group membership or solidarity which can emerge in more conventional class based teaching and which, as Lee argues, is actively promoted by social education.
The personalised approach reflects the major problem of this type of provision - how to construct a content for the curriculum. The relative lack of skill content in the jobs in which these young people are most likely to be employed and their rejection of academic educational careers leaves a crucial lacuna. The solution adopted is to start from the trainee him/herself and to construct a particular type of model of the trainee.

The authors of "Vocational Preparation" say:

We start from the point that in this document we are considering the developmental needs of adolescents in the 16-19 age range. The problems of adolescence, although often exaggerated, remain real and enduring, differing in the stage at which they are resolved for each young person. There is no lack of evidence to indicate that if a satisfactory transition to adulthood is to be made, some form of self-fulfilment has to be acquired by the adolescent... For the low achiever without the supportive framework of proven conventional academic success, and without a job or any foreseeable career development, the acquisition of self-achievement becomes a near impossible task. Any curriculum process which contributes positively to a young person's essential personal development can be defined therefore as an essential social process.

(FeU 1981 p11 para24)

There are two particularly significant points here. Firstly there is the psychological developmental model which appears to underpin thinking in this paradigm, and secondly there is the equally pervasive view that only official agencies can support and enable the transition to adulthood.

The first assumption enables the construction of a deficit model of the trainee which is similar to that found in social education, but whereas in the latter the model was derived from a concept of "the socially handicapped community", in this case it is derived from a developmental psychological theory. Young people in the target group are now seen as having to cope with
the problems of the transition to adulthood and the capacity to resolve these problems relates to a) the 'stage' they have reached in their maturation process, and b) the availability of supportive agencies (schools, colleges, apprenticeships). What the second point achieves is the eclipsing of the cultural processes and traditions of the young person's own community, both its general culture and the youth culture. The development of competence is seen as not possible without the support of official agencies. Once again we can see how this creates the ideological effect of translating the problem of the young person's position in society into a problem located in the young person him/herself. Hence in this respect the voc-prep ideology is similar to social education. The important difference lies in the fact that the latter constructs its model on the basis of a radical analysis of the community and adopts a sociological/collectivist approach, whereas the former utilises a psychologistic/individualistic approach and a maturation theory of the individual.

At the time of ROSLA, the Schools Council believed that a third of young people in the schools were in the problematical category of "reluctant attenders". Today the FEU calculates the problem group as comprising "about half of the sixteen year old age group" (ibid p11 para26)! The following statement embodies a number of fundamental assumptions in the new approach:

For all young people the transition from school or college to work or unemployment can be a traumatic experience. The ease of this transition has much to do with the stage of maturation of the young school-leaver and there is some evidence to indicate that the transition is a less acute problem.
for the academic young person than the non-academic. Traditionally the more academic pupil tends to 'buy time' by staying on in education. The apprentice, though perhaps less academic, tends to enter his world of work via protective agreements, invariably supported by release to college. The low achiever, who is probably the least able to come to terms with the outside world, is the least supported in this transition. When jobs are plentiful there is some evidence that they 'survive' this transition by frequently changing jobs in the initial stages. Increasing unemployment now precludes this strategy. It follows that for all young people some form of vocational preparation is a necessity and in the long-term a more comprehensive provision of this element of education and training may well be seen as making a major contribution to the flexible work-force that our changing technologies appear to demand.

Material considered throughout this work suggests that on every count, the assertions and assumptions in this statement are wrong. It is interesting that a footnote on the page from which the above is taken refers the reader to the review of research by Clarke referred to above. Strangely, Clarke's conclusions are precisely the opposite of the views expressed by "Vocational Preparation". She says, for instance, that,

The great majority of young workers express themselves as content or satisfied in their jobs. Although nearly half the youngsters change jobs at least once in the early years, and a small proportion change several times, this has no harmful effects in terms of economic or occupational disadvantage. (Clarke L. op cit pl0)

I have already quoted her conclusion that the great majority of young people adjust easily to working life and that the non-academic ones tend to do so even better than the others.

(3) The shift from an elaborating to a restricting orientation pivots about the concept of skill. Skills, as opposed to knowledge, provide the content of
The curriculum'. "Basic Skills" says that,

The term skill includes not only the industrial connotation of a skilled worker but also a psychological perspective. The psychological use of the term skill is that skilled performance requires perceptions, decision-making, knowledge, judgements and understanding, and at the same time all skills involve some kind of co-ordinated, overt activity by hands, of speech etc.

(FEU 1982 p1)

Skills are essentially **skilled performances**. The most striking feature of the presentation of the concept is the 'atomisation' of social action. Each skill is treated as a **discrete item**. This approach is revealingly displayed in the FEU's documents themselves and some examples have been appended to the end of this chapter.

The most significant aspect of the development of the skills concept is the manner in which **social and life skills** have been aligned with a particular concept of **job skills** (see appended material). It was noted earlier how the topic of "the world of work" in the school curriculum has always been blighted by the lack of any precise definition of the actual requirements of working life. As mentioned in ch. 6 the MSC has initiated a major research programme into this area. In recent times there have been around fifty projects investigating the area of skills for employment ("Basic Skills" p31). The MSC itself was involved in the "London Into Work Development Project" (with the ILEA and DES) which was carried out by the Institute of Manpower Studies, and the Young People Starting Work Project (in conjunction with Leeds, Liverpool and Coventry LEAs), which was carried out by the Social and Applied Psychology Unit at Sheffield University. In both cases these projects were concerned to identify specific skills in particular jobs and to describe those which form 'families' -
the aim being to develop transferability in the skills acquired between occupations. Both job skills and social and life skills assume the same basic behavioural form.

I suggested above that the shift from the educationalist paradigm in which social education was grounded to the technicist-training paradigm involves the separation of practices from theoretical forms of discourse. Performance rather than knowledge become the content of the curriculum. Although the technicist-training paradigm is produced by agents of symbolic control who are themselves located within a field of theoretical discourse, the programmes they construct render that field inaccessible both to 'trainees' and supervisors. Whereas the liberal-humanist educational paradigm (in both its traditional elitist and egalitarian-progressive forms) saw education as the cultivation of an idealised subject and was (at least potentially) both reflexive and critical towards society (it is important to remember that the traditional-elitist position is associated with and largely grounded in a conservative critique of modernism and industrialism), the technicist-training paradigm is concerned essentially with adjustment.

The above characterisation of the paradigm should not be allowed to obscure the fact that in its direct implementation contradictions are likely to occur. First, in CFEs, lecturers will still largely be the products of the liberal-humanist tradition and will be interpreting and applying the new programmes in a way which might reflect this. Teachers at all levels, confront before all else the problem of control and the pragmatic centrality of this fact means that no educational programme can be simply and directly imposed - implementation
of policy is always mediated by the pragmatics of the transmitter/acquirer relationship. As Prately indicates (see Prately op cit p34), FE lecturers have not traditionally seen their role in terms of teaching non-academic or non-vocational students. The new "low-level" YOP and YTS entrants to the colleges are imposing considerable strains upon them. Even where trainees are being supervised by non-teachers (often skilled workers taken off the dole queues), there is evidence that the problems they encounter having to deal with frustrated and disenchanted young people are leading to more critical and radical positions being adopted (e.g. in terms of equipping the youngsters with skills for the black economy) (8). It is also the case that some FE teachers have located the new approach within their own radical ideology. Boffy and Cave, for instance, have argued (9) that the significant feature of the YTS will be the degree of control it can place directly in the hands of the learner and the tutor. In a somewhat similar fashion the trade unions and the Labour Party are tending to be generally supportive of the new system because of the way in which its institutions incorporated trade-union representation (10).

CONCLUSION

I have argued, in this chapter, that the rise of the Manpower Services Commission and the educational/training programmes associated with it marks a fundamental shift from the liberal-humanist educationalist paradigm (traditional-elitist and egalitarian-progressive) to a behaviouristic technicist-training paradigm. I argued that this shift can be observed in a comparison between social
education and social and life skills training (which in turn embodies the more fundamental distinction which Reed identifies between the monitoring and adjustment tendencies in educational thought). I described this in terms of a shift from an elaborating orientation to a restricting orientation. The former indicates that educational practices are grounded in theoretical discourse which remains (however tenuously) available to both teachers and pupils and can impart critical facilities. The latter indicates that that link has been broken. Practices are presented simply as skilled performances. That this shift should occur was explained in terms of the effects of mass youth unemployment in opening a space within the evolution of the social career path by extending the period of the transition to work. In 'the Newsom period' the schools responded to the crisis of control created by the extending of educational careers by differentiating their pedagogic process. This entailed changes in the principles regulating access to elaborated orientations. The possibility of a smooth transition into working life countered the potentially radical implications of this repositioning of certain categories of youth. The advent of youth unemployment changes this situation. It was demonstrated how changes in the regulation of the relationship between school and community knowledge and between categories of transmitters and acquirers (an extension of the sociologistic/collectivist logic of social education) could bring about a radical repositioning of groups relative to theoretical discourse.

The significance of the technicist-training paradigm lies not so much in what it actively contributes (the idea that it increases the employability of young people by providing them with relevant skills is almost entirely spurious), but in
the manner in which it closes down the space which unemployment has opened up and forestalls the logic of development described above. In what might be appropriately called 'the Holland period', the situation of CFEs is analogous to that of the school fourth and fifth years in the 'Newsom period', and there are parallels in the ways in which FE has responded - differentiation, deficit model of the trainee, etc. There are similarities within the shift which has occurred. A crucial element in the shift is that the centralised MSC structure entails a shift in power away from educationalists with an indirect relationship to production towards agents with a direct relationship to production. Hence a fundamental change has occurred in the systemic relationship between education and production. This is reflected in the ideologies: in particular in the replacement in the curriculum of knowledge by skills. The situation can be represented as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARADIGM</th>
<th>LIBERAL-HUMANIST</th>
<th>TECHNICIST-TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;the world of work&quot;</td>
<td>vocational preparation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social studies</td>
<td>social education</td>
<td>social and life skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter-positional pedagogy</td>
<td>rising youth unemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% increases 1973-8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE 'A'</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCE 'O'</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE 1</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE 2</td>
<td>130%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSE 3</td>
<td>205%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIC</td>
<td>CRITICAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter-personal pedagogy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWSOM 1963</td>
<td>ROSLA 1972/3</td>
<td>HOLLAND (YOP) 1979 YTS 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE RELATION</td>
<td>DES: decentralised</td>
<td>MSC: centralised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATION/PRODUCTION SYSTEMIC RELATION</td>
<td>INDIRECT</td>
<td>DIRECT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF AGENTS</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORIENTATION</td>
<td>ELABORATING</td>
<td>RESTRICTING</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN


(2) information on the backgrounds of MSC course supervisors can be found in MSC (undated).

(3) see Shelton L (1979).

(4) Eggleston gives the following case:

An example known to the writer was in a community service project in a 'twilight' area which constitutes the school's catchment area. The senior pupils had a local reputation for indifferent or even anti-social behaviour. A young teacher with these senior pupils undertook an impressive programme of socially approved activity whereby the boys and girls created and ran a playground, dug old people's gardens, painted their walls, cleared the local brook of debris and generally brought acceptable improvements to a rundown area. There was widespread social approval for the project. The pupils were widely praised. The civic leaders visited them; the local newspaper featured them. The teacher soon received a graded post. But events did not end there; the teacher and his pupils began to realise that the old people still had fundamental problems that could not be solved by direct action alone. They had difficulty obtaining their rate rebate, the local council was tardy in the repair of roofs and blocked drains and other maintenance of a kind that was beyond the scope of children. With the teacher the children decided that some further action was needed and wrote to the local housing committee and to the local newspaper about the problems urging immediate action. The response was different in nature from that which they had enjoyed previously. This time the local paper was distinctly unenthusiastic about their 'interference' and redefined them as a group of teenage troublemakers led by a 'radical' teacher. The coincidence that the chairman of the local housing committee was also a member of the local education committee appeared to lead to several problems with the school. Certainly the teacher was encouraged not to continue with this particular line of action and the project was discontinued.

Here we have reached one of the fundamental truths of the reflexive
that the curriculum is about the distribution of power. The community service project offered previously powerless adolescents the chance to exercise power in society. (Eggleston J. 1977, pp82-83)

See Williams and Rennie (1972) on the distinction between "community service" and a social education "action survey" and also Whitty G. 1976.

(5) for a relevant discussion on the character of a 'radical' curriculum see Entwhistle (1979) on Gramsci.

(6) fig. 7:3 can be related to fig. 3:2 - essentially 7:3 plots the movement towards the "oppositional elaborated" position in 3:2.

(7) the Department of Industry supports a wide range of school/industry link schemes, and many large companies promote such links themselves.

(8) see Watts A.G. (1982).

(9) see Moos M. (1982) in NATFHE Journal No. 6 Oct. '82 and the reply by Boffy and Cave in the following issue.

(10) see Gleeson D. ed. 1983 for a collection of papers discussing issues in the general area of the MSC, youth training, vocational preparation etc.
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SEVEN


Davies B. (1979) In Whose Interest - from social education to social and life skills training NYB, Leicester


Farley M. (1982) "Youth Task Group Report", in NATFHE Journal vol. 7 No. 4 June '82

FEU (1979a) A Basis for Choice FEU, London

FEU (1979b) Supporting YOP, FEU, London


Lee R. (1980)
Manpower Services Commission
(undated)

Prately B. (1982)
Reeder, D. (1979)
Shelton L (1979)
Whitty G. (1976)

Manpower Services Commission

Moos M. (1982)

"MSC - a wolf in sheeps clothing?"
in NATFHE Journal Oct. 1982

Instructional Guide to Social and Life Skills MSC/TSA London

"A Recurring Debate: education and industry" in Bernbaum G. ed. 1979

"Community Service and the Curriculum" in Community Education Autumn 1979

"The Informal Economies and the FE Curriculum" in NATFHE Journal Vol. 7 No. 4 June 1982

"Studying Society: for Social Change or Social Control?"
in Whitty G. & Young M.F.D. eds. 1976

Beyond Coping, FEU, London

Five Community Service Schemes: a summary of research SPD/PD2 Sheffield

Signposts, FEU/HMSO, London
SECTION FOUR

REPRODUCTION

The final section will attempt to draw together the main themes developed in the work and to discuss various of their implications. Chapter eight will be particularly concerned with defining the material location of "educational decision fields". The process of educational decision making will be located within a "culturalist perspective". Work upon labour markets, income distribution and class images of society will be drawn upon in order to describe complex social structural formations within which categories of pupils might plausibly be seen as developing specific identities, values and orientations which are realised through the practices associated with distinctive ideologies of class, gender, ethnicity and labour. At a more theoretical level this approach will be related to the labour theory of value and the distinction between the social relations of production and social relationships in production. This distinction will be related to the concept of the circuits of capital and this, in turn, to Marx's theory of need in relation to theories of consumption. Consumption will be viewed as the material process through which identities and social careers are realised, and 'the world of goods' will be seen as a symbolic representation of the classification of the social division of labour. The major implication of this for reproduction theories and theories of cultural transmission is that the emphasis should switch away from relationships in production to the realm of material cultural practices which precede and contextualise involvement in production. The conclusion will summarise the arguments developed throughout the work.

- 436 -
CHAPTER EIGHT
PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION

In this final chapter I will attempt to draw together some of the themes which have been prominent throughout this work. In particular I will look at the issue of reproduction in relation to education and production. The central argument in this work has been that the relationship between education and production does not provide the principle for understanding what happens in education. I have argued for a view of a weak systemic relationship between education and production. On this basis it becomes possible to treat education as a system and to study what happens within it in terms of transformational principles specific to it. I have related events within education to changes brought about by critical developments in the pupil population which result from changes in the labour market - specifically in the relationship between social background, educational levels and the occupational structure. A crucial component in this argument has been the idea that pupils' attitudes to education, and in particular to extended educational careers, are the major factor in determining their position relative to the school under the conditions of change outlined. Attitude towards schooling has been related to more complex conceptions of consciousness - specifically to ideologies of identity, membership, gender and work. Essentially the assumption has been that conflicts develop between the need to extend the educational career and the desire to develop the social career. Extended schooling interrupts the social career by postponing the transition to work - occasioning a conflict of role and identity. These are the themes which I now want to bring together.
I suggested in chapter six that we should treat with some degree of scepticism the idea that employers are extremely dissatisfied with the quality of young workers. I produced evidence to indicate that this is not so. Obviously this raises the question, why, then are so many young people unable to find work? Why is youth suffering unemployment disproportionately relative to other categories of workers? The answer lies simply in the fact that they are young. This is reflected in the data on employers' attitudes to young workers. They are most likely to be seen as differing from older ones on the age-related attributes such as experience and maturity (see table 6:1). It is not so much that employers are dissatisfied with young workers as that young workers are their least preferred category. The Holland report says that,

Whilst a little over a third of employers thought there was no difference, those employers who did state a preference were, in almost all cases, more likely to prefer other recruits to young people. This was especially true when young people were compared to up-graded existing employees, those recruited from other firms or women returning to work. (Holland op cit p41)

Employers' preference for older workers reflects the fact that it is experience and on-the-job training which counts rather than education. However, it is not simply a matter of experience. It is not the case that work experience provision in itself can compensate for that which young people lack. As Richards' study of employers' attitudes shows, they are mostly concerned with attitude - this was why out of school work was treated as far more significant than school-based work experience.
Attitude to work is not just a matter of emotional maturity.

Blackburn and Mann found that:

The ideal worker is male, around thirty, married with small children, related to other employees and with a stable educational and work history. He is not necessarily cleverer than other workers, but his commitments are less likely to make him jeopardise his job. (Blackburn and Mann op cit p13)

What is significant about the ideal worker has nothing to do with the specifics of his education, it is simply that he is a thirty year old man with a wife and children, etc. In other words, and this is the crucial point, the employers' preferences refer not to intrinsic personality factors developed by a specialised socialising agency but to life cycle characteristics. The difference between the older worker and the young worker reflects their differing situations, their different sets of commitments and responsibilities. Their descriptions can be treated as co-ordinates in social space, locating them at different points on the trajectories of their social career paths.

'The Lad's' commitment to what he is is simultaneously a commitment to what he will become - the 'ideal' worker. It is not so much "the dull compulsion of the labour market" which disciplines workers today by the brute necessities of subsistence, but rather the range of developed commitments which catch them in, what Blackburn and Mann term, "the life cycle squeeze" (ibid p108).

As far as employment and the labour market is concerned employers' preferences become significant through the mechanism of the opportunity structure. Preferences provide the principles organising labour queues. Thurow
has argued that the traditional "wage competition" model of the labour market, based in classic demand and supply principles, fails to account for the realities of life in the labour market. He suggests instead a "job competition" model in which:

...an individual's income is determined by (a) his relative position in the labour queue and (b) the distribution of job opportunities in the economy. Wages are based on the characteristics of the job, and workers are distributed across job opportunities on the basis of their relative position in the labour queue. The most preferred workers get the best (highest income) jobs. According to this model, labour skills do not exist in the labour market; on the contrary, most actual job skills are acquired informally through on-the-job training after a worker finds an entry job and a position on the associated promotional ladder. (Thurow L. 1977 p328)

This principle, associated with the development of internal labour markets, explains much of why there is only a poor association between educational level (usually fixed at entry point unless an individual continues to study part-time) and actual job held (see chapter four) (1).

Thurow points out that, "Entirely subjective and arbitrary elements may also affect the labour queue." (ibid p329). Employers' prejudices (2) can influence where groups stand in the labour queue. Blackburn and Mann, for instance, report that,

Most writers characterise employer selection procedures for manual workers as haphazard. Only a minority conduct tests of aptitude, intelligence or literacy, and the normal reliance is on informal, highly subjective interviews conducted by personnel managers or production foreman. (Blackburn and Mann op cit pl08).

This subjective element will differentiate groups which might be similar in
educational level (e.g. black from white, male from female, Catholic from Protestant). When unemployment is high, employers will simply be able to recruit more of their most preferred categories. They do not have to go very far along the queue to get all the workers they need. Because skills are acquired on-the-job rather than pre-existing them, the specific educational characteristics of workers are of little relevance. Where the skill content of the work is of a low order in any case, life cycle characteristics and the social skills necessary to fit in and get on with work-mates (skills which are culturally acquired within the class) come to the fore. Blackburn and Mann say that "Using technical notions of 'skill', we find that almost all workers use less skill at work than they do, for example, in driving a car." (ibid p12) They estimate that about 85% of the workers in their study could have done 95% of the jobs in the associated labour market.

If we make a purely analytical distinction between the technical and social/ideological aspects of jobs, (3) it seems to be the case that the abilities required for the former are widely distributed and that relatively few jobs involve levels of proficiency of such a high order that they would debar the majority of the population. It is also the case that the competence to acquire the requisite social skills is widely available, as the material on social mobility, work-life histories and substitution examined in chapter four indicates. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the evidence does not suggest that education either blocks or promotes the formation of appropriate attitudes to a great degree.
The opportunity structure/labour queue model (4) indicates that even after the changing relationship between educational and occupational categories is taken into account it will still be the case that at any point in time the actual distribution of agents will be only approximately determined by the relationships between categories. The actual distribution will be a function of the ratio of agents to places. Simply having the right qualification will not guarantee a job (5). The currently appropriate qualifications will be means around which labour queues form according to the aggregation of agents to places at each level. The salience of education, and all the other factors which come into the employers' preferences (race, gender, etc.) will depend upon the opportunity structure at any point in time and how discriminating it allows them to be.

Although individuals can acquire a great deal of information about the relationships between categories, from the careers service, newspaper advertisements, etc. they will have little knowledge of the opportunity structure. Consequently it is the category relationship which will affect pupils' educational aspirations as a function of their occupational aspirations. However, it is the opportunity structure which will determine their actual destination. The educational mix within an occupational category will be contingent upon a number of factors: changing relationships between categories through time, the state of the opportunity structure at different points in time, mobility through internal labour markets, movement between sectors, etc. Much of what happens in education can be understood as responses to the implications for pupils' consciousness of changes in the relationships between educational and occupational categories.
THE STRUCTURAL LOCATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL DECISION FIELD

The argument being advanced here is that it is not so much that educational attainment determines occupational placement as that occupational aspirations determine educational attainment — more specifically, the point at which individuals feel they can quit the school (6). Educational decision making processes are the product of specific orientations grounded in forms of class consciousness and realised under material conditions critically focussed within the labour market. Boudon defines the "educational decision field" as a "secondary effect" of social stratification. As described earlier, Boudon distinguishes between "primary and secondary effects" of stratification on education. Primary effects can be seen as the forms of material and cultural disadvantages which sociologists have traditionally invoked in order to explain working class underachievement at school. Boudon demonstrates that these factors are of diminishing significance, both historically and within the context of an educational career. Secondary effects, however, increase in significance as careers progress and are the major factor in accounting for class differences. Secondary effects are to do with values, orientations and the sense of identity and membership. I have suggested that "Learning to Labour" can be seen as an exploration of the cultural logic of a specific educational decision field. In "Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality", Boudon explicates his concept in terms of the social and psychological 'costs' associated with atypical educational careers for members of different groups. In the more recent "The Logic of Social Action" he appears to be opting for a narrower economistic
version of 'costs' in terms of a human capital type view of education as
an investment. A similar approach has been taken by Halsey et al in
"Origins and Destinations". My own view is that this economistic approach
is sociologically inadequate and that a cultural perspective, though less
amenable to formal quantification techniques, is richer and more complex.
It is the culturalist perspective (closer to Boudon's original formulation)
which will be adopted here.

Income Career and Class Image

Boudon says little about the actual structural location and deter-
minants of decision fields. A useful lead on how they can be related to social
structure has been given by Tyler who relates Boudon's concept to Lane's
theory of educational decision making. Tyler summarises the situation as
follows:

Lane offers an economic explanation of educational choice not
in terms of the size of parents' income, but in terms of what
he calls "income career". This is the pattern of earnings of
the father over time. On this it is claimed the child constructs
his 'model of the world' and consequently derives the value of
having a certain credential. Whether or not an extra year of
education is perceived as useful is then not related to the father's
economic well-being, but rather to the cultural orientations of the
home based in the stability and predictability of his income. This
is not the same thing either as 'social status' since it is possible
to enjoy different 'income careers' within the same broad status
level. It may be possible then to use this concept to account for
the differences in values and cultural influences of the home in
economic terms.

This concept of 'income career' may perhaps be linked to a 'social
position' theory to arrive at a rather tighter explanation of edu-
cational choice than has been so far presented. This is because
Lane may have identified a common source of both 'primary' or
cultural effects and of 'secondary' or 'positional' effects in terms of Boudon's model of choice. The parents' 'income career' may be the basis of the cultural variables associated with achievement and aspirations. (Tyler W. 1977 pp107-8)

This approach has a number of virtues:

(1) it gets away from a simplistic 'social inequality' view of income differences in terms of mean differences in incomes associated with educational and occupational levels. This enables the construction of more sociologically complex formations associated with income.

(2) it makes possible the identification of a factor which can vary within as well as between classes. I have already pointed to the significant differences which exist between groups such as professionals, and managers and employers in terms of education and career mobility routes which occupy a similar general status position. Equally, similarities can be seen in attitudes towards the value of educational credentials between the views of certain types of employers (such as small proprietors) and of certain types of workers (such as manual workers). Within the working class itself there seems to be a distinct difference between the attitudes of skilled and unskilled workers towards education. Hence it is possible to view 'classes' as exhibiting complex internal structures which involve deep divisions in terms of values and orientations.

(3) it suggests that we can look for associations between forms of consciousness and forms of labour market which go some way beyond the 'occupational communities' which have traditionally formed the topic for studies of class imagery.
Lane points to problems associated with traditional explanations of class differentials in education, and in particular to the problem of accounting for intra-class variance. He argues that a successful theory must be able to account for both differentials and variance, and that this should be done in terms of a factor which varies within as well as between classes. He argues that educational choices should not be treated in isolation:

...like all decisions, they are explored, weighed, and ultimately resolved within a general and systematic framework of social knowledge from which are derived notions about what types of actions are efficacious and what types are not. That is to say, men possess relatively systematic maps or pictures of the world in which they live, and from these they are able to determine (to their own satisfaction) what is and is not possible. In this paper I postulate that these systematic ideas are not automatically absorbed, by some species of osmosis, from the environment, as most discussion of class values implicitly assumes, but rather are constructed out of experience by acts of conscious or semi-conscious ratiocination.

(Lane M. 1972 p257)

The basis for class images being proposed here is experiential and the material dimension of that experience is located in the characteristics of the income career.

Lane draws a broad distinction between middle and working class income careers. The former is characterised by a steady, incremental growth whereas the latter are fluctuating, non-incremental and less secure.

The figure on the next page illustrates these differences.
Willis contrasts the Lads' view of work as an undifferentiated world of 'graft' with the careers teacher's middle class conception of jobs as individuated careers between which one chooses on the basis of their relative merits. In line with Lane's view, the Lads' approach is based on experience (as equally is the teacher's) -- work is simply work and the apparent differences between types of manual labour are immaterial. This experiential basis for class knowledge convinces the Lads that they are right and the teacher wrong. As Lane argues, the models which people construct on the basis of their experience and the tradition on which it draws, organise their actions and the decisions they make.

The concept of 'income career', as presented in Lane's paper, needs to be more fully developed in order to become sociologically complex enough
to support the complicated class imagery with which he wishes to associate it. Lydall has shown, on the basis of an extensive comparative analysis, that income distribution tends to adopt a characteristic curve, which he terms the Standard Distribution of Income. The distribution tends to be positively skewed and lognormal:

A peculiarity of this distribution, however, is that it departs from the log-normal point at the upper end (7). Lydall explains this fact by arguing that the top twenty percentiles or so of income are determined by a particular principle which relates to the characteristics of modern corporate organisations:

...if managerial hierarchies are built on the principle that each manager supervises directly the same number of people in the next rank below him, and if his earnings bear a constant proportion to the aggregate earnings of those whom he supervises directly, the distribution of earnings of managers will conform to the Pareto law.

(Lydall 1976 p28)

The significant feature of the function which has become known as "Lydall's Law" is that it is explained in a sociological fashion, i.e. on the basis of the features of organisations and a convention supported by those who exercise power in those organisations.
The process of disaggregation of the Standard curve has been extended by Phelps-Brown who argues that,

The wide manifestation of the lognormal form or lognormal-Paretan hybrid is striking, and highly suggestive of some basic processes being at work that are common to a number of different economies. But these forms appear only when we bring together into one distribution persons of many different types: more homogeneous groups show a variety of forms.
(Phelps-Brown op cit p287)

He illustrates this with the following graph:

**Fig. 8:3**

(from ibid fig. 9:3c)

Hence the Standard distribution can be seen as a "hybrid form" composed of a number of different distributions for different groups.

Thatcher has analysed data from the New Earnings Survey for 1968 and 1970-3. He concludes that:

The overall distribution is a mixture of several component distributions, notably manual men, non-manual men, manual women, non-manual women, juveniles and part-time workers. There is a gain in understanding if these components are considered separately.
(Thatcher A.R. 1976 p227)
Thatcher's study provides more detail on the distinction between manual and non-manual income careers to which Lane refers. In particular it is notable that the earnings of manual men are highly variable year by year. Those who were high earners one year tend to be low earners the next and vice-versa, and those in the middle tend to go either up or down. These fluctuations tend to maintain a stable dispersion of earnings within the group despite the considerable fluctuations for individuals. The earnings of non-manual men have a higher median and a wider dispersion. The dispersion also tends to increase with age whereas for manual men it remains similar between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-four. It is also the case, as Lydall's distribution shows, that the upper part of the distribution adopts a Pareto form. This reflects the segmentation of the non-manual category between the upper echelons of management and the great mass of clerical workers who comprise the 'other non-manual' group.

Disaggregation of the Standard Distribution of Earnings reveals a number of distinct groups. It is important to recognise that although they differ significantly in terms of mean and median income levels, they are also hierarchically organised internally to a significant degree. This fact is sociologically significant. Routh says that "the breadth of dispersion within occupations seriously dilutes the meaning that can be attached to any absolute average, or any other expression of central tendency." (Routh G. 1980a p215). In fact the dispersion of incomes within occupational categories is nearly as great as that between them. As table 8:1 shows, there are considerable overlaps in the earnings of manual and non-manual men.
Table 8:1  Dispersions of gross weekly earnings, men 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>lowest decile</th>
<th>lower quartile</th>
<th>MEDIAN quartile</th>
<th>upper quartile</th>
<th>highest decile</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all men:</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>113.3</td>
<td>143.4</td>
<td>183.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manual:</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>156.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-man.:</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>100.4</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>163.8</td>
<td>215.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(from New Earnings Survey 1980 Summary Analyses table 15)

Historically it appears to be the case that dispersion of earnings within occupational categories is actually widening. This seems to contradict the widely held view that income distribution has remained relatively stable over a long period of time. This is certainly the case if Lorenz curve type measure of income distribution which compare percentiles of total incomes against percentiles of income units are considered. However, it is also the case that income differentials between occupational categories have narrowed. The widening of dispersion within categories counterbalances the narrowing of differentials between them. The Lorenz curve is insensitive to the source of earnings and, therefore, simply registers a stable pattern. The sociological significance of this fact is that the social composition of income groups is becoming increasingly heterogeneous. As the previous quote from Routh indicates, measures of central tendency are of little value as far as the internal structuring of the broad income groups described by Thatcher is concerned. But in terms of Lane's proposition that structuring will be of considerable significance.

This examination of income distribution data enables us to considerably
develop Lane's concept of income career. We can see the existence of distinctive groups which not only differ significantly in the characteristics of their income distributions but which also exhibit complex internal, hierarchical structures.

The Labour Market

I now want to relate the above discussion of income distribution to theories of the labour market. The aim is to map income distribution across labour markets and a corresponding segmentation of the occupational structure. The purpose, here, is to build up an increasingly sociologically complex image of a social structural formation which can be posited as the location for the distinctive forms of culture in which educational decision fields can be located.

As Routh and other commentators make clear, the drift of the above approach to the examination of income is away from the marginalism of neoclassical economic orthodoxy and towards a more sociological approach. This is exemplified in the theory of "dual labour markets" developed by the American economists, Doeringer and Piore. In this country Barbara Wooton's "The Social Foundations of Wages Policy" (1956) seriously questioned the realism of the marginalist approach and stressed the significance of custom and tradition in the shaping of economic forces in the real world. Dual labour market theory divides the economy into a primary labour market characterised by large, technologically advanced firms with complex internal organisations (internal labour markets) and, usually, a high degree of unionisation, which pay relatively well, and a secondary labour market made up of small, technologically backward firms with a low degree of internal organisation, little union...
representation and a generally informal and low wage approach to workers.

In the US this research concentrated in the way in which the secondary labour market was integrated with a segmentation of the labour force which restricted principally ghetto Blacks to that sector. This segmentation imposed work patterns which reinforced radical stereotypes and ghetto lifestyles.

In their study of Peterborough, Blackmann and Mann found a more complex structuring of the labour market:

The explanation would seem to be that the labour market contains not one but several hierarchies that can often cross-cut each other. These are, firstly the rival internal and external labour markets, where jobs can be desirable in certain respects either because the firm is 'good' (even if the job level is low), or because the job is a high-level one (even if the firm is 'bad'). Secondly, there are jobs which offer unusually unbalanced work rewards, such as assembly-line work, foundry work, many kinds of heavy labouring, where secondary workers can earn high wages doing unpleasant work...

Thus there may be effective segregation only at the extreme of the market: secondary workers will rarely have jobs which offer high rewards on all dimensions, and primary workers will rarely have generally 'bad' jobs, but in the middle there is considerable overlap.

(Blackburn and Mann op cit p28)

They make the point that racial discrimination itself can actually restrict the degree to which segmentation on race lines develops - employers will be wary of allowing the proportion of black workers in a factory to go beyond a certain level. Where segregation does exist in certain sectors it is along gender lines.

In the labour market studied by Blackburn and Mann "occupational segregation is virtually complete - men and women are almost never interchangeable as individuals in the manual labour market." (ibid p24)

The segmentation of the labour market in this way reflects customary
and conventional ideas about the appropriateness of different types of work to different categories of persons. The occupational division of labour is interpenetrating with the social division of labour. Mace says that segmented labour market theories emphasise:

- historical/structural forces as determinants of the allocation of men and jobs in the labour market, the endogenous nature of institutional forces in labour market structures, and group rather than individual patterns of behaviour.

(Mace J. 1979 p59-60)

From this point of view the labour market is not merely an emergent effect of supply and demand relationships responding to marginal changes, but a complex socio-historical construct in which economic factors are heavily mediated by social forces. There is an important sense in which the labour market structure can be seen as the produce of an ongoing negotiation between workers and managers within the context of power relationships. The maintenance of traditional demarcation lines in industry is an obvious example of the way in which entrenched custom and tradition enables workers to exercise some control over the labour process (8).

This aspect of labour market segmentation is most clearly revealed in the development of internal labour markets in firms in the primary sector (re Mace's reference above to the "endogenous nature of institutional forces"). Mace describes the development of ILMs as a "mutually beneficial compromise between workers and management" (ibid p52). An illuminating example of the construction of an ILM is provided by Ashton et al:

...company A operated in the Distributive Trades and had traditionally employed large numbers of married women in what was routine, undifferentiated clerical work. Supervision
was carried out by a small, predominantly male, management team. Partly because the work was routine and there were few prospects for advancement, the company suffered from a high rate of labour turnover. In order to combat this problem, all jobs were evaluated in terms of the skills involved and a grading system was introduced, locating each job in one of six grades, leading from clerical trainee to junior management. This produced a line of progression for those entering the company at the bottom level, leading to some of the highest positions in the organisation.

(Ashton et al op cit p20)

The authors report that provision was made for training at each level and that all vacancies were advertised internally. The system was created in conjunction with the unions which represented 85% of the workers. This new organisation significantly changed the opportunity structure, particularly for young women (generally without educational qualifications) who tended to replace the older ones.

Internal labour markets institutionalised informal regulation. Customary practices come to control features such as promotion and responses to changed market conditions for the commodity. They have important implications as far as formal educational qualifications are concerned:

1. entry points are limited, usually grouped towards the bottom and top ends of the structure.

2. promotion is regulated by internal practices and this can involve movement within "job clusters" (see Mace op cit p56) in which individuals may be in positions which bear little relationship to their formal qualifications.

3. internal training programmes become particularly significant and aim at developing the specificity of skills to the organisation rather than their transferability.
These factors tend to break down strong links between qualifications and jobs – even in the case of a technical industry such as engineering which Mace studied.

Most significantly, in the present context, internal labour markets represent the social regulation of the occupational structure. ILM theory presents the structure of the firm as a social construct, as the result of a complex collaborative exercise or negotiation between workers and managers and groups within each camp. We can see industrial systems not merely as the phenomena of market forces but as structures whose organising principles will be as much symbolic as economic. Routh says that,

So it is that, within the employing organisations, where the decisions are made, we at last witness the assertion of sentiments and beliefs, hopes and convictions, of what is right and proper, just and fair, with the meting out of some sort of rough justice.
(Routh op cit p219)

Ashton et al developed an index of labour market segmentation by comparing the number of firms promoting internally with those drawing upon the open market – where both methods were employed they characterised the situation as a "joint market". They found a high degree of variation between the regions in their study and between sectors. In response to this they developed the concept of "labour market segments":

... in the labour market there is considerable movement between firms in certain types of industries, whereas in other firms and industries the movement is more likely to take place within the internal labour market. One closer examination we found that labour mobility tended to be confined either to firms within a single industry or group of industries, or to certain types of occupations within firms. This we refer to as labour-market
segment. These market segments could sometimes stretch across a whole range of industrial orders, as in the case of secretarial and clerical work, where the same skills would be required in both the service of manufacturing sectors. In other areas such as the engineering industry, the skills required for the more highly skilled manual work were industry specific. (Ashton et al. op cit p24)

They concluded that skill was a major factor determining the boundaries of labour market segments, and, like Blackburn and Mann found a rigid sexual segregation in manual labour.

The labour market segments discovered by Ashton et al correspond to the income distributions described by Thatcher. Their features can be summarised as follows:

(1) **manual men**: segments tend to be specific to those industries requiring certain skills, e.g. electrical and mechanical engineering, shipbuilding and aero-space. For groups such as maintenance workers the segment stretched across industrial orders, but for workers in the gas industry it was restricted to a single organisation. In the latter case there was an internal labour market, but elsewhere joint markets operated.

(2) **non-manual men**: a "fairly rigid" sexual differentiation was found at the higher levels of employment with men tending to be recruited as trainee managers in banking, insurance and the building societies. Internal labour markets predominated.

(3) **manual women**: women were confined to distinct areas. They were primarily found in jobs demanding 'dexterity', e.g. machinists in the textile industry, packers in the food industry. Jobs were semi-skilled and, interestingly, employers were favourably disposed to the women moving between firms.
as an antidote to the boredom of the work.

(4) non-manual women: only in the professions and in public administration did men and women tend to compete directly. Elsewhere women tended to occupy routine (as opposed to career) clerical jobs.

(5) young people: in this case there are different patterns of entry for young people into the segments described above. They argue that young people tend to get 'locked' into these segments.

Ashton et al describe their view of the labour market as "a series of hierarchically ordered market segments". These segments correspond to the divisions described by Thatcher in income distribution data. It is important to remember that they are not only hierarchically ordered relative to each other, but internally as well. Lane refers to his approach to educational choice as involving the view of "a mechanism whereby structural attributes, mediated through cognitive processes affects individual patterns of behaviour." (Lane op cit p264). Boudon's concept of the educational decision field can be related to this developed account of 'income career' superimposed over the system of labour market segments. I will now turn to the topic of cognitive processes.

Cognitive Maps

Lane relates the concept of 'income career' to that of 'cognitive maps' - the characteristics of the income career provide the experiential basis for images of society and corresponding value systems and orientations. He stresses that these cognitive phenomena should be seen as "distillations of
(peoples') experience of society". They are essentially cultural pheno-
mena. D. Davies has proposed that

....culture is a structuring and transformative process.
The historian, E. P. Thompson, has referred to this notion
of culture as an '...active process through which men make
their history...' (Thompson 1961, p33). Our focus will
be on forms of popular and working class cultures, which it
will be argued have a dual quality - they are processes of
active transformation and adaptation of the social and his-
torical structure and yet at the same time are the (partial)
means whereby that social structure is preserved and main-
tained. Culture, then, refers paradoxically to conservative
adaptation and lived subordination of classes to other classes
and to opposition, resistance and creative struggle for change.
(Davies D. 1981 p60)

It is the idea of the 'paradoxical' quality of culture which is significant
here. Davies' concept is clearly similar to Willis' and he points to the
fact that "The Lads actively choose their mode of failure." As the earlier
discussion of positioning theory argued, it is resistance itself, the counter
cultural strategies of the Lads and the insight upon which they are based (the
partial penetrations) which end up locating such pupils in working class jobs.
The pupils, not the schools, do the real work of cultural reproduction.

The transposition of class relationships into symbolic relationships
and their expression in human action is not a process of simple transmission.
Early work on class images of society tended to concentrate on relatively homo-
genous occupational communities (with a strong integration between work and
leisure activities) and on dichotomous models of class imagery. Davies
writes that "Class relations become transposed into symbolic relations at
the level of culture...."(ibid p92). Bulmer has related the problems of
class imagery to the wider problems of culture:

Indeed, the problems associated with the nature of imagery are generalisable to the study of culture more generally. The variety, diffuseness and lack of precision evident in the study of imagery does not mean that the investigation of the social sources of their variation is misconceived. Rather it underlines the point that subjective aspects of social action and social relations are by definition idiosyncratic, particularistic and relatively formless. One does not therefore abandon the sociological study of culture, however. For the central question remains: what is the relationship between structure and culture, between the relatively exact indicators of structural position in society and the diffuse or elusive meanings and interpretations which men hold about their own society? (Bulmer M. 1975 p165)

Coxon and Jones mention the influence of Bott's work on this tradition of research, and they say that "Her conjecture that the content of an individual's belief system gives information from which the structure of that system may be deduced, runs through the work of Lockwood and the Affluent Worker group, and has also influenced more recent research (Bulmer 1975)" (Coxon and Jones 1978 p22). Formulated in this fashion, this approach is clearly consonant with that being advocated in this work (compare to Harre's "modal transform" discussed in chapter 3).

Bulmer suggests, cautiously, that "In relating images to social structure the most immediately realisable aim is to show congruences between particular social characteristics and particular types of imagery, rather than to demonstrate necessary causal relationships between the one and the other." (Bulmer op cit p6). Bulmer's remark implicitly raises issues of a fundamental epistemological nature - what should be understood by "necessary causal relationships"? The view advanced in this work is that causality should be understood
in terms of **structural causality** rather than in terms of the constant

conjunctions of empiricist variable analysis. The contrast that Bulmer
draws between "the relatively exact indicators of structural position in
society and the diffuse or elusive meanings and interpretations which men
hold" is best intelligible in terms of a conceptualisation of the complex

transformations which take place within systems of relationships, the con-

tents of which assume their specific meanings, powers and values, not by

virtue of essential attributes, but through the relational properties of the

system. The quality of diffuseness and elusiveness which Bulmer refers to

results not from some irreducible contingency in human action which must in-

evitably elude the formalisms of sociological analysis but from the failure of

that analysis to grasp the generative principles whereby class relations become

transposed into symbolic relations at the level of culture.

Despite Bulmer's contrast between the exactness of the social-structure side of the coin and the diffuseness on the symbolic meaning side, structuralist analysis (e.g. of myth) gives, at least the appearance of formidable precision. It is useful to relate the comments above to Mary Douglas' criticism of Levi-Strauss:

His analysis of symbolism lacks an essential ingredient. It has no hypothesis. Its predictions are impregnable, utterly irrefutable. Given the materials for analysis (any limited cultural field), given the techniques of analysis (selection of pairs of contrasted elements) - there is no possibility of an analyst going forth to display the structures underlying symbolic behaviour and coming home discountenanced. He will succeed, because he takes with him a tool designed for revealing structures and because the general hypothesis only requires him to reveal them. He is not asked to correlate particular kinds of structures with predicted social variables.... To be useful, the structural
analysis of symbols has somehow to be related to a hypothesis about role structure.
(Douglas M. 1970 pp66-7)

The criticism must stand, although, once again, the issue of correlating structures and social variables raises fundamental questions. Contrasting this with Bulmer's remarks, we can say that the real problem is not the failure to talk about either social structure or symbolic structure with rigour and precision, but to talk about both together - to reconstitute their real unity.

The previous two sections traced movements from relatively simple to more complex formulations of their topics - from income careers to the distributions identified by Thatcher, and from dual labour markets to the "segments" described by Ashton et al. Although the two research traditions drawn upon do not invariably cross reference each other, it was found that Thatcher's distributions and Ashton's segments coincided. We can plausibly suggest that they map, along different gradients, complex and distinctive social structural formations which can be treated as the locations of Boudon's "educational decision fields". Following through the implications of Lane's argument that income careers provide the experiential basis for class imagery and cognitive maps of society, this section concludes with an approach to those issues which, in a similar fashion, provides a far more complex conceptu- lisation than the classic definitions of homogeneous occupational communities and dichotomous class images. In the book indicatively entitled "Beyond Class Image", H. Davies argues that "...a simple division between 'factors' affecting consciousness at work and outside work cannot be made without distorting the
relationship between these two spheres." (Davis H. 1979 p186). He says:

It is more a question of showing how, according to the circumstances, social relationships can furnish the elements not only of identity but of opposition and totality awareness which have equal weight in the movement of society. The focus of attention is then on the 'historical subject' or the system of historical action and the community ceases to be only the conservative, retarding force which it sometimes is, but one part of a system of social action which is effective in the production of society as well as the reproduction of its past states.

(ibid p187)

Davis' view of the contradictory character of the community is similar to that expressed by Davies in his approach to culture.

Davis advocates a "generative" approach to the study of class imagery which is close to that proposed in this work:

An alternative to the typological approach, and the one adopted here, is to look for the underlying rules used in the structuring (and also the re-telling) of social experience. The notion of 'generative processes' which is familiar to students of language and grammar has relevance in this context. Using the word 'generative' in a mathematical sense, a set of rules that recursively define an infinite set of objects may be said to 'generate' this set. With regard to language, therefore, the grammar can be said to constitute the rules for the generation of the sentences of the language. The grammar is a system of rules which allows the elements of the language to be combined in an acceptable way and which also provides a structural description of the resulting sentences. By analogy, there are generative rules by which the extreme complexity of social reality can be reduced to acceptable forms in human thought.

(ibid p56)

The cultural logic of the educational decision field must be related to the wider system of meaning in which their agents are located and through which they realise their lives in 'acceptable forms'.

- 463 -
Before we proceed to the next section I will retrace the argument so far. This section began with the problem of defining the social structural location of the educational decision field. The idea of the "educational decision field" as a secondary effect of social stratification was located within a culturalist perspective. Educational decision making was related to wider cultural themes to do with identity and membership, work and social careers. Lane's theory was taken as a starting point, following the suggestion by Tyler that it can be usefully related to Boudon's concept. Firstly the concept of income career was developed through an examination of data and work on income distributions. It was found that a number of distinctive distributions can be identified within the labour market. Secondly labour market theory was examined and found to lead to a similar set of structures, or labour market "segments". Thirdly the tradition of research into cognitive maps and class images of society relative to "occupational communities" was briefly discussed and a 'generative' approach to the topic considered. Although these three distinct traditions of research cannot at every point be exactly correlated, the first two in particular can be 'superimposed' one over the other with a marked degree of correspondence to suggest the existence of complex and distinctive formations located within the broad social organisation of the occupational structure.

It is important to note that these formations are themselves internally structured. It is not simply a matter of a vertical stratification hierarchy. Labour market segments incorporate a wide range of jobs which vary both in terms of income levels and by symbolic and value criteria. Hence, workers
within the same segment cannot be assumed to hold similar values and orientations, or to undergo the same types of experiences simply by virtue of being in the same segment. The material cultures, which pupils bring with them into the school, will be variegated and contradictory - consider the case of manual men who choose to work out of doors with little direct supervision but relatively low wages with that of assembly line workers, or women in routine clerical jobs and those in teaching or public administration. The range of material cultural experiences within segments will be associated with differing orientations towards schooling and will constitute the experiential bases of pupils' attitudes and behaviour. Lastly, it must be emphasised that the manner in which schooling is interposed between the home and the world of work and the degree to which it interrupts or facilitates the coherent development of a social career is not fixed but changes continually through time, and these changes are continuously revalorising the system of relationships.

THE WORLD OF GOODS

Implicit in the culturalist perspective advocated in the preceding section is the view that the primary processes of cultural reproduction are to be found not in specific "apparatuses" working directly upon the consciousness of individuals, but rather in the material practices and experiences of 'everyday life' which precede involvement in or subjection to the practices institutionalised within those apparatuses. It is the pupils not the school who do the work of reproduction. The Lads 'choose' their mode of failure not
because of anything the school actual does but because of what it is and they already are. In capitalist society workers are not made workers by a lengthy and protracted process of ideological manipu-
lation and nurturing - they are workers from the very beginning. It is not that the existence of capitalist production necessitates the ideolo-
gical construction of workers, but rather that the existence of workers is the precondition for capitalist production (what precisely these pre-
conditions entail will be considered in detail later). Marx says:

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the indivi-
duals. Rather it is a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are.
(Marx K. 1970 p42)

The social relations of production produce, or find expression in, a "definite mode of life". Such "modes of life" are associated with social relationships in production, but these social relationships must not be confused with the social relations of production as such nor the latter reduced to the former.

The material cultures through which these modes of life find expression, though crucially associated with and interpenetrating with social relationships in production, are located within a wider social division of labour. The culturalist perspective implies a switch away from a preoccupation with production to a con-
cern with the material cultural experiences associated with consumption. But the field of consumption should not be approached simply from a 'social inequality' point of view. As Rainwater argues:

Money buys membership in industrial society....Thus money
does not just buy food and clothing and housing and appliances, cars and children and vacations. The purchase of all these commodities, in turn, allows the achievement and day-to-day living out of an identity as an at least "average American or average Briton or average Italian or average Japanese". When people are not protected from this inexorable dynamic of money economies by some local enclave they cannot fail to define themselves most basically in terms of their access to all that money can buy.

(Rainwater L. 1974 Preface)

Rainwater develops the relationship between consumption, identity and membership through the idea of "validating activities": "that is, activities that confirm a person's sense of himself as a full and recognised member of his society......" (ibid p17).

This approach to the sociology of consumption is valuable because it treats consumption as a process rather than simply records inequalities in levels of consumption. It also involves a view of these processes as socially constructed and encapsulates the dialectic between externality and interiority. "Well-being", Rainwater says, "arises from activities that yield membership." (ibid p34). This idea is related to Goffman's "virtual social identity" and to the concept of social career:

The discussion...emphasises the importance of identity at any one time but also of identity through time. One's own sense of identity involves a conception of a likely life course (or of alternative life courses with subjective probabilities attached to each possible development). And just as the actual social identities of individuals are matched against virtual social identities that represent society's conception of who its members are, the actual life careers of individuals are paralleled by the virtual life careers that members of the society carry around in their heads to summarise their understandings of how members of their society progress through life.

(ibid p35)

This way of relating consumption (as a "validating activity"), identity and
social career can be referred back to the earlier discussion of "the ideal worker" and what Blackburn and Mann call "the life-cycle squeeze".

A somewhat similar approach to commodities has been developed by Douglas and Isherwood who, echoing Levi-Strauss' interpretation of the role of totemic emblems, argue that "the essential function of consumption is its capacity to make sense - 'commodities are good for thinking'" (Douglas & Isherwood 1980 p62). They suggest that,

Instead of supposing that goods are primarily needed for subsistence plus competitive display, let us assume that they are needed for making visible and stable the categories of culture. It is standard ethnographic practice to assume that all material possessions carry social meanings and to concentrate a main part of cultural analysis upon their use as communicators. (ibid p59)

What is important, from this point of view, is not simply degrees of material inequalities between groups but the system of relationships through which that inequality is symbolically expressed. "The world of goods" displays, realises and reproduces through its material practices ("validating activities") the social division of labour. The dynamic quality of production in advanced consumer societies necessitates that it is the principle of the system of relationships in the social division of labour that is reproduced, not simply material inequality.

The symbolic significance of work and the material cultural practices which prepare and orientate people towards 'the world of work' are intelligible in terms of and grounded within a wider social division of labour. As Wootton has pointed out, the conventional divisions of the occupational structure, "salaried and wage earning", "professional", "clerical", "manual", etc., are essentially social rather than narrowly economic: "They do not, of themselves
tell us anything about what people are paid; but they do indicate standing, and they have a marked hierarchical flavour." (Wootton B. 1962 p39).

She argues that:

Nearly all the features of the wage and salary structure... which are anomalies from the angle of economic theory become intelligible in a broader frame of reference. It is the social factors which are missed in the economist's interpretation; and what is anomalous to the economist may make perfectly good sense to the sociologist. In a hierarchical society such as ours, large issues of social status are involved in wage and salary scales. Pay and prestige are closely linked... (ibid p68)

She gives the following examples:

Occasionally these conventions are explicitly acknowledged, and the cost of living is frankly defined as the cost of maintaining an appropriate social position. As the spokesman of once set of claimants put it, 'No matter what way of life one has to live, one gets used to that way of life.' In another case a wage advance was asked for - in order to enable the recipients 'to dress in a manner befitting their vocation.' The terms of reference of the Spens Committee, which was appointed to make recommendations as to the renumeration of the various branches of the medical and dental professions, included an instruction to have 'due regard to... the desirability of maintaining the proper social and economic status of the professions concerned; and in the public discussion of the Government's proposal early in 1953 to increase the salaries of Her Majesty's judges, the same argument was freely used.

(ibid pl28)

In his authoritative survey of occupation and pay, Routh argues that this complex interpenetration of economic and social dimensions can be related back to the Scholastic doctrine of the Just Wage. Historians such as E.P. Thompson have recorded the struggles around the principles of the "moral economy" in the last century and writers on contemporary industrial relations give full recognition to the role of "custom and tradition" in governing wage
differentials and work practices. Wootton says that "In order, therefore, fully to understand the forces that shape our wage structure, account must be taken of the human processes by which wage and salary rates are actually determined." (Wootton op cit p70). Routh argues that,

Pay is determined not by economic laws, but by what people regard as fitting and right. Hence for long periods, the pay of different occupations in different industries will move roughly in step. It is a very ragged army, but one that goes marching along in some sort of formation.

(Routh G. 1980b p9)

This "formation", and the social forces behind it, can be related to Runciman's classic sociological study of the experience of relative deprivation and social inequality (9). Phelps-Brown provides the remarkable case of the income differential between craftsmen and labourers in the building trade which has been maintained at 3 to 2 to five hundred years! (10) In an important commentary on volume three of Capital, Engels (11) describes how the traditional value relationships of Feudal societies are translated into capitalist commodity values.

The symbolic organisation of social space and the transposition of class relationships into material cultural forms (crucially focussed in virtual social identities and life careers) involves the morphogenetic (i.e. "form generating") effectivity of specific cultural fields. Bourdieu writes of the "intellectual field" as follows:

The intellectual field, which cannot be reduced to a simple aggregate of isolated agents or to the sum of elements merely juxtaposed, is, like a magnetic field, made up of a system of power lines. In other words, the constituting agents or systems of agents may be described as so many forces which, by their existence, opposition or combination, determines its specific
structure at a given moment in time. In return, each of these is defined by its particular position within this field from which it derives positional properties which cannot be assimilated to intrinsic properties.

(Bourdieu P. 1971 p161)

In their studies of perceptions of occupational prestige, Coxon and Jones found a tendency to organise the social space according to a number of dimensions or axes.

The first dimension, though multifaceted, may be labelled 'Educational Qualifications', but subsumes properties such as work conditions, extent of training, income and status, and contrasts such as professional/manual. The second dimension, labelled 'Service Orientation', reflects the people v. data-and-things contrast, and the third dimension serves to differentiate the Carpenter and Machine Tool Operator from the other manual jobs, leading to its labelling as a 'Trades' or 'Skill' dimension.

(Coxon & Jones 1978 p113)

As their work shows, people treat these organising principles as the basis for a wide range of information about the type of person doing jobs as well about the jobs themselves. They represent the dimensions as follows:

Fig. 8:4

Quadrant A includes groups such as clergy and teachers, B qualified actuaries and accountants, C ambulance drivers and policemen, and D engineers, joiners and fitters.

( Ibid p67)
These dimensions may be treated, at least putatively, as the morphogenetic principles which regulate the reproduction of the social division of labour under conditions where its material contents (e.g. in techniques of production, consumption goods) are being continually developed and supplanted. Coxon and Jones discuss a "generative" approach to the formation and transformation of cognitive maps:

A generative interpretation of the relationships between the actors' cognitive maps is to say that they are produced from a single, common basis, called the 'objective system'. This 'deep structure' is thought of as generating the individual maps by means of a further set of 'transformational rules' which takes one map into another. (ibid p79)

Morphogenetic cultural fields provide the unifying principles of sets of practices and relationships located in various systems, e.g. in production, in education, in the family, and regulate their transformations through time.

Where consumption is taken in its broadest sense (as involving the 'consumption' of culture, education, leisure, as well as 'goods') and in its deepest sense (as bestowing and developing identity and membership) its principles, the manner in which it makes "visible and stable the categories of culture", constitute distinctive 'ways of life'. Bourdieu says that,

Because life-styles are essentially distinctive, a number of features only take on their full significance when they are brought into relation not only with the social positions they express but also with features appearing at an opposite pole of this space. (Bourdieu P. 1980 p259)
Bourdieu's complex analysis of life-styles represents a concerted attempt to integrate within a complex structural model the dimensions, principles and material forms of "the world of goods". It locates the social relationships in production within a wider system of relationships which together constitute the social division of labour in society.

The final section of this chapter will relate the preceding discussion to a more theoretical consideration of the distinction between the social relations of production, and social relationships in production.

THE SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

I argued in chapter two that Althusser is mistaken in separating the "material conditions of the existence of labour power" from what he calls "the competence of labour power". It is this separation which grounds the selection of social relationships in production as the site towards which educational ideological practices are directed. I suggested that Althusser confuses the material conditions for the existence of labour power with the factors determining the value of labour power. The effect of this is to make a basic separation between two spheres: those of production and distribution. A move of this type underlies all the radical approaches discussed in the earlier chapters. It places a restriction upon the concept social relations of production, which comes to be understood simply in terms of social relationships in production. This is effectively to concentrate on the character of the labour process at the expense of the implications of the logic of the valorisation process. The process of production, Marx says, is "the immediate unity of

To ignore this is to ignore the most fundamental aspect of Marx's theory: capital is a totality not a moment. Clarke argues that,

The essential point is not simply that production is determinant within the circuit of capital (although it is true that in some senses production is so determinant), it is that the whole circuit is the circuit of capital, of value in motion, the fetishised form of alienated labour, and so is premised on the class relation between labour and capital. Thus production and circulation are not independent spheres between which relations of dependence or interdependence can subsequently be established, they are differentiated moments of the circuit of capital which is itself a totality. They are, specifically, differentiated forms of the social relations between capital and labour. The circuit of capital is not a structure but a process.

(Clarke S. 1980 pp8-9)

The social relations of production constitute the material conditions of the existence of labour power. Labour power, Marx says, is a "capacity of the living individual", and, as such presupposes the existence of the individual. But, for Marx, human existence can never be anything other than social existence. Hence, to speak meaningfully of the material conditions of the existence of labour power is to specify their social form: the preconditions given by the social relations of the mode of production and the concrete "mode of life" through which they are realised. In its specifically capitalist form these material conditions (the preconditions for capitalist production as such) are those under which labour power becomes a commodity with a value to be realised through exchange. The most fundamental condition is the separation of the worker from the means of production which necessitates the sale of labour power as the means of acquiring the
the means of subsistence. On this basis the worker is involved in production not for its own sake (as the exercise and development of creative capacities) nor, directly, for the sake of the product, but in order to realise the exchange value of his/her labour power. Marx says:

Thus when we look at the process of capitalist production as a whole and not merely at the immediate production of commodities, we find that although the sale and purchase of labour power (which itself conditions the transformation of a part of the capital into variable capital) is entirely separate from the immediate production process, and indeed precedes it, it yet forms the absolute foundation of capitalist production and is an integral moment within it. Material wealth transforms itself into capital simply and solely because the worker sells his labour power in order to live. The articles which are the material conditions of labour, i.e. the means of subsistence, both become capital only because of the phenomenon of wage-labour. Capital is not a thing, any more than money is a thing. In capital, as in money, certain specific relations of production between people appear as relations of things to people, or else certain social relations appear as the natural properties of things in society. With a class dependent on wages, the moment individuals confront each other as free persons, there can be no production of surplus value; without the production of surplus value there can be no capitalist production, and hence no capital and no capitalist! Capital and wage labour...only express two aspects of the self-same relationship.

(Marx op cit pp1005-6)

From the point of view of "capitalist production as a whole", the separation of the worker from the means of production constitutes the principle for an entire "mode of life". Clarke says that,

Moreover the dispossession of the labourer is not only the basis of the worker's entire social existence, and so the basis on which workers enter not only production and circulation, but also engage in leisure activities, enter political relationships, and conceptualise their relationships with the
social and natural conditions of their existence. Dispossession is thus a total social experience, an experience not only of exploitation, but also of social, political and even natural domination. The crucial feature of the capital-labour relation is not that it is defined in production, but that it is prior to both production and circulation as the social precondition for human existence within a capitalist society.

(Clarke S. op cit pp10-11)

It is the capital relation, understood in this extended sense, that is transposed into the cultural forms explored elsewhere in this work. Those cultural forms are the capital relation realised experientially in the everyday lives of the people.

The dispossession of the labourer becomes the basis of an entire social existence because under these conditions labour power becomes a commodity and, as such, has a value to be realised through exchange - through wage labour. What the worker obtains from this exchange, Marx says, is "a means of subsistence, objects for the preservation of his life, the satisfaction of his needs in general, physical, social etc." (Marx K. 1973 p284). But these needs are not given in any absolute sense. They are socially developed. Marx says that, "In contrast, therefore, with the case of other commodities, the determination of the value of labour power contains a historical and moral element." (Marx K. 1976 p275), and, elsewhere that "...it is quite immaterial whether a product such as tobacco, for example, is from the physiological point of view a necessary means of consumption or not; it suffices that it is such a means of consumption by custom." (Marx K. 1978 p479)

The value of labour power, through the mediation of commodities,
corresponds to a system of historically developed needs (12). Ollman describes this situation thus:

Articles of consumption... have power over their producers by virtue of the desires which they create. Marx understood how a product could precede the need that people feel for it, how it could actually create this need.... In this situation, the very character of man is at the mercy of his products, of what they make him want and become in order to get what he wants....

Besides manipulating people's needs, the form given to articles of consumption helps determine the prevailing mode of consumption. Every product carries with it a whole set of accepted usages. Taken together they constitute the greater part of what is meant by the way of life of a people.

(Ollman B. 1971 p.147, my emphasis)

The development of the system of needs is an intrinsic feature of the logic of the development of the capitalist mode of production:

Capital's ceaseless striving towards the general form of wealth drives labour beyond the limits of its natural paltriness (Naturbedürftigkeit), and thus creates the material elements for the development of the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared; because a historically created need has taken the place of the natural one.

(Marx K. 1973 pp324-325)

The value of workers' labour power is represented in a "certain quantity of the means of subsistence", but these "means of life" must be understood in terms of a "way of life" - "a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part."

There are three important points that need to be emphasised here:

(1) value, understood in this way, must be seen not simply as an 'economic'
category but as an ontological category. "Means of life" correlate with systems of need and, as such, are constitutive of the Self, or, more precisely, of specific categories of subject.

(2) labour power in its material, social forms is expressed not in specific forms of concrete labour, but as categories of subjects within the social division of labour. The value of labour power is given prior to involvement in immediate production itself. What the capitalist buys is not labour but the right to dispose of labour power - essentially the socially developed capacities of individuals - but precisely how he uses those capacities is irrelevant to their value.

(3) the system of needs is historically developing and, therefore, what is reproduced is not a set of levels but a system of social relationships - the principles of the social division of labour reflected in the symbolic codes of 'the world of goods' and interiorised in the system of needs. As Levi-Strauss has said, "Goods are not only economic commodities, but vehicles and instruments for realities of another order.... (Levi-Strauss C. 1969 p54).

When we consider "the process of capitalist production as a whole" and not "merely...the immediate production of commodities", we see that the social relations of production are the relations of the production of the social - modes of life realised within definite material cultures. When, on this basis, we separate the social relations of production from social relationships in production we see that the latter are open to a range of possible variations, in just the way that the differentiation of pedagogies explored in previous chapters shows that the social relationships in education are variable.
according to certain rules and subject to given conjunctural conditions.

The implication of this for sociological analysis is that there is no justifi-
cation for imputing a unique role for any given set of social relationships
in serving particular class interest. Within each of the major systems
making up the social formation (e.g. in the family, in education, in pro-
duction) a range of possible forms of social relationships can be realised.

It is also the case that contradictions can develop in the relationships
between systems, e.g. between modalities of control in the family, in edu-
cation, and in production. Such contradictions do not, however, necessarily
operate in a simple fashion. For instance: when the orientation of working
class girls towards secretarial and clerical type work is combined with the
introduction of new technologies in office work and the development of courses
in the schools to teach the associated skills, then such girls may actually ex-
perience an expansion of opportunities. On the other hand, the orientation
of their male peers towards traditional skilled work under conditions where
those skills are becoming technically outmoded and the apprenticeship system
is collapsing creates a situation where opportunities, and in particular the
opportunity to fulfil a particular received class/gender identity, are declining.

Although from the perspective of middle class feminist intellectuals, the
former situation can be interpreted as a new form of patriarchal control (by
a certain category of middle class men), from the point of view of working
class women it can represent a positive development in their life chances and
in the possibilities of their relationships with working class men (especially
given the condition of their male peers). The contradictory movements of
the technologies associated with the occupational sectors to which the
groups aspire, and the manner in which schooling can intersect those
movements (e.g. by developing 'progressive' courses in new office
skills, associated with a developing technology, for girls, but only
social and life skills training for boys), can radically revalorise relation-
ships in each system. Schooling of a certain type may come to be seen
(quite objectively) as offering real opportunities to some girls, whilst for
their male peers, schooling as such becomes increasingly irrelevant.
At the same time the increasing subordination of female routine clerical
workers to (mainly) male career clerical workers, because associated with
an expansion of opportunities in education and the labour market, can corre-
late with decreasing subordination to men in their own families. From this
point of view, social relationships within systems, and the relationships be-
tween systems are in a constant state of complex and overdetermined trans-
formation and development.

Marx's emphasis on the revolutionary character of capital's develop-
ment indicates that such a mode of production cannot depend for its reproduction
upon the maintenance of a specific articulation between given sets of relations-
ships or practices. MacDonald's view that "The impression we have to keep
is of the dynamics of class and gender relations through the development of
capitalism..." can only be effectively realised when a clear separation is
made between the social relations of production and sets of social relationships
within specific systems, including those in the occupational system. Funda-
mentally what this separation achieves is the possibility of grasping systems
precisely as systems and treating relationships within them as sets of possibilities realised through the generative principles of the systems under given conjunctural conditions.

Systems must be understood as, to borrow a somewhat controversial term from the natural sciences, "morphogenetic". That is, form generating or form constituting. Morphogenetic fields are further to be understood as probability structures. The principle of the field (defined in chapter three as the doxa) regulates the realisation of its possibilities. The reproduction of the social totality depends not upon the maintenance of correspondence between sets of relationships within systems, but upon the delimitation of possibilities within morphogenetic fields. In chapter three Bhaskar is quoted as saying:

Society may thus be conceived as an articulated ensemble of such relatively independent and enduring generative structures— that is, as a complex totality subject to change both in its components and their interrelations. (Bhaskar 1979 p48)

These generative structures can now be seen as morphogenetic fields materially realised as systems of social relationships, the forms of which are modulated by the generative principles of the field in interaction with the overdetermined conjunctural state of the totality and subject to the ultimate constraint ("in the last instance") of the morphogenetic principle of the social relations of production (relations of production of the social).

I will now formalise the preceding argument.

(1) We must distinguish between the social relations of production, i.e. the general conditions upon which the immediate production of commodities, in its
specific social form, is predicated, and social relationships in production.

(2) Social relations of production are essentially the relations of production of the social ("the production of the social relations of...life").

(3) In their specifically capitalist form, the social relations of production involve the following:

a) the separation of the worker from the means of production.

b) production for exchange.

c) value expressed in money not use-values.

d) formal freedom, i.e. the worker legally constituted as the owner of his/her labour power.

(4) Reproduction in society is in the first place the reproduction of these general conditions - of the social relations of production. As such, the social relations of production constitute the material conditions for the existence of labour-power in a specific social form, i.e. as an exchange value. The most fundamental condition is the separation of the worker from the means of production.

(5) At the most general level the means of production (under the general conditions of the social relations of production) produce the system of needs through the production of commodities.

(6) The separation of the worker from the means of production enables the production of the worker (and categories of subjects in general) through the production of systems of need.
(7) The system of needs, represented in its other aspect as a "certain quantity of the means of subsistence", gives the value of labour power.

(8) Value is thus both an ontological category constitutive of the subject, and an index of the subject's position in the social formation. Labour-power translates materially not into concrete forms of labour, but into social categories of subjects. The value of labour power can be treated as an index of both the speciality of the category and the cultural specificity of the subject within the social division of labour.

(9) This positioning is expressed in the manner in which the means of life realise a way of life.

(10) Systems of needs, realised as ways of life constructed within specific morphogenetic fields, translate the world of goods into the social division of labour under the principle of the social relations of production.
NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

(1) associated with the concept of internal labour markets and labour market segmentation is a tradition of research which rejects the neo-classical, marginalist view of the labour market. Gordon D. (1972) gives a critical survey of three paradigms: the orthodox position, the dual labour market position, and a radical position. In relation to the radical view, which is not discussed in detail in this work (very crudely, it sees labour market segmentation as a device by the 'ruling class' to fragment the workers), see Stewart A. et al's discussion on the work of Wright and Perrone (Wright E.O. & Perrone L. 1977). See also Wright E.O. (1979). Although this work is in certain respects highly pertinent to the present study, given its detailed material on education, income and occupation in the US, its central premise (i.e. that education develops 'labour power') is one which I disagree with at a fundamental level of Marxist analysis. As I did not wish to discuss such issues at that depth in this work and as Wright's book appears to have had little impact on the writers covered here, I decided to omit it altogether rather than give it insufficient attention. Wootton's "The Social Foundation of Wage Policy" can be treated as a classic British text which attacks the lack of sociological realism in the neo-classical view (Wootton 1955). See also: Blackburn and Mann (1979), Ashton et al (1982), Atkinson A.B. (1975) and Mace J. (1979) for discussion on various aspects of labour market theory.

(2) on the effects of discrimination in the labour market see Hakim C. (1979) and Phelps-Brown (1977) ch. 5.
(3) radical theorists, such as Althusser (see Althusser, L. 1971), rightly reject the view that technical aspects of production can be treated neutrally and considered separately from social or ideological aspects. The view that this is possible is usually termed "technical functionalism" (see Collins, R. 1977).

(4) the labour queue model can be usefully related to Roberts' opportunity structure model of occupational decision making in the transition to work (see Roberts, K. 1974, 1975).

(5) for a very similar account to that being proposed here, see Hussain, A. (1981).

(6) it is self-elimination, not formal rejection, which is the main factor generating class differentials in educational attainment.

(7) on "the Pareto Function" and for general background on the economic theory of income distribution see (in addition to texts quoted) Pen, J. (1971).

(8) it must be noted that the same type of informal mechanisms are also largely responsible for perpetuating sexual and racial segmentation.

(9) see Runciman, W. G. (1972).

(10) see Phelps-Brown (1977 pp68-69)

(11) see Engels, F. (1956, Section III).

(12) on Marx's theory of need and its place in his general theory see: Heller, A. (1976), Avineri, S. (1968 ch. 3) and Meszaros, L. (1970 ch. vi.).
### REFERENCES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title and Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson A.B.</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>The Economics of Inequality, Oxford University Press, Oxford.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourdieu P.</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>&quot;Intellectual Field and Creative Project&quot; in Young M.F.D. ed. 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourdieu P.</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Media, Culture and Society, vol. 2 no. 3 July 1980 (edition on Bourdieu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarke S.</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>&quot;The Value of Value&quot; in Capital and Class No. 10 Spring 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins R.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational Stratification&quot; in Karabel &amp; Halsey eds. 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title and Year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis H. (1979)</td>
<td>Beyond Class Image, Croom Helm, London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon D.M. (1972)</td>
<td>Theories of Poverty and Underemployment D.C. Heath, Lexington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane M. (1972)</td>
<td>&quot;Explaining Educational Choice&quot; in Sociology vol.6, 1972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 487 -
Lydall H. (1968)  
The Structure of Earnings  
Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Lydall H. (1976)  

MacDonald M. (1981)  
"Schooling and the Reproduction of Class and Gender Relations"  
in Dale R. et al eds. 1971b

Mace J. (1979)  
"Internal Labour Markets for Engineers"  
in Brit. J. of Industrial Relations, March 1979

Marx K. (1973)  
Grundrisse, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth

The German Ideology Lawrence & Wishart, London.

Marx K. (1976)  

Marx K. (1978)  
Capital Vol.2 Penguin Books Harmondsworth

Meszaros I. (1970)  

New Earnings Survey (1980)  
Department of Employment HMSO, London.

Ollman B. (1971)  

Pen J. (1971)  
Income Distribution Allen Lane, London

Phelps-Brown H. (1977)  
The Inequality of Pay, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Rainwater L. (1974)  
What Money Buys Basic Books, New York

Richards G. (1982)  
Work Experience Schemes for Schools - the shape of things to come?  
University of Warwick, (unpublished)

Roberts K. (1974)  
"The Entry into Employment" in  
Williams W. M. ed. 1974


Thurow, L. (1977) "Education and Economic Inequality" in Karabel & Halsey eds. 1977


Willis P. (1977) Learning to Labour, Saxon House, Farnborough


CONCLUSION

I will summarise the arguments developed in this work and discuss some of what I feel to be the more significant implications.

(1) THEORETICAL

In the first section I attempted to locate the debate surrounding the new sociology of education within the framework of a particular "philosophical problem field". Following Baskar, I defined this field as being grounded in the categories of the subject and experience. On this basis I argued that phenomenological sociology and positivism, rather than being fundamentally opposed positions, in fact represented the poles of this field. Phenomenology retains the fundamental categories of the field, but rejects the empiricist account of them and the accompanying theory of knowledge which is represented in positivism. 'Positivism' has come to mean two things: first, positivism 'in the strict sense', which can be seen in terms of a commitment to the deductive-nomological mode of explanation and the associated rejection of holistic models of the social system and of the concept of 'action'; secondly, a model of the human social actor and its relationship to society if the D-N model of explanation is applied to the social world. The former came to be understood as science as such. Hence, 'positivism' was taken as the view that the methods of natural science should be applied to the study of human beings in society. I argued that anti-positivist sociologists were primarily concerned with what they saw as the dehumanising quality of the 'D-N social world' - the reification of the social and a determined, mechanistic
model of the social actor. These features, termed 'objectivism' and 'absolutism', resulted from the attempt to reconcile positivist doctrine (the D-N model of explanation) with a systems level of theory incorporating the concept of action (e.g. in functionalism). Objectivism and absolutism made possible the application of D-N method within an approach which incorporated fundamental concepts which contradicted the central tenets of positivist doctrine.

From this point of view, the new sociology of education occupies an ambivalent position in relation to phenomenology. Although new sociology writers shared the humanist outrage of phenomenologists against the de-humanising effects of 'positivism' and welcomed the critical reflexiveness of the approach, their strong political commitments and their belief that sociological knowledge should be orientated towards social change implied (or in some cases led directly to) a rejection of the political quietism of phenomenological relativism. The new sociology writers consequently required a means whereby they could (a) privilege a particular radical class of interpretations/explanations of educational practices, and (b) view the knowledge associated with those interpretations/explanations as effective (necessary but not sufficient) means towards educational and wider social change (or "transformation"). This requirement was met by taking the relationship between educational practices and social structure as the key issue. This relationship came to be more precisely defined as the relationship between education and production, or, more specifically still, as the relationship between the social relationships
of education and social relationships in production. This position contradicted phenomenology in two major respects: first by privileging a particular point of view (both moral and theoretical), and secondly by treating social structure as an effective ontological category.

The principle of the relationship between education and production came to provide the principle for interpreting and explaining the characteristics of educational practices. I termed this principle "indexicality" in order to accommodate both the earlier "correspondence" type formulations and the later more complex accounts incorporating concepts of relative autonomy and resistance. In the mid-seventies the problem of defining and describing the education/production relationship came to be the basis for the developing convergence between the new sociology of education and various neo-Marxist approaches. The political economy approach provided a systems level of analysis within which ethnographic classroom analyses could be contextualised. However, within the new sociology of education it remained the case that this movement was problematical; contextualising micro analysis within systems level theory invariably resurrected the spectre of structural determinism which the humanist outrage which inspired the phenomenological revolt against positivism had militantly rejected. Hence there was a fundamental problem - phenomenological subjectivism was associated with relativistic nihilism, structural objectivism was associated with deterministic pessimism. I argued that this problem is endemic to the field as such and that the only viable and lasting solution was to transcend the field - to understand the problem as a problem of the field.
Implicit in the search for a solution to the nihilism/pessimism dilemma is the requirement for an alternative, non-positivistic model of science. I argued that the problem of the relationship between positivist and phenomenological sociology can be seen in terms of the problem of the relationship between positivist and conventionalist theories of science. I further argued that in an important sense the phenomenological approach remains wedded to a positivistic model of science - phenomenology argues not for an alternative theory of science, but rather sets out to show how the conditions for science in the positivist sense cannot be met. The real alternative to the positivist model is to be found in the realist theory of science.

The anti-empiricist, realist ontology of real objects (generative mechanisms), in combination with the sociological view of the material dimension of science as practice and production can be taken as providing the framework for a solution to the set of problems associated with the positivistic problem field and phenomenology's place within it. In particular it abolishes the voluntarism/determinism dilemma which forms the interstice between subjectivism/objectivism and nihilism/pessimism, between the forms of the problem at the level of analysis and at the level of action. My contention is that given the ambivalent position occupied by the new sociology of education within the field, as analysed in this work, then the most fruitful line of development is to recontextualise the aims and aspirations of the new sociology of education within a realist epistemology rather than to persist in the ultimately futile task of attempting to reconcile these contradictions within a putative 'correct' appropriation of the education/production relationship.
The central concept within the realist theory is that of "generative mechanism" - the complex, structured objects whose powers, tendencies and liabilities (conjuncturally and overdetermineingly) generate events experienced by human beings at the empirical level. I argued that the model of material 'objects' in this sense was inappropriate to the social sciences and, drawing upon Harre's distinction between "causal" and "modal"transforms, that we should think in terms of generative principles governing the transformations within fields articulated within complex ensembles constituting the social totality and subject to the morphogenetic principle of the mode of production (realising the social relations of production). I explicated the concept of modal transform in terms of Boudon's formula of structuralist analysis and applied this to the educational field through Bernstein's classification and framing theory. On this basis the context of an educational transmission comes to be understood as a context regulating the realisations of competencies possessed by culturally specific categories of subjects. Transmission/realisation is then to be understood in terms of the structuring principle of the transmission matrix, embodied within the transmission code. The code functions as a regulator/reproducer by virtue of its positioning powers vis-à-vis categories of subjects - we can understand the transmission matrix, therefore as a "position-practice system" (Bhaskar).

(2) EDUCATION AND PRODUCTION

The substantive critique of indexicality involved looking in detail at a range of evidence concerning the relationship between the educational system
and production. The indexicality principle entails treating educational processes as processes of identity formation in which characteristics are developed in individuals which are appropriate to their predestined places in the system of production. In this way the characteristics of production (e.g. authority relationships, features of the labour process) provide the principle of intelligibility for educational organisation and practice. I argued that if this was in fact the case we should expect to find (a) that individuals are systematically distributed in the occupational system on the basis of their educational characteristics, and (b) that there is an enduring relationship between educational categories (i.e. career paths through the educational system specific to given social groups and represented in given levels of attainment and certification) and occupational categories (i.e. sets of positions or strata within the occupational system). Although it is the case that a crude correlation between educational level and occupational position exists from the point of view of groups defined in terms of their educational level, groups defined in terms of their occupational position show a considerable degree of variation both in terms of type of qualification held and level of attainment. Both work-life patterns and elasticities of substitution indicate that the specificities of educational qualifications and careers have little bearing on the occupational efficiency or mobility of most categories of workers. Furthermore, the significance accorded to education in employer recruitment strategies varies considerably between labour market segments (and in only a tiny minority of cases does it have priority) and also changes through time.
The lack of an enduring through-time relationship between educational and occupational categories not only undermines the indexicality principle, it also supports the theoretical view that education and the occupational structure should be treated as systems or fields which are governed by their own endogenous principles which realise sets of possibilities under given, overdetermined conjunctural conditions and subject to (transformational) principles of structural causality. The significance of Boudon's simulation model in this respect is that it demonstrates that indexicality is impossible in principle. It is a condition which cannot be realised and is, therefore, implausible as a mechanism of social reproduction. The relationship between the educational system and the occupational structure is crucially mediated by the labour market. The labour market should be seen as an economically and socio-logically complex system. The labour market can be seen as the material cultural nexus between production and community and domestic life.

The complex labour market segments described by Ashton et al and which can be traced along the contours of the distinctive income distributions defined by Thatcher can be seen as forming discrete socio-occupational communities. It is important to recognise that these formations have their own hierarchical features. The phenomenon of variance within groups is of particular significance and reduces considerably the implications of mean differences. The analysis of historical trends in income data suggests that whereas differentials between occupational strata have declined, dispersion within them has increased.
Consequently at any given level of income social composition is becoming increasingly heterogeneous. Theory, therefore has to be able to accommodate a complex conceptualisation of these formations which are not only hierarchical but structured 'in depth' by distinctive value orientations contained within the symbolic representations which they assume within culture: e.g. in manual labour in the distinction between jobs which give high earnings in return for suffering harsh conditions and close supervision and those which give lower earnings but with better conditions (e.g. working out of doors) and low levels of supervision, or in non-manual work between working with things and working for people. A second major set of dimensions which structure the social space and are transposed into symbolic and cultural forms are those to do with the complex of relationships between the state and production. Teachers, for instance, are traditionally employed in a decentralised state agency and have an indirect relationship to production. Trainers in private corporations have an indirect relationship to the state, but a direct relationship to production. MSC personnel have a direct, centralised state relationship but an indirect relationship to production. Within the context of the Youth Training Scheme, these relationships have important implications for the implementation of programmes and are formally presented in the institutional structure of the YTS delivery system (I am now involved in a study of this complex in a research programme at the Polytechnic of the South Bank).

(3) THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD

I have argued that the significance of the education/production relationship for new sociology of education writers lay in large part in the way
in which it provided a principle to guide the analysis and explanation of the specific characteristics of educational practices. Educational practices were seen as processes of identity formation the specificities of which were given by requirements of production. This work has attempted a systematic critique of this view. The rejection of the principle of indexicality is a rejection of that rule of method. I argued that associated with indexicality is a second principle: that of the effectivity of educational practices; that is, the (usually implicit) assumption that educational practices can and do act as processes of identity formation in the prescribed manner. I argued that although it is quite possible in an ad hoc fashion to produce interpretations of educational practices which are consistent with indexicality, more detailed examinations of the evidence cast severe doubts on the assumption of effectivity. First, systematic surveys on different teaching methods do not indicate that any major advantages for particular groups accrue to different approaches, e.g. streaming vs non-streaming. However, it is the case that a more subtle set of variations may be discerned for various groups in certain aspects of scholastic and personal development (the most significant case might be in the teaching of girls, especially in relation to maths and science, where evidence suggests that single sex schools might be advantageous). But these variations do not fall neatly along the conventional divide between what are taken to be 'conservative' and 'progressive' approaches. Secondly, and more significantly, the pronounced, systematic features of educational trend data (most noticeably the narrowing of class differentials in attainment) cannot be accounted for in terms of changes in
educational organisation or approach. Variations in practices might account for differences between schools at given points in time, but they do not seem to account for the significant changes which have occurred through time within the pupil population as a whole.

Associated with the rejection of the principle of effectivity is the rejection of what I termed 'essentialism': i.e. the view that given forms of educational organisation and practice can be unambiguously defined as 'conservative' (serving the interests of 'the ruling class' or 'capital') or 'radical' (serving the interests of the workers, or girls, or ethnic minorities). I argued that educational practices should be analysed in terms of a complex system of structural causality in which instances are grasped through the interaction between principles and properties endogenous to the educational field (subject to its form within the social relations of production) and specific conjunctural conditions. This approach is consistent with the theoretical, realist/structural approach outlined in chapter three and draws both theoretically and substantively upon the works of the three major generative theories in this area: those of Bernstein, Bourdieu and Boudon. I attempted to construct a model within which to locate the analysis of selected educational practices. It can be summarised as follows:

1. A number of pressures (e.g. credential inflation in the labour market, the political demand to expand educational provision) have imposed upon successive generations of pupils the need to acquire extra years of education. (2) Particularly at the lower branching points this leads to critical changes in the social composition of the pupil population.
(3) these changes give rise to problems of classroom control as the requirement to extend the educational career conflicts with the need for certain groups to realise a transition in their social career which crucially involves leaving school and entering 'the world of work'.

(4) schools respond to these control problems by transforming their pedagogies - specifically by changing their modalities of control (the value of framing in the transmission code).

(5) these changes involve alterations both in the social relationships of schooling (shift towards interpersonal as opposed to interpositional pedagogy) and in the boundary strength between school and community knowledge.

(6) these changes are formulated within specific educational ideologies (e.g. social education) which effectively position both pupils and teachers in relation to the school through constructs which provide a deficit model of the pupil (which shows how they need schooling) and which appropriate pupils' real skills and knowledge whilst formally denying them ('relevance').

This model incorporates a complex set of relationships:

(1) the position of culturally specific categories of pupils relative to schooling and production.

(2) the relationship of a group of specialised teachers to (a) the school and traditional pedagogy and authority, (b) the state, and (c) production.

(3) the systemic relationship between education and production which affects the degree to which educational ideologies can be constructed by specialist agencies which have an indirect relationship to production and a high degree of relative autonomy.
(4) changing through-time relationships between social groups, educational career paths and the occupational system. These changes systematically revalorise the symbolic and material values of educational career routes and levels of attainment.

These sets of relationships (systems of relationships and the relationships between them!) constitute a complex network within which groups are positioned according to their own principles of specificity (the classification of the social division of labour) and within which their relationships are continually changing - changing opportunity structures, power relationships (e.g. between groups of men and women) and realisations and constructions of identity.

I argued that positioning is a central (though neglected) aspect of Bernstein's theory. It becomes obvious as such as soon as it is realised that social structure figured in the original formulations of the socio-linguistic thesis not as the point of origin in different forms of socialisation which fix in individuals different types of speech (then understood as different degrees of linguistic competence) but as the regulative context governing performances (and hence presupposing shared competence differentially realised). Positioning within the regulative context of the school crucially involves positioning relative to knowledge (more specifically to "the ultimate mystery of the subject"). Implicit in this is a recognition of the tension within knowledge between its critical facility and the social form (the social division of labour) of its transmission. The social form realises the positional system and, hence, regulates access to the critical possibilities of elaborated knowledge. The social relations
of the transmission of knowledge reproduce the principle of the social division of labour in society (classification) and thereby regulates access to critically elaborating orientations and governs the form in which such orientations may come to be realised (realisation rules) and reproduced. Transformations in the modalities of control invariably involve changes in the principle regulating access to elaborated knowledge and to the practices developing elaborating orientations.

A particularly significant implication of this is that it is the contending (heterodox or 'radical') position within the educational field which does 'the work' of reproduction. This is a position given by the regulative principle of the field. It is a position given by the field and adopted by culturally specific categories of subjects interpellated within the regulative structure of the field. It takes the form of an oppositional restricted code i.e. a symbolically condensed, particularistic cultural (rather than theoretical) form, the practice of which presupposes competent membership of the school community and a deep (though sceptical) understanding of its rule system.

Changes in the modality of control, by changing the principle governing access to elaborating orientations, introduce the possibility of transforming oppositional restricted practices into oppositional elaborated forms. This possibility was the incipient problem of social education. Community and work relationships were taken as the object of study for oppositionally positioned groups of young people within an elaborated knowledge context based in critical social sciences. I attempted to analyse how the social education philosophy functioned as an educational ideology blocking the development of elaborating
orientations. I also attempted to demonstrate how transformations of the classification and framing of relationships between categories of transmitters and acquirers and those formally classed as neither could move towards an oppositional elaborated form. I argued that this possibility was least likely to occur in situations where young people were able to successfully make the transition from school to work - their expectation of realising the social transition into young adulthood which extended schooling postponed negated the critical possibilities opened up by the transformations of the transmission code created by the requirement to contain them within the school situation.

The development of high levels of youth unemployment has fundamentally changed this situation. The transition from school to work which is a crucial moment in the development of the social career of certain groups of young people can no longer be successfully accomplished. Consequently, large numbers of young people are no longer simply critically positioned relative to the school, but relative to society itself. This situation necessitates a radical repositioning of classes of agents involved in educational transmission. I argued that the development of the Manpower Services Commission and the inauguration of the Youth Training Scheme can be seen as involving a shift of power away from educationalists with an indirect relationship to production to a new set of agents with a direct relationship to production. This entails a shift from programmes contextualised within an elaborating educationalist paradigm to programmes contextualised within a restricting technicist-training paradigm. This shift from an indirect to a direct systemic relationship between education ('training') and production breaks the link between
practices (in 'the world of work') and elaborating curricular knowledge. Hence in the first period (from Newsom to the late seventies) we see a process of transformations of modalities of control within an educationalist paradigm, and in the second period (from the late seventies onwards) a radical shift from the educationalist to the technicist-training paradigm - a switch in the relationship of the agents of transmission to production, from an indirect to a direct systemic relationship.

(4) REPRODUCTION

Positioning theory entails that agents are competent members of the school community - pupils who adopt an oppositional position do so on the basis of their deliberate rejection of school values and scepticism towards formal accounts of the way things are and the validity and efficacy of school knowledge. A central component of this approach is the view that identities are constructed within cultural networks centred in the family and extended into wider socio-occupational communities. They are the constructions of ideologies of class, labour, gender and ethnicity, and are realised through the development of social careers. They are not the result of direct ideological imposition through the action of state apparatuses, but the effective accomplishment of hegemony at the level of material cultural practices. Material cultural practices construct virtual assemblages from ever shifting alignments of elements of class and national (working class and popular) culture under the guiding influence of the morphogenetic principle of doxa. These practices (just as much in their heterodox transformations) sustain what Bourdieu terms the "self-evident practicality" of the doxic relation to the
social world. To put it another way: transformations of framing, of modalities of control, realise the set of possibilities delimited by the classification of the social division of labour. The principle of classification is reproduced through the transformation of practices within the ensemble of fields articulated within the social totality. As Bourdieu says in "Outline of a Theory of Practice":

Practical taxonomies, which are a transformed, misrecognisable form of the real divisions of the social order, contribute to the reproduction of that order by producing objectively orchestrated practices adjusted to those divisions. Social time as form, in the musical sense, as succession organised by the application to passing time of the principle which organises all dimensions of practices, tends to fulfil, even more effectively than the division of space, a function of integration in and through division, that is, through hierarchisation.
(Bourdieu P. 1977 p163)

Indexical theories take social relationships in production as the site towards which educational practices, as practices of reproduction, are directed. I argued that this view erroneously conflates two fundamentally different things (or levels): social relationships in production, and the social relations of production. I argued that Marx's view of "capitalist production as a whole" places the social relations of production prior to sets of social relationships within the immediate process of production. The social relations of production are the preconditions for capitalist production as such - the worker is a worker not simply because s/he is involved (at various times) in the production process, but because s/he is always available. This availability reflects the fundamental condition of dispossess on from the means of production and its central dimension is not just availability for production but availability for consumption. The system of production of commodities is simultaneously
the production of the system of needs. The labour theory of value is not only an economic theory of production under capitalism, it is an ontology of human being within that mode of production. The social relations of production are the relations of the production of the social.

The distinction between social relations of production and social relationships in production corresponds to the distinction between classification and framing. The principle of classification (a principle specific to the mode of production) is repeated within the transformations of the framing of social relationships. These transformations are materially achieved through the practices of specific ideologies: ideologies of class, of labour, of gender and ethnicity. These ideologies intersect at the points where subjects are interpellated within the structures of fields whose forms are given by the principle of the mode of production. Hence parallel to the distinction between social relations of production and social relationships in production is the distinction between the form taken by a field under the social relations of production (classification) and the sets of social relationships realised (or realisable) within the field (framing). The significance of the educational system lies not in the relationship between its practices and practices in production, but in the space occupied by its form within the social relations of production.

High levels of youth unemployment, which prevent the achievement of identity as adult worker/consumer, become critical, especially in advanced consumer capitalism, because they open a social space within which alternative cultural forms for the construction of identities might be forged. Identities
are constructed through the process of consumption (understood in the broadest sense). The process of consumption is simultaneously the production of systems of needs and hence of constructions of identity. Individual patterns of consumption are culturally specific interiorisations of the principle of the social division of labour which is realised through that "immense collection of commodities" (Marx) which makes up 'the world of goods'. Consumption is the unifying practice which orchestrates, across the various fields through which people move, the construction of identity. Central to any theory of reproduction should be a semiotics of consumption – as Marx said at the very beginning of Capital: "Our investigation therefore begins with the analysis of the commodity."
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Althusser L. (1971) Lenin and Philosophy


Anthony W. (1979) "Progressive Learning Theories: The Evidence" in
                 Bernbaum G. ed. 1979

Apple M. (1979) Ideology and the Curriculum


                 of Education Vol.3.

Ashton P. (1982) Youth in the Labour Market
                 Dept. of Employment Research Paper 34 HMSO, Manchester.

Atkinson A.B. (1975) The Economics of Inequality
                 Oxford University Press, Oxford.


Avineri S. (1968) The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx

                 Social & Applied Psychology Unit, University of Sheffield.

                 NFER Windsor

Barnes B. (1974) Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory
                 Routledge & Kegan Paul London


Bhaskar R. (1975b) 'Feyerabend and Bachelard: Two Philosophies of Science" New Left Review No. 94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title and Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blaug M.</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td><em>An Introduction to the Economics of Education</em> Penguin Books, Harmondsworth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boudon R.</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>&quot;Social Mobility in Utopia&quot; in Coxon A. &amp; Jones C. eds. 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boudon R.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;Education and Social Mobility: a Structural Model&quot; in Karabel &amp; Halsey 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourdieu P.</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>&quot;Structuralism and a theory of sociological knowledge&quot; in Social Research 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourdieu P.</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>&quot;Intellectual Field and Creative Project&quot; in Young M. F.D. ed. 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourdieu P.</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td><em>Articles in Media, Culture and Society Vol. 2 No. 3 July 1980</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins R. (1977)</td>
<td>&quot;Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational Stratification&quot; in Karabel &amp; Halsey eds. 1977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Publication Year(s)</td>
<td>Book Title/Article Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davies B.</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>In Whose Interest? from Social Education to Social and Life Skills Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis H.</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Beyond Class Image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s) and Year</td>
<td>Title and Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Training (1982)</td>
<td>&quot;Training - the vital factor in economic recovery&quot; January 1982</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Erben M. & Gleeson D. (1977) "Education as Reproduction" in Young M. F.D. and Whitty G. eds. 1977
Esland G. (1971) "Teaching and Learning as the Organisation of Knowledge" in Young M. F.D. ed. 1971
Esland G. et al eds (1975) People and Work Holmes-MacDonald
Executive Post (21.10.83) Published by the Professional and Executive Register (MSC)
Farley M. (1982) "Youth Task Group Report" NATFHE Journal Vol. 7 No. 4, June '82
FEU (1979a) A Basis for Choice HMSO, London
FEU (1979b) Supporting YOP FEU HMSO London
Filmer P. et al (1972)  
New Directions in Sociological Theory  

Finn D. (forthcoming)  
"School children and the World of Work" in  
Clarke J. & Willis P. eds, 1984

Finn D. & Frith S. (1981)  
Education and the Labour Market  
OU Society, Education and the State, Block 1 Unit 4 Open University Press, Milton Keynes.

Flew A. (1976)  
Sociology, Equality and Education  

Flude M. (1974)  
"Sociological Accounts of Differential Educational Attainment" in  

Educability, Schools and Ideology  
Croom Helm, London.

Frith S. (1980a)  

Frith S. (1980b)  
"Who's to Blame" in  
Youth in Society 39

"The New Idealism" in  
Giddens A. ed. 1974

General Household Survey (1980)  
HMSO, London.

General Household Survey (1982)  
HMSO, London.

Positivism and Sociology  
Heinemann, London.

Giedymin J. (1975)  
"Antipositivism in Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science and Humanities" in  
Brit. J. Philosophy of Science No.26 1975

Giglioli P. ed. (1972)  
Language and Social Context  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gorz A</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;Technical Intelligence and the Social Division of Labour&quot; in Young M.F.D. and Whitty G. eds 1977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London

Hand N. (1976) "What is English?" in
Whitty G. & Young M.F.D. eds. 1976

Theories" in
British Journal of Sociology of
Education Vol. 3 No. 2


Harrop M. (1980) "Popular Conceptions of Mobility"
in Sociology Vol. 12 1980


Harvey D. (1973) Social Justice and the City
Arnold, London.

Heath A. (1981) Social Mobility Fontana, Glasgow

Heller A. (1976) The Theory of Need in Marx
Allison & Busby, London.

Hendry & McKenzie H. (1978) "Advantages and Disadvantages of
Raising the School Leaving Age:
the Pupils' Viewpoint" in
Scottish Educational Review 1978
Vol. 10 No. 2

Hesse M. (1980) Revolutions and Reconstructions in
the Philosophy of Science
Harvester Press, Brighton.

in Brit. J. of Sociology Vol. 33 No. 4
Dec. '82

Hirst P. (1974) Knowledge and the Curriculum

Holland G. (1977) Young People and Work (The Holland
Holland G. (1982) Times Higher Education Supplement 2.7.82
Homans G. (1973) "Bringing Men Back In" in Ryan A. ed. 1973
Hooker C.A. (1975) "Philosophy and Meta-Philosophy of Science" in Synthese 32 1975
Inner London Education Authority Guideline to Teachers on Work Experience ILEA, London.
Inner London Education Authority (1982c) Sex Differences and Achievement RS 823 82 ILEA R & S London.
Jencks C. (1975)  
Inequality  

Jessop B. (1977)  
"Recent Theories of the Capitalist State" in Cambridge Journal of Economics Vol. 1

Karabel J. & Halsey A. H. eds (1977)  
Power and Ideology in Education  
Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Keat R. & Urry J. (1975)  
Social Theory as Science  

Keddie N. (1971)  
"Classroom Knowledge" in Young M. F. D. ed. 1971

Kockelmans J. ed (1967)  
Phenomenology  
Anchor, New York.

Kolakowski L. (1972)  
Positivist Philosophy  

Labov W. (1972)  
"The Logic of Non-Standard English" in Giglioli P. ed 1972

Lakatos I. & Musgrave A. eds (1970)  
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge  

Lane M. (1970)  
Structuralism: A Reader  
Jonathan Cape, London.

Lane M. (1972)  
"Explaining Educational Choice" in Sociology Vol. 6 1972

Layard P. et al (1971)  
Qualified Manpower and Economic Performance  
Allen Lane, London.

Leach E. ed (1967)  
The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism  
Tavistock, London.

Leach E. (1976)  
Culture and Communication  

Lecourt D. (1975)  
Marxism and Epistemology  

Lee R. (1980)  
Beyond Coping  
FEU, London.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Editor</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Work Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Levi-Strauss C.</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>&quot;The Story of Asdiwal&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in Leach E. ed. 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levi-Strauss C.</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>The Elementary Structures of Kinship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eyre &amp; Spottiswoode, London.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levi-Strauss C.</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Structural Anthropology Vol. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindley R. ed</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Economic Change and Employment Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little A. &amp; Westergaard J.</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>&quot;The Trend of Class Differentials in Educational Opportunity in England and Wales&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in Brit. J. of Sociology, Vol. 15 No. 4 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;Memorandum on the Great Debate&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in Education and Training May 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lydall H.</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>The Structure of Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oxford University Press, Oxford.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lydall H.</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>&quot;Theories of the Distribution of Earnings&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in Atkinson A.B. ed. 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacDonald M.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Culture, Class and the Curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Open University Press, Milton Keynes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacDonald M.</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>&quot;Schooling and the Reproduction of Class, and Gender Relations&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in Dale R. ed al eds. 1981 vol. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace J.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>&quot;The Shortage of Engineers&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in Higher Education Review Autumn 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace J.</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>&quot;Internal Labour Markets for Engineers&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in Brit J. of Industrial Relations March 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC (undated)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Five Community Service Schemes: a summary of research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Services Commission (1982)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Learning at Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McHugh, P.</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>&quot;On the Failure of Positivism&quot; in Douglas J. ed. 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore R.</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>&quot;The Value of Reproduction&quot; in Screen Education No. 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prateley B.</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Department of Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkin F.</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Middle-Class Radicalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phelps-Brown H.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>The Inequality of Pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popper K.</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Objective Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prateley B.</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Signposts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards G.</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Work Experience Schemes for School Children - the Shape of Things to Come</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson C.J.</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Contemporary Social Mobility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 522 -


Shelton L (1979) "Community Service and the Curriculum" in School and Community 25 Autumn, 1979


Vulliamy G. (1976) "What Counts as School Music?" in Whitty G. & Young M.F.D. eds. 1976

Walsh D. (1972) in Filmer P. et al 1972


West Midlands Economic Planning Council (Quoted in) Frith S. 1980b


Whitty G. (1977) "Sociology and the Problem of Radical Educational Change" in Young M.F.D. and Whitty G. eds 1977

Whitty G. & Young M.F.D. eds (1976) Explorations in the Politics of School Knowledge Nafferton Books, Driffield

Williams W. & Rennie J. (1972) "Social Education" in Rubenstein D. & Stoneman C. eds. 1972


Willis P. (1977) Learning to Labour
Saxon House, Farnborough.

Wilson T.P. (1971) "Normative and Interpretive
Paradigms in Sociology" in
Douglas J. ed. 1971

Woods P. & Hammersley M. eds (1977) School Experience
Croom Helm, London.

Wootton B. (1955) The Social Foundations of Wage
Policy Unwin, London.

Wright E.O. (1979) Class Structure and Income
Determination

Wright E.O. and Perrone L. (1977) "Marxist Class Categories and
Income Inequality" in
American Sociological Review
Vol.42, No.1 1977

Wright N. (1977) Progress in Education
Croom Helm, London.

Young M.F.D. ed. (1971) Knowledge and Control

Young M.F.D. (1976) "Curriculum Change: Limits and
Possibilities" in
Dale R. et al eds. 1976

Ideology and the Politics of
Schooling" in
Brit J. of Sociology of Education
Vol.2 No.2

Young M.F.D. and Whitty G. (1977) Society, State and Schooling
The Falmer Press, Lewes.